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ABSTRACT
LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS-
THE CONTADORA AND ESQUIPULAS II CASES
MAY 1992
MARY KATHRYN MEYER, B.A.
, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA
M.A.
,
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
The purpose of this study is to examine the Contadora and
Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace process of the 1980s
as inter-related case studies that provide important insights into
the interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin
American diplomacy and foreign policy making. By reconstructing and
analyzing the diplomacy of the regional peace process, this study
seeks to understand why it persisted for as long as it did despite
tremendous political obstacles and expectations of failure. This
study shows that the peace process is rooted in the diplomatic
traditions of Latin America, but it emerged and persisted because of
the development of the new interests, capabilities, and diplomatic
innovations of several Latin American states.
To understand the lessons of the Central American peace
process, this work opens with the study of the traditions and
historical development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s
and up to the emergence of political crisis and war in Central
America. Then it focuses on reconstructing the significant phases
and diplomatic events of the Contadora and Esquipulas peace
processes and examines their central documents. Finally, it
analyzes the specific foreign policy interests, capabilities, and
contributions of four states actively involved in the peace process,
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, in order to understand
the nature of contemporary Latin American diplomacy and its import
to both the persistence of the peace process and the future of inter-
American relations.
This study's primary level of analysis is at the inter-regional
level, focusing on Latin American diplomacy, however, factors at the
systemic and societal levels of analysis also receive considerable
attention. The data used comes from both primary and secondary
sources and includes interviews by the author with several
Nicaraguan and Costa Rican diplomats actively involved in the peace
process, including former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who won
the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. In the end, this study seeks
a deeper understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy
interests and diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American
neighbors
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On January 8 and 9, 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met on the Panamanian island of
Contadora to discuss several issues of mutual concern, but the focus
of their talks centered on the deteriorating political and military
situation in Central America. After having developed growing
interests in and ties to the isthmian region during the 1970s, the
four states meeting at Contadora had become alarmed at the deepening
civil wars and political violence in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala in the early 1980s. Not only were these internal
conflicts becoming increasingly bloody; they also threatened to
spill over national borders. Increased numbers of refugees,
emerging border conflicts, and the growing militarization of the
region with the help of outside powers meant that the region's civil
conflicts were taking on ominous international dimensions. The
renewal of the cold war and a reassertive United States in its
traditional sphere of influence complicated the regional crisis
while the peacekeeping mechanisms of the Organization of American
States (OAS), which was itself in crisis, were incapable of dealing
with Central America's deepening wars. The four foreign ministers
meeting at Contadora called on the Central Americans to find some
framework for negotiations to resolve their internal and inter-state
conflicts. Before long, this call for dialogue and peace evolved
2into an ongoing peace process that persisted through the end of the
dec ade
.
The Central American peace process that emerged after January
1983 had three major phases. The first was the Contadora phase,
lasting from January 1983 to April 1987. In this phase, the
Contadora Group countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama)
persisted in their efforts to encourage and mediate negotiations
aimed at containing and resolving the Central Americans' conflicts.
Through the Contadora peace process, the Contadora Group states
sought to provide a shelter of diplomacy in the midst of war so that
the Central Americans could find a formula for regional peace and
demilitarization. The Contadora Group mediated the negotiation of
three different versions of an agreement —the Contadora Act for
Peace and Cooperation in Central America— aimed at achieving these
goals despite insurmountable obstacles, including the hostility of
the United States, the intransigence and stalemate of the Central
Americans, and the serious economic and debt crises the Contadora
Group states faced in the 1980s. The Contadora Group's persistence
in the face of these obstacles provides significant lessons about
the foreign policy interests, political will, and diplomatic skills
of these states. While other studies of the Contadora peace process
have focused on explaining why it failed, we will try to understand
why it persisted for so long and how it laid the groundwork for the
subsequent phases of the Central American peace process.
The second phase of the regional peace process, the Esquipulas
phase, overlapped Contadora as it emerged with the inauguration of
3Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo in January 1986. Its highpoint
came in August 1987 at the second formal summit meeting of the five
Central American presidents in the small town of Esquipulas,
Guatemala, a town known historically as the destination of
Pilgrimages by the faithful seeking miracles from its Black Christ.
If the second Esquipulas summit was not exactly miraculous, it was
successful in finally producing an agreement, inspired by Costa
Rica's President Oscar Arias, that allowed the five Central American
presidents to embark on a new process of internal national
reconciliations, democratization, and regional peace and
cooperation. While fulfilling all the commitments of the Esquipulas
II agreement
—the Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm
and Lasting Peace in Central America— would prove difficult, those
commitments (among other factors) facilitated the internal process
of national reconciliation, cease fire talks, and democratization
that eventually led to the end of the contra war in Nicaragua in
1990. The diplomatic commitments of the Esquipulas II summit and
its five subsequent presidential summits also played a role (along
with other factors) in bringing the Salvadoran government and its
revolutionary opposition to yet a third negotiating table under the
auspices of the United Nations secretary general's office,
culminating in a cease fire agreement in El Salvador's long civil
war in January 1992.
The third phase of the Central American peace process takes us
outside of the realm of inter-state diplomacy as it centers on the
4internal peace processes of the individual Central American states,
particularly those of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and (less
successfully) Guatemala. The analysis of this phase will have to
await future research. Instead, the focus of this study is on the
emergence, persistence, and meaning of the Latin American diplomatic
response to the inter-state conflicts in Central America in the
1980s. More specifically, the purpose of this study is to examine
the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American peace
process as inter-related case studies that provide insights into the
interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin American
diplomacy and foreign policy making.
The Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central American
peace process are rooted in the traditions of Latin American
diplomacy. These traditions include the nineteenth century practice
of diplomatic unity in the face of threats from outside powers and
the twentieth century challenges by Latin American states to United
States hegemony and intervent ionism in the c ircum-Car ibbean region.
The diplomacy of the Central American peace process also stems from
divergent interests between Latin American states and the United
States over the uses of the Organization of American States (OAS)
and from longstanding weaknesses of OAS mechanisms of conflict
resolution when significant U.S. interests were involved. Existing
studies of the Central American peace process (the vast majority of
which focus on the Contadora phase alone) fail to take this
diplomatic history into account —to their detriment.
5Beyond these traditions, the Contadora and Esquipulas peace
processes also indicate several innovations in contemporary Latin
American diplomacy and new lessons for understanding the role of
Latin American states in regional and world affairs. The Contadora
peace process developed out of the desire of the Contadora Group
states to protect their emergent subhegemonic interests in the
circum-Caribbean region that were based on growing economic,
political, and cultural ties. Contadora also represents an
increased willingness and capacity of the Contadora Group states to
play a more active role in regional and international affairs. If
the multilateralism of the Contadora process was not entirely new,
the persistent and skillfull diplomacy of the Contadora states
throughout the complex negotiating process was. The Contadora Group
states were able to persuade the Central Americans to embark on
regional talks and kept them involved for several years. Even
though the political stalemate between the Central Americans over
verification procedures and timetables for demilitarization
prevented the finalization of the Contadora Act, the Contadora
states succeeded in keeping open the political space for dialogue
and the peaceful resolution of conflict in a region rent by war and
pressured by outsiders for bigger military build-ups. That
political space allowed the Esquipulas phase of the peace process to
emerge
.
It is unlikely that the Esquipulas phase of the regional peace
process could have emerged without the previous mediation efforts of
the Contadora Group states and their continued support for regional
6peace talks. But the Esquipulas phase, which has yet to be studied
seriously in North America, also provides new lessons about the
nature of contemporary regional diplomacy. Guatemala's President
Cerezo initiated a new forum for discussion by inviting the Central
American presidents to face-to-face meetings in Esquipulas. Costa
Rica's President Arias later presented a new and simpler plan for
regional peace (leaving Contadora's complex demilitarization talks
for the future) that the five presidents themselves could negotiate
successfully. Several more presidential summits followed the
Esquipulas II meeting. The summit diplomacy of the Esquipulas phase
was an unprecedented and innovative means by which the Central
American presidents could come to know and respect each other,
understand each other's positions, and find a workable formula for
achieving regional peace and cooperation.
To understand these and other lessons of the Central American
peace process, we will study the traditions and historical
development of Latin American diplomacy through the 1970s and up to
the emergence of the regional peace process. We will then
reconstruct the significant phases and events of the Contadora and
Esquipulas peace processes and analyze their central documents.
Finally, we will analyze more closely the foreign policy interests,
capabilities, and contributions of four states actively involved in
the peace process —Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica
—
in order to understand the nature of contemporary Latin American
diplomacy and its import both to the persistence of the peace
process and to the future of inter-American relations.
7Our historical analysis will devote particular attention to the
factors at three levels of analysis that have influenced events.
Our primary focus is at the inter-regional level and our primary
interest is Latin American regional diplomacy. In other words, we
hope to understand how Latin American states have related to each
other at the regional level, both historically and during the
Central American peace process. Yet factors at two other levels of
analysis are also important for our study and will receive
attention. Following James Rosenau's (1976) classification, these
are the systemic (or international) and the societal (or domestic)
levels of analysis. At the systemic level we will consider the
international political factors that have influenced events and
shaped Latin American diplomacy over the years, including threats
from European powers during the formative nineteenth century,
relations with the United States as it emerged as a regional and
international power, and relations within regional and international
organizations such as the OAS and the United Nations. This level
will also be important for understanding the role of U.S. policies
toward Central America during the 1980s and the Contadora Group's
diplomatic response to them. At the societal level, we will try to
understand the internal or domestic political factors that have
shaped both the foreign policy making process and ultimately the
diplomacy of the states involved in the peace process. By devoting
attention to these three levels of analysis, we hope to gain a
fuller understanding of the emergence, persistence, and meaning of
the Central American peace process.
8The data used and analyzed in this study come from both primary
and secondary sources, but a special effort has been made to include
and at times favor the writings of Latin Americans. Indeed, in
recent years there has been a virtual explosion of works from Latin
America on the region's foreign policy and diplomacy (e.g., Munoz
,
ed., 1988, 1987, 1986; Puig, ed., 1984; Hirst, 1987; Tomassini,
1981; and others). The richness of this material is in itself an
excellent topic for study, and parts of a preliminary analysis are
provided in Chapters IV and VIII. These Latin American works are
also good sources for information on regional events and actors (and
often documents) not readily available in the United States. Beyond
these works, the primary sources used in this study include the
writings and speeches of nineteenth and early twentieth century
political figures from both Latin America and the United States as
well as treaties and other historical public documents focusing on
pre-World War II inter-American relations. Most of these sources
can be found in collections or anthologies published in Latin
America or the United States (see e.g., Alvarez, 1924; Lecuna and
Bierck, 1951; Dozer, 1966; Gantenbein, 1950).
Primary sources relating to more recent events, particularly
the Central American peace process, include numerous documents
(communiques, information bulletins) produced by the Contadora
Group, the three versions of the Contadora Act, and the Esquipulas
II Procedure. These and other official sources can be found in
various North American and Latin American collections (e.g., Bagley
et al
,
1985; Muffoz , ed .
,
1988;) or in Latin American periodicals
Clones
ias in
Internar.iop q 1 PC , and In tegraci<<n T.at inn.^V^ More
importantly, valuable interviews by this author with several Central
American diplomats actively involved in the peace process, such as
Alejandro Bendana, Jose* Leo'n Talavera, and Dennis Torres in Manag,
in June 1990, and Luis Guillermo Solis and President Oscar Ar:
San Jose" in January 1991, provide crucial first-hand insights into
the Contadora and especially the Esquipulas phases. Other primary
sources include newspapers (especially the New York Tin^ in the
United States and Central America that further document regional
events and the course of the peace process during the 1980s.
Secondary sources used tend to focus on the more historical
aspects of our topic, but along with trying to favor the Latin
American voice, special attention has been devoted to including the
"classics" of Latin American or inter-American history, such as
Atkins, (1989) Gil (1971), Inman (1965), Karnes (1976), Langley
(1985), Munro (1964), Perkins (1966), Perez (1983), Ronning (1963),
Schmidt (1971), Schneider (1958), Slater (1970), and Woodward
(1976). The secondary sources relating to the Contadora process,
such as Bagley and Tokatlian (1987), Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo Garcia-
Pena, eds., (1985) and Drekon ja-Kornat (1985), are cited mainly for
the specific dates or other hard to find data on events and to
provide the reader with citations of alternative studies relating to
the course of the early years of the Contadora peace process.
Finally, other secondary sources on the Contadora phase of the peace
process, particularly by North Americans, such as Bagley (1986),
1 0
Arnson (1987), Purcell (1985), Farer (1985), Goodfellow (1987), Karl
(1986), and others, are used as much for their negative views on the
prospects for Contadora's success as for the information on the
peace process they contain. For indeed, as noted above, most North
American works on the Contadora phase of the peace process seek to
explain how or why the Contadora mediation was failing. Few seemed
interested in explaining how or why it was persisting.
Thus, in the coming chapters, our study will proceed in the
following way. In Chapter II, the formative period of Latin
American diplomacy from the 1820s through the 1880s will be studied.
We will see how and why nineteenth century Latin American diplomacy
turned repeatedly to the use of multilateral conferences
—or
congresses— aimed at protecting the weak states of the region from
great power intervention. In Chapter III, the period between 1889
and the 1930s will be covered. Of special interest here is the
development of Latin American views and diplomatic responses to U.S.
policies in the c ircum-Car ibbean region during the transformation of
the Monroe Doctrine from a defensive policy statement to a rationale
for intervention. Moreover, we will also study the development of
inter-American institutions and conferences during this period and
related Latin American diplomacy to press for the U.S. acceptance of
the non-intervention principle, which finally came with the Good
Neighbor Policy in 1933. We will also find that earlier in this
century, three Latin American states undertook a mediation effort
(the ABC Mediation) that provides a little studied but interesting
precedent for the Contadora mediation.
11
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In Chapter IV, the post-World War II period of inter-Amer
relations will be studied with special attention devoted to the
and demise of the OAS system. We will see how divergent interests
between the United States and Latin America over the nature of the
OAS system (i.e., both the OAS and Rio Pact institutions) created
early weaknesses that limited its ability to resolve the region's
conflicts, especially when U.S. cold war interests were involved.
Aside from a brief period in the early 1960s, the OAS system was
never as solid as it seemed, creating a degree of dissatisfaction by
Latin Americans that led to several attempts to reform its
institutions in the each of the post war decades. Moreover, by the
mid 1970s this dissatisfaction (along with other factors) led
several Latin American states to turn to other international forums
to press their foreign policy interests (namely, economic
development and reduced dependency). In the process, these states
developed a new presence in international affairs, a new foreign
policy activism, and new diplomatic skills. The inability of the
OAS system to deal with the emerging political and military crises
in Central America in the early 1980s and the increased propensity
of some Latin American governments to coordinate their foreign
policy strategies and work outside the OAS system to secure their
interests are directly relevent to the emergence of the Contadora
peace process in 1983.
In Chapter V, we will look at the emergence of political
violence and civil war in Central America in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s. With deep roots in the past and revolutionary
12
implications, the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala were soon caught up in the reemergent cold war of the
time. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the regional and
extra-regional players that were involved and their respective
positions on the deepening political and military crises in Central
America. We will also see how international calls for peace in the
region led to the first meeting of the Contadora peace process.
In Chapters VI and VII, we will reconstruct and analyze the
course of the Central American peace process from the first
Contadora meeting in January 1983 through the Esquipulas summits.
The Contadora phase can be broken down and studied in five stages:
(1) Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the Contadora Framework
for Peace (January 1983-January 1984); (2) The First Draft of the
Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America (February-
October 1984); (3) The Second Draft of the Contadora Act (November
1984-December 1985); (4) Stalemate and the Third Draft of the
Contadora Act (January-June 1986 and beyond); and (5) the transition
to the Esquipulas phase. The Esquipulas phase will be considered in
two stages: (1) The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas II Procedure, and
(2) the Post Esquipulas II summits.
In Chapter VIII our focus shifts to analyzing and comparing the
particular foreign policy interests and diplomatic capabilities of
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. We will look more
closely at the emergence of a greater international activism by
these states since the 1970s and the related development of
diplomatic skills that were significant in driving the peace process
1 3
and
onward during the 1980s. We will also compare the contributions
limits of these states as they participated in the Contadora and
Esquipulas phases. Of special interest here is gaining some
insights into these states' foreign policy making processes and
evaluating their degree of exercising what Puig (1975/76) has called
"relative autonomy." Finally, in Chapter XI, we will discuss the
lessons of the Central American peace process for understanding the
nature of Latin American diplomacy in the 1980s as well as the
implications for the inter-American system into the 1990s. By
proceeding in this way, it is hoped that we can gain a deeper
understanding and appreciation of the foreign policy interests and
diplomatic capabilities of our Latin American neighbors.
CHAPTER II
NINETEENTH CENTURY FOUNDATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC UNITY
I shall tell you with what we must provide ourselvesm order to expel the Spanish and to found a free
government. It is unioji, obviously; but such a union
will come about through sensible planning and well-directed actions rather than by divine magic."
Sim6n Bojivar, from the "Jamaica Letter," September
6 , 181 5.
The Contadora and Esquipulas peace processes constitute
important and meaningful examples of Latin American diplomatic
initiative, expertise, and concerts i^n (harmonization) in the
face of what the participating states perceived to be a series
of foreign threats to their national interests and security.
Yet contrary to the assertions of some observers and
participants, the Contadora and Esquipulas diplomatic
initiatives were not the first such examples. In fact, there is
a long history of active Latin American diplomatic solidarity
and cooperation when confronted with foreign military threats
and interventionism from outside powers. This diplomatic
history of Latin American unity in the face of foreign threats
is tangled up with the seemingly contradictory Bolivarian
aspirations of continental confederation versus the absolute
independence and sovereignty of individual Latin American states
during the nineteenth century. In this chapter, we shall
attempt to untangle the Bolivarian meaning of Latin American
unity, show its decidedly foreign affairs orientation, and tell
the story of Latin American diplomacy during the formative
nineteenth century.
Spanish-American Confederative Ideas
at Independence
The idea of unity to win the independence and defend the
sovereignty of the emerging sister republics in Spanish America
was integral to the labor of the independence movement itself.
By 1810 arguments stressing the consanguineous bonds between
Spanish-Americans were well-established in many provincial
capitals, where calls for unity and confederation to create a
great American "family of brothers" inflected the incipient
Creole nationalism. For independence leaders like the Chilean
Juan Egana, the Honduran Jose' Cecilio del Valle, and many
others, ties of blood and identity rooted in a common history of
conquest and colonial tutelage, strengthened by common bonds of
language, religion, law, social custom, and a shared perception
of the uniqueness of el puebl o americano ; All seemed to bind
the restive Spanish-American provinces into natural political
union (Moreno Pino, 1977: 33, 37; Davis, 1977a: 69-70).
In addition to such inward-looking arguments based in the
presumed consanguinity of the emerging sister republics, Juan
Egana and others also developed the argument that Spanish-
American union was necessary for the mutual defense against
European attacks. This more outward-looking cons iderat ion was
particularly strong in Santiago de Chile, where one .ember of
the governing junta, Juan Martinez de Rosas, argued in his
C^ismo Politico Cri s fi rm n (1810) for the confederation of the
Spanish colonies of South America in order to expel all foreign
domination. Meanwhile, another Chilean document of 1810, the
Declaration <je 1 0B Dererh
,
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congress of the nations of America 3 for their organization and
strengthening, and looked forward to the day when "America's
voice, meeting in congress .. .and speaking to the rest of the
world, would impose respect" (Moreno Pino, 1977: 33, 36-37).
After 1810 both arguments served to unify South American
independence forces in the political and military campaigns
against Spain. But as the final independence battles drew near
in the early to mid-1820s, centrifugal forces also appeared to
disprove the assumption that the former colonial provinces
shared unbreakable bonds of natural kinship and community.
After centuries of administrative and commercial centralization
by Spain, the reality was that isolated provincial capitals,
each with distinct identities and interests, had already begun
their separate albeit difficult experiments with self-
government. Large distances, imposing geographical barriers,
and poor communications systems between the provinces served to
promote provincialisms and parochial jealousies. Political
differences concerning the best form of government (i.e.,
republicanism vs. monarchism; unitarism vs. federalism) and the
power of local c aud il los also contributed to these centrifugal
forces, revealing deep internal political and class divisions
both within and between provinces as well as chronic political
instability.
For Simon Bolivar, such factionalism and its related civil
disturbances posed serious threats to completing the project of
independence. Unity was everything for the Liberator, as he
stressed in his famous Angostura address to the Second National
Congress of Venezuela in February of 1819; but the unity he
championed at Angostura was clearly national in character.
There he asked the Venezuelan congress to consider abandoning
its federal constitution which, he argued, had resulted from
"the ill-considered pleadings of those men from the provinces
who were captivated by the apparent brilliance of the happiness
of the North American people, believing that the blessings they
enjoy result exclusively from their form of government rather
than from the character and customs of the citizens" (in Lecuna
and Bierck, 1951: 180). Instead Bolivar proposed a
constitutional plan for a unitary republican form of government
that could enhance political equality among citizens and achieve
political stability for Venezuela.
All our moral powers will not suffice to save our
infant republic from this chaos unless we fuse the
mass of the people, the government, the legislation,
and the national spirit into a single united body.
Unity, unity, unity must be our motto in all things.
The blood of our citizens is varied: let it be mixed
for the sake of unity. Our Constitution has divided
the powers of government: let them be bound together
to secure unity. Our laws are but a sad relic of
ancient and modern despotism. Let this monstrous
edifice crumble and fall; and, having removed even its
ruins, let us erect a temple to Justice; and, guidedby its sacred inspiration, let us write a code ofVenezuelan laws (in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951 : 191
-92).
Here Bolivar the Law-Giver sought to build a viable
sovereign republic whose integrity would no longer be threatened
by domestic factionalism and civil unrest; here, as elsewhere in
South America in the next few years, he sought to eliminate the
institutionalized sources of internal factions and political
unrest in order to establish fully autonomous national
governments. But there was another important dimension to his
strident pleas for unity both within his native Venezuela and
elsewhere: Bolivar the Liberator knew that continuing domestic
political division and anarchy only served the interests of
Spain and other European powers seeking to restore imperial
control over Spanish America, thus postponing the day of real
national independence for the infant sister republics.
Painfully aware of this danger, Bolivar spent several years
campaigning, both politically and militarily, for the domestic
and geopolitical unity of the Spanish American nations. To
accomplish the latter Bolivar championed several different plans
of "confederation" for the sister republics of Spanish America.
The first and furthest implemented was the decade-long
"union" of Gran Colombia, comprising present-day Colombia,
Venezuela and Ecuador. Just six months after his Angostura
address, Bolivar led a successful military campaign in Colombia,
defeating royalist forces at the decisive Battle of Bocaya.
With Colombian independence thus assured, a new constitution for
the "United States of Colombia" was promulgated in December,
1819, joining Colombia and Venezuela in a "pact of union" that
would also include the province of Quito after the latter's
liberation. By the summer of 1822, when Quito and Guayaquil
formally joined the confederation, Gran Colombia encompassed
essentially the same territory as that of the former colonial
Viceroyalty of New Granada circa 1800. Boli'var seemed to have
held high hopes that this union4 could produce "a new nation
composed of Venezuela and New Granada." News of its dissolution
after Venezuela's secession in early 1830 was clearly an
important source of bitterness in the last few months of his
life. But as Simon Collier (1985: 408-412) points out, Bolivar
was acutely aware throughout the decade of its rocky existence
that the "union" would not last. Moreover, the primary reason
for its creation and existence, its raison d'etre , seems to have
been less an experiment in creating a new national or
supranational identity than a geopolitical answer to weakness in
the face of ongoing foreign threats. As early as 1813, Bolivar
wrote that in northern South America " v two different
nations .. .will appear ridiculous. Even if Venezuela and New
Granada were united, this would only just make a nation capable
of inspiring due and decorous consideration in others.'"
This concern with appearances on the world stage and the
weaknesses rooted in the " vmult ipl ic ity of sovereignties'" in
Spanish America was central to the Liberator's calls for unity.
The "pact of union" was something "^presented [to] the world'"
so that the world
-specifically Europe- would take
"Colombians" seriously. Gran Colombia was created out of
military and diplomatic necessity (Collier, 1985: 408).
Bolivar's second plan of confederation
—or union, or
league (like others in the early nineteenth century, Bolivar was
never very clear or consistent in his terminology for these
Plans except that, in this case, the term "federation" was not
to be used in public discourse)- was a short-lived scheme
conceived in 1826 but never implemented. It was proposed and
discussed by Bolivar 5 in the context of growing political unrest
in Gran Colombia and related military threats from the Holy
Alliance. To put down such factions and check the danger of
European-supported monarchism, Bolivar proposed a federal union
of Gran Colombia, Peru and newly independent Bolivia (formerly
Upper Peru), named in honor of the Liberator. The "Bolivarian
Constitution," drafted by Bolivar himself, would have been
adopted by each member state to create a federal government
composed of a president or "Supreme Chief," who would tour the
provinces and visit each state at least once a year, a vice
president, and three chambers (Bolivar to Santander, May 7,
1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585-593; Collier, 1985, 407).
Each state in the confederation would manage its internal
affairs "in agreement, however, with the other states" (Bolivar
to Sucre, August 18, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 634).
The government of each state "will continue to be vested in the
President and Vice President and their Chamber and Senate,
respecting all matters affecting religion, justice, civil
administration, national economy - in short, evervrh^ K
„ f
foreign affairs, war, and the Federal treasury" (emphasis mine;
Bolivar to Sucre, May 12, 1826 in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 590-
591). However, political factionalism in Gran Colombia was too
far advanced, and the idea of such a supranational union was
soon politically dead (Collier, 1985: 406-407). Perhaps the
idea also seemed superfluous at the time given the fact that
Bolivar's third plan of Latin confederation, the 1826 Congress
of Panama, was already under way.
The Congress of Panama
The Congress of Panama is generally held to be one of the
most famous
—and unsuccessful— examples of the Spanish
American attempts to create an ongoing union or federation of
the newly independent states. For many it remains the mythic
symbol of a Bolivarian ideal that would present to the world a
Latin American giant state with a supranational identity.
However even Bolivar had rejected the possibility of creating
such a state as grandiose and Utopian. Indeed, in his famous
"Jamaica Letter" of September 6, 1815, which is considered the
primary source of inspiration for his confederal experiments and
for the Congress of Panama eleven years later, Bolivar wrote:
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Boli'var went on to reject the popular arguments heard
elsewhere stressing the consangu inous bonds of origin, language,
custom and religion that could unite the new states. Rather, he
argued a Montesquieuesque or Rousseauan line of thought
stressing the "climactic differences, geographic diversity,
conflicting interests and dissimilar characteristics" that
divided the new states one from the other. Yet Union
-"through
sensible planning and well-directed actions rather than by
divine logic"— was what was needed "in order to expell the
Spaniards and found a free government" ("Jamaica Letter," in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118; 121).
How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama
could be for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for
the Greeks! Would to God that some day we may have
the good fortune to convene there an august assembly
of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and empires
to deliberate upon the high interests of peace and war
with the nations of the other three-quarters of the
globe. This type of organization may come to pass in
some happier period of our regeneration. But any other
plan, such as that of l'Abbe St. Pierre, who in laudable
delerium conceived the idea of assembling a European
congress to decide the fate and interests of those
nations, would be meaningless" ("Jamaica Letter," in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 118).
Of course, after the news of the 1815 Congress of Vienna
reached the New World and after three other European
"congresses" were held by 1822, the Abbe' St. Pxerre's eighteenth
century plan for a "union" of sovereign states to found a system
of "perpetual peace" no longer appeared quite so "delerious."
In fact, the Congress of Vienna and the emerging European
Concert System constituted a more pertinent model for the
Bolivarian project of a "Congress" at Panama than, as is often
assumed, the federal congress of the North American union.
Moreover, the very nature and outcomes of the European
congresses between 1815 and 1826 prompted the Latin American
states to counter with their own Congress for their mutual
protection. In order to understand this important point, we
must briefly expain the nature of l'Abbe St. Pierre's plan for
"perpetual peace" and its partial realization by European powers
in the early nineteenth century.
L'Abbe' St. Pierre's five point plan for "perpetual peace"
was to establish a collective security system among the European
sovereigns to replace the seventeenth century balance of power
system, which he considered merely a "system of war." To
accomplish this, the Abbe' proposed the creation of a permanent
"congress" to arbitrate and mediate disputes between
sovereigns. His plan also called for the disbanding of national
armies in favor of a multinational force that would provide for
the mutual defense against outside threats. The creation of
such a European "body politic" would respect and protect the
actual possessions and the sovereignty of each member state.
Such a "general alliance" and "permanent society" based on the
principle of arbitration would eliminate the pretexts for war
found in the European balance of power system. The idea was not
so much to create a supranational state as it was to constitute
a collective security system and to institutionalize the
principle of arbitration in settling interstate disputes
(St. Pierre, 1974). L'Abb^ had lobbied hard in the salons of
the European sovereigns at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht
(1715) to gain support for his plan, and an essay by Rousseau
helped to popularize the Abbe"s plan in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. One hundred years after the Treaty of
Utrecht, the sovereigns of Europe created a short-lived version
of l'Abb^'s plan with the Concert system originating in the
Congress of Vienna of 1815.
The European "congresses" of the early nineteenth century
(e.g., Congress of Vienna, 1815; Congress of Aix-La-Chapel le
,
1818; Congress of Laibach, 1821; Congress of Verona, 1822) had
originated in the collaboration of Great Britain, Austria,
Prussia and Russia against France during the Napoleanic wars.
At the Congress of Vienna, this Quadruple Alliance called for
"meetings at fixed per iods . . . f or the purpose of consulting upon
their common interests." The "Holy Alliance" was also formed in
1815 within this emerging concert system by the Austrian,
Prussian and Russian monarchs. France became an active member
of the concert in the 1818 Congress of Aix-La-Chapel le
.
Differences soon emerged within the system over how to handle
anti-monarchical revolts in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere as the
Holy Alliance sought to use the European congresses as its anti-
revolutionary instrutnent (Hartmann, 1973: 177
; Claude, 1984:
25).
Although the European congresses never became "fixed"
(Great Britain stopped attending them after the 1822 Congress of
Verona and a balance of power system reemerged in Europe), they
served as powerful examples to Latin Americans of the ways in
which sovereign states might coordinate their common interests
in foreign affairs, construct a bloc of power, and arbitrate the
questions of war and peace. More importantly, it was precisely
the existence and power of the Holy Alliance, its anti-
republican use of the congresses, and its support of the Spanish
monarchy's attempts to reconquer its former colonies that posed
the most serious threat to the independence of the new Latin
American republics in the early 1820s.
Thus as Bolivar and other Spanish American statesmen
developed plans for the Congress of Panama, the goal was not to
follow the North American example of creating a "national"
legislative body to govern a tight federal union. The Congress
was not meant to constitute the "national assembly" of a giant
state. Rather, the Congress of Panama was meant to follow the
European example of coordinating matters of foreign policy and
mutual defense in order to answer the common threat to
independence posed by one of the products of the European
congresses, the Holy Alliance. As Bolivar put it in a letter to
Francisco de Paula Santander, Vice President of Colombia, in
January 1825,
The great sovereigns of Europe themselves have beenobliged to gather in congresses in order to establishcordial and friendly relations among their respective
states. As long as they relied on diplomatic negotia-tions only, discord kept them apart. They formed acongress and composed their differences; now they areinvincible. It would seem that we, being nothing, aswe are on y m the process of being born! shoul^nothesitate for a moment to follow their exampleCm Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 462).
As chief of state of Gran Colombia, Boli'var began to lay
the groundwork for such a Spanish-American congress in 1822. He
first sent diplomatic envoys to other parts of Spanish America
with treaties of alliance in the face of continuing European
military threats. His emissary to Mexico, don Miguel Santa
Man'a, found an eager ally in the Mexican Minister of Internal
and Foreign Affairs, Luca's Alama'n, who would later play an
important role in nurturing the goal of Latin American
diplomatic unity. The two signed a treaty of Union, League and
Perpetual Confederation in October 1823 (essentially a treaty of
defensive alliance) which was soon ratified by their respective
governments. Bolivar's emissary to South American capitals, don
Juaquin Mosquera, was also successful in persuading first Peru
(in 1822), then Chile, and finally Buenos Aires to sign similar
treaties; however, a political turn of events in Chile and
rising isolationist sentiment in Buenos Aires at the time
prevented the latter two states from ratifying the alliance
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treaties. Bolivar's diplomatic emissaries had also extended
his invitation to the signatories of these treaties to hold an
eventual congress (Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39; Salcedo-Bastardo
,
1977: 92, 95).
On the eve of the defeat of Spanish forces at the important
Battle of Ayacucho in early December, 1824, Bolivar issued a
circular to the "Governments of the Other Republics of America-
reiterating his earlier invitation to hold a congress of
plenipotentiaries in Panama, "or some other point agreed upon by
the majority ...that should act as a council during periods of
great conflicts, to be appealed to in the event of common
danger, and to be a faithful interpreter of public treaties when
difficulties arise, in brief, to conciliate all our differences"
(Circular, December 7, 1824, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 457).
Continued Spanish American unity was important to prevail
against Spain, but appearances mattered most. Meeting in a
congress in Panama was a condition for survival for the weak.
This Congress must serve us at least for the first
ten or twelve years of our infancy, even though it
should dissolve forever following that period. It
is my feeling that we will live on for centuries if
we can survive the first dozen years of childhood.
First impressions last forever (Bolivar to Santander,
January 6-7, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 461-62).
Bolivar not only sought to create an image of unity to ensure
survival; he also wanted the Congress to project an image of
strength to convince the Holy Alliance that any further attempts
at reconquest were futile. Arms and bilateral diplomacy were
important, but so was the spectacle of a Spanish Ameri
Congress
.
The fact that all Europe is against us and that
all America is devastated makes quite an appalling
picture It seems politic, therefore, for us to
enter into friendly relations with the gentlemen
of the Alliance, using dulcet and persuasive words,m order to discover their latest decisions and
to gain time. With this end in view, I believe
that [Gran] Colombia, which has taken the lead in
foreign affairs, should be able to undertake some
move through her agents in Europe. While this isbeing done, the rest of America, meeting at the
Isthmus, can ^present itself in a more imposing
manner (Bolivar to Santander, March 8, 1825, in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479.
Though addressed to the "Governments of the Other Republics
of America," Bolivar's formal invitation to the Congress of
Panama was originally limited to the states that had ratified
the earlier bilateral treaties of alliance. It was the
Colombian Vice President, Francisco de Paula Santander, who
extended the invitation to Chile, Argentina, and the United
Provinces of Central America. 7 Bolivar had opposed extending
the invitation to Haiti, Brazil and the United States. He
believed that the Congress should be limited only to the Spanish-
speaking nations of America in order to enhance the
"homogeneity, compactness and solidity" of the league. He
believed further that it should be limited to those nations
ghaving republican forms of government (thus excluding Haiti and
Brazil) in order to prevent any influence of the Holy Alliance
(Moreno Pino, 1977: 38-39; Salcedo-Bastardo , 1970: 360; Bolivar
to Santander, June 7, 1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1955: 507-08).
As for the United States, Boli'var wished to exclude it on
the grounds that it lacked "continental solidarity," given its
neutrality during the war with Spain, and because it seemed to
Pursue its "own selfish interests." Moreover, Bolivar feared
that admitting the United States to the Congress might create
trouble with Great Britain, which, considering the latter's
break with the Holy Alliance, he expected would be the protector
of the Spanish American league. Courting Great Britain's
recognition, favor, and protection was crucial to Bolivar's
strategy of checking the threats of the Holy Alliance. Great
Britain was also emerging as Spanish America's leading trade
partner at the time (Bolivar to Santander, March 8, 1825, in
Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 479; Bolivar to Santander, October 21,
1825, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 543; Bolivar, "Views on the
Congress of Panama," February 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951:
561-62; Bushnell, 1987: 147).
Nevertheless, the governments of Colombia and Mexico
extended the invitation to the United States, and two months
before the Congress opened, Bolivar expressed his approval that
the U.S. had decided to send an envoy. Yet the United States
mission to the Congress of Panama never participated. One of
the two U.S. delegates died en route and the other, John
Sergeant, failed to arrive until after the Panama sessions had
closed 10 (Wilgus and D'Eca, 1963: 385; Moreno Pino, 1977:39;
Bolivar to Revenga, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, April
8, 1826, in Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: 585; Bushnell, 1987: 147).
Likewise, Brazil was finally invited to the Congress of
Panama but its delegate never arrived, presumably because Brazil
was not interested in helping to strengthen Spanish America
(Atkins, 1989:177). Great Britain and the Netherlands were
invited to send observers, largely due to Spanish American hopes
for favorable trade relations with the two, and delegations from
both states were present at the Congress. Paraguay was never
invited (Moreno Pino, 1977: 40; Davis, 1977a: 72; Bushnell,
1987: 147; Boersner, 1986: 110).
The long-awaited Congress of Panama finally opened on June
22, 1826.
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Over the course of the next three weeks of the
early Panamanian summer, the plenipotentiaries held ten meetings
and worked to produce four interrelated diplomatic instruments.
The first and most central was the Treaty of Perpetual Union,
League and Confederation, which established a defensive alliance
based on the principle of collective security and provided for
other principles of cooperation within the league, such as
conciliation and arbitration. Related to this treaty were two
agreements to create a multinational army and navy of 60,000
men, with each nation providing a set quota. Mexico, which vied
with Colombia for leadership in the league, was to supply more
than half of the 60,000. Finally, given the torrid summer heat
and the uncultivated surroundings they found in Panama, the
delegates agreed to move the site of the Congress to Tacubaya,
outside Mexico City, where they would meet to continue their
diplomatic work every two years. The Congress then adjourned on
July 15, 1826 so that the plenipotentiaries could escape the
summer heat and seek ratification of the agreements in their
respective countries (Moreno Pino, 1977: 40; Salcedo-Bastardo
.
1970: 360; Wilgus and D'Eca, 1963: 385; Davis, 1977a: 73).
Only Colombia ratified the accords of Panama, and even
Bolivar opposed this ratification. In a letter to the Colombian
delegate to the Congress of Panama, General Pedro Briceno
Me'ndez, Bolivar expressed his immediate disapproval of the
treaties based on two problems. First, he opposed the
relocation of the assembly to Tacubaya on the grounds that it
would come to be dominated by the "already disproportionate-
influence of Mexico, and possibly by the United States. Second,
Bolivar considered the terms of the convention on troop
contingents "futile and ineffective" as well as dangerous; its
provisions for cavalry strength were "contrary to all the
principles of the art of warfare." More importantly, "[t]he
convention does not even regard [a foreign] invasion as being
serious unless it involves over 5,000 men, and aid will be
rendered in such cases only. This condemns certain countries to
inevitable occupation." Bolivar noted that there was "unanimity
of opinion" about these matters throughout the other South
American republics and urged that the treaties not be ratified
pending his return to Bogota for more detailed discussions
(Bolivar to Briceno Mendez, September 14, 1826, in Lecuna and
Bierck, 1951: 637).
Other factors were at work that led to the failure of
ratification of the Panama accords. Desp.te Bolivar's concerns
vith the dangers of the military convention, it appears that by
the second half of 1826 and thereafter, few perceived a credible
European military threat to Spanish African independence.
Though such a threat had seemed important when the invitations
for the Congress were sent out in December, 1824, the defeat of
Spanish forces at Ayacucho that same week turned out to be
decisive. While sporadic military skirmishes had continued, by
mid-1826 independence seemed assured. Like Great Britain, even
France had long foresaken the imperial cause of the Holy
Alliance and, through the Polignac Memorandum of 1923, had
promised the British not to intervene by force in Spanish
America (Davis, 1977a: 46, 59, 70).
Beyond this changed international situation, Moreno Pino
(1977: 41) argues that, due to the diplomatic and political
inexperience of the Congress delegates, the four Panama accords
failed to win approval because they were legally tied too
closely together: widespread misgivings about the military
convention meant that the entire package of agreements had to be
opposed —or revised at a later date. The package was too much
too late for the member states to support.
Finally, internal factors in several states prevented even
the revision, much less the ratification, of the Panama
accords. The government of Mexico tried twice to get its
congress to ratify the treaties, but political insurrections
prevented it. Gran Colombia, wh.ch soon came to loggerheads
with Peru, was on the verge of dissolution, and civil war in
Central America beginning in 1827 prevented ratification there.
Independence had been won but internal unrest, so c 0ffim0n to
newly independent states and fueled by an emerging caudillismo
and Liberal-versus-Conservative factionalism in almost every
Spanish American republic in the late 1820s, left Bolivar and
his dream of a united Spanish American league in disarray
(Moreno Pino, 1977: 41-42; Lecuna and Bierck, 1951: xxii;
Atkins, 1989: 178).
Insofar as no permanent league of Spanish American states
was legally created, the Congress of Panama was a failure.
However, its failure is a qualified one. Although its
agreements were set aside, the Congress provided an important
precedent for and useful symbol of Spanish American diplomatic
unity in the face of foreign military threats during the rest of
the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. The
Congress of Panama at least laid the groundwork that facilitated
the holding of subsequent Latin American diplomatic congresses
as the preferred means of addressing certain common foreign
affairs concerns. Liberals, diplomats, and experts in
international law tended to continue to embrace the notion of
Spanish or Latin American unity to meet the threat of foreign
interventionism. As the nineteenth century wore on, these
proponents of Latin American diplomatic unity were also able to
develop a body of international legal principles, if not law,
renouncing the use of force and stressing arbitration as a means
to settle international disputes. A brief overview of these
developments during the rest of the nineteenth century is
important for understanding the nature of Latin American
diplomacy and inter-American relations in the twentieth century.
Latin American Congresses After Panama
In the late 1820s and 1830s, the government of Mexico led
the effort to reanimate Bolivar's project of a Spanish American
league, both to adopt a common policy of defense against further
European intervention and to carry out common negotiations for
diplomatic recognition by Spain. Invitations for congresses at
Tacubaya were sent out in 1831
, 1834, 1836, 1838, 1839, 1840 and
1842, but these Mexican efforts proved to be in vain. In spite
of any empathy for Mexico's problems with Texas, other Latin
governments were suspicious of Mexico's bid for leadership,
especially after it independently negotiated its recognition by
Spain in 1835. Moreover, growing political instability
throughout Spanish America in the 1830s made foreign policy a
low priority for the region's troubled governments, many of
which came to be dominated by conservative military caudillos
little interested in the largely liberal project of unionism.
The outbreak of the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) brought an
end to Mexico's leadership in promoting the conf ederative idea;
however, the war did contribute to renewed concern over foreign
interventionist, elsewhere in Latin America, particularly in
Peru (Inman, 1965: 20-21
; Nuermberger, 1940: 32; Moreno Pino,
1977: 42).
Immediate interest in holding a second "American Congress-
grew among the Andean republics in 1847 when they were presented
with the threat of a military expedition organized in Europe by
the exiled president of Ecuador, General Juan WFlores. With
2,000 Spanish and British mercenaries, General Flores sought to
oust the Liberal government and support the conservative cause
in Ecuador and elsewhere. In Colombia, there also existed the
fear that General Flores would use his forces in a filibustering
venture in Panama.
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With Flores' threat to the Andean
republics, a growing suspicion of imperialist ventures in
Central and South America, and the Mexican-American War, the
government of Peru issued the formal invitations for the
"American Congress," which was held in Lima from December 1847
to March 1848 ( Inman
, 1965: 21-22; Moreno Pino, 1977: 45-46;
Davis, 1977a: 100; Nuermberger, 1940: 32, 35).
The governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Chile
responded positively to the Peruvian invitation and participated
in the Congress. The government of Colombia had issued an
unauthorized invitation to the United States, but this was soon
retracted by the conference organizers because of the Mexican-
African War. 13
Over the course of three months, the Congress delegates
met informally several times a week to draft four separate
treaties. The first and most central was the Treaty of
Confederation, whose purpose was to "sustain the sovereignty and
independence of all and each one, to maintain the integrity of
their respective territories, to assure in them their dominance
and soveriegnty, to refuse to consent that they should be
permitted to suffer outrage or offense" (in Atkins, 1989: 178).
The Treaty embraced the collective security principle by
outlining the duty of reciprocal assistance with land and naval
forces to defend against foreign threats to the political
independence or territorial integrity of its members. It also
provided for regular meetings of a congress of pleni-
potentiaries, renounced the right of conquest, and called for
the peaceful resolution of conflicts according to specified
procedures. The other treaties included a Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, aimed at facilitating trade through a
preferential customs union, a Postal Convention, and a Consular
Convention, addressing such issues as political asylum,
reciprocal duties in cases of civil struggles, and an interest
in the codification of international law (Atkins, 1989: 178;
Moreno Pino, 1977 : 46)
.
Other American states, including the United States, were
invited to subscribe to these treaties; but after British port
authorities in Jamaica broke up Flores' expedition and after the
Mexican-American War had ended, interest in the confederation
waned. Only the Consular Convention was eventually ratified by
the states that participated in the Congress of Lima. It would
become the only agreement produced by the Spanish American
congresses ever to enter into force 14 (Atkins, 1989: 178;
Nuermberger, 1940: 35).
If the threat of foreign adventurism seemed to ease by
1849, it re-emerged by the mid-1850s, prompting renewed unionist
sentiment and several significant examples of joint Spanish
American diplomatic activity. This time, however, concern came
to focus on the expansionist tendencies of the North Americans.
In late 1854, the Ecuadoran government signed a commercial
convention with the United States minister granting generous
concessions for the exploitation of guano on the Galapagos
Islands. Allegations of the establishment of a U. S.
protectorate over the islands stirred concern in Peru and
especially in Chile, where anti-Yankee sentiment had been
growing. 15 The skilled Chilean Foreign Minister, Antonio Varas
,
succeeded in persuading Ecuador to renounce the convention by
offering a new Chilean-Ecuadoran commercial treaty as well as a
mutual assistance pact against "all piratical and filibustering
expeditions." The latter was requested by the Liberal Ecuadoran
government after it became alarmed that General Flores had taken
up residence in Lima. Varas was able to diffuse tensions
between Ecuador and Peru by including the latter in the
discussions for such a pact in the Spring of 1856. Out of these
discussions emerged a draft of the Continental Treaty (also
known as the Tripartite Treaty) and a tentative plan for a new
American congress (Inman, 1965: 25; Nuermberger
, 1940: 33-39).
The Continental Treaty provided for the convening of a
congress of plenipotentiaries three months after the exchange of
ratifications of its members. The congress was to be a
consultative body with the "right and power to offer its
mediation... in the event of differences arising among the
contracting states." It was prohibited from involving itself
with "the intestine commotions, internal movements or
agitations" of the member nations, but the signatories were
pledged to assist whenever any state was threatened by
"piratical expeditions or aggressions." The treaty affirmed the
preservation of independence of each state, the non-recognition
of cession of territory except by mutual agreement, the
prohibition of amassing troops on frontiers for invasion, and
the existence of an American international law. Like the 1848
conventions, the treaty also sought to promote commercial
expansion by seeking a uniform customs system with reduced
tariffs, uniformity of monetary systems and weights and
measures, rules of navigation and shipping, and postal reform.
It also included articles encouraging the diffusion of education
and extending generous privileges to members of the learned
professions. Peru was charged with the responsibility of
inviting other Spanish American governments to subscribe to the
treaty after it was signed by the representatives of Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru on September 15, 1856 16 ( Nuermberger
,
1940:
43-46; Inman, 1965: 25; Moreno Pino, 1977: 46-47).
By that time, however, William Walker's infamous
filibustering campaign in Nicaragua was well under way. This
North American adventurer held a dubious claim to Nicaragua's
presidency after defeating the conservative government's forces
in 1855. The other Central American states, led by Costa Rica,
soon united in a military campaign against Walker. 17 An
incident involving the reception of Walker's diplomatic envoy to
the United States, August x'n Vigil, by the Pierce Administration
in May 1856 convinced many Latin Americans that the U.S.
officially supported Walker. This unfortunate incident not only
prompted the signing of the Continental Treaty; it also caused a
flurry of diplomatic protests by outraged Latin governments and
produced several other joint Latin American diplomatic
responses
.
Immediately after the Vigil incident, an invitation was
issued by Venezuela, where unionist sentiment had reemerged, for
an American congress on the isthmus of Panama. 18 A short time
later, in November, 1856, the Latin American diplomatic corps in
Washington held a two-day conference at the Peruvian legation to
discuss the Walker filibuster. Unaware of the terms of the
Continental Treaty and acting without instructions from home
governments, the ministers of seven Spanish American states 19
signed a sub spe rat is treaty providing for a plan of alliance
and confederation and calling for a new American congress in
Li-. Independently of these efforts, Costa Rican envoys
seeking aid from Chile and Peru to f ight Walker invited all the
Spanish African republics to an African congress at San Jose'.
One of the Costa Rican envoys had also suggested to Mexico that
it revive the treaties drafted at the Congresses of Panama and
Tacubaya; soon, Mexico offered itself as the site for a
-great
American congress,- arguing that its proximity to the U.S. made
it the first line of defense against Yankee expansionist
(Nuermberger, 1940: 41-42, 47-51; Moreno, 1928: 114-115).
With so many different calls for an American congress in
response to the Central American crisis, it became difficult to
coordinate anything except the idea that some such congress
should be held. The government of Peru focused on fulfilling
its responsiblity of inviting other Latin American states to
subscribe to the Continental Treaty. Colombia, Argentina and
Brazil all expressed reservations to some of the terms of the
treaty while Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia focused on one of
the various other calls for an American congress. Nevertheless,
by June 1857, Peru's envoy to Central America, Pedro G^lvez, had
persuaded Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to
20sign the Treaty. By that time, however, William Walker had
been routed (in May) by Costa Rican President Juan Rafael Mora,
who led a united Central American military campaign to defeat
Walker. The "Great National War" of the Central American states
revived a sense of unity as well as the idea of re-establishing
2
1
the Central American federation. But with Walker defeated and
an Official U.S. disapproval of his filibuster, the stifled
internal struggles between Liberals and Conservatives soon
resurfaced in Central Africa and elsewhere. With the foreign
threat removed, this third polycentered movement for a Spanish
American union fell apart and the Continental Treaty was
officially shelved by its sponsors on September 14, 1857 22
(Nuermberger, 1940: 54-55; Karnes, 1976; Moreno, 1928).
Yet this phase of the congress movement in Latin America
and its related diplomatic activity was not a complete failure.
Latin American diplomatic and military aid did help to defeat
Walker, and both the Continental Treaty and the sub so.
pact drafted in Washington caused the United States to take
notice of the potential power of a Spanish American league. As
the U.S. minister to Peru, J. Randolph Clay, warned the Peruvian
government in the summer of 1857, the ratification of both
treaties would have presented
the singular spectacle of a Union of all the Nations
of the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United
States. And the only... cause of such exclusion would
be that the nations signing the treaties had formed
themselves in£o a league to control the power of the
United States (quoted in Nuermberger, 1940: 53).
Moreover, the Continental Treaty would remain an important
instrument and point of departure in the next movement for a
Spanish American congress in the early 1860s.
In March 1861, Spain annexed the Dominican Republic in a
bid to reassert its imperial claims in the Western Hemisphere.
The Peruvian Foreign Minister, Jose Fabio Melgar, protested the
annexation and called on the African republics to unite in
opposition. In October of the same year, France, England and
Spain signed the Convention of London, providing for their joint
intervention in Mexico to force the collection of debts. 24 Once
again the Peruvian foreign minister sent a circular to other
Spanish American republics urging a uniform response to growing
European interventionism. Peru also tried to gain United States
support in opposing these threats, but the U.S. Civil War
prohibited North American participation (Frazer, 1948: 378-379;
Frazer, 1949: 321; Inman, 1965: 26; Davis, 1977a: 109).
After French military forces began a march from Vera Cruz
to Mexico City in April 1862, the Peruvian minister to the
United States called a conference of the Spanish American
diplomatic corps based in Washington. Like their counterparts
six years earlier, the representatives from Peru, Chile, Mexico,
Colombia, and the two men representing the five Central American
states wrote a document calling for a convention that would
constitute the "international law of the Americas," guarantee
the sovereignty of the Spanish American states, and provide for
the collective security of its members. Meanwhile, the Peruvian
minister to Mexico, Dr. Manuel Nicola's Corpancho, had no trouble
persuading the anxious Mexican government to accede to the 1856
Continental Treaty, as stipulated in a bilateral treaty of amity
and alliance signed in June, 1862. This Peruvian attempt to re-
invigorate the Continental Treaty was not as successful
elsewhere in Latin America, where it was generally held to be
inadequate. 25 Nevertheless, with strong domestic support26 the
Peruvian government continued to plan for a diplomatic
conference in Lima to aid Mexico in its war against France
(Davis, 1977a: 109; Frazer, 1948: 382-384, 386).
Then in early 1863, under the pretext of a "scientific
expedition," Spanish warships established themselves in Peruv
waters off the Chincha Islands. The true purpose was to force
Peru into settling old financial claims with Spain and, failing
that, to seize the guano-rich islands and exploit its riches as
payment. Alarmed at Spain's expanded imperial ventures, the
Peruvian government sent out invitations for a new American
congress. Once Spain occupied the Chincha Islands and began to
mine their guano, Chile and other neighboring states responded
positively to the invitation, both by aiding in the war against
Spain and by agreeing to hold the International Congress of
American States (also known as the Second Lima Congress), which
opened on November 14, 1864 (Davis, 1977a: 121-2; Inman, 1965:
27; Frazer, 1949: 335).
Distinguished delegates from Chile, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador attended the congress.
Unlike past congresses, even Argentina took part through its
respected participant-observer, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. Two
issues were on the conference agenda: The Spanish aggression in
capturing the Chincha Islands and the formation of a permanent
American union. As for the first issue, the congress drew up a
warning to the admiral of the Spanish fleet stating that the
lan
aggression against Peru constituted a threat to all the
^ericas, and that if friendl y relations with Spain were to be
maintained, he would have to withdraw promptly from the
Chinchas. But the war continued. A joint Chilean-Peruvian
fleet inflicted important losses on the Spanish, but the war
finally ended due to political changes back in Spain that
reversed its imperial ambitions. After a treaty between Spain
and Peru was signed in January of 1865, the Spanish fleet was
withdrawn and the financial claims against Peru were declared
paid by the sale of the Peruvian guano. Spanish forces withdrew
from the Dominican Republic in the same year (Inman, 1965: 28;
Frazer, 1949: 335-36, 341; Davis, 1977a: 123).
With the crisis over, the international congress in Lima
turned to its second agenda item, the establishment of a
permanent American union. Four treaties were negotiated
resembling those of the previous congresses. The Treaty of
Union and Defensive Alliance sought to guarantee the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the union
members through the principle of collective security. It also
provided for a congress of plenipotentiaries every three years.
The second treaty, On the Conservation of Peace, called upon the
signatories to settle all differences by peaceful negotiation
or, failing that, by arbitration. It specifically cited
boundary disputes, a nagging (and growing) source of conflict
between Latin American states throughout the ninetennth century,
as a matter for negotiation or arbitration. The third treaty
was another postal convention designed to improve communications
between the members, and the last was another Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, similar to those of the past (Frazer, 1949: 339-
341, 343-344; Moreno Pino, 1977: 47; Inman, 1965: 28).
The congress held its last meeting on March 13, 1865. None
of the treaties were ever ratified. As in the past, after the
Chincha crisis had been resolved 27 some delegates began to lose
interest in the conference. As in the past, reservations
surfaced in some states over the specific terms of the treaties
while in other states, domestic political differences re-
emerged. In Peru and Bolivia, civil unrest forced both
governments to table the treaty ratifications. The President of
Chile argued in his national legislature that pacts of union
between American states would be ineffective until the
individual nations were more stable and could provide for their
own defense. The Colombian government voiced the opinion heard
elsewhere that the Spanish American states should not form
alliances that might limit their autonomy or involve them in
other states' domestic or foreign conflicts (Frazer, 1949: 344;
Inman, 1965: 28; Moreno Pino, 1977: 47).
The Second Lima Congress ended with a lasting sense of
failure. After 1865, the Latin American states abandoned
efforts to create a Bolivarian union and instead turned their
attention to developing several principles and codes of
international law. Several Latin American legal conferences
were held in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
including the Congress of Jurists at Uma fr0ffl 18„ to^ ^
Bolivaran Congress at Caracas on arbitration in 1883, and a„
important congress on private internationa! lav i„ Montevideo in
1888-1889. Latin American dipjomats also worked hard to gain
international acceptance of arbitration as a remedy for
resolving disputes at the Hague conferences in the 1890s and
pressed for acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, formulated by the
Argentine Luis Drago, which stated that debt or economic claims
never give rise to a legal right to intervene by force in
another country. But the idea of creating a uniquely Spanish
American union of states faded into the past (Atkins, 1989: 179-
180; Inman, 1965: 31; Davis, 1977b: 12).
Cone lusion
Why did the Latin American states fail to establish a
permanent Congress after so many attempts? The answer to this
question partly depends on the standards by which one judges
nineteenth century Latin American diplomacy. It is true that
the statesmen failed to build the necessary institutional
machinery that would drive an ongoing union of states, yet it is
clear that calling diplomatic congresses to defend against real
foreign threats was the preferred, accepted, and repeated means
of countering such threats. The idea was "institutionalized."
The exercise of Spanish American diplomatic solidarity in
seeking collective security -x agreements to block European or
North American adventurism was at least stronx g enough to
coov.ce uetin statesmen that ^ „asanatural
, usefuijand
elective
_ for indiyidually ueaR states ^
respond to the threat of ir,*n intervention. Whether n, ocwn cn these congresses
«*»U, deterred aggression „ cau£ed foreign pouers ^^
iDterVeDti0nS «~. lass important ^
». f«t that nany Latin teerican sta£es apparentlybeHeved
such diplomatic unity £hen uith ^
means of defense.
Moreover, the hoIding „f such high.level
congres.es „a s stil, an innovation in ^ ^^
nat ional re lati0„s. U the Europeens failed t0 institutionaUze
their congresses into
. "percent" svste, in the nineteenth
century, „e should „ot hoId the Lati „ ^ ^ ^
different standard.
The Latin American congresses of i-h*di r the nineteenth century
must be appreciated as more than just ad hoc meetings. They
constitute the critical points in the development of Latin
American diplomatic history and diplomatic style. They
represent a series of steps towards multilateralism in
international affairs aimed at preserving the peace and progress
of member states. They were tools that allowed individually
weak Latin American states to develop a degree of strength from
unity. Moreover, these congresses also had agendas that went
beyond dealing with the immediate threat of foreign
rntervention
. The diplomat£ at tne congresses Ieco^ the
«- for increased
.terstate cooPeratio„ and „araonUatlon
,f
-t aiso t„ prooote co_ rce ^ deveiopMnt ^
K inally> these congresses
thfi
contribution to the deve lopment o £ geoera! codes of publ ic
-fn-tW Uv an. ioternatioaai legal re.ed.es t o resdve
conflicts, es Pecia lly those of Nation and arbitration
_
treaties negotiated at tne congresses snov a dear c„«itMt t0
each of these themes.
Nevertheless, it is trn* ^v,,,ue that once signed by the diplomats,
the treaties produced by the congresses failed to receive
ratification by m0S t of the participating states. These
failures sometimes resulted from reservations over certain-
details of the treaties often followed by calls for further
negotiation. Sometimes interstate rivalries or disputes over
border questions interfered. But the failure of treaty
ratification appears to be mostly due to the chronic internal
instability of nineteenth century Latin American governments.
Liberals tended to support such diplomatic activity while
conservatives tended to balk at the Bolivaran notion of
collective security and foreign policy cooperation against the
European monarchs. Whatever temporary cooperation may have
existed between Liberals and Conservatives to defend national
interests against foreign aggression, once such threats were
r-oved, Liberals and Conservatives could reS ume their lnternal
power struggles, thus upsetting the ratification process. 28
Related to but going beyond the chronic instability and
weakness of Latin governments in the nineteenth century, there
is another explanation for the seeing fai l ure of instUu .
tionalizing the Latin congresses into a true international
organization in the four decades after the Congress of Panama.
Not only were international organizations as we Know the, today
as yet unknown, but there existed no clear and accepted hegemon
of such a regime. The strongest states of the region, Brazil
and Argentina, had remained mostly aloof from the congress
movement, thus foregoing the opportunities to lead it. Mexico
had tried to play a leadership role until the mid-1840s, and
later Peru came close to playing such a role after that.
Occasionally other states vied for the leadership role in
furthering the Bolivaran project. The jockeying for leadership
roles by Lima, Mexico, Colombia and Chile may have also stirred
nationalistic jealousies elsewhere, helping to stalemate the
ratification process. The polycentered movement for a congress
that was never realized in the mid-1850s clearly suggests that a
clear and accepted hegemon was lacking.
In any case, as we know from the work of Keohane and Nye
(1977) and Keohane (1984) on the study of complex inter-
dependence and international regimes, without a clear and
accepted hegemon to lead and support the institutionalization of
rnternationa: cooperation
, an ongoing international organiMtion
win problably not energe
. Indeed> i( Mt untii ^^
S-tes joined in and proffered ^ ^ ^
syste. that the machinery capabu o£ m totir^rian
organization „as buiu
. To be sure> ^
"ithin the ran-*»erican svste* over it, leader6hip>^
Principles, and tteans. hatin American statesmen continued to
try to develop the legal and diplomatic theoes of ^
especially the principles of non-intervention and arbitration
and the desire for economic development, while North American
statesmen sought to institutionalize various versions of the
Monroe Doctrine. „ is thi . phase of Latin
relations to which we turn in the next chapter.
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and whose
President James Monroe's Statement to theUnited States Congress, December 2, 1823. 1
The Pan-American Union and The Monroe Doctrines
The government of the United States tended to remain aloof from
the various nineteenth century Spanish American attempts to form a
diplomatic and defensive union of states. The United States shared
with Latin American liberals the idea that the New World republics
were uniquely different from the decaying monarchies of Europe, and
the "Two Spheres" concept developed early in the North American
national consciousness. However, the Washingtonian and Jeffersonian
pronouncements against permanent, inveterate, and entangling
alliances became the cornerstone of early U.S. foreign policy and
precluded serious participation in the Bolivaran projects of union
to the south.
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statement to Congress, which on ly much later would come to he known
as the Monroe Doctrine. 3 was a unilateral policy statement seeking
to defend the national interests and security of the young North
American republic vis-a-vis European powers. It did not pledge any
U.S. aid or support to other American states for the mutual defense
of their independence. It also recognized the continued colonial
status of other European territories in the circum-Caribhean region,
such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica (Atkins, 1989: 112-115;
Moreno Pino, 1977: 72-73; Boersner, 1986; Whitaker, 1954; Langley,
1989).
Preoccupied with its land expansion westward during the rest of
the nineteenth century, the United States government tended to deal
with the states of South America on limited, bilateral, and mainly
commercial terms. Nineteenth century U.S.
-Mexican relations are an
important exception to this generalization, with the Mexican-
American War (1846-1848) playing an important role in the
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there v,ere factions in the United^ ^^^
U.S. part icipati0n in Spani8h AMr .cin dipioMtic ^^^^^
rilibusterers and private entrepreneurs, such as Willi» WaXRer
^ohn L. O'SolHv.n, Cornelius VanderhiHt ana others, heca.e
intensely involved in the affairs of LpHt, aUS t atln American states in the
circum-Caribbean region.
Nevertheless, it was not until the western frontier was closin,
in the 1880s that the United States government officially began to
turn its attention southward to expand its commercial ties and
promote commercial opportunities with the rest of the hemisphere.
The need for raw materials for industrial expansion and the search
for new markets for its industrial goods were becoming all the more
important given intense European (and especially British)
competition. In the 1880s both the United States and many Latin
Americans shared a growing concern over increased European economic
investments in the Western Hemisphere and over Europe's
imperialistic tendencies there as well as in Africa and Asia. In
the United States, this concern was manifested in a growing
sentiment of "Pan-Americanism," which stressed the presumed
geographic ties and political affinities of the New World
repub 1 ic s
.
One of the better known Pan-Americanists in the 1880s was James
G. Blaine, who served as the U.S. Secretary of State in two
different administrations. In 188], Secretary Blaine issued
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invitations t0 el! tne Latin American states <„„^ ^ ^
-taxational confer in Wa8hington
. ^ ^
ootbreak of the War of the Pacifio (1 879.1882 oetveen Chile.
Peru, and Bolivia), Secretarv m •>> y Blame mtended for the conference to
consider ways to prevent war as well acs xmprove commercial relations
- the Americas. After President ^
President Chester Arthur rep lace d Secretary Blaine and poinded the
conference invitations. Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress maintained
an interest in Blaine's ideas and sent a mission to Latin America to
study commercial opportunities in the reg ion. ln 1888
, the Congress
Passed a resolution authorizing P res ident Grover Cleveland to call
another international conference to address commercial matters as
veil as to consider a plan of arbitration to settle international
disputes in the Americas. The president acquiesced and invitations
for the Pan-American conference were sent out. It was James Blaine,
reinstated as Secretary of State under the new administration of
President Benjamin Harrison, who presided over the First
International Conference of American States, which opened in
Washington on October 1, 1889 (Moreno Pino, 1977: 75-76; Peck, 1977:
167; Inman, 1965: 33-34; Atkins, 1989: 116).
All of the Latin American states except the Dominican Republic
sent delegates to the conference. 6 Over the next six and a half
months, until April 18, 1890, Secretary Blaine ably ran the seventy
sessions of the conference and nurtured his pan-American vision of a
hemisphere of friendship and cooperation. The first fifteen
sessions focused on the general organization of the conference and
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o* <eveloping it8 procedural ruUs>7 uou]d e£tabiish^
Precedes for future ffieeting£
. The ^^^
.««t- to the two principal agenda itens; expansion ^^
" "d 4~1<«" of
. plan 0£ arbitration
daman, 1965: 40; Moreno Pino, 1977- 75. •. 'HI. 75; Atkins, 1989: 116; peck>
1977: 167-168; Boersner, 1986: 194-195).
The Latin American delegations
.ere most interested in
^cussing toe plan of arbitration and related politica! matters
such as those relating to extradition, the juridical rights of
foreigners (including the Calv0 principU)> ^ ^ ^
the right of congest. The conference approved a treaty providing
for the voluntary arbitration of international disputes vhich eleven
states signed, but no state ratified the treaty before its deadline
of Kay 1, 1891. 8
The United States was most interested in discussing the
commercial matters on the conference agenda, especially measures to
for, an inter-American customs union. The conference passed various
resolutions concerning improved transportation and communications
services, uniform customs and commercial regulations, monetary and
exchange controls, patents and copyright protection, and
international sanitation measures; yet these agreements received few
ratifications (Peck, 1977: 168; Inman, 1965: 43, 45).
Little came of the U.S. goal of creating a hemispheric customs
union except for one lasting agreement that created the
International Union of American Republics. This rudimentary
regional organization including both the United States and Latin
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~ '° p„bHsh
, and di6tribute
co-ercia!
""""" °«d
fron and f„
— The „„ioo- s permanent org an, the Coaaercial office of
A-ican Republics> ^ fa ^ ^^ ^
SUper„ iaion of the u.s. secretary of state
_ s36)0oo ^ u
^ the unit ea S tataa for itl operation£ in first year>
Co^ercia! Office „egan publialling a P e ri ocic tulletin lna sooa
conceded it8elf vith . vid„ range Qf ^ ^
economic life and erowth nf {f. u 9 ,g o its members (Moreno Pino, 1977 : 76;
Atkins, 1989: 205- Peck 1Q77. t
=>, r , 1977: 168; Inman, 1965: 45-46; Boersner,
1986: 194-195; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxi).
It took eleven years for a second International conference of
American Republics to be held in Mexico City (1901-1902), but two
-re conferences followed at four-year intervals after that (in Rio
de Janeiro, 1906, and Buenos Aires, 1910). It thus appeared that
the Pan-American movement gained ground in the first decade of the
twentieth century. However, at each of these three inter-American
conferences, clear differences emerged between Latin American states
and the United States over the structure and control as well as the
purpose of the fledgling regional organization.
Differences over the structure of the organization focused on
the tight control of the U.S. State Department over the Commercial
Bureau, which was renamed and reorganized as the International
Bureau of American Republics at the Mexico City conference in 1902.
The Bureau was restructured to include Latin American diplomats
accredited to the United States in its directorship, however the
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U.S. secret of state continued t„ fce ^ ^^^
Governments uithout u^ recognUion ^ un£ted^ ^
those without dipiomatic representation to Washington could not
Participate iu the lnternational ^^^^
-tic ism at suhseque„t conferences hv Latin American states becauseU vas not dear whether the International Bureau was an
internal! diplomatic or8an administering a hemispheric union of
equals or merely a technocratic appendage of the U.S. State
Department, which sought to control and define
"Pan-Americanism" on
its own terms.
The United States blocked Latin American demands to change
these rules until well into the 1920s. However, after the 1906
conference in Rio de Janeiro, the International Bureau was given an
expanded secretarial role for the next inter-American conference.
At the 1910 conference in Buenos Aires, the Bureau's structure was
again a topic of debate, but all that could be agreed was to rename
it the Pan American Union after a new building of the same name was
donated by Andrew Carnegie in Washington to house this
administrative organ of the Union of American Republics (Moreno
Pino, 1977: 168-172; Atkins, 1989: 205-207; Inter-American
Institute, 1966: xxii-xxiv).
Renaming the Pan American Union was the only success of the
1910 conference. As Peck (1977: 172) summarized it, »[t]be spirit
of Pan Americanism, which had never been hardy, almost expired at
this conference." By that time, not only had differences over the
structure and control of the Union by the United States become deep,
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but disagreement over the purpose of thm ,P e regional organization
became clearer.
^ United States had continued t0 see the regioMi union ^ a
—
.
to improveMM ^^^^ coMerciai ^^^^^ ^ ^
COnSOUdate D ' S
-"— «- - regionat tteexp
_
of Europe capital. As heads ef the organization's^
secretariat. t„e .... secretaries of
_ ^ ^^ ^
agenda items of these ear!y inter-American conferences on such
apolitical issues a commercial reiations, settlement of financia!
c^ms, the study of the codification of Internationa, Uw. and the
secretariat's own institutional and procedural development. The
latin Americans, however, were more interested in political and
security issues. Io the tradition of the nineteenth century. Latin
American states thoug ht that the purpose of the Internationa! union
of American Republics was to ensure the sovereignty of its members
and develop peaceful. juridical means t0 seftU iDter.state
disputes. Conferee was a second-order issue compared to the
protection of sovereignty against interventionist threats from
outside powers. But by 1910, it vas the United States, not European
powers, that increasingly seemed to pose the principal threat to the
sovereignty of at least the c ircum-Caribbean states.
Between 1895 and 1910, Latin Americans had grown increasingly
concerned over the considerable expansion of U.S. interests in and
power over the c ircum-Caribbean region. In 1895, U.S. Secretary of
State Richard Olney articulated the new U.S. attitude toward the
region in his instructions to the U.S. minister to London, who was
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inwlved
"
arbitr£ti"8
* «•« •— Britain and
U. His instructions contained what would come to be called
the "Olney Corollary" te the Morroe
ccitL^/aniitriLi j: r ticaiiy™^ °° <«•it confines its interpos UP°?t^ e EUbj*" 6 '° «"ch
situation and practical^ ,'" "•••»«»ter of the
an other powers (in Gantenb™^",^: tl^" «
Three years later, in 1898, the United States intervened in the
Cuban war for independence fro, Spain and suddenly found its
military forces occupying the former Spanish colonies of Cuba,
Puerto Pico, and the Philippines. As Philip Koner ^ ^
the era of United States imperialism was born.
Within five years, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt had
implemented the Platt Amendment, which made Cuba a virtual
protectorate of the United States, and had secured the
"independence" of Panama from Colombia under similar terms in order
to begin the construction of a transisthmian canal. Then, in
response to political and financial instability in the Dominican
Republic in 190A, President Theodore Roosevelt declared his famous
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to justify U.S. military and
economic intervention in that island nation:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in
a general loosening of the ties of civilized society
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately requireintervention by some civilized nation, and in the
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United Statesto the Monroe Doctrine may force the United Stateshowever reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international
police power (in Gantenbein, 1950: 362).
65
to interne by force „^ ^ ^
Internationa! police power in the hemisphere
. A£ter^ ^
°»itea states increasingly turned to it£ BariDes to^
Sowing security interest8 and en£orce U6 _ authority ^ ^
circum-Caribbean region.
Thus Huited states polio, toward Latin America by 1910 operated
on two singly contradictory trajectories. On toe one hand, the
unxted States tried to promote its cooception of fr ie„dly "Pan
AOeriCaDiSffi
" ^ °» »-•» ioter-^ericao institutions to
increase the co^ercial oo ity and cooperation of the reg ion. On the
other hand, the Dnited States increasingly used its marines
unilaterally and aggressively to excercise its new-found aiiitary
and financial power at the expense of the sovereignty of Eany circum-
Caribbean states, including Cuba, Pana.a, the Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua and soon several others.
Not surprisingly, U.S. intervent ionism through military force
and financial control had produced considerable resentment and
opposition in Latin America. As early as 1901, at the Second
International Conference of American States, the Latin Americans
urged the United States to accept the principle of non-
intervention. 10 The United States opposed the resolution and was
able to push the intervention issue off the agenda of subsequent
conferences. Moreover, U.S. interventionism inspired many Latin
American essayists, poets, and statesmen to articulate a growing
anti-Yankee sentiment throughout Central and South America. Few
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-te„ could Batch the angry anti.intetVMtion£<tic
_ e ^X- r agU a„ Poe t Rub ,n Dario's Poem "To Ko0 savelt " (Wo
, ,„„
But ^y other Latin A.erican „ iter.u eioquenUy pointed ^
hypocrisy of "Pan Americanism" a^nd condemned Theodore Roosevelt's
twisting of the Monroe Doctrine into » -il l 0 a unilateral claim of
hegemonial police power over the hemisphere.
Several essayists even came to identify «ltlpll Monroe
^ctrines. The Chilean diplomat Marcial Martinez (1913: 302)
compared the Monroe Doctrine to a medal: On one side was President
Monroe's "simple and wise declaration," and on the other "the
aspirations and schemes
... 0 f imperialism, or Napoleonism, of the
United States in this hemisphere." The Mexican diplomat and
sociologist Carlos Pereyra (1914: 47-50; 1959) found at least three
Monroe Doctrines,
"perhaps there are others," each progressively
-re aggressive than the former and each serving only United States-
interests, not those of Latin America. Still others, l ike the
Colombo diplomat Santiago PeVez Triana (1914: 324) and former
Argentine President Roque Sa'enz Pena (1914: 345-352), argued that
the original Monroe Doctrine be extended to prohibit not just
European but also North American intervention ism in Latin America.
Only in this way could true pan-American friendship and trust
prevail in the hemisphere.
Despite mounting Latin American criticism, U.S. interventionism
in the circum-Caribbean region became even more aggressive in the
1910s. Eager to exercise its growing military power and convinced
of its moral and political superiority, the Wxlson administration
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turned increasingly to the use of gunboat dim.plomacy and initiated
prolongued military occuDat-i^oY p ions xn several other Caribbean states,
including Mexico (1914), Haiti (191«n a lU915)
»
and the Dominican Republic
<»">
-
Theodore Koosevelt, Woodrow Wilson was impatient with
«" political instability of the weak states of the region »
Wilson also held the traditional Monrovian concern about the
Possibility of European intervention in the states of the region
—
ally after the Panama Canal opened and war bro.e out in Europe
in 1914. Grounded or not, fears nf . cC t o a European military threat to
expanded
.... interests tfc# ^^ ^
Prompted the Wilson administration to rely increasing ly on the
marines as its principal policy instrument.
Latin America* hostility to Wilson's gunboat diplomacy and
prolongued U.S. military occupations in Cuba, Panama, Dominican
Wic. Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti was strong enough to prevent
any further inter-American conferences 13 until veil into the 1920s
and preclude continental solidarity in the course of World War I."
But the Latin American diplomatic response to U.S. hegemony and
interventionist, in the c ircum-Caribbean also took more positive
forms in the 1910s, !920s, and 1930s. During this period, both
within and outside of the pan-American institutions, a new kind of
diplomatic activism by several Latin American states emerged and
sought to challenge the power of the United States through various
diplomatic mechanisms while pressing the United States to accept the
principle of non-interventionism in inter-American affairs. The
Latin American diplomatic activism of this period is important for
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und er6tanding the Eub6equent development Qf ^
institutions of the inter.A^ •cn inter-American system.
Latin American Diplomatic Challenges toHege»ony and Intervention ism, 1914-1933
The ARC MeHi^j^
Between 1914 and 1933, several Latin American states jointly
used various legal and dip lomatic means to challenge the United
Sites' presumed right of intervention in the c ircum-Car ibbean
region. The first of these diplomatic challenges came in the wake
of the U.S. intervention in the Mexican Revolution in 1914, when
three of the stronger Latin American states, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, offered their good offices to mediate the military conflict
between the United States' and Mexican forces.
The events of the Mexican Revolution had deeply interested
President Woodrow Wilson since his first days in office and he
personally handled much of U.S. policy toward Mexico. Wilson
opposed General Victoriano Huerta's claim to power after the
assassination of Mexican President Francisco Madero and his vice
president. Instead, in the country's bitter civil war, Wilson
supported the constitutionalist forces led by Venustiano Carranza
against General Huerta's federalist forces.
In April 1914, two incidents occured in close succession that
drew U.S. marines into direct conflict with General Huerta's
forces. The first incident involved the arrest of a group of
marines on April 9 that had disembarked from its ship in Tar.pico
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-
—
» - -1 without the permission o£ the local authorUies
^ metter wa s SOOD cleared up ^ thfi _ uere ^ ^
*.«. admiral aemana ea an officlal apology ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ $
"as by Huerta's forces
, wMch controUed ^ ^ ^
refused these demands. Preside u-iesxdent Wxlson responded by announcing a
naval blockade of Mexico's coasts to cut off .° arms shipments to
Huerta's forces and bv askinooy x g Congress for the authority to use
military force in Mexico if i* xn it became necessary.
Before the Congress coula act the second incident occured
. 0q
APHI 20 soother U.S. ship at the port of ^
^
German ship „, about £0 deUver ^ GeMrai Huerta _ £^
Oo orders from Presiaent Wilson io the esrl y mor „ ing hours of April
21. the U.S. ship's admiral launched a violent attach on Veracruz
and landed 1,000 marines who fought both Mexican troops and
civilians to capture the town's customs house. Later that day,
Henry Oahot Lodge led the effort in the U.S. Senate to authorize the
use of force against Huerta ana urgea an even fuller U.S.
intervention into Mexico. Reinforcements of another 3,000 marines
soon followea to pacify the town ana establish the U.S. military
occupation of Veracruz (Guerrero Yoacham, 1966: 56-61; Serrano
Migallo'n, 1981 : 42-45; Peck, 1977: 174-157).
Throughout Latin America, the public reactea with shock and
angry conaemnations of the U.S. intervention. Many fearea the
outbreak of war between the two countries. In Washington, the
Argentine minister to the Unitea States, Rdmulo S. Naon, initiated a
proposal to his Brazilian and Chilean counterparts that the three
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the rntervention, on April 25, 1914, the tbree South African
-ipl-t. sent a note on hehalf of the ir go™n ts to the U.S.
Secretary of State. WUUaa, Jenning8 Bryan, ana to General Huerta
-ith the offer o£ Nation "to serve the interests o f peace ana
elation in out continent and with the desire of avoiding any
further bloodshed...." A si.iUr note was sent to Venustiano
Carranza on April 28 (Guerrero Yoacha*. , 966: 70> 74_74; Gantenbein,
1950: 572).
The offer of mediaton by the ABC powers, as they vere called by
the press at the tin*, von tbe praise of statesmen, diplomats and
the publics throughout the Americas and Europe. A rg entina 5 Bra.il
and Chile were the most stable and advanced states in Latin Africa
at the time and were emerging actors on the international scene.
Wary of encouraging revolutionary ideas in their own countries, none
of them approved of the bloody revolutionary conflict in Mexico; but
they were even less favorably disposed to leaving the U.S.
intervention unanswered. The primary interest of the ABC powers in
the mediation effort was to prevent a larger war through total U.S.
intervention in the Mexican civil war and to arrange for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Veracruz, but they also had an
interest in promoting negotiations among Mexico's warring factions
in order to pacify its violent civil conflict. 15 However, the
intransigence of the Wilson administration and the complicated
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as a
set up
internal situation of Mexico's civil „s a „ar prevented the mediat . on
effort from achieving ail of these goals.
The Wilson edministration vie„ed ^^ ^
Perfect opportunitv to arrange the removal of Ceneral Huerta
Provisions! government under ,S. influence. and 8upport c„ tai„derate reforms that would circumvent more radical demands for
change in Mexico. President Wilson immediately sent a confidential
-mo outlining this plan to the ABC diplomats aIong ^ ^
official U.S. aCce P t a„ce of the mediation offer (Ouerrero Voach.m,
1 966: 71-72).
Genera, Huerta initielly ans „ered that „e ^^
the matter of the U.S. intervention hefore the International Court
at the Hague, but international pressure persuaded him to agree to
the ABC medietioo. He also saw the boost to his claims of
legitimacy that might be gained by being a party to the talks,
despite the official U.S. position of refusing to recognise his
government. As for the constitutionalists. Carranca's position vas
initially positive, agreeing "in principle" that the international
conflict between the United States and Mexico should be settled
through mediation. But after the ABC powers sought a cease fire
from all three parties. Carranza made it cle a r that he in no way
considered the internal civil conflict between Mexicans as a
legitimate subject of the mediation. It would instead constitute as
much of a violation of Mexican sovereignty as the landing of foreign
troops. Frustrating the careful preparations of the ABC diplomats
and thwarting Wilson's plan to negotiate the removal of Huerta in
72
tavcr of a coKtitotiMalitt provisional govenment) ^^^^
reeved the c« timiMlIi[tt f_ any^ ^ ^ ^
mediation (Guerrero Ycachaa, 1966: 71-72; 76-77).
Thus handicapped, the ABC mediation opened in Niagara F.ll.
Canada, on May 20, lM and ^ ^ ^
sessions were held iu which varioua proposals were drafted and
teieoted by either the United States or the ABC powers to remove
Huerta, estahlish S* type c, provisional or interim government,
and withdraw U.S. troops from Veracruz. The main difference in
these proposals had to do with the nature of the proviaional
government to he established. The Wilson administration insisted
that it he headed by a member of the constitutionalist party
-hut
not hy Carranza"-- while the ABC mediators, in accordance with the
Mexican Constitution of 1857, proposed that a provisional junta he
formed with one Huertista, one constitutionalist, and two neutrals
who would then call for new presidential and congressional
elections. Another difference was that the U.S. insisted that the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Veracruz was an issue to be
negotiated by the United States and a new provisional government
whereas the main ABC proposal stipulated that the withdrawal of
troops begin fifteen days after the formation of a provisional junta
and end within thirty days. In any case, the United States
succeeded in focusing the discussions on the internal political
matter of establishing a new government rather than on the
international conflict between the United States and Mexico.
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M" le
- " «. d.cussion of
i.t.n.,1 problems by outside (Guerrero YoMhAB> )966;
ICO 's
142).
The intrasigence of both WUson CarranM ^
«C medietors t0 the point tha£ they feared cmpiete^ ^
tb. mediation. Ir . final .ttenpt £o save uhatever internationai
Prestige they had won by extending their^ ^.^ ^ ^
mediators drafted a protocol that resolved iitae
represented the most that could be a2reed A „ • •o g . provision^ government
would somehow be organized by the Mexico* ,,,„ ," xic ans themselves; the United
States a„d the ABC states would recognize such a government
Mediately; the United States government would renounce any claims
to
.
„ar indemnity; the provisional government would declare a
political amnesty, and it would negotiate the creation of
international commissions to settle private Cairns of foreigners for
damages sustained during the civil war. The agreement made no
mention of
.
U.S. troop withdrawal from Mexican soil. The protocol
«as signed by the U.S. representatives on duly 1, 19H, and on duly
3 Huerta's representees sent the protocol to the Mexican Congress
for ratificotion, which came on July 11 with t-hi.> lx> ""t this meager outcome,
the ABC mediators proclaimed success and ended the mediation
conference (Guerrero Yoacham, 1966: 144-149).
The final protocol provided General Huerta with a face-saving
means to give up his claim to power and leave Mexico by July 16. It
also pledged the United States to respect the interim government
that followed. Within a month, an interim government negotiated the
14
surrender of federalist forces to rh»t e constitutionalists and turned
over power to Carranza by August 20. But it
„ 101y
U 11 W3S not ""til November
23, 1914, that the United States began to withH •draw its forces fromVeracruz, a decision which appears to have had l ittle if . fh .
.
.
,
lc i l anyt ing todo with the ABC mediation efforts 18 (r"tor (Guerrero Yoach^m, 1966: 152-
153; Serrano Miga ll<$n
, 1981: 52-54.
>es PUe its United outcone
, B0st observerE of ^
then have agreed that fhe ^ nediation probaMy
^
wider war or deeper int_ention by e unued^ ^ ^ ^
frustrated President Wilson's plan to installF a constitutionalist
Sovernment of His HKing (Guerrer0 ^ ^ ^
Sreatet significance of the ABC mediation is that it was a joint
diplomatic effort by three leading^ ^ ^
challenge the United States' presumed rig ht of intervention in the
civil war of a circu.-Caribhean state. The marine occupation of
Veracruz and the threat of another „, between the United States and
Mexico had prompted Argentina. Brazil, and Chile, in the ahsence of
inter-American peacekeeping machinery, to act together to limit and
try to resolve an inter-American crisis through diplomacy. The
participation of Argentina and Brazil in the mediation was in itself
significant insofar as both states had traditionally remained aloof
from earlier Spanish American multilateral diplomacy. Nov they led
the joint mediation effort, which would remain an important
precedent in establishing the principle of the peaceful resolution
of conflict in inter-American affairs (Guerrero Yoach^m, 1966: 170).
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The ABC mediating !r ion „ also lffiportant because ^
emergence of an ABC power hl„- v
'
b °C ln the^ twentieth century 19
which acted to chprk the expand lng power of the United States and
•»». leadership in asserting "Latin American" in t
. .
x erests in
hemispheric affairs. Moreover thm a- •
to ,
'
medlatl0D eff
-t itself helped
strengthen the ties nf «-v, •o thxs power bloc and made it a kind of
counterpoise in the southern cone to North Am •
. . 20 erican power in thehemisphere. Even Theodore RooseveltK recognized in his 1922
autobiography that
nllWTe AtnP t-:ePerBr: z
C
j
ViU
r
d
"—".1th..
•o far that they no longer s ' T ^ > ^ adva»«°
tutelage toward'the Z'"^ °'us precisely the position t-ll. n , ey occuPy toward
friendship is the ir ienZ » occ^ i^- Their
(Roosevelt, 1922? 506)
P e,UalS f° r e<,Uals
Finally, the ABC mediation won for the three states sufficient
diplomatic prestige to holster their new position and underscore
th.i. emerging power interests in hemispheric and intentions!
affairs. The diploic leadership and prestige goals of these
states (but especiany Argentina) would remain important once the
inter-African conferences resumed in the ,920s, as would the issue
of U.S. interventionism in the circuc-Caribbean region.
Latin American ni
r l omaflv Challenges t „ n q t„» . .W i thin the P,n *ZlTJ„\X
rU -Z
Tnt r r,rMMM»
The experience of the ABC mediation did not deter the Wilson
administration from launching other interventions and new military
occupations in the smaller circun
-Caribbean states, such as Haiti
in .915 and the Dominican ^ ^ ^^^ ^
Sch.idt, 1971; Calder> 1984; Langley> i989j i985; ^
1983). „0„ever
, it did cause D s< ^ state^
Lansing t0 advise wilson against further intervention ^ ^
at the very least, to avoid using the vord
"intervention." A»ong
other reasons, Lansing recognized that "African intervention in
"exico is extremely distastefu! to all Latin Africa and n ig ht have
a very bad effect upon our Pan-African program" ( in Gantenbein.
1950: 587).
Indeed, the United States' Pan-American program was stalled
until 1923, when the Fifth Inter-Amer ican Conference
-postponed
since 1914- was finally held in Santiago, Chile. Unlike the
previous inter-American conferences, the Latin American states
successfully placed several political and security issues on the
agenda of the Santiago meeting. There were few substantive results
of the conference, but three of its achievements were important.
First, the Pan American Union was again restructured, this time
removing the U.S. secretary of state as its officio head and
providing for the election of its president. The second and most
substantive product of the conference was the approval of the Treaty
to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts Between the American States, better
known as the Gondra Treaty (named after its author, a former
president of Paraguay, Manuel Gondra). This treaty was the first
positive attempt of the Latin American states to create an
obligatory procedure to settle potential military conflicts. Any
controversy not settled through diplomatic channels or arbitration
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-« to be submitted t0 an ad five conmissiM o£
The disputants vere pUdged to abetain ^ ^ hoEtiie^ ^
*ule the emission investigated the controversy and for . pariod
of six .onths after the mission made it< repor£
_ Auhough
cession's report had no jurid . cal ^ ^
established no effective s,ea„s tor 8ettUng
. con£Uct ^ ^.^
actio, had begun, it nevertheless provided for a coding off period
to prevent
.iHtarv conflict between states. It also created two
permanent emissions, one in Montevideo and one in Washington, to
receive and trans.it requests for invoking the emissions of
inquiry (Moreno Pino, 1977: 79; Peck, 1977: 185; Inter-A.erican
institute, 1966: xxv; Garner,
.966: 56; Gondra Treaty in Gantenhein,
1950: 731-736).
The third important occurrence of the 1923 Santiago conference
was an unusually frank discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Sever,]
Latin American delegations, led by Colombia, asked the United States
for a definition of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Not only
was the presumed right of intervention claimed by the Roosevelt
Corollary openly being questioned for the first time in an inter-
American conference; also at issue was the relationship of the young
inter-American organization to the League of Nations. By 1923 most
Latin American states 21 actively participated in the League, which
they saw as another potential counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. refusal to join the League
and Article XXI of the League's Charter mentioning the existence of
the Monroe Doctrine created doubts in many minds as to the
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usefulness of the League protecting utin ^^^^^ ^
-1U.— exercise o f U.S. pwer
. Argentina „ _^
an amendment at the Lpaon^'oe gue s first assembly that would have
eliminated the Charter's reference to t-fc mt the Monroe Doctrine, but that
Proposal was tabled 22 (Moreno Pino, 1 977 : 79; ^ ^
Peck, 1977: 181
, 184).
m Santiago, the U.S. delegation ^^
request by stating si.ply that the Monroe Doctrine „as "originally
and essentially"
. national policy not subject to international
debate or definition" (Moreno Pino. 1977: 79). Later that year, in
a speech co„ating the centennial of the Monroe Doctrine. U.S.
Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes reiterated this position by
stressing that because "the policy embodied in the Monroe Doctrine
is distinctively the policy of the United States, the government of
the United States reserves to it-col f a r-S 0 l se its definition, interpretation,
and application" (
i
n Gantenbein, 1950: 387).
The Latin American states were dissatisfied with this response
because it failed to renounce the interventionist claim of the
Roosevelt Corollary or re-establish the original anti-
interventionist premise of President Monroe's message to Congress.
In this atmosphere of growing Latin American impatience with and
hostility toward continuing U.S. interventionist policies in the
circum-Caribbean, the issue of intervention became the central focus
of the next two inter-American conferences.
At the Sixth Inter-American Conference held in Havana in 1928,
the debate over the intervention issue was so rancorous that the
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-notes of the meeting had to be rewritten (Connell-S.ith, 1966:
155). Led by Argentina, the Latin African delegations denuded
that the United States accept the principle of non-intervention as
formated during a meeting of the emission of African Jurists in
the previous year. The formula stated simply, -Ho State hfl8 the
right to interfere in the internal affairs of another." U.S.
Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes flatly refused this formula,
countering with what had become a familiar U.S. argument stressing
the international legal right to protect the lives and property of
its citizens (Moreno Pino, 1977: 80; Williams, 1971: 81-82; Peck,
1977: 187-188) :
What are we to do when government breaks down and
American citizens are in danger of their lives?...
Of course, the United States cannot forego its right
to protect its citizens. International Law cannot be
changed by the resolutions of this conference
( m Williams , 1 971 : 82)
.
Beyond the rancorous and unresolved showdown over the non-
intervention principle, the Havana conference did pass several
important resolutions, including one to study and codify American
international law and one to hold a special inter-American
conference on arbitration and conciliation. By December 1928, the
special conference was convened in Washington and produced the
General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, which extended
the scope of the Gondra Treaty, and the General Treaty of Inter-
American Arbitration and Protocol of Progressive Arbitration. These
agreements condemned war as an instrument of national policy and
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sought t0 develop ,te^ricso methods f„ setuement
o £ disputes. They veTe eventuany signed Md ^^^^ ^ ^
—
-
or the p.„-Anerican 8yster„ a„d Muld conprise centrai
albe it liBitea peace-keeping 6tructures o£ ^^ ^ ^ ^
'ecade (la Gantenbein
, ^^ ^ ^
Peck, 1977: 188).
The !928 „avana conference ms 3uccessfui ^ ^
~b.r.bi, and representation „,el of the Pan ^
dropping the old and controversial requiret ,eat that oniy those
diplomats accredited t „ Washington could participate ^ ^^
But despite its successes, the Havana conference is best revered
for its boated debate over tbe intervention issue. Yet official
U.S. attitudes toward intervention were beginning to change. I„
December 1928, tbe U.S. Under-Secretary of State J. Reuben dark 26
issued bis "Memorandum on tbe Monroe Doctrine," which repudiated the
Roosevelt Corollary as an invalid interpretation of the Monro,,
Doctrine and separated the "right of intervention" fro* the
underlying security principle of Monroe's message to Congress. In
other words, the Clark Memoranda did not repudiate the "right of
intervention" ^ ^, but disconnected it from the Monroe Doctrine.
The Clark Memorandum was not made public until 1930, but with the
diplomatic showdown between Latin America and the United States in
Havana and the writing of the Clark Memorandum, tbe year 1928 marks
the beginning of the end of this era of unilateral U.S. military
interventionism in the circuni-Caribbean region (Clark, 1 928: 115-
122; Perkins, 1966: 83; Connell-Smith, 1966: 157-158).
This
The Seventh Inter-American r„„rnc Conference was held at Montevideo
—a, in 1933 and marks the beginning of a new period o f inter-
-erican relation,. The conference ^^
—meats, but its _
^ ^
-Prove: 0£ the Convention on the Rights and Outies o £ State, X
convention not only define *k«7 ined the existence, personality, juridical
equality, and recognition of the state but it ,1 ,
'
D 11 also included in
Article 8 a non-intervention principle that vent even further than
^iled 1928 resolution by £tating> nate ^ ^
intervene in the internal or external «ff„<a airs of another" (in
Gantenhein, 1950: 759-763
; Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxvi .
Hcreno Pino, 1977: 82; F in8c
, 1977a; 2Q0; ^ ^ ^
By agreeing to this convention and accepting its non-
interventio,, principle, 28 Franklin D. Roosevelt demonstrated his
commitment to implementing his "Good Neighbor Policy," which he had
announced in his inaugural address in March 1933. Just two days
after the Seventh Inter-American Conference closed, President
Roosevelt reiterated this commitment in a speech to the Woodrow
Wilson Foundation by stating "the definitive policy of the United
States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention" (in
Gantenhein, 1950: 166). Franklin Roosevelt thus began to implement
a policy he had outlined in his 1928 article on U.S. foreign policy
that appeared in Foreign Aff n j r n, where he stressed the need to
"renounce the practice of arbitrary intervention in the home affairs
of our neighbors."
"Single-handed intervention by us in the
internal affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of
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others we shall have more order in thi* u ,a m s hemisphere and l e8s dislike"
(Roosevelt, 1928: 586, 585).
Although it was foreshadowed in the Clark Memorandum and in the
Hoover administration's decision to end the U.S. marine occupatioQ
of Nicaragua, the Good Neighbor Policy was a significant break with
Past U.S. policy by eX p licitly repudiating thfi^ ^^.^
and occupations of the previous decades (Curry, 1979). 29 Moreover
,
these interventions had not only created ill-wUl among Latin
Americans toward the United States; with the onset of the Great
Depression, such military interventions and occupations had also
become costly at home, both economically and politically. I„ factj
the Good Neighbor Policy became the foreign policy complement to
Roosevelt's New Deal policies by easing the financial drain on the
United States and facilitating economic recovery through trade in
the face of rising economic nationalism throughout Latin America.
As Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained in his speech to the
Seventh Inter-American Conference at Montevideo,
My government is doing its utmost, with due regard
to the commitments made in the past, to end with all
possible speed engagements which have been set up by
previous circumstances. There are some engagements
which can be removed more speedily than others. In
some instances, disentanglement from obligations of
another era can only be brought about through the
exercise of some patience. The United States is
determined that its new policy of the New Deal
—of
enlightened liberalism— shall have full effect and
shall be recognized in its fullest import by its
neighbors. The people of my country strongly feel
that the so-called right of conquest must forever be
banished from this hemisphere and, most of all, they
shun and reject that right for themselves. The New
Deal indeed would be an empty boast if it did not mean
that" (in Gantenbein, 1950: 164).
83
Thus, between 1 933 and 1936 tbe EooseveU ^.^.^
Caribbean reg io„. The administration ended the ^^
occupation of Haiti as Bell as t„e financiai ^.^^ ^
Haiti ana Dominican RepubUc; u ^ ^^
-it* Cuba and negotiated
. new ean al treaty with Panama. of courEe
» th. piece of the marines, long-standing dictators like
Somoza in Nicaragua. Fulgencio Batiata fa^ ^^
in Dominican Republic soon rose to power through the national guard
organizations previously created and trained during the D.S.
occupations. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt administration moved to
reorient U.S. policy toward Latin Africa along
.ore Hultilateraliat
and cooperative lines and hegan to construct a hemispheric security
regime based on the principle of collective security.
As if to prove its break with the past, in 1936 the Roosevelt
administration renewed its commitment to the non-intervention
principle by signing without reservation the Additional Protocol on
Non-intervention, a document containing the most sweeping non-
intervention clause yet:
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible theintervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly,
and for whatever reason, in the internal or external
affairs of any other of the Parties (in Gantenbein, 1950:
The Additional Protocol on Non-intervention was just one of
several important agreements produced by the Special Conference on
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the Maintenance of Ppar« \>^tae ce held „ Buenos Aires in 1936. The
immediate concern of this conferencp v»« ^t e was the devastating Chaco War
between Bolivia and Paraguay (1928-29, 1933 -38)
;
30 however ^
important part. The special conference's oth.s er agreements included
resolutions on the limitations of armaments and on the
"humanization" of war f„,f;1
» treaties on Good Offices anH u-a •Alic d Mediation and oi
the Prevention of Controvert {»« » rsies, a Convention for the Maintenance,
Preservation, and Rees tab 1 ishment of Peace> ^ & ^
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation. These
agreements would come to constitute the foundations of a new
security regime for the hemisphere based on the principle of
collective security (see Gantenbein, 1950: 771-780).
This nascent collective security regime was given a procedural
basis at the Eighth International Conference of American States held
in Lima in 1938. The "Declaration of Lima" established a mechanism
of consultation of foreign ministers to discuss any matter that
threatened the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any
American republic and thus gave effect to the principles of
continental solidarity and security. The new hemispheric security
regime received further elaboration at the three special Meetings of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers held during World War II (in
Panama, 1939; Havana, 1 940 ; Rio de Janeiro, 1942) and at the special
Chapultepec Conference on the Problems of War and Peace held in
Mexico in March, 1 945 (see Chapter IV). These moves toward building
an inter-American security regime culminated in the 1947 Conference
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the Maintenance of peace ^ Continen£ai £ecurity ^ ^ ^ ^jMeir
°'
WhiCh
'"-A-ican Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, ,„„ known as the Rio Treaty ^^ ^^
19?7: M "89;
"~"^ ^ Gsntenhein, 1950: ?85 .8I5)
Cone Imp ion
During the 1930s
, KrankUn D . Roosevelt ,s Good Ne . ghbor
Policy went
. long way t0„ard ^ ^ ^
almost died in 1910. In „ords and actionE> ^
administration convinced moat Latin American, that the era of U.S.
intervention^
-or whet Marcial Martinez had c a„ed "Hepoleonisn"-
»as over and that a new er s of hemispheric cooperetion and
solidarity based on mutual respect had begun. 31 The change in D.B.
policy may have had more to do with the United States' weakened
condition as a consequence of the Great Depression and related
domestic politics than with any specific diplomatic pressure exerted
by the Latin American states. 32 T.t the heated discussions of the
meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the principle of non-intervention
at the inter-American conferences of the 1920s and early 1930s
clearly indicated the necessary diplomatic path to take if the
United States wanted to improve its hemispheric relations and
strengthen inter-American institutions.
The effect of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was to
set the stage for widespread hemispheric cooperation during World
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- « -«. earn t„e g00d „iU politic a] capital nec_ ry to
<eve lop
_ ^e^. in8titutions during ^ ^
;
var
- h°— just
— -— - Dnited states had learaed
and partners, the United States emerged as a eloh ,g bal superpower and
developed a new vision of its ™i„ a •role and interests in the post-1945
international system. As Bryce Wood (19851 h fcy U98 ) has shown, the United
States then began t0 dismantle ^ ^ ^.^
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^ Unit6d Stat6S: Argentina, Chile,mbia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela.Argentina even went so far as to try to call an inter-Americanconference against the United States (Peck, 1977: 177-179)'
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>
the Argentines had soundedut he Brazilians and Chileans about the possibility of
offering their good offices to the warring parties in Mexico toend the civil war. All three states maintained neutrality inthe civil war (Guerrero Yoacha'm, 1966: 74-75).
16. Nevertheless, Carranza did send diplomatic envoys, including
Josd Vasconcelos, to Washington and to Buffalo, New York tokeep track of the proceedings in Niagara Falls and to relay
messages.
17. Wilson did not think Carranza was capable of governing
(Guerrero Yoacham, 1966: 113, 125).
18. The withdrawal did not end U.S.
-Mexican conflicts, which
continued throughout the revolutionary period. U.S. forces
again intervened in 1916 in pursuit of Pancho Villa.
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19.
20.
21
.
Norman Bailey (1967: 58) has referred to this bloc as
J-JJ- «
a resuU of L2£ ^^Hlso^ ins
Guerrero Yoacham (1966: 156-167, 170) cites at length severalassessments by Latin and North American observers at the timethat praxsed the ABC mediation as opening a nTv era ofdiplomacy and defining a new meaning for "Pan-Americanism"while earning for the ABC states a new prestigfand power ininternational and hemispheric affairs. ?
1921 T/r
B0
^
V
\
a end6d th6ir ParticiP^ion in the League inafter the League failed to consider the Tacna-Aricadispute, but both states returned to the LeaguJin 1 29 oncethe dispute was resolved (Peck, 1977: 181).
22. After this failed attempt, Argentina stopped actively
^L1CiPa A lng in LeagUG althou§ h ^ officially remained amember Argentina and other Latin American states (includingCosta Rica) tried again in 1928 to get the League to clarifyits position toward the Monroe Doctrine, especially after the
at tt l
ta
lt%
TfUSf Latin d6mandS t0 r6D0Unce interventionismhe Sixth Inter-American Conference in Havana (infra). TheLeague responded that Article 21 was not intended to extend thescope or confirm the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. This newposition permitted the League to begin to play a role inhemispheric conflicts after fighting broke out between Bolivia
and Paraguay over the Chaco territory (see note 30 below)(Peck, 1977: 183; Garner, 1966).
23. This position of the unilateral nature of the Monroe Doctrine
as a national policy was shared by many previous
administrations. President Taft's Secretary of State, Elihu
Root, once stated that "[sHnce the Monroe doctrine is adeclaration based upon the nation's right of self-protection,
it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by
American states or any number of them." President Wilson
reiterated this position by stating that "The Monroe Doctrine
was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It
always has been maintained and will be maintained upon her own
responsibility" (quoted in a speech by Charles E. Hughes, in
Gantenbein, 1950: 388).
24. Hughes also stressed that the Monroe Doctrine "is not a policy
of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense It still
remains an assertion of the principle of national security" (in
Gantenbein, 1950: 386). This is the earliest official use of
the term "national security" that I have come across in my
research.
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d "nit oTand ""I
C °nVenti0n f °CUSi
^ °° ^e" roll ms of
• 7 '
iUiains i iy/1: 96; Moreno Pino 1 977 - ft-nhis reservation left the door open'to futureTs }interventions* xn accordance with "the lav of nationsgenerally recognized." Nevertheless, the reservation stressed
'
U °
t
— t need fear any intervention on the lilt ofthe United States under the Roosevelt Administration" (inGantenbein, 1950: 763). ^ l
9
'
^Tp 11 ! °TPati °n ° f the ^minican Republic had ended in1924 due largley to its unpopularity in the United Stateshowever the United States maintained a military presence therethrough the training of the Dominican National Guard. The US
untii
ma
n
ntr ed S' 8 francial receivership over the country *
*
l the Roosevelt administration. Moreover, Curry (1979- 10)argues that during the Hoover administration, "the threat ofintervention [in the Dominican Republic] was held out as apossible if unwanted measure to discourage developments
regarded as inimical to the interests of the United States or
certain of its citizens." These threats of U.S. interventionin the Dominican Republic during the Hoover administration ledCurry to insist that "a Good Neighbor Policy for the westernhemisphere did not emerge before 1933. ...At no time during histenure did Hoover commit his administration to a policy of non-intervention in Latin America. ... Roosevelt was prepared to
commit the United States to non-intervention; Hoover was not.
And therein lay the difference" (Curry, 1979: 1, 9).
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAN II
The Emergence of the OAS System
The pa„-A.erica„ system began
. new phase ,f ^.^.^
consolidation and development with the special Chapultepec
Conference on the Prohlems o f „a r and Peace in I945
. 0rganized by
the Mexican government, the conference's agenda included
considers, ion of the future of the pan-A.erican system in light of
the creation of the United Nations Organization and discussion of
wavs to strengthen hoth the regional organization and the economic
health of the hemisohere 1 Th«> epn . The conference's Resolution IX, entitled
"Reorganization, Consolidation, and Strengthening of the Inter-
Scan System," introduced certain immediate reforms in the
structure of the Pan American Union and initiated a move to
consolidate the various juridical and institutional mechanisms of
the pan-American system into a more formal and permanent regional
organization.
Along with an "Economic Charter of the Americas" and other
resolutions of an economic nature, the Chapultepec Conference also
adopted Resolution VIII, kn0Wn as the "Act of Chapultepec," which
reaffirmed certain basic inter-American principles including the
sovereignty, equality, and independence of states, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, and the principles of collective security
and regional solidarity in the face of acts of aggression. With
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these principles in mind, the "Act of cu ,Chapultepec" called for the
development of a mutual defense treaty for th„ Au t e American states.
Such a treaty was signed at the 1947 Conference for the
Maintenance of Pearp onj r~ _ •ce and Continental Solidarity held in Rio de
-neiro. As indicated „^ ^ ^ _
Tr-, of Peciprocal assistance, or the Pio Pact (also Pio Treaty,
"Presented the collation of the decade-long development of the
'
collective security principie alo„g side the Cood Neighhor Policy in
xnter-Aa.erican affairs. The Pio Pact hecane a ready model for the
united States in formating its other post-war „tMl defense pacts
such as the North Atlantic Tr-^.*- rsTreaty Organization (NATO), s igned in
1949 (Moreno Pino, 1977- 87-rq. t„«. a
,
87 89, Inter-American Institute, 1966: xxix-
xxx; in Gantenbein, 1950: 816-81 9). 2
In 1948, at the Ninth Inter-American Conference held in Bogota,
the move to restructure the pan-American syste, as called for hy
Resolution IX of the Chapultepec conference culminated in the
signing of the Charter of Bogota, which created the Organization of
American States out of the older Pan-American institutions. The
Ninth Inter-American Conference also adopted the Pact of Bogota', or
the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which mentioned,
consolidated, and was meant to supercede all previous inter-American
instruments aimed at the pacific settlement of disputes 3 (Puig,
1983: 13; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 77).
Thus, between 1945 and 1948, the legal and institutional
framework for the post-war regional organization was rebuilt,
largely with the mortar of pan-American good-will left by the Cood
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Neighbor Policy. But after 1948, divergent US * r •.S. end Latin American
tb. edifice which „eakened it6 Ung .tera ab .uty ^
<»e relative interests of UHn African states and the United
States in thi new 0AS^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^
inStitUti0" 6)4
— they had baan at the origin
of the pan-American movement i„ i„9. For the United States,
security concerns in the hemisphere had become primary during World
War U and regained so with the emergence of the cold war . To the
e-ent that the inter-American system mattered at all to policy-
in Washing given their new preoccupation with developing
containment policies for Europe end Asia, the new inter-American
institutions were taken to represent an undisputed anti-communist
regional bloc that supported U.S. ideological and strategic
leadership in the global cold war (Williams. 1971: 48; Wilson, !975:
53).
While many La tin American states shared the anti-communist
focus of U.S. containment policy, after the signing of the Rio Pact
in 1947 the most crucial issue for their post-war foreign policies
and for the reformed regional organisation was to promote economic
development. Even at the 1947 Rio Conference, Mexican Foreign
Minister Jaime Torres Bodet expressed the view of msny Latin
American delegates that raising the living standards of the masses
was as important an obligation as providing for mutual defense
(Finan, 1977d: 259). With the security of the hemisphere provided
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* the Rio Pact
, m0£t Latin AnericM govmts^ ^ ^
OAS as a mechanism t0 promote regiona[
l0 °ked
"
DnUed S
— - •«« « «-hall P lan for the
j!'el0PMl a6Si— 5~ '° «- "Sio, during the l 950s and
».S. rnsistence on the role of priva[e loan£ ^ priyate
direct investment as the motor fM deveiopnent becMe ^
of contention during the fir** a c ,8 st decade of the OAS (Wilson, 1975: 54-
55; Williams, 1971: 66).
The U.S. stance on aevelopment pol . cy aUo cushed Bith ^
approaches of several Latin American reformers and /or popu lists in
the 1940s and early l 950 s. Leaders like Rdmulo Betancourt in
Venezuela, Rafael A„g el Calderon Guardia and W ?im^
Costa Rica, Juan Jose Arevalo and d^cobo Arbenz 6 in Guatemala, and
several others had admired Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies
and sought to devise Latin variations to promote their countries'
economic d evelo Pn,ent through public capital and a significant state
role. Their economic, social, and political reform programs soon
got them into trouble with comestic elites and eventually aroused
suspicions in the United States. Once the col d war got unoer way,
Latin American keynesianism (or state capitalism) and economic
nationalism, combined with a tolerance of left wing political
parties by some of these reformers, led to growing concerns from
poliy makers in Washington who tended to interpret such orientations
in stark cold-war terms.
Beyond the » tMtl „„ over economic ^ ideoiogicai
distinct problem „ f the UDited states .
_ 6uferpower status
«- Us meaning for hemispheric ^ ^
or legal e,MUty of the American states, now codified in the
PO- ana it s new leadersh lp role in the internationaI^ _
led to the re-emergence of old problems in the inter-American
•ysten. while some Latin American states saw the OAS as a mediatins
mechanism between the United States and Latin America, others saw it
once again as a tool for the United States to control Latin America
according to U.S. hegemonic interests.
Indicative of Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance over
the reformed regional organization is the fact that several Latin
American states delayed their ratifications of the OAS Charter for
four or more years after its signing i„ 1,48. For example, Cuba and
Peru delayed ratification until 1952; Chile until 1953; Guatemala
and Uruguay until 1955; and Argentina delayed ratification until
1956. Only three states, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and
Mexico, ratified the OAS Charter within one year of its signing. By
contrast, all signatories to the Rio Treaty except Guatemala had
ratified the treaty within three years of its signing in 1947, and
most states
-fifteen of them- had ratified it within one year. 7
The 1948 companion to the OAS Charter, the Pact of Bogota, likewise
failed to attract the enthusiasm of the American states. Seven
states signed the Pact with reservations, and by 1966, only ten
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states had bothered to ratify it 8 The f"r . few ratifications and
numerous reservations attached to this form,!cm al system of pacific
"*«!—. c f disputes tteant that the pact of Bogot ,
— Institute
, 1966: 382
_
387 _398
1983: l3i Scheman, 1988: 66; Martz>
» thus appears that after J948 ^^.^ soi . d8rity ^
b-.in.in. to veaken and that from Us inceptim ^ ^ ^
-rains of diverg ing interem ^ fa^^ ^^
America. The fine cracks i„ th. 0AS system^ ^ ^
with the Tenth Inter-American Conference he!d in Caracas in Harch -
the last such conference ever to be heia 9- an, .itb the ensui„g
political crisis in Guatemala in June.
The OAS System and the Cold War
The Guatemala r r ; s j s .
United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally
attended the Caracas conference just long enough to ensure passage
of the famous Resolution XCIII, the "Declaration of Solidarity for
the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States." This declaration was aimed against the government of
Ja-cobo Arbenz in Guatemala, which was increasingly seen as communist-
oriented by the U.S. press and policy-makers in Washington. 10 The
declaration stated that
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movement, extendi; ^ h ^ °£ colonist
system of a„ extracontinentalTower
"ouL
P°UtlCal
a threat to the sov»™;„„,
Powe
f.
wo ld coostitute
of the American States
8^ * >°Uti'* 1 independence
and would call f« IMJSSS.'S ° f *""U '.
tUsjUMliaiuif approprH e^ccion I"' "-"^^^X
existing treaties fl„ r I ,
lo ln accordance with
emphasis added) ^'"-Anerican Institute, 1966: 131;
Aware that it was directed against the Arbenz government and
vary of unilateral action by the United States, the Latin American
delegations insisted on amending Dulles' resolution by inserting the
retirement of calling for "a Meeting of ConsuUation to consider
the adoption of" appropriate action. 11 Under hoth the OAS Charter
and the Rio Treaty, a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers
was the mechanism through which political and collective security
issues were to he discussed and decided. In times of crisis or when
it was otherwise impossible for the region's foreign ministers to
assemble, the Council of the OAS (COAS) could act as the system's
provisional organ of consultation.
Along with trying to prevent any unilateral U.S. action against
Guatemala, several Latin American delegations also challenged the
cold war orientation of Secretary Dulles' resolution and introduced
amendments stressing the need to address the economic, social, and
political problems within the hemisphere that gave rise to communist
movements in the first place. But Secretary Dulles' maneuvers at
the conference succeeded in leaving such amendments to be
incorporated into a separate resolution (XCV) entitled "Declaration
of Caracas." According to Richard H. Iam.era.an (1982: 149), Dulles
100
even Bent so far as ^
^^
of KesoUUon «!„. The Latin
went a!ong sith Sec retary Dulle5 - in ^^ ^ ^
inducing him to consider Latin reauest, fo
13
q s for economic development
a^. However, Secretary Dulles returned to Washington once his
resolution was passed, leaving the remaining U.S. delegation with
the task of dealing with those requests (Ronning, 1963: 73-74, 82-
Wilson, 1975: 55-57; Will iaros> 1971:A9; ^
'
Wood, 1985: 171; Connell-Smith
, 1974: 212-214).
A short time later, in June 1954, events in Guatemala produced
the first cold war crisis of the OAS system. A small insurgent army
of anti-communist Guatemalans, armed and trained by the CIA in
Nicaragua and Honduras, launched an attack on Guatemala with the
purpose of overthrowing the Arbenz government by force. Although it
had not yet ratified the OAS Charter, the Arbenz government called
on its two peacekeeping mechanisms, the Council of the OAS (COAS)
and the Inter-American Peace Committee, to investigate the acts of
aggression launched from the territory of Guatemala's neighbors.
Due to deliberate obstructive efforts by the United States, the OAS
machinery was slow to respond to this request, leading the Arbenz
government to appeal directly to the United Nations Security
Council. There the United States disingenuously argued for the
"primacy" of the OAS in dealing with the regional crisis. In
accordance with Secretary Dulles' Resolution XCIII, the Rio Treaty
was then invoked by ten member states, who demanded that the Organ
of Consultation meet
-for the purpose of considering all aspects of
1 0 1
the danger to the peace and security of t-hn e continent resulting from
the penetration of the Doliti'n.i fc -p itical institutions of Guatemala by the
international communist movement - fu , ,n„.... ( Wood> j 9g5 . ^ Connell _im. a„lf
, Inter.Anerican Institute> i%6: ^
1 975
:
56
S Ronning, 1963: 73-74).
Kather t „an actiDg as tu provisioMi 0rgan ^ ConsuUation
_
-eat,, the COAS cal l ea for . full Meet£ng „f^ ^
discuss the situetion.^ B<jt before ^^ ^^
Ministers cou.a be assembled, Arben, resigned, turning the
government over to his Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Carlos
Enr ique Di az
,
on dune 27. A short time later, the COAS met to
consider the new situation in Guatemala and postponed the Meeting of
Foreign Ministers^ ^ The lead„ of ^
insurgency, Coionel Castillo Armas, soon emerged as the head of a
new military junta that was recognised hy the United States on duly
13, 1954 (Wilson, 1975: 56; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 89-90,
131-132; Fanning, 1963: 73-74; taerrcan, 1982: 173-174; Schlesinger
and Kinzer, 1983: 216- Wood IQftS- 1 o? . r 1n „ . ,xu, w a, 192; Connell-Smith, 1974: 212-
217).
Many Latin American governments saw the U.S. hand in events and
considered the coup to be an intervention by the United States in
the domestic affairs of Guatemala, contrary to the principles of the
OAS Charter. Juan PerOn's Argentina, whose bilateral relations with
the United States had seemingly improved with the development of the
cold war by establishing its anti-communist credentials,
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«~r.h.l... insisted that the coup in GuateMia
_
b eginning of renewed interventions by the UnUed ^ Latin
Africa and expressed it . deep conce„^ ^^
»-».n«»).
c 0ngresse8 of ArgentiM> Druguay> Md chiu
—
--
tl. „.,. indention „ GuataBala as aggreEsion
_
aa d^
«. Ecuadoran gover„nen, Even pro .D
. s . ^
America reacted strong against the United States>^^
Yankee demonstrations swept across Arge„ti„a, Brazi,
, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela (Ronning, 1 963-75 ft?, u-n-g. iW>J. 75
,
82; WilUams, 1971: 47; Schlessinger
and Kinzer, 1983: 188-189).
In the wa.e of the 1954 coup in Guatemala,
.any Latin Africans
grew critical of the United States' use of the OAS as an instruct
of the cold war and of its use of the cold war as a justification
for renewed U.S. interventionist Not only were the non-
interventionist and multilateral principles of the Good Neighbor
policy abandoned, but the credibility of the OAS was seriously
eroded. As Bryce Wood (1985: 198) has shown, »[t]he dismantling of
the Good Neighbor policy and the enfeeblement of the OAS began
simultaneously in 1954" (Dx'az-Callejas
. 1985: 125; Wilson, 1975: 55;
Connell-Smith, 1974: 218-221).
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impl i cations for tLte r\ a c ggat£p
In the decade foUowing the Guatemala coup
_ ^^
"rUCtUreS
°
f
°
AS
- «» nature of inter-American
relation,. The Latin Americans cooked to look for 8upport for
regional economic development from the OAS, hut it was not until the
very eod of the 1950s that some movement was made in this
direction. In 1958
, BrazlUm
Proposed his "Operation Pan America." aimed at promoting regional
economic development and raising living standards. In the same
year, after Vice President .W. difficult latin American trip
("hich was punctuated by several anti-U.S. demonstrations), the
Eisenhower administration began to reexamine U.S. economic, policy
toward the region. Soon the OAS Council of Foreign Ministers set up
the Committee of Twenty-One (formally, the Special Committee to
Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation),
which met for the first time in late 1958 to study Kubitschek's
proposal and discuss the recommendation from the region's foreign
ministers for the establishment of an inter-American financial
institution to promote development. The Cuban Revolution may have
provided further incentive for action on the economic front. At the
second meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One in the spring of 1959,
Fidel Castro proposed that the U.S. finance a $30 billion "Marshall
Flan" for Latin America. In any case, on December 31, 1959, the
Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB) was established with
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:ions at
significant U.S. support.
-ItiUu™, Undiag agency aimed at pronoting ^ ecMomic ^
social deveiopment 0f it s members (Atkins, 1989;
Smith, 1974: 224-225).
Respite this .oK» t t0 improve regional economic reuti
«» end „f the 1950s andicto the !960s (infra), the united sutei
continued to view the OAS as primarily oriented^
-sues. However Latin dissatisfaction with the 0AS syste„_ s^
keeping and conflict resn1,iH ft« i. •olution mechanxsms remained chronic through
the 1950s and ,e„ into the 1960s . The ceatral d„ t ^
the peaceful resolution of conflict, the 1948 Pact of Bogota (or the
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement) continued to lack
ratifications, apparently because of its compulsory nature. A move
to revise the treaty to meet the various objections or reservations
of states began in 195, after the Guatemalan coup, but this move
petered out by 1957. There was also a suggestion to create an inter-
American Court of Justice in 1954 as a mechanism to settle disputes,
but this proposal died in 1964 after only eight states had bothered
to express their views on the idea (in Inter-American Institute,
1966: 80-82). These failures left the Council of the OAS and the
Inter-American Peace Committee as the main peacekeeping of the OAS.
Yet the discomfort with these mechanisms after 1954 „as
evident in the repeated revision of the Inter-American Peace
Committee's statutes in the 1950s and 1960s. Crested in 1940. the
Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) had remained intact as a
special agency of the OAS after 1948. It was a vehicle by which
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tradition methods or procedures of ^^^^ MtM^ ^
such aE investiga tion, nediation
_ conciUation
_
^ goQd
offices, could be suggested fn ^ Q - •to parties in conflicf tk^v-uiii icc
.
ine committee
PUyea
. use£uI and often important ^ investig8Ung ^d
porting on the numerous confUct6 invoiving irujiiio^ ^
the Oominican , blic and other circ_aribbean confUcts becweenl**..*!*." m f-. n08t of the inte„tate confUct8 referrea
to the OAS tftWM 1M8 a„d 1956 went to Mpc ^ a semi _foraai
organ of investigation. In 1956
_
^ _ ^^ ^
ana institution,,,^ the committee's role in peacefu! settlement,
but the effort bacKfired. Among its ne« statutes „a s the nev
requirement that both parties to a conflict consent to the
committee's action. This apparently made the IAPC unattractive to
OAS members, as no cases were submitted to it for the next three
years
.
In 1959 an effort was made to save the IAPC at the Fifth
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Santiago, Chile.
The TAPC's functions were expanded to include investigations into
(1) methods to prevent intervention, aggression, or overthrows of
governments from abroad; (2) the relationship between human rights
violations and dictatorship to political tensions affecting
hemispheric peace; and (3) the relationship between economic
underdevelopment and political instability. These points reflected
the concerns of the Latin American ministers meeting in Santiago
with the problems of human rights and economic underdevelopment that
seemed to be behind the conflicts involving the Trujillo
1 0
dictatorship i„ the Boninican RepubUc ^
^ ^
Batista dictatorship in Cuba
. The IApc
^^^^^
to act "at the request of governs or on its own initiative" (in
Inter-American Institute, 1966: 84-85). After n.(l this expansion of the
"PC's functions and authority, it again became active in
investigating various inter-American conflicts" until
.966, when
its expanded authority was taken away (infra) (Inter-American
Institute, 1966: 83-91; Slater, 1969: 502-503; Scheman, ,988: 67-69,
81-84; Puig> 1983: 14-15).
Despite this activity of the IAPC, the conflicts it
investigated between 1948 and 1964 tended to be the chronic yet
politically safe conflicts involving the relatively weak states of
the circum-Caribbean and usually centered on the issue of the use of
territory by bands of exile groups to overthrow another
government. 17 However, as in the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the IAPC
and related OAS peace-keeping machinery were powerless to settle
peacefully the more serious political and military conflicts of the
inter-American system, especially those in which United States-
interests were involved. The more serious political and military
conflicts tended to be addressed through the mechanisms of the Rio
Pact. But the Rio Treaty was a collective security instrument, not
an instrument for the resolution of political conflicts. For the
Latin Americans, invoking the Rio Treaty was considered very serious
business, meaning that a clear act of military aggression had been
committed and that some form of collective sanctions would have to
be imposed (Slater, 1969: 501). To resolve political conflicts, the
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ut 10 Americ an 6tates tended to prefer to invoke
keePi"E MChinery
-
b68i
-^ tb. convocation of . Meeting Qf
Consultation of Koreign Ministers Arucu ^ ^
Charter.
war in
the United States, given th . centrality
„ f ^ ^
the Rio Treaty became the preferred means for introducing a„d
addressing its East-West security concerns in the hemisphere,
especially through the treaty's arduous Article 6. This article
was an open-ended provision for action hy the Organ of Consultation
under the Rio Treaty in cases where a state faced
"aggression which
« not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-
continental conflict, or hy any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America" (in Inter-American Institute, 1966:
378). This article was flexible enough to bring virtually any
matter that could be termed a "threat" to the peace and security of
the hemisphere under the purview of the Rio Treaty, whether an
actual aggression had occured or not. The inadequacy of the OAS
system's peace-keeping machinery in conflicts involving United
States' interests and the divergence of Latin American and United
States' views about the proper uses of the OAS Charter vs. the Rio
Treaty can be seen in the cases of the Dominican Republic and Cuba
between 1960 and 1965.
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CahM touecminic,, „,„ pf..
In the Kake o £ the fall of Batista . n Cuba Md wr6ening
-an Nation. in 1960> the Bnited states begM ^^^ ^
in a cold „ar tint> but no( an ^ utin ^
•» «<• Zn.tead, m08t Latin governments
_ ^
the excesses of the Trunin,, a-Trujxllo drctatorship i„ the Dominican Republic
and its involvement in a recent assignation attempt against
Venezuela's President Romulo Betancourt. In June 1960, the
Venezuelan government invoked the Rio Treaty against TrujilU's
attack, and the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers
was convoked in San Jn^d rw^ d-ose\ Costa Rica to investigate Venezuela's
charges. After condemning the Dominican Republic for its
"aggression" and "attack" against Venezuela, the majority, of the
Latin American foreign ministers favored the imposition of
collective economic and diplomatic sanctions, in accordance with the
Rio Treaty's provisions, against the Trujillo regime. But the
United States opposed collective sanctions in this case and
advocated instead OAS-supervised elections in the Dominican
Republic. The Latin American majority viev on sanctions prevailed,
resulting in the first example of collective sanctions being imposed
by the members of the OAS system against one of its own members
found to have committed an act of aggression 18 (Slater, 1970: 8;
Ronning, 1963: 77; Wil son> 1975: 60; Scheman, 1988: 76; Connell-
Smith, 1974: 229-230).
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At the sa„e «eeting of Consultation, the United States aUo
trx- to introduce an anti .Castro reeoiutiM ^
failed. The Latin
ministers dU ^ ^ e mMhani>n ^
Kio Treaty as appUcable t0 the case ^ ^
«»« the OAS was the proper venue fM discuesing poUticai
COntrOVmiet
^ 'ft.. and Cuha. Immediate ly
foUowin, this meeting , in AugU8t 1960> thfi^^
the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign ^ ^
under Article 3, of the OAS Chatter. Stin asse-bled in San w
the United States tried to convince the Latin Americana to pass a
resolution condemn, the Cnban government for its gro„ing ties to
the Soviet Union. The United States even held out the carrot of
$600 million in economir ain 19 +~c d to win support for its resolution
(Ronning, 1963: 78).
But the majority of the Latin American ministers were not
prepared to go along with the United States in this case. Instead,
a much weaker resolution was passed, entitled the "Declaration of
San JoseV vhich only condemned
"extra-continental intervention" in
the Americas and rejected "attempts by the Sino-Soviet powers to
make use of the political, economic or social situation of any
American state" (in Wilson, 1975: 61). The resolution made no
20mention of Cuba. In fact, the Mexican delegation insisted on
adding a "Statement" to the declaration stressing
-that in no way
is it a condemnation or a threat against Cuba, whose aspirations for
economic improvement and social justice have the fullest support of
1 1 0
the Government and the people of Mexico- f r ," ico ( ln Connell-Smith, 197A-
230; Ronning, 1963: 78; Wilson, 1975- 61- S.h> ^'-i. 01; c eman, 1988: 77).
Lacking majority suppport for irePPP its growing antipathy for Castro
states acted Milaterilly by impl_ ting a cm ^ ^
invade Cuha
. ,„„. of counter.revolutionary
^
hope. of sparking
. popuUr uprUing against^ ^ ^
bitter failure of the Bav nf d;ey of P lgs operation in April 1961, the old
oehate ahout interventionist be t tteen Latin America end the United
States rested. Although severe! Latin American governments did not
like the course the Cuhen Revolution vas taking
, most Latin
Americans considered the B ay of Pigs invasion to he an iUegal U.S.
intervention only too reminiscent o, the 1954 CIA operation in
Guatemala (Wilson, 1975:62).
In response to the course of the Cuban Revolution and, spurred
by the political fallout of the Bay of P igs fiasco
, the Kennedy
Administration vent forward with a new strategy of containment in
Latin America. Kennedy deepened the U.S. commitment to the region's
economic development that emerged at the end of the Eisenhower
administration by announcing his Alliance for Progress. This
multilateral program was designed to provide $20 billion in
development assistance over a ten-year period and encourage social
and political reforms in order to promote economic growth, liberal
democratic government, and peaceful change in the hemisphere. For
the United States, the Alliance's economic aid, reform, and related
counter-insurgency training programs were both a way to revitalize
inter-American economic and political relations and a strategy to
1 1
1
21
>ress
:e on
p~ a „ y £uture radical revoiutione in utin^ ^^
Amencan governments embraced the AHiance for Progress
enthusiastically: Finallvy, after some sixteen years, their post-war
requests for a "Marshall Plan" for Latin a •t America were being answered
by the Doited states. The charter of the Alliance for Prog
vas signed at the Uruguayan seaside resort of Punta d„ Est
United States had made it clear i.that it vould provide no funds for
Cuba as long as its revolutionary government maintained its ties
"ith the Soviet Union. The government of Peru, backed by a number
of other delations, also proposed the inclusion of an anti-Castro
Political clause in the Alliance's charter, but this proposal was
voted down by the rest of the conference (Connell-Smith, 1974: 233;
Wilgus and d'E^a, 1 963: 411-412).
Before long, however, the Latin American votes in the OAS
system began to shift in favor of the United States' position on
Cuba, despite the continued divergence of a significant bloc of
Latin American states. In January 1962, the Colombian and Peruvian
governments charged Cuba with supporting subversive activities that
threatened the peace and security of the Americas. Colombia invoked
the Rio Treaty and called the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers to discuss what collective measures could be taken
against Cuba. The United States led the hard-line position, which
urged collective action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and
sought to expel the revolutionary Cuban government from the OAS
system because it had "identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist
1 1 2
~"
—
-« Argentinaj BrasU, ChUe, Ecuador,
Bolivia, led the 8o£t.Une „ ^
Clllltled WO™* of the Kin Ireaty Co the situation>
Oebatea the nature o £ the Cuban governmct. defended the
of non-intervention and 8elf^eterainat . on> opfosed
expulsion or exclusion of any member state on rh.t e grounds that
neither the OAS Charter nor the Rio Treatv ^r y made any provisions for
such an action. It was Haiti . fi _ e from 8oft _Hne ^ ^_
l»e position that assured the fourteenth vote 23 for the two-thirds
majority needed to exclude the "present government" of Cuba from
Participation in the OAS syste*. The meeting also decided to impose
an arms embargo against Cuba (Atkins, 1989: 224; Wilson, 1975: 62-
63; Connell-Smith, 1974: 236-237; Scheman, 1988: 77).
Ten months later, in October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis
prompted ,n emergency meeting of the Council of the OAS as the
provisional organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty. The United
States called on the COAS to discuss the crisis and decide on
collective action. With proof of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba,
the United States persuaded the Latin American delegates that the
missiles represented an extra-continental intervention in the
Americas. The Latin Americans overwhelmingly
-but not unanimously-
passed the U.S.
-sponsored resolution calling for the naval blockade
of Cuba; Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia abstained. Near the end of the
naval blockade, Argentine and Venezuelan naval units joined U.S.
forces in enforcing the blockade (Wilson, 1975: 64-65; Finan, 1977c:
254).
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In the case of the MissiiP ..ule Crisis, the vast majority of Latin
American states ag reed that the situation was not merely
. politica]
or ideological conflict hetween the United States and Cuba but that
« resented a dear security threat for the hemisphere and came
under the purview of the Rio Treaty's provisions for collective
action. There was strong inter-American agreement on this use of
the Rio Treaty by the United States> ^ .^.^
^ ^
Cuhan Missile Crisis was the apparent strengthening of inter-
America, sol ldarity against this projection of Soviet military power
in the hemisphere. Interestingly, the medium- to long-term outcome
was the Latin American move toward making Latin America a nuclear-
free zone, which culminated in the signing of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco in February 1967 24 (Atkins, 1989: 337-338).
For the next year and a half after the Missile Crisis, Latin
American majority support for the United States' position against
Cuba continued; it ever, grew once the March 1964 military coup in
Brazil added that state's vote to the anti-Castro column of the OAS
system. A short time later the system took its final step in
isolating the Cuban government through collective sanctions under
the Rio Pact. In July 1964, the Venezuelan government called the
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers after it charged
Cuba with aggression in the form of aiding a group of Venezuelan
revolutionaries. An investigating committee appointed by the COAS
had corroborated the Venezuelan charges, thus clearing the way for
the Meeting of Consultation to discuss what collective action under
the Rio Treaty would be taken. The foreign ministers meeting in
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Washington, 0. c. condemned Cuha. and
,
by ._ of^ ^ ^
-Posed tough ne„ sanctions again8t Cufca ^ ^
consular and diplomatic reLtiona and the suspension of all trade
and sea transport vith the island nation. Bolivia. Chile, Mexico
and Uruguay opposed these sanctions, hut in the end all states
except Mexico eventually severed relations vith Cuha (Wilson. 1975:
66-67; Scheman, 1988: 77).
Thus, between 1960 and 1964, fairly strong differences between
Latin American states and the United States over the nature of the
Cuban Revolution and the proper uses of the Rio Treaty began to
narrow. By early 1962, the United States had succeeded in
convincing a tvo-thirds majority of Latin American states that its
conflict with Cuba should be understood in an East-West security
context rather than a North-South pc-Uticrt context and that the Rio
Treaty rathe, than the OAS Charter was the appropriate venue for
action. Yet a significant group of Latin American states continued
to oppose the U.S. campaign to isolate and punish the Cuban
government for its revolutionary direction until the Cuban Missile
Crisis later that year. The Crisis brought near unanimous Latin
American support for the United States' position. But then the
issue was not so much about U.S. power in the hemisphere as it was
about the indisputable introduction of an extra-hemispheric power's
nuclear arsenal. The OAS system appeared to be its strongest in
response to the Missile Crisis and in its immediate aftermath. The
collective security provisions of the Rio Treaty and even the
original precepts of the Monroe Doctr:"ne seemed to be vindicated.
«t„ the MiB8ile Crisis. even more 6tates ..thougb
_f "PPort the U.S. position on Cuba ar, d t„e use of
against Cuban adventurism especially once the Venezuelan government
charged Cuba with aggression in 1964 results .ulting xn the imposition of
final economic and political 8 ,„,f'H ul i sanctions against CpQt-™'„6 81 ^as ro s government.
Several factors ha a facilitated this shift within the OAS
system toward greater if not unanimous Latin Ericas support for
«>e U.S. position on Cuha and for the use of the Rio Treaty against
Cuba. Vastly proved U.S.-Latin African economic relations as a
-science of the AlHance for Progress economic aid programs had a
Positive spill-over effect for politico-security relations.
Moreover, the political shift against Cuha involved other politic.!
and security factors: The emergence and growth of guerrilla
~nts either inspired or supported by revolutionary Cuba in
several Latin American states; the anti-revolutionary fears of
elites and militaries throughout Latin America; the stepped-up
security assistance and counter-insurgency training programs
sponsored by the United States as part of the Alliance for Progress;
and the eight military coups overthrowing constitutionally elected
but unstable goverments in Latin American between 1961 and 1964. 25
Beyond the Cuban Missile Crisis, all these factors played a role in
bringing East-West security concerns to bear on hemispheric
political events and in creating inter-American support for using
the OAS system to implement U.S. containment policies in the
hemisphere. But it soon became clear that this inter-American
solidarity was more fragile than it seemed.
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A poUtica, ana military crisis in tha Dominica„ RepubHc
anti-Castro C0n6ensus could ^ withstMd ^^
—Pril
,
a few Doffiinican aray u„lte attenpt6d a coup againet tu
unpopular head of the cm.,„-oountry s junta, Donald Reid Cabral. The
- power o t former Pre8ident ^ Bo8ch
_ Bosch ^ ^^
President in OAS-supervised eUctions in late but ua8
overthrown hy the military in September 1963, just seven month6
after taki„8 o£fice . As the
became stronger, anti-Bosch factions in the military with the
support of the U.S. embassy decided to resist the "revolution"
actively. 26 A brjef blt violen[ civil ^
^ ^
uays the U.S. embassy asked Washington to intervene on the side of
the anti-Bosch forces to help restore law and order. The United
States Mediately responded by landing 400 marines, but soon over
20,000 .ore U.S. troops were sent to the Dominican Republic with the
purpose of preventing "a second Cuba" (Slater, 1970; 9-38
; Wilson,
1975: 67; Williams, 1971: 116; Pinan, 1977d: 263).
Latin American reactions to the United States' military
intervention in the Dominican Republic ranged from amazement to
outrage. Anti-yankee protests erupted throughout Latin America
while anti-intervention protests were lodged by Latin governments in
the OAS and the United Nations. The governments of Chile, Mexico,
Uruguay, and Venezuela
-then among the most respected and stable
civilian governments in the region- were most critical of the
1 1 7
United States' intervention. The ChiT.Hi lean government requested that
the COAS convoke a Meetinp nf rx g o Consultation of Foreign Ministers
under Article 39 of the OAS Charter thn,c , us engaging the OAS peace-
keeping mechanisms
--not the R io Treaty's- to dliy s iscuss the
intervention (Wilson 1071; co1975: 68; Atkina, 1989: 222; Schenan> „„.
78). ' •
It is interesting that CMIe did not invoRe ^ ^
asainst the United state.- intervention. In the previous ^
blowing the 196A Panamanian fUg riots>27 ^ ^
-ate to invoke the Ri0 psct agaiMt ^
After the Inter-American Peace Committee had failed t0 ^
».S.-Panamanian eonfUct. which ca.e to focus on the issue of
negotiating a new nana, treaty, Panama's request to invoke the Pro
Treaty against the United State, was approved hy the COAS by sixteen
votes; only Chile opposed the request, while Panara and the United
States were not eligible to vote. Acting as the Pio Treaty's
provisional organ of consultation, the COAS set up a special
committee to try to resolve the conflict. 28 In this case, the Rio
Treaty was used as a mechanise for conflict resolution rather than
collective security (Wilson, 1975: 65).
In the case of the Dominican invasion, Chile's preference for
working through the OAS Charter's mechanisms for conflict resolution
was again manifested, and the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers, this time under Article 39 of the OAS Charter,
began its first session in Washington on May 1, 1965. The four
states most critical of the U.S. invasion introduced resolutions
11
«—* - u.s. violation of the non,ntervration ^^^^
«t- state, moved quickly t0 try £omuunaterali2e it8
action, u introduced
. re8olutiQn ^ crea(e ^
^ace Porce to occupy the ^ ^«U ne, election. co„W be held
.
"e
"80lUtiM ^ • vote of fourteen to £ive . chlle
Bcuador, Meiic0( Peru, and Uruguay sote(J against resoiutiM
Veneauela abetaineu. Included in the ^ ^^ ^
the neceeeary tvo-tbirde majority to paa. the resolution was the
vote of the Dominica,, representative whose Eo,e ra,Mt had been
overthrow by the pro-Bosch supporters. A Br„iHan genera, became
° f
°
d h« '""—ping force, with the U.S. coaler
in the Doa, inic a n Republic becoming his deputy. By l. te May, Utin
American troops froa, Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay began
to arrive, totaling some 1 ,750 troops in addition to the 23,000 U.S.
troops in the
"Inter-American" peace-keeping force (Wil.on, 1975:
68; Finan, 1977d: 263; Williams, 1971: 91-92).
With only seven per cent of the total forces, the Latin
American contingent participating in the occupation of the Dominican
Republic barely qualified the peace-keeping forces as "multi-
lateral." Yet the United States apparently felt confident enough to
propose the establishment of an inter-American peace-keeping force
on a more permanent basis, arguing that the lack of such a force had
been a long-standing weakness in the OAS system's peace-keeping
machinery. But the reputation of the OAS was alread; falling
1 1 9
— ly after the organi2ation had faiud o^
0^ even vern.Uv con^
. D . S .
^ _Mrhtr Instead th
'
0AS
»•« -a to legitiMte tt.~ion
. Almost overnight Latin^ ^^Wy
"
yaDkee
-
-rv 0£ tne Unite, State8 - use
of inter-American institutions to serve its» ovn narrow interests.
1 AneriCM
°
PP08iti0
° <° »•• -po.al £or
. perMnent inter-
A-rican peaoe-keepi„g force „as„elming fcy ^^ ^
miHtarv
.overrents of A rgentina, Boiivie, and Brazil opposed
the idea (Slater, 1969: 500; 91 _92;
69).
The stresses produced by the Dominican^ ^^^
Among the... costs [of the Dominican intervention] waRan upsurge of anti-Americanism in world and LtinWxcm public opinion. Furthermore, the Alliance
tiL Ts
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m::
ffe
:
ed a severe ioss
°
fime. U.S. oves to strengthen the OAS's collectivecapabilities were reversed, leading to its weakeningat Buenos Aires in 1967. The hopef for an Inter-
*
American peacekeeping force were obviated for the
v 111 'i
^
tUre
* -^r-American systemwas called nto question and U.S. self-interest in
TIT* °fu i^. C0Dtinued viability set back at leasta decade (Williams, 1971: 99).
Indeed, the cracks that were evident in the OAS system in 1954
had only been papered over with the anti-Castro consensus between
1962 and 1964. But they became fissures too deep to repair after
the 1965 Dominican intervention. Isolated moves before 1965 to
reform the OAS syster, to make it stronger gave way to a broader
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" ™" -*« 1965 that succeeded only in further
*— ab ility t0 address polUical confUcte> ^
those involving the DDited StBUs
. As Manget u968)
OAS became lncrea8ingly
„^
-tea left it t0 deaI with technicai Mtters yhue £hey
— ingly turned to other ioternationai fM^ ^
Pressing their international political interests.
Redefining Inter-American Relat ions
ups
The economic, soc io-cultural
, political and military
relationships making up the inter-American system underwent
important transformations after the Dominican intervention of 1965.
By inter-American system we mean the complete set of relations.,
and institutions linking the states of the hemisphere in various
"ays and of vhich the OAS system (defined here b> the OAS Charter
and the Ric Treaty) is only a part. Pressures to reform the OAS
system beginning i„ the 1950s and strengthening in the early 1960s
had indicated that many were not happy with its structure; after the
Dominican intervention the movement to reform the OAS system
indicated that many were not happy with the structure of power
within the inter-American system as a whole. Beginning in the mid-
to late-1960s and continuing into the 1980s, the Latin American
states pursued a variety of new paths in their foreign relations in
order to redefine the structure of inter-American relations and
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-vise tb. „a ture o £ Latin ^ericm part ic ipation .„ international
politics.
Reforming fh P oar c
yntr]11
Before 1965, the various proposals to reform and strengthen the
OAS system had included strengthening the initiative and role of the
Council of the OAS in the pacific settlement of disputes so as to
avoid action through the Rio Treaty, 29 increasing the ^
and authority of the General Secretary, and resurrecting some form
of the Inter-American Conference as a regular, high-level meeting
between the member states. After the Dominican crisis, however, the
support for strengthening the political role of the OAS reversed
itself. Instead, in three OAS Charter-reform conferences, held in
Rio de Janeiro in the fall of 1965, 30 Panama in the spring of 1966,
and Buenos Aires in early 1967, the Latin American majority grew
increasingly determined to minimize the political role of the OAS.
This reform movement culminated in the Protocol of Amendment to the
1948 Charter of Bogot^, which was signed in Buenos Aires in February
1967 (Slater, 1969: 502; Dreier, 1968; Manger, 1968).
The Buenos Aires Protocol abolished the moribund Inter
-American
Conference and replaced it with a General Assembly. As the new
supreme organ of the OAS, the General Assembly meets annually to
decide the organization's general policy. It may discuss any matter
and it coordinates the work of the other organs. It approves the
OAS budget, elects the General Secretary and his or her Assistant,
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- oversees the Borl[ of the Ge „ eral Secretariat
. ^ ^
strengthening ltl polUical ^ ^ ^ ^^
-
tb. H-aited.
.on-ai, inittrative roU of tfce SKretary>
"hose te™ of office vas raduced ^ ^ ^ ^
r6f0raS
-
"°"
°* orientation of the re£ora
t. the na.e 0£ the Pan teerican Union formany change<] ^
the
.ore technocratic
"Genera! Secretariat" (Manger, 1968: 7, 11
:
Dreier, 1968: 483; Atkins, 1989: 210-212).
The Buenos Aires Prnt- rv> ni jotocol also redesignated the Council of the
OAS as the Permanent Council of the OAS. Previously considered ^
"hub" of the organization, its authority was reduced and placed on a
par with three other organs now raised to council level: the Meeting
of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, the Inter-Amer ican Economic
and Social Council (1AEC0S0C), and the Inter-Amer ican Council for
Education, Science, and Culture (IACESC). No longer the executive
organ of the OAS, the primary role of the Permanent Council became
that of peacekeeping, with the assistance of the Inter-American
Committee on Peaceful Settlement (formerly the Inter-American Peace
Committee). However, the authority of both organs over pacific
settlement vas actually curtailed by the reforms. As William Manger
(1968: 6) lamented,
eliminating the verbiage and analyzing the essentials,
the Council is reduced to a channel of communication.
It can receive a request for its good offices from one
party to a dispute and transmit it to the other. It
can function, however, only if both parties agree to
avail themselves of its facilities. If one refuses the
tender of good offices, the Council shall limit itself
to submitting a report to the General Assembly.
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- *~« no power to initiate peacekeeping act;on£ on Ue
— n. council also 6erves as „ preparatory cMmittee ^
General Assembly and it may still «»
, ,
7 1
" the Provisional Organ ofConsultation in emergency situations until the Meeting o f
Consultation o f Poreigu Ministers can assemble Oreier, 1968s 483 .
Manger, 1968: 5-7; Atkins, 1989: 210-212).
There was no statutory cbange in tbe Meeting or Consultation of
foreign Ministers, hosev6r itE reUUve ^^ ^
«« nearly meeting, of tbe new Ceneral Assemby and by tbe elevation
to council level of tbe 1AEC0S0C an, tbe IACESC (Manger, 1968- 9-
°reier, 1968:
.83; Atbins. 1989: 210-212). A long with t „.^
structural cbanges, tbe elevated status of £hese Utt .r ^
reflected tbe overwhelm^ interest of tbe Latin American majority
to refocus tbe OAS system on economic and development issues rather
than political and security issues. Tbe Charter reforms vent into
effect in February 1970, after two-thirds of tbe member states had
ratified tbe Protocol cf Buenos Aires (Mart,, 1977: 177; Wilson,
1S75: 70).
These reforms had scarcely entered into force in 1970 when a
second movement to reform the OAS system emerged. The immediate
causes of this second reform movement stemmed from Latin American
dissatisfaction with the Nixon administration's protectionist
foreign economic policies after 1971 32 as well as the continued hard-
line position of the United States against Cuba. At the second and
third OAS General Assembly sessions in 1972 and 1973, a proposal to
hold an OAS conference to reconsider Cuban participation in the OAS
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lions
»• supported by . plurauty of Latin wicm^ ^ o{^
ha, already begu„ to re.estabUsh econom . c ^ d .pioMtic^
with Cuoa. Hoover the uoited States insi6ted ^ ,
vote of the OAS meBber.Mp VOuld be neceE8ary to rever£e botb
1%2 decislou to exclude the revolution governs fro* the
organization and the> 1 qaa • •e 1964 decrsxon to impose diplomatic and ecomonic
sane t ions
.
Other issues exacerbating friction between the United States
and Latin America in the early 1970s included widespread Latin
resentment over the U.S. refusal up to that point to negotiate
. new
Panama Canal treaty that would transfer "effective sovereignty" of
the canal to Panama as well as Latin resentment over the political
and economic power of U.S.
-based transnational corporations. At the
1973 OAS General Assembly session, all of these issues led several
Latin American states to criticize strongly what they perceived to
be continued U.S. political exploitation and domination of the OAS.
Some even went so far as to call for a strictly Latin American
alternative to the OAS (an idea that continues to attract
adherents). Instead, the majority supported a resolution to create
the Special Committee to Study the Inter-American System and to
Propose Measures for Restructuring It (CEESI, by its Spanish
acronym), which began its work in Lima in June, 1973 (Wilson, 1975:
76-79; Atkins, 1989: 126-127, 208-209; Lowenthal, 1987: 39; Martz,
1977: 177).
After nearly two years of work, the CEESI submitted its Final
Report to the OAS General Assembly. The focus of CEESI's reform
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",y passed a resoiut.oo convoking
, £peciai
^
Plenipotentiaries to amend SeC" lty »«• conference was»« » San dose, Costa Pica in July of that year. rne proposed
a.endme„ts t. the Eio Treaty ^
taken by the orLnl .* "* COlle«i« measures
-Clarifying the definition of an "act of -in accordance with th* j » . aggression"
in order to prevent It \ • 10nS def i^tion
Tieatv
P the political uses of the Riotr y, as was possible under the ori P in*i V
controversial Article 6; and
S l al *nd
^Ek^^ mailed
recordations (Martz, 1977 177-180)
lmp °rtant
The conference made no changes m, 0 u •i.ang m the mechanisms for the pacific
settlement of disputes, such as they were for tM., t his was considered
an area too sensitive to touch.
Coincidental to the San Jose conference, the Sixteenth Meeting
of Consultation of Foreign Ministers convened on duly 25 to consider
the question of continued sanctions against Cuba. After continuous
day and night sessions, the
-eeting adopted the Freed™ of Action
^solution, which allowed states party to the Rio Treaty the freed™
""to normalize or conduct in accordance with the national policies
and interests of each their relations with the Republic of Cuba."'
Even the United States supported this resolution (Martz, 1977: 178).
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«te r its adoption by the San dose conference, the 1975
Protocol of Amendment to rhe n;„ rt R10 Treaty was sent to the member
»ates for ratification. By that time, ho.ever. interest in the OAS
—m .as at an all time lo„, and the moves to reform it faded.
The Protocol never received enong h ratifications to enter into
force. Liaise, the drafts of other instruments produced h y this
-ond refor. movement, s„ch fl8 the Draft Convention on Cooperation
for Development, the Draft Convention on Collective Economic
Security for Development, and other draft amendments to the OAS
Carter, all languished and hecame dead issues for lach of ioterest
in the late 1970s and into the 1980s 33 (Martr, 1977: 180-183;
Atkins, 1989: 209).
The OAS reform movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s
indicated significant Latin American dissatisfaction with the
structure and focus of the OAS system. The reforms reflected both a
certain impatience with continued U.S. domination of the system and
a longstanding Latin American interest in refocusing the regional
organization on economic and development issues rather than
political and security issues. Indeed, by the late 1960s more and
more Latin American states were defining their "national security"
in markedly economic and development-oriented terms.
Most writers analyzing the reform period and contemporaneous to
it, such as Dreier (1968), Manger (1968), Slater (1969), Wilson
(1975), and Martz (1977), saw Latin American "nationalism" or
"economic nationalism" as the underlying cause or impetus for the
reform movements. In fact, "nationalism" and/or "economic
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nationalism- seen, to have become th.e conventional North American
explanation for T a hi n aABeriCM ChalUn
*68 " »•»• Powe, and t0 the
— I. see. t00 simpli6[ic (e6peciauy wUhout^
analysis).
"Nationalism" and •economic nationalism" seem to be
headings too broad in which to ni0 Cl3S8lfy the Latin American diplomacy
of the time, much of which had come to stres,s economic integration-
ism and multilflt-p-roi -f~lateral foreign policy coordination on many issues.
Instead it seems more correct to explain the f«•« reform movements
« P«« of a larger transformation in Lstin teericM dipwy^
- - i^^^ 0£ certai „ LaUri ^^^^
'o define and act on their own conceptions of "national interest „
We
.11, consider this assertion keI„, and examine it .ore f„„y in
«»Ptr mi. For „o, it is enough to recog„i ze that divergent
interests underscored the Latin American disillusionment with the
OAS system, which was dominated by U.S. co.d war interests and thus
constrained in serving Latin American development interests. The
tinkering with the OAS peacekeeping mechanisms iu the 1950s and
1960s indicates the discomfort of Latin American states with the
institutional
"fit" of the regional organisation, while the broader
reform movements after 1965 show the degree of disillusionment with
the system as a whole. The U.S. rejection of the second reform
movement's emphasis on "collective economic security" resulted in
the virtual abandonment of the OAS system for anything but the most
technical of issues ir, the 1970s and into the 1980s. Instead, Latin
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it
feiCM diPl
—~ <°
—ioMl forums and
r
ioped
~
forei
-—— that could better_
particuiar
of Latin ABerican states
-er since the m, Chapultepec Conferee („ not before) ^
-.««.! interest „as aC0D0Bic development
_ ^ ^ u^
1960s, it became increasingly clear «-Wg^y that national economic
development was limited by the condit-^ * ay n ion of dependency in which
these
" ates we" "U8ht -
34
th
. Latin taerie.„ foraed the
Economic Co-issio, on Latin AKerica (ECU) ^ a speci£Uzea^
Nat.oos age„cy in 1951
, the studies fcy ^ ^
Ms associates at ECIA were importan[ „ ^
trade raletionship experiellCed by^ ^ ^ .^^.^
political economy and its its negBtive^ on Utin
development.
ECLA's work led to the development of dependency theory, which
was widely accepted in Latin Americe by the late 1960s end early
1970s (if „ot esrlier) end which indicated certein policy
prescriptions a t both the domestic end interna tion al ievels eimed at
lessening Letin toerica's economic dependency and underdevelopment.
At the international level, such policy prescriptions included
tariffs to protect infant industries, multilateral commodity
agrees, regional economic integrationism, and tu
dlVmifi"liM
"—— (ifnot of thegoods traded)-
These policies received con6iderabu attMtion ^^
"«« in the 1960E andl9?0s> albeit with varying degrees of
success. Thus Mt„ ECLA - e studies as a spur Lar • . .a , tin America acquired
Its ovn intellectual framework for analyzing M, •the international
Political economy, Latin America's place therein andr «= un rem, various policy
alternatives available to Latin American states.
At the same time. Latin American diplomats were also acquiring
-Portant practical experience in multilaters, dip l0macy through
-y different forums outside of the OAS system. Partly trough the
existence of ECLA and partly through the early dissatisfaction of
Latin American states with the OAS system after 1948, Latin African
diplomacy turned increasingly to the United Nations and its various
agencies as alternative forums for pursuing economic development
interests. Latin American participation in the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNO TAD) was especially
significant by the mid 1960s, both economically and politically.
Within UNCTAD, certain Latin American states, notably Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others sought to play a leadership
role among Third World states, the vast majority of which had only
recently gained political independence. More importantly, within
UNCTAD
,
Latin American states rediscovered the usefulness and
potential bargaining power of speaking with one voice in inter-
national forums by forming the Comisio'n F.n.. i q1 ,„ c^;^^
latinn».pr jfrinf (CECLA).
1 3
«*" ~ originally created a6 . coordinating mechMisn ^
- positions of Latin America„ paruc
1964 UNCTAD I Conference. It soon K
0£Lati .
800,1 b" a
- « o^oing caucusing group
- foreign ministers aimed at
_
PoUcies with regard to internatiMal econMic negMiations ^
VSri0US
(
———gy transfer, etc, a„d
-
-ions international forums (UNCTAD, GATT, the IMF and „„ld
Bank, the European Economic Community, ana even within the 0AS)
(Aftali<$n, 1 975« s^Q. n i9". 539, Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 46; Atkins, ,989: 198-
1 QQ\199).
""1. tne OAS reforms were being debated, CECLA became an
increasing!, important collective instrument for Latin American
produced the "Consensus of Vina del Mar » a do,m , document sent by CECLA
to tbe Nu< on administration voicing Latin Africa, grievances with
».S. foreign economic policies and signaling the need for the United
States to recognize the
-distinctive personality of Latin America"
CConoell-Smith, 1974: 36). Similarly, CECLA sent another document
called the "Manifesto of Latin America" to the United States in
September 1971 protesting the Nixon administration's New Economic
Policy aa unfair to the countries of Latin America (Aftalion, 1975:
543). Neither of these two documents had much of an effect on the
United States. While the Nixon administration showed some
willingness to improve the "special relationship" and open a "new
dialogue" between the U.S. and Latin America, little of substance
tually achieved 35 (Atkins, 1989: 198; Lowenthal
, 1987: 38).
was ac
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contrast, CEC^s ef£orts
««• ur0Pe were more ,ucce8sfu, At its meeting ^ Buenos
J^a 1970, CECLA produced the "Declare,- t .B at 10„ of Buenos Aires," which
« pressed t0 t„e European Economic Comity (EEC) „
h
"
eriCaD intere
" -—S a ..specie! reUtionship"
wit the EEC. Th* vvr ,e EEC responded by declaring 1971 as the "Latin
—
an Vear." More substantively, a mechanism for consultation
De80tiati0D
«» *» -s set up and a series o f
hlgh
-level meetings were held between 1971 snd 1975. Although the
results were less than what tha CECLA had honedn a P , this initiative did
have positive reetilt-e t_-^- ,su s. Initial contacts were made between the EEC
-d the young Andean Croup (which had forced a regional economic
-tegrstion pact parti, inspired by the success of the EEC)
, and
several new non-preferential commercial agreements were signed
between the EEC and individual Latin states, namely Argentina,
Braril, Mexico and Uruguay. European trade and diplomatic exchanges
with Latin America intensified offer ion (r, , • „att 1975 (Drekonja Kornat, 1982:
47; Aftalio'n, 1975: 557-558; Tanner, 1986: 95-96).
In spite of some differences between the economically more
advanced nations and the rest of the members of CECLA over economic
policy positions, and despite some rivalry between the larger states
for leadership within it, CECLA's meetings did produce a high degree
of Latin unity and coordinated positions on a number of economic
issues (Atkins. 1989- 1 qq) tk^ „s, i*ey. iyy;. The caucusing group was so successful
that in 1975 it was reconstituted in a more institutionalized and
expanded for.. At the initiative of Mexican President Lui'e
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:
h
7ri
'
a and venezueun preside
-
cari
°*^ -
—
^"^"^^^^11^ (SELA) „as create . . ,d to replace CECLA as the
Latin American regional caucus.
According t0 lt
. Charter, SELA is "an organization for
consultation, coordination, and joint economic and socio,
Promotion." Like its predecessor, SEXA is a political arrangement
^signed to enhance the international bargaining peer of its
-her, by foraulating
_ regicnai posUions ^
dialogue. SELA itself is not an economic integration scheme hut it
does support integrationism. U„l ike CECLA, SELA includes
participate h y Cuha as veil as many English-speaking Carihhear.
»ates, but i, continues to exclude the United States. SELA's
Principle organ is the Latin African Council, composed of ministers
who meet at least once a year. The Council's decisions are not
binding: Member states are only obligated to multilateral
consultations. SELA has a permanent secretariate head,uarte t ed in
Caracas, Venezuela and a secretary general who serves a four-year
term. The organization is supported by budget contributions
assigned to masters based on their relative ability to pay (Atkins,
1989: 199-200; Finan, 1977e: 265-266; Drekonja Kornat, 1982: 53-54).
In addition to these examples of Latin American multilateral
diplomacy outside of the OAS system, several other important
examples should be noted. Beginning in the early 1960s and inspired
both by the work of ECLA and the success of the European Common
Market, several regional economic intergration schemes were
undertaken by Latin American states. With roots in several
133
"lean
in
— „ the 1950s (and io tbe ou cMfederai
^
five Centra! A^ aI1 £t8tes (C0SU Rica> ^ saivadc
"emaU> HOnd
— ~—*> created the Central
_Common Market (CACM) in i960. The CACM * *in united its members
seeking the gradual realization of a custom,s union and the promotion
— ^».tria„Mti0D
. Its first
considered succeesful in contributing ^ ^^^^^^for lt
. member, and promoting intra.regional trade> hovever
re81°"'S eCOn°" iC Md P° liti" 1
« the 1970s and 1980s haveSemUS
"
hamP6red CACM ' 6
— eve, eince (Athins, ,„,. m _
188).
Also in 1*0. the Lati „ AKerican Free Trade A£socistion (Mpw)
»as forced to promote free trade between its eleven members. 36
^TA proved to be a disappointment. Differences in the levels of
development between the members were an important source of problems
for eliminating tariffs, and LAFTA became virtually moribund in
1968. Hovever, some of its members were un„ill ing to abandon
integration and signed the Andean Pact in 1969. The Andean Pact
created a common market among its members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and, after 1973, Venezuela) that successfully
eliminated tariffs between its memhers on schedule and instituted a
common external tariff by 1976. The Pact also adopted a
comprehensive regional industrialization policy and a foreign
investment code. In the mid 1970s and again in the early 1980s, the
Andean Pact ran into economic and political problems, however the
1 34
^Atkins, 1989: 192-194).
j;::::; 1:
the^^^^^
^ * moribund^ and e£tabH8hed a
JUridiCSl b86i8 ~ *"t«.»tU» among lt . Mnbers
. It6
goal „ t0 estabU8h
, regio
_ ide iatin
c^U seeks t . addrets SMe of the probUms ^ usPr— sue, as perBittjrg greater negotiatiM ^ operationai
fl-aillt, than LAFTA and pe«itting certain regionai tar . ff
preferences based on members' levels of d»v„,„development. Throughout the
1980s, the
.embers of ALAD I continued to renegotiate the old
agreements of LAFTA and negotrate new ones, however the 1980s proved
to be a very diffic „ lt peri od for Latin American economic growth and
regional tr.de. ALADI ' 6 success remains to be seen. (Atkins, ,„„
196-197).
For our purposes, the ultimate success of these various
economic integration schemes is less important that the fact that
they vera undertaken at all and that they provided Latin American
states with ongoing experiments in multilateral diplomacy, from the
highest levels to the more technocratic levels, outside of the OAS
system. Other examples of Latin American multilateral diplomacy
through the 1970s and 1980s would have to include the increasing
number of Latin American states joining the Non-Aligned Movement as
wel! as several ad hoc meetings of Latin American foreign ministers
and several formal and informal presidential summits. In fact,
presidential inaugurations have recentlv h.y become important meeting
dKUratiMt Md
^ve been bora at 6 „ch
meet ings
.
"-.over the pa6t three decades>^^
^ve gained va>uable experience in miUiiaterai forM8 ^ ^
e"SbU,1,ed
" ltiPle
-— ication betveen 8tate£
_
and outside of Lati, America. With this situation, the
mstitutiona of the OAS system became less and Uss important tc
Latin American international relations.
Meanwhile, beginning il( the 1960s but fa ^^
-a 1980s, there has heen an explosion of new Latin American
institutes and think tanks (usually associated vith national
universities) devoted to the study of internationa! relations fron a
Latin American perspective. Beginning vith Mexico's D^^^
E
.tudi.s Tptfrn arin n i1rf M CvW l> „, H^ 1 p „ in 1959 and
tutltata Snn-rior d f w„di> rr nr n ,., „ founded in th#^^
there has been an important movement within Latin America to stop
simply importing and translating North American theories of
internationa, relations without any Latin adaptation. Instead,
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica. Ecuador, Mexico,
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, Latin American academics
and political analysts have been elaborating ECLA's intellectual
framework, developing Latin American perspectives on international
relations, and training personnel who can then cove into government
12
— e as part o£ the diplomaUc corps (Drekonja^ ^
^; 19a5: IonaS6inl> 1980; MuW> i98o) _
•
'
*ven »ore significant, the various oatioMi institut^ f^u£i
" <- «->
-
—etional relations throughout reg;oD ^««*H- important contact£ wUh other throush ^
"^^-^^^^^^^
~" nr '1 ,nri "". knovn by the acrony* RIAL, i„
The hraiicMTd of _ of Lat;n foremost
of intentional relations, Luciano Tomaesini, RIAL sponsors
-Uinational meeting ,Di ,e.ltm
, Btudies, publlcatioDE
, and
other joint activities aimed at exchanging iceas, theories, an,
Perspectives on Latin American international relations and foreign
Policy (Tomessini, 1985). „ith this developffient of ^ ^
field of international relation, in Latin America, combined ,lth the
Practical experience gained by Latin American diplomats in the past
fev decades, many Letin American states have developed their desire
and capacity to identify and assert their particular national
interests in international affaire. They have found the
institutions of the OAS system inadequate for pressing and meeting
their poUtical interests in international and inter-American
affairs. They have found the inter-Aa,erican system (mb1b laUa)
too confining to satisfy their contemporary economic and political
national interests.
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Conclusion: The Central American Cri„- ,Cri.i. of the Inter-A.^XteT'
~i-U.i- of ,tin toerlcan dipWy ^ ^ ^
' —^ Policies had turned iMrea8ingIy
"
"UUilateral
-— -P.. other Ihird
world states, and among the Latin ag American states themselves
(Tomassini. 1975) r^^ n ,»» The Unuea States was no longer the so!e or even* ^inciPal pole t own ra which L„ ti „^^^ ^P—it- ^foreign policy goals. And t,_ghout ^ i970s
_those goals focused on tryine to r*A r •g reduce Latin American dependency on
the United States and diversifv t.«h„ i- •y Latin political and economic
relations.
*»e OAS SyttM had also lost it. reHabiUty ana usefulness for
Onitea States after 1970 as the latter's previous two-th ira s
-Jorit, was no long e r assurea. Despite the pronouncements of the
Nixon administration ahout the neea to rehuila the "special
relationship" between the Doited States ana Latin Africa, the
reality was that for most of the 1970s, 0. g. policy tovard Latin
America ana the regional organization was one of benign neglect. 38
The Carter administration had gone a long way toward improving U.S.-
Latin American relations (while expending
. great deal of dome8tic
political capital) by signing ana securing the ratification of the
Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Treaties in 1977 a„a 1978. However,
the rickety institutions of the OAS system could no longer serve (if
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- really did) as a mediating mechMism betHeen ^ ^ ^Lata American political differences.
IW became dear in June 19„ when the uaited s^^
*-
-
'Pecfaf „eefing of Consultation of Foreign ^dUCU
"
"VOlUti °n
-— -— X» a Ust minute
e«ort t0 prescrve the Nicaraguan
„ational Guard in ^ ^
— by the revolutionary Sandinista FrMt
, Secretafy
.£^
Cyrus Vance presented a plan calling for th.r e resignation of
resident A„astacio Somoaa, the creation of . ^^
~-.ilU.U-. and the formation of an 0AS Peacek eeP ing fo rce te be
-« to Managua t0 enforce a ceasefire. The p lan wa s resoundingly
rejected by .„ 0 f the Lsti„ ^ ^
Sola's and „aE widely criticised a6 . thin l y veiled intervention
a Nicaragua's civil „ar (Blachman et al, 1986: 300).
The triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Jul y 1979 ~with
significant anti-Somoaa suppor t coming f rom the govermeIltf „ f
Mexico, Venezuela, Cost a Rica, Panama and others- was followed a
October by a mi l itary coup carried out by .un . or eff , cers ^ n
Salvador. The coup had held some promise of needed reforms for
Central America's smallest and most populous country, hut increasing
repression fro. the military and security forces led the c„Ie refo™-
minded
.ethers of the new junta to resign within a few months. El
Salvador soon found itself engulfed in a hitter civil war.
The United States responded to these revolutionary challenges
in its "backyard" with alarm. In the last months of the Carter
administration and the first months of the Peagan administration,
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"
0TW policies of " earlier e-— - putPU
" * P— *
-— ^ the troubledisthmus. The Reagan administration
.^^crati was especially o~
.
p l I y convinced thatthe emerging political crises in r . ,m Central America were best
understood and addressed in ^ C °nteXt
°
f
—8ing East-West
««««t. The new administration V0Ked £o dr
What 4* ~
6 aSainstv it perceived to be the spread of rn • .P
°
C0I^^sm in the isthmus. ItsPolicies focused on increasing U S *rm u. s. economic and security
assistance to an ti
-communist governments in Central A,c merica and onincreasing political, economic, and milita™
,
itary pressures on the new
government in Nicaragua.
These policies would soon bring abou£ ^^
opposition or severe! other lati „^ 6tate6> which
^ »y «<*"° and Venecia, the civilian
sovernments of Utin America tended to see the revolution unr est
» Central America rooted in
. hiE tory of poverty, socis, iDiquity
,
and dictatorship. Alarmed at the consequences of the vast
militarisation of the region and fearful of the threat of a direct
0. S. military intervention in the early 1980s, these states
initiated an ongoing process of negotiations aimed at rescuing the
Central African crises fro* the East-West conflict. Kith the
weakened OAS system in shambles, particularly after the
Falklands/Malvinas rslands war, the Latin African diplomatic
response to the civil and military crises of Centra. America was to
promote the emergence of an ongoing peace process outside of the OAS
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system through which the Central «
" " int"—
- —tie c0nflicts
. A6 ve wni
Peace process represe„ t
UnderetiDdin8 Latin A
— «"~, ana the nature of inter.
American relations in the 1980s.
- Chapter
„, „e have _ ^^^
—en t
„
century repeatedly turned to . lateral ^
lnt"VeDti0D
-
lD C""""
- seen how the inter-
-erican institutions tying the Unite, States an, Latin teerica
-Sether in a regi o„al organisation were create, an, how they
doctrine an, the issue of intervention^ in inter-American
relations. l r the present chapter, we have seen how the 8oo,wi„
Produced by the anti-interventionist Cood Neighbor Policy ero,e,
with the onset of the Col, War an, how ,ivergent interests in the
OAS system promote, the chronic weaRness of its mechanisms for
Peacekeeping an, conflict resolution. We have also seen how, after
1%5, Latin American dissatisfaction with the distribution of power
in the inter-American system le, to new orientations and
multilateral experiments in Latin American diplomacy aimed at
increasing Latin American autonomy vis-a-vis U. S . foreign policy
interests. Each of these lessons in the history of inter-American
relations has an important bearing on the political relations
1 4 1
U.S. polxcy toward Central America is rf^ , •13 ooted m this history.
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ENDNOTES
1. The Chapultepec Conference h^s r,technically not one of the /I February and March 1945, was
though the Pan Africa!X ^
"^eTth:^
0^6renCeS
itself with the future structure of ^ '
lt conce™ed
thlr
<* major agenda item w B , re§ 10^l organization,to World War Il^d, in pert icuLr he"^^ 8 t0 haSten"failure to join the rest of the hemisnh ? ^ ° f Ar^ntina'sbreaking relations with Nazi Germany (Mo" "V* that P ° int inInter-American Institute, 196eTZll) ° ^ 19?7: 87 ^
2
' ^^^^^^ al documents and treaties
Latin America, can be found in llT "' S ' P °Uc y tow«
d
t l Gantenbien's 1950 collection.
3. The Bogoti Pact mentioned in Article IVTTTconsolidate and supercede each of the fi/ t0Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the I & '' t0Treaty) (1 923); the General Convent on ^ (G°^Conciliation (1929) hk. r„ ! , International
Arbitration ( 929) the Pr«»" IT* ° f Int«-A»erican(1«9)
. the Addition % oc„? t : th:°c reSST Arti'r»«nInter-Aa,erican Conciliation (1933?. tl Co°««i°n for
Aggression and Conciliation^ 9 j ?
Antl-W" T«aty of Non-
Convention to Coord o te L end nd*^ ?,Ct> ° 933) = thefisting Treaties between tneter ntaces'a ^l**" ° fTreaty on the Prevention nf r„„, . " s US»36;j the
American Treaty oFcood Off" T" 5168 (1936) > and th * Inter-
c .
^ac r Goo Offices and Mediation (191Minstruments remain in force for rh„* ^
l0 Uy36;. These
Bogota Pact (Puig, 1983 U-14 ' A " ^
Party t0 the
396). ^ J 14 > Inter- merican Institute, 1966:
In this chapter, the terms "OAS System" and "int-.r Asystem" are nr^ r, Q ~ • -. 7 u a mter-American
noted in the text !
y
^
non>""0" s
- *y CAS Systen,, as
Charts a d tL Rio ^t: ^ •T"'"J™ ^ ^ 0A£
•
In 1951, the United States extended military aid to LatinAmerica, but economic development aid remained scarce untillater xn the decade. The United States had been providing EX-1: l t°E AmeriCa SinCe 1940 to facilitated,nowever, he Latin Americans wanted more development aid.
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p
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oHUc
r
un
ai
:L: 1^11^1/^"' ">«senting f«
significant c„»Mist inf luence ^ i
3 COm»u " is
'. allowed
agrarian reform program (Schneider
, Lir" 1™6" and hisrepresents a reformer and pop „! ' • F°r °thers -further the development of cSate^l! I mentions "ere "toas he specifically stated : f U lnto a capitalist state
78). Richard"™e™ te")*-'C ,'inaugural address, Arbenz sta ed "that f K k " Msadministration wonld be -t„ " the Dasic policy of hi.
^und by a predominant y endaTecon fr» * "untrycapitalist one.' He would ec omy into a modern,
would enconrage the J^lS^'S"^'*' "itiative, hewould encourage the influx of far!- P caP»al, and hetechnology. This was virtuallv It?* """""""a andArevalo at his inauguration If r t Pr0gran announced bywas that Arbenz went eve f"artw
™
y di«erences, it
- ^ of government in l^ S^^=^
":
f
JnL^iD\T f:-:tdD::-:r^»--ario„s ( tw„-thirds,
^CciXr^t™™^ th. Pact of Bogota
Haiti, Honduras, H«k „ ° Do" lni"» Republic,
Uruguay), but save" "f ? .^™» ' ^guay, Peru, and
Salvador, which had ratified the Pact much
El
instability within Ecuador a d ( j t "f'dispute between Ecuador and Peru prevented it a ""borderCreier (1968: 478) has noted "ftlll * i , °hn C "
overcome political obstacle 'to L ho'ld ^ °£. the °A$ t0
was "in itself a demonstration J b°U ™i °f this conference"
the Organization." If \ f 'J* shortcomings of
hemispheric meetings were re Jcefb^ StSi"" nT™'
:r;;
t
;;:;;: t
:°
r
i;
E;«»- x: oAS
-ireacy, as the case might be Ac k„ v
system!"
P ° lltlCal 0r purity emergencies within the OAS
As noted in endnote 6, Arbenz's political orientation and thatof his government remain controversial Th* a k
did encourage the participating and suppo^'ofl^rESEincluding the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), which he '
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legalized in 1952, as well as the trad*communist leadership. Ronald l*?
e
,
unions
.
«hich did have
influence in the labor movemen t
6 had substantial
bureeaucracy, and over other \ S overnment
".t by 1953, it was "ill a^o it on tVs^ 8 *" Guate^> andPolicies and determine the L V ?6 S over^ent
extent greater than that f
0t natlonal affa irs to an
Soviet orbit" (Schneider, 1958- lyT^'^ °Utside ° fImmenaan (1982: 184-185) notes'"^ r However . Richard
agrarian legislation, worked hard
C°~Unii,ts Promoted the
«d defended the rights of „orkers °°
the
,
llte«=y campaigns,
Code. They also supplied Jch needed atai"? f°
the Lab°r
assistance. But they did J f™ , dm nistrative
did they control theVotes Co™ "V'c J""
1
?^ ™
~ res ^ative^ Infc^ K""--"- - »government, ^.".^^.^S ' P--ions in
«c*i..x« ,^s:,
(l
i
9
s
2
M)
1
f ) ;°d others u - e-
middle-class reformer win d ? ar8Ued that Arbeo^ "was a
survival. The 19™ revo^ P ^
°n the middle clas * for his
movement, and its charLter n!
°ri8
;
Mted
" a middle-class
atmosphere and the McCarthyism of UtT' i I" the " ld "«Washington (and the Dnitd IVuit r„ \ ed P ° licy makers in
Arbenz government L Fr " . Company) to interpret the
which led to the CIA ™»
? 38 c0™ist dominated,
^r our Pur;L :,
c
i°
:
c
a
l
1
:^ L
c
te
E
r
s
orth°rrh
hro
"
Arb^ z
-
t^lTT^tVJZlTl dthM ^--united
hostile Policies LcUdin 8 °
"d "rrled out
overthrow. Our Interest here ITJ** ^""j 00 " th« ^ to his
reaction to U.S. polLv an th • • America" diplomatic
system. *
be la,pact this had on the OAS
11. Dulles' original resolution simply called for "„™
action in accordance with existing' "e.tzesMWoXm": m)
.
12. According to C. Neale Ronning (1963- 74) *h* e-
"-"-i'" Sr.":--."-Dominican Republic, Batista in Cuba, and Odrfa in Peru
13. According to Connel 1-Smith (1974: 220) in 1 9S4 i • .
(sic) o^th ;
Ur8er
"editS f°r the "dustrialisationI f their countries; United States pert ic ipat ion in a new
^TelZlT C °nCerned ~™*«J with their ™ic
a 11 til 21 ' ancouragement in their plans for establishingLa n American common market."
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I*. COAS also called on the Inter Ainvestigate the situation?Tnl^T ***** Com*i"ee toAmerica. ' but lt: never made it to Central
15. For example, the TAPr
fusing tbe follovi^"^^^^^ "'""Sating ann
Rib,
561
Repub c
bb
r;4
n
8
CO
S
fliCtS
»48
«P«bllc, 1949; Caribbean area fC^-Cv Haitl
-Dominican
1949; Cuba-Dominican
[ "^ j^ioa activities),
,
T0"e
,"ntr«ersy), 1953-1954- L Ju , ! 1*:'™^ da a1956 (Inter-Aa,erican Institute,^^E^"" *«P»"ic.
16. The IAPC's aeti'vi'fj
Dominican Republic, I960 ^PubUc, 1959; Ecuador-
Mexico-Guatemala, 1961- Peru-Cnh! rQ??
iniCan Re Publ ic, I960;
961-1 963; Panama-U.S.; l 96t TlnL I '
NicaraS—Honduras ,
'
9D. 1 4 < Inter-American Institute, 1 966:
17. See notes 15 and 16.
The sanctions lasted until 19ft? ro-i
Eventually, after Tru '
(Wilson, 1975: 60).
moved on the U S * assassination in 1961, the OAS.S. proposal for 0AS -sponsored elections in 1962.
According to Connel 1-Smith (1974- 232) rh. n owas related to the groundwork laid a e Ttt
S;*~ »f aid
administration toward implementing n Eisenhowerlater deepened through £^2,^-,^' -
According to Wil gus and d'Eca (1963- 426) thset up a Committee of Eleven to trv't! V' \ COnferenc * also
reconciliation between thTSnitJ L I 8 ab °Ut 3
yet been able to find a Jin ^ ^ 1 have not
work, or outcome oflhS 0^^™^°"^ ^ —""P.
18.
19.
Atkins, 1989: 222; Inter-American Institute, 1966: 379).
22.
23.
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In 1961, the government of BrazilAmerxca be made a nuclear-free iJl * that Latinpresented to the UN General I s 1 d™ f'"""lut ionon the resolution. After the* CuZni ^ th> ™GA never votedPresents of Brazil, Bolivia Ch ? ^ " Crisis > thesigned a declaration st ^ Ecuador > *nd Mexico
-uld create such a zone. After^he lET r 3 tr"* thatBrazil, Mexico took the lead in\l military coup inof Mexico's deputy fo^ig e" 1!,°"* Thr0Ugh 'heRobles, a draft treaty was son * ^""dor Alonso Garcia
other Latin American t B SIC'^ Pre8ented t0 ^ater received the Nobel Peace PrLrf ^^ 6 * Garci'a Rob les1989: 337-338). 06 ?riZe for ^is efforts (Atkins,
25. G. Pope Atkins (19RQ.
military coups overthrew DT that " fr° ffi 1961 to 1963in seven Latin Zt] cl c cunt' 1eT^l eleCted g™ents1964, there were at least elh ' „ ^ Brazil ^n coup ofMarch 1 964. ig t Such cou Ps between 1961 and
6- Bosch had been elected in December 1969 *governing civilian/military W tLt "J 1*" theassassination in 1961 sll SI emerS ed af ter Trujill 0 ' s
of the U.S. embassy k encour J, n" J'^ 24
~31) f ° r the ro1 *
unite and forcibly
7
™^ ^V^T t0considered Bosch weak emnMn „ 0 he United St ates
(Slater, 1970: U-n).
0tl °nall y unstable, and untrustworthy
27
28.
29.
Panamanian flag Xside tne VS n^T ^ ° f ^
agreement to that effect between th U S
3 1963
riots broke out between U S I ^ ?™**a. When the
troops were called on o ^t r rd"^'^"'j • ^
several Panamanians were killed and ^nded "*
Treaties of 1977.
eventually in the Carter-Torri jos
As indicated above, there was a certain Latin American
oTicarc:
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f 1 icts
Rl°
I
Treaty
^
,i?»ti~ ^ oUtical and
both highlighted "mp encT f
C
tbe":8h the *" I"""
settlement and heiehtpJ/rV mec anisms of pacific
inter-American ^^T^U^^
30.
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31. The General Secretary may be elected munder the Charter reforms. " l ° * Second "ve-year term
32. To deal with the problems of <n •
which was also felt b t ^r c ^ *" the U ' S ' ™y>administration surprised e^er^ne econo»ies . the NixonU.S. dollar from the gll standi aTV l9?1 by removi^Bretton Woods monetary regime) and ' (thUS abando^ng the
-Ports, which hit Latin A*e L ' "ETV " UrChar« e °* a11same time, the U.S. Congres o on f 7 At theaid to the region. For^heir part lnC!ea?ed ^ economiconly criticized the new vrtllrl atlD Orleans not
also chafed at the strlngT ^Ts^ 1^68 ° f ^ W ' B ' ^increasingly respnff.,1 fc u aid and grew
U.S. tranfnltiJL
fc
c po a o
e
nrrr
iC
"f P °Ut?cal P-r of
Lowenthal, 1987: 3 9)
°
r °r tl0 s (Atkins, 1989: 126-127;
33. A third attempt to amend the OAq ri, .
culminating in the Protocol Lrtf in 1984 ~85 '1985. This reform movemen incLd d^both IT? °? 4 'economic reforms Th* U e political and
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be™ aMe t0 fi"d
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£
'
MS
separate research proiect
"udled further in a
otherwise comprehend ve 1989 study of"S'T AtkiDS '
makes no mention of the Cartel """"American relations
to the OAS Charter in the 1980s!
8 " ° f
34. Theot6nio dos Santos (1970: 232) provides an excellent
£Prh« ^-sirs =L«
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection o thatexpansion, which can have either a positive or a negativeeffect on their immediate development" (emphasis added)
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The Nixon adminis trat i nn e
other international an forf ^ WaS °riented towardV.etna. War negotiations detlnte vi^ T^™ > SUCh as ^pensions in the Middle East? etc For th ^ "* China >America mattered very little to th* 2* P3rt > Latinthe exception of its role in Iht ^ adffiin istration withthe Allende government in Cnile Ift^8 *** overthrew fProtestations, the administration df \ ^compromise in certain foreign Sh °W SOme wiHingneSS to
noted in note 31) ^ £ ng^T^ 01^ 188065 b" «go along with Latin demands on Jhese ILaPP"?nt^ twilling to199; Lowenthal, 1987: 38-40) 68 Utki-™> 1989: 198-
The founding members of LAFTA were- A.Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Urueuav ?!f t™' Br3Zi1 ' Chil *>joined LAFTA i„ i 961 . VenezupT" Colombia and Ecuadorin 1967. LAFTA onl/slug" eHmin ^ B °Uvia^its members; it d ?d not Lpose a ***** barriers amo*gof the world (Atkins, 1989 1
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2 fl
94)°™°° tarrif with the reft
( FEDESARROLLO) Ecuador^T^^
Grupo dP Analysis aJ
^axrollo frrAnn , ^"^or ; Peru's
Important exceptions to this generalization include U S
38.
human rights policy. ^ Carter Ministration's
CHAPTER V
We have an interest in
democratic states in cUtra^/"1 6Upp0rti*g
conducting their politicly If * ° ffrom outside interference a^°Domic affairs free
vital interest in not * •
Stra ' e8"«"y. we have a
Cuba-model states L 7 the proliferation of
subversion, 0^^^".^^^- ^
direct military threat „ S and Pose a
would undercut us globaUv 'r" °" Thisdislocation and a t ff"" oconomic
illegal immigrants
U,fl» t0 th* D - S
-
«*
National Security Council, April 1982 1
Peoples to live better ?f
P f oppressed
olse and to act aHr^ °^ ^^
*
Productive: you finish up achieving wha^ou wanted
Mexican President dose Lopez Portillo, February 1982 2
lo the late 1970s, the countries of Central America entered
into a period of economic, social, and, for some, political crisis
that lasted throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Neighboring
states with economic and political interests in the troubled isthmus
understood the causes and remedies of these crises in different
ways. After the successful armed revolution that ousted Nicaraguan
dictator Anastacio Somoza Debayle in July, 1979, and after the
growing revolutionary activity and civil violence in El Salvador and
Guatemala in 1980, United States policy makers increasingly
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interpreted events in Central Amer 1C a as part of . .
. .
F t a larger, renewedS-ba, struggle betueen East ^ wegt
_ giQbai^
rr
ts at stake ana
-
uh
— —
-
- cold uar>
Washington moved to "draw the line" i„ r + ,m Central Amerira q„jc and reassert
«• -"uence over a region Mlttalllj considered ^ ^ ^
Unite. States'
.,ac kyard,. with ^ ^ ^^ ^^
-erference U id at the Heart o£ Centra!Wl politica ,
— a, Washington developed containment-oriented poUc.es for
r68i0n
^ 1M°- economic and mUitary a id for
allies to covert operates a„d shows o£ force f„
"asMngton deve lo ped and nse d a wide ra„g e o f foreig n policy tools
to reassert and protect traditional U.S. interests in rl.m the region.
As these policies u„fol d ed
, however, other states neig hboring
Centra! Africa d eveloped their own interpreters of the causes of
the reg ion-s crises and moved to develop their own foreig „ policy
tools to assert and protect their interests. Emerg i„g sub-hegemo„s
such as Mexico and Venezuela as veil as other states with growi„g
ties to the region, such as Colombia and Panama, became .ore and
.ore concerned over the deepenx„g violence in Central Africa and
the related militarisation of the region hy outside powers of both
East and West. After several isolated attempts during 1981 and
1982, these four neighboring states issued a joint call for peace in
Central America in January, 1983, that developed into an ongoing
diplomatic process aimed at the peaceful resolution of the region's
conflicts.
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The Contadora peace process f c « , rf ^.c u named for t-v,^ v>r the Panamanian island
— -
-re.gn mlnlsters of the countries first ^
S~
^ *» »«• It emerged in response t0 . specific
regional and international context R.f. Before we can study the course
of the Contadora peace process, „e Bust look hriefly at the
PoHtical situation in Central Series as „ell as the international
spurred Mexico, Veneris, Colons, and Panana t0 undertake theirdipWic ,ue.t for peace. Thus, the a im of this chapter is to
review events of the latP 1 Q7n.o j1970s and early 1980s to help situate the
e-rgence of the Contadora peace process. It is not aeant to he a
comprehe„sive analysis or explanation of the causes of poUtical
violence in Central America.
Changing Times
Beginning in the mid 1970s, the countries of Central America
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) faced
emerging economic, social, and political crises that would deepen
and attract the world's attention in the 1980s. The isthmian
economies had experienced dynamic growth during the 1960's
industrialization process, thanks largely to the success during that
decade of the Central American Common Market (CACM) as well as the
related Alliance For Progress programs. Between 1960 and 1970,
Central America's industrial sector had grown by 8.4 per cent, to
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17.5 per cent of its GDP ln i
9
7n .m iy 0, while the region's rnPB 8 GU grew at an
average annual rate of 7 67 „ o67PerCeDtf0rthed^ 3 (Torres R lvas
,1988: 143; Newfarmer, 1986: 215-216- Ron** ,
, A , s
'
BOOth and Wal ker, 1989: Tables2 «->. Respite this important growth and diversification of the
~g >on-s economy throug h import-substitution
-Hcies during the 1960s
,
Central America, exports to the Mrli
0arket t0
*— " - -itW agricultural products-
Coffee, bananas, sugar, cotton, and beef Thiso t. continued dependence
on Primary products for Centra! Erica's export earnings resulted
- •
situation of deteriorating terms of trade in the mid-to-late
1»70., es Pecia, ly after the op£c ^ ^^ ^^
Import prices rose b y 38 per cent between 1976 and 1982 while
Central America's exports lost their purchasing power* (Newfarmer,
1986: 215-216).
To make matters worse, the 1969 "Soccer War" between El
Salvador and Honduras brought about the stagnation of the CACM i„
the 1970s. 1„ this nationalistic war based in demographic and
economic frustrations in both states, the actual fighting was
relatively brief thanks to OAS peacekeeping procedures ^ the
significant mediation efforts of the other three Central American
states, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, whose diplomats worked
to save the Common Market. However, Honduras cancelled its
membership in the CACM in 1971 and tense relations between Honduras
and El Salvador persisted throughout the 1970s (Martz, 1975). Thus,
both the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization and the
stagnation of the CACM after the 1969 "Soccer War" contibuted to the
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deteri0r" i0n
* * —
— -
th. 1970s, „ith per
CPs and per capUa incoMs famng markediy5^ ^
;T ;
987: 5; Ne-fara
- boo. a. Halker
, 1989:Tables 2 and 4).
Beyond its impressive grouth during
^,.iatiM pr0cess alsQ contributea ^ ^^^^
domestic social changes. These inri a a^eluded increased urbanization and
the growth of new urban sector* * v,s, such as industrial elites and
workers
—as well ac hv, n us the urban unemployed and underemployed- all
of whose economic and pol itica l interests ^ ^^
tradlti °nal
^creased landlessness for the
attests at land reform under the Alliance Per Prog ress (Cepeda and
Pardo, 1987: 5; La Feber, 1984: 145-195).
With the deterioration of traditional economic and social
structures came gro„ lng demands on the political systems of the
region for the accomodation of new ln terests. New social B roups and
new political movements emerged in Central America in the 1960s and
•970s, signalling pressures for change. However, in Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala in particular, the traditionally elitist and
exclusionary political systems resisted demands for change.
Specifically, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua became more brutal and
greedy; El Salvador's military fru^t-raf^ . ar s rated a democratic election held
in 1972 and turned more brutal and repressive; and Guatemala's
centrist civil/military regime of the early 1970s became much more
brutal later in the decade. The turn to political repression by
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states to
— 8rouPS often served to
"
8r0" in8 dl8COntenC
^^ *'— *~ alreadydivided societies. By the late 197n
guerrilla groups that had emerged in the I960g 1960s and early 1970s hadgrown 10t0 foraidable revoluti
y "roes, both in spite of and as
"
"
COTSeqUen
"
° f «» "«« ^criminating counter-
agency strategies carried out hy these states. In short, as the
region s economic situating a*-uu uon deteriorated aftPr t-v^ ci e the first OPEC oil
shock and as social and political a-P discontent expanded, political
violence also grew. As the 1970s drew to a close Nicd i , aragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala all faced Bpri«t se ous economic, social, and
political crises (La Feber 1 or/ . „ .,
'
1984
>
Hami lton et al, 1988; Booth and
Walker, 1989: 52-53 1 SA . r53, 154, Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 5-6; Valero, 1985-
132-133; Diskin and Sharpe, 1,86; GUbert, 1986; Trndeau and
Schoultz, 1986).
By the end of the 1970s, the international political context
Had also changed for the Central American states. As discussed in
Chpater IV, the inter-American system had undergone portent
changes in the 1960s and through the 1970s. Some of these changes
were due to the changing domestic political scene in the United
States and the related search for a new U.S. role in the world after
Vietnam; others were the result of the new diplomatic assertiveness
and relative foreign policy autonomy of certain Latin American
states (Puig, 1976). Both would be significant for the Central
American states in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
- * United states, the Vietnam and us t
course o£ U.S.-Sovret detente poUcies>
effects ^
;r;:T
scandaI a11
-
-—
-
- PMt-World
Policy MKMUS on co„ tainnent poUcy ^ ^ a
— of concessional participation ^ £he f_ iation ^ ^
-lgn policy
. Significantly
, begiMing in ^
Congress passed leeialaH«„ • •g slation requiring that II q ^i »S Ln c u.b. economic and
nghtS SitUatl
°" in "» "untries rather than cold war
Cli'ena
'
"
nd
" "»— ™«-io„, the g oal ef support,,kM riShtS
-
one of the fev foreign policy goals
"at enjoy ed some measure of biparti s a„ consensus and it soon becaee
the centerpiece of the C art er for eig n polic y . Vet tMs PoHc y led
to tensions between the UnUed States and contain Latin A.eHcan
states uhose hunan right s situations were P oor. For the governments
of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in the nid-to-late 1970s,
the new U.S. hu.an rig hts policy was an important break with the
'
Past (Schoultz, 1987; Kirkpatrick,
,979; Crabb and Holt, 1984: 187-
212; Leogrande et al, 1986: 298). 6
Another important change in the inter-American context for the
Central American states was the negotiation, signing, and
ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties (or the Torr i jos-Carter
Treaties for the Latin Americans). Although the ratification by the
U.S. Senate was a difficult and rancorous process 7 reflecting a deep
division within the U.S. over this symbol of U.S. know-how and
power, the new treaties seemed to indicate a new U.S. relationship
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ra
Lie
on
with Latin American countries d 1pH ;Pled^ * new respect for their
™ ::::: ::r
treaty ™
—
—
;
Panamania
"
8
~ "- - - —I trough the to
Panama's Contadora Xslend, the pleJged^^ ^
- end encourage the „ egotiation process^
— s tatas aad Panana
. Ihis di£p]ay of dipiMatic^ ^^
-tes ..the original „Contadora Group „ (thMgh ^ ^ ^
this name at the tiae)-- wes a significant nanifestation of
feir new interests and gro„ ing assertiveness in ^^^^^
Polio, issues. Tbe Panes* Canal Treaties were finany ^
Septet 7, 1977
, at the0AS w . th aU ^ ^
state present 8 a„d the members of ^ ^
™°"8 th6m (CePeda a"d P»d °. "87: 6-7; Bel,, ,984: 10; Atkins,
1989; 332-334).
This growrng foreign po l icy asser t iveness „f ^
American stetes on regional issues „ou l d have inportaDt consequences
for Centrel America in the late 1970s and ear ly 1980s. Not only wa s
Panama's Torrijos seeking to play . l eadership role in regional
affairs and in U.S.-Latin A.ericen reletions; so too was Mexico's
Jose Lopez Portillo, Venezuela's Carlos Andres Pe'rez, end Colon's
Julio C^ser Turbey. Mexico's new petroleum findings in the 1970s,
combined with the two rounds of petroleun, price increases which
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—a both Hexlco and Vene2ueUi encouraged ^
1970s. Central America and the Carihh. k
-
v .
bbean became important new foci
of their foreign policy interest, a r7 s. As Cepeda and Pardo (1987:6)
explain it, in the late 1970s
credit, collaborated in Lelo^ a"^e" tei their l cvels ofincreased their diolo^ f P ' banks for «ne,
tnere were nationT nlllltTlTl'^ I'V™'
*> "el980 Pact o f San Jose
, Vene2ueU and Mexico ^
subsidized S ale of petroled to Central American and Carrbbean
Thanks to this Program of Cooperation through the Pact of SanW, Venezuela and Mexico joined the ranks of hemispheric aid
donors to Central America (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 24; La Feher,
1984: 215-216).
Finally, the Central Americans also witnessed the foreign
ministers of the Andean Pact nations, led h y Venezuela and Colombia,
taking an interest in the deepening Nicaraguan civil conflict in
late 1978 and 1979. The new diplomatic activism of the Andean
foreign ministers included various declarations calling for Somoza's
resignation as well as opposition in the OAS to the Carter
administration's failed attempt to create a multinational peace-
keeping force in Nicaragua. It culminated in the Andean ministers'
recognition of the Fpente Sandinista He T.ih»-,.,; on n^n.l (FSLN)
as a belligerent force against the Somoza dictatorship on June 16,
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-d „ their mediat . on between
dlPl0MtlC
"Men paralledthat of the original
"Contadora" countries
ambivalent efforts of the United St.f *6 at6S to P^ent the FSLN f rom
Atkins, 1989: 195-196).
By tb. end of the 1970s, the Carter administration's
„uma„
"Shts poHc y provided evidence th. t the so-called
"hegemonic
PreSUKPti ° n
" (L0Wenthal
-
197« -isted, a lb eit in a .ore
.-era! and perhaps attenuated for. T. t
.
after
„ f^
hege.ony in th> circum-Car lbbean region had grea tly and dang erous ly
eroded, citing the "eive „B g away of the Panama Canal and the
"abandonment" of Anastacio Somoza as proof A ,«db t. conservative group
known aa the Co^ittee of Santa Pe was perhapa the aost articulate
in stating this view. In its 1,80 report, A_M£^£^m^
Eg licy for The Fifhfi r ; , the Conaaittee warned that
America is everywhere in retreat
.... Evan the Caribbean
center* J.T"^ """"^ a"d P«™1— refining
'
tlf. \ t° °mln8 * Ma"<"t-Leninist lake. Neverbe ore has the Republic been in such jeopardy froTitsexposed southern flank. Never before has Africa"foreign policy abused, abandoned, and betrayed its
slllTft: tllo'V. "
L3tin AmeriCa (COnmitt
" ° f
59
What seems to be more accurate is that U S hpC ,b
' egemony over the
ClrCU"-C"ibbCM « r eal ly eroded; rather .
,
id n , the growing
" rensth
"
d
"
rel"i«—
"
c^. im) of certain Latin
— states had becone signincant by ^ ^ ^
°rei8n P°UCy
"""" ^ CaPabiUti" ° f~< Mexico,Mmel
"
PMama
-
*"d
—
C— i. i- Central Wca and tha
Caribbean had become £ignificant ^
tb.. the Central teerican states ^ unued stat^ _ ^ ^
^ce. As th. isthmus experienced ^^^^ econMiC)^ ^
Politlc.1 crises, it also faced a„ international context ^
Eluded the continued presence of the United St a tes a s the
traditional hegemon as well as tha nan e new presence of neighboring
states with active, subhegemonic interests in th. 9x L m e region. The test
of these competing hegemonic interests wonlH au d develop m the 1980s as
^ited States sought to reassert its tradition al hegemony over
Centre! Amerrca while Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia end Panama sought
to exercise end maintain their sub .hegen]0nic interests
_
In 1980, political polarization end violence deepened markedly
in Centrel America. In El Salvador,
. coop by reform-minded junior
military officers in October 1979 brought widespread hopes for an
improved poHtie.l situation. However, after January 1980, the
military and civilian junta began to drift to the right. Growing
death squad violence sponsored by El Salvador's ultra right
political sectors and military factions, along with the inability of
the new junta to do much to stop the violence, led to the
resignations in early 1980 of the more moderate and leftist civilian
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or s
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of th. junta
. Romin Hayorga> Rector ^ ^
A»erican „niversity
, and Gumermo Ungo
_ ^ n^
Soc ial „e.oc ratlc Party
, both resigned
.^^ in january
- —b. christlan Denocratic civnians Hector ^^
•
resign ed
. 0aly the more CQnservative chrutian Democrat ^
Napouon Duarte atayed on in a„ ^^^ ^
-titute refers an d m0cerate the grouing political violence
_
Instead, death squad activity DolinV.ic , p tical repression, and growing
revoluti on ary guerril l a aotivity „ EJ Salvador only ^ ^
coun try £ank int0 full.Mown cWil (DisUn ^^ ^ ^
59; See .!.„ Bal oyra
, 1982; »ontgomery> 1982; ^^
1982).
In Nicaragua, 1980 brought growing tension bewteen the leftist
Sandinista Front 11 and the .ore moderate and conservative business-
oriented members of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted
Somoza in July 1979. In April 1980, the FSLN unilaterally undertook
a reorganization of the governing revolutionary Council of State by
adding more seats for the FSLN-related popular organizations. This
move alienated the more conservative members of the council and
resulted in the resignations of Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso
Robelo. With the mediation efforts of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence
Pezzullo, the political crisis was contained after the FSLN made
conciliatory gestures to the more conservative private sector
business groups represented by COSEP, the Superior Council of
Private Enterprise (Cpnseio Superior Hp 1
fl Emor^a Pri YflH^
However, by November 1980, Robelo, COSEP, and others made up an
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emerging ant i-Sand in is ta political EM,u.coalition. Meanwhile, former
Somoza national guardsmen began to or,,8
°
° gani2e and with the help
of Argentine military advisors in r - ,Guatemala and Honduras in thehopes of removing the Sandinistas frnvist om power through an armed
counter-revolution ThioI
"^ instituted the core of what wouldUter
"
CaUed * " <*•
aad uould
inside Nicaragua (Gilbert, 1986- 96-98- v n n uy 98, Kornbluh, 1987: 25; Dickey
1986: 91; Past0 r, 1987: 367-368).
In Guatemala in 1980 a new cvcIp n f i- •y le of political repression and
violence under General Romeo Lucas G«™.,' • 19arcia was gaining momentum. 12
* the citie.. the government repression lncluded arrests^
charges, kidnapping, torture> and^ ^ ^^
of Guatemala's centrist parties 13 uk.P , labor union leaders, university
Pressors, and student leaders. ln rural areas> t„e _y
a new counter-insurgency cempaign thet soon c* to focus on the
indigenous communities in the highland, of wester„ ^
revolutionary guerrilla groups hade successfully increased their
activities and built up their support. A brutal civil war via
ethnic or racial as well as soc io-economrc lines once aga.n engulfed
Guatemala (Aguxlera Peralta, 1981; Trudeau and Schoultz, 1986: 36-
40; Aguilera Peralta, 1988: 156-157; Booth and Walker, 1989: 86-94).
In very broad terms, the Carter administration's policy toward
these regional political crises in 1980 was to begin t o increase
U. S. economic and military aid to the government of El Salvador, 14
continue to try to moderate the course of the Kicaraguan revolution
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— oth positive and
econonic ^^
maintain a cut-off of II c? -j°" t U.S. aid to Guatemala due to n,
. . . .
° U 0 the severe human
rights abuses there. But U S f«. . foreign policy setbacks elsewhere,
as the Iranian hostage ordeal, the effects of a s h
0pFr .
3 Second round of
1DC
— <P~^ the related economic sug.
«-on,. cheMariel im^Uon crisis, and ^ SovietMr ^
Afghanistan all contributerbuted to a grow.ng sense of
"America under
siege" within the Unit^H ^ .States. Durrng the last year of the Carter
Ministration,
.ore trad ltio„al cold war and geostrategic
—derates reeled in
.... foreig
„^^
-re conserves poHtica, cand.dates succes6fuUy
^
growrng xenophoh lc attitude during the 1980 elec[ion ^ ^
reinjected cold war rhetoric into the American pubHc discourse.
Detente d,ed i„ the la3t year of ^^ ^ ^
bur.ed with the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. The
U.S. foreign policy agenda returned to the securrty of .ore familiar
strategic concerns as the cold war was reborn and the United States
-ught to reassert its .ore treditional interests in the circum-
Caribbean region.
During its first two years in office, the Reagan administrate
sought to redefine the ends and means of U.S. fore lg „ policy away
fro. its renderings of the 1970s. Both ideology and a renewed
global strategic vision shaped the administration's interpreta t ,on
of events in world politics. Fro. the new administration's
perspective, after years of setbacks, the United States was once
again confronted with a global struggle against aggressive Soviet
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communism. Central AmeriCfl
~ - being a current target
of Soviet-sponsored subversion. The ree ion'< , •gl0 s revolutionary ferment
nad its origins in Soviet Cuban
lfi
'
3
'
and D0W Nicaraguan inter-
ventionism. E1 SalvadQr^ 81 case against further
economic aid t0 that besieged goveramMt ^ ^^^^ ^
- advice t0 strengthe
„ and ^
» U. counter-insurgency campaign against foraidabie m^
<»~c..ti. Revolutionary Front-Farabun4o M„ti, pront ^ NatiQnai
Liberation) (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987- 18- r a
'
S
>
Cepeda and Pardo, 1987-
12; DisUn and Sharpe, 1986: 50-87; Blacken, at al, 1986: 295-328-'
Pastor, 1987: 360-365
; Weinrauh, 1983: 1,4; Schoulta, 1, 89)
.
The new admi„ istrati o„ also sought to support the Guatemalan
-Htary in its efforts to neutrals the country's growing
guerrilla groups. However congress resisted the administration's
efforts to renew U.S. military aid to the hrutal military regimes of
Generals Romeo Luca's Garcia (1978-1982) and Ife.fi, Rr'os Montt (1982-
1983). 17 Thus, the Guatemalan military's counter-insurgency
campaigns generally remained perrpheral to the Reagan administra-
tion's containment policies during its first term (Trudeau and
Schoultz, 1986: 37-39, 44-45; Pastor, 1987: 360-369).
However, Nicaragua became the primary focus of the Reagan
administration's new policies of containment and, eventually,
1
8
rollback. The administration initially took the position that the
Sandinista government needed to be pressured into abandoning its
support for revolution or subversion against its neighbors,
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-,o „hlch
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"
°- S
-~ '« «» '-I, the blocking Q£
financial credits and loans from multilateral b a wc nks such as the
World Bank and the Inter-An>. •
19
merlCa
" Bank during 1982 and
— • mixed signals from U.S. diplomats about theP^cts for normalised bUatera. relates. For sample. it t00k
tb. Keagan Admtnistration seven months to send a new ambassador
Anthony Quainton, to Managua after Lawrence P,„ullo left the post
-Augusts,
"eanwhile, at Pe^llo's recuest, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders
travelled to Managua to ho!d discussions on August 12 and 13, 1,81,
with the Sandinista government on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.
The "Enders Talks" seemed to open the door to improved
relations, and some follow-up correspondence did take place in
September between the two governments. However, for Nicaragua's
ambassador to the United States, Arturo Cruz, and other
inexperienced Nicaraguan diplomats, Enders' initial presentation of
the U.S. position for improved relations sounded "like the
conditions of a victorious power" rather than an opening negotiating
position (Gutman, 1984: 4 , 10). Not only did the United States
reiterate its demand that Nicaragua end its material and logistical
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support to El Salvador's FMLN20 if errii.w l economic aid were to
It alcn i„ • , be renewed.
— that Nicaragua limit the size of ^
between 15,000 end 17,000 soldiers and
10,000; the „ s al t
eVe"UalIy red
""
-
—
OManded Ki"«g ua send back the _Z~ ******it. neighbors did not possess
>
^o^. 7; Walker, 1985).
"ore mixed signals c,e in the £oU_p
—s Talhs in September. As Gutman ?)^ ^
the administration sent a draft- „fdeclaration promising vigVrou enfor
UDllateral
neutrality laws r»«rJ,-, » cement o£ U.S.
in an example of^JIiX'T^t"""'saying that remaining economi?' V e was attached
had been canceled.
° °" c aid to Nicaragua
Enders sent another draft «f .of a proposed joint declaration on non-
intervention shortly thereafter r.y . It uould have comnitted ^ ^.^
^ates not to use, threaten, or acquiesce in the use of force
against Nicaragua i f Nicaragua pledged the same to its neighs.
However, two days later, on September 18, the Reagan administration
announced plans to hold a joint naval exercise with Honduras in
October. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D -Escoto Brockman
expressed his government's concerns about the meaning of such
exercises. Soon thereafter, the Enders" initiative broke down
without any other draft documents on security issues, cultural
exchanges, and economic aid ever being presented. The mixed
diplomatic signals produced growing mutual distrust, missed
opportunities, and deteriorating relations between the United States
and Nicaragua (Gutman, 1984: 3-9; Bagley et al, 1985: 22-32,
documents 1.8-1.13; Bendana, 1990).
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Military tools and shows of force were also d ,eveloped to createCO" tai"Mt P
—— a. By thm of
eagan ad"ini"»"»-
—17 ^Ported tie appearance Qf cQntra
—g camPS i„ F l orida
,
Texas
, and CaUfo„ ia
, de8pite „. s
.Mtril"y *— tion had aUo authorized
contra. from their Argentlne advisors ^ ^^ ^ ^^
"" tra
"8ani— «" HondUr.n-ba8ed September 15 ^
Miami-based Nicaraguan Democratic Union „„H.u , under one anti-Sandinista
banner, the Nicaraguan Democratic Porce <PDN) 2 ' (Knornbluh> 198? . „.
27, Bagley and TokatHan, 1,87:
„, Pas tor, I98?; 3^3^^
and Pnrdo, 1987: 13; Dickey, 1986; Chamorro, 1987).
By the end of 1981, toe National Security Council had approved
a 519 million prograffi of ^^
to interdict arms trafficking from Nicaragua to Salvador
guerrillas, and President Reagan had sent Congress a "finding"
stating that such covert activity was in the national interest.
Soon thereafter, in March 1982> contra a[tacks fa
increased in the i r frequency and destructiveness. In response, the
Sandinista government declared a C t- Q »- Q ~fa i s ate of emergency and mobilized
troops along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The "covert" war was
by then well under way (Goodfellow, 1987: 146; Kornbluh, 1987: 24-
25; Pastor, 1987: 366-367).
Honduras became a key player in the Reagan administration's
containment strategy in Central America and the stage for
Washington's new shows of force in the region. Largely ignored by
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g eographlc ,oMlm
, bordering Nicaragua> ^ ^^^^^ ^
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;r
au aod pos- ing
* —— h the north> as
« its strongly anti .co_ l8t nmtary ^ civiUM ^
Pt0Vlded ^ - - oPPcrtunity t0 increase
°-atically u.s. Bllic„y capabilltie6 „ the region
_ ^ o£
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Policy to rea sse rt U.S. oilitary poser in tbe region ^ ^
,e« years ln office> the Reagan adffiinistratiM spMsored a
ra P io U.S. Bilitary build -up in „onduras
. The bund _up a
»».-*.« ln„e a se in „.S. military aid tQ ^
between 1981 and 19fn f-v^ _ -. • ,1983, the establishment of numerous new U.S.
military hases and training centers, the construction or improvement
of several new airfields, the building of advanced radar stations
operated by the U.S. miliary and the CIA, the trebbHng of U.S.
military advisors in Honduras, the building of roads and other
infrastructure to support the new military facilities, and the
establishment of contra base camps near the N 1C araguan border (La
Feber, 1984: 309; Sheperd, 1986: 131-133; Gold, 1987: 43).
But perhaps the most significant example of the Reagan
administration's early attempts to reintroduce shows of force in its
regional containment policy was the holding of numerous ongoing
military exercises with the Honduran military. The first joint U.S.-
Honduran military exercises took place in October 1981 near the
Nicaraguan border and the Caribbean coast. Their frequency and
duration increased substantially in the following years. 22 These
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shows of force sent different political me8ssages to different
audiences in the region. To U S
E1 , , A
*
-
aUleS
'
SUCh as the governments ofM Salvador, Honduras, and (l ater ) Costa Rica thed » exercises
signalled a renewed U 9 m,-i-a.».8. nulztary preparedness and wi 1Hngneas to
resort to force if necessary to protect both U S inte
...
u,b
* rests and
allies who might call for help. To U S ,HP i . . adversaries, such as the
"
— - * Hnion as vell as
revolutionary FDR-FMNL in E1 SaIvador> ^ ^ ^ ^
« threatening a U.S. miHtary invaslon in ordertos£op ^^
-y advances in the spreading of radrcal revolution in the region"
(Sheperd, 1986: 133-134; Gold, 1987- 50- r ,
. • 50, Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987-
18).
^r other regional actors, however, the military exercises,
'beir associated military bulld^ p ^ ^
military aid to the Salvador government, the emerging contra
Policy, and the beHicose rhetoric of the Reagan administration all
produced growing concerns. The governments of Mexico, Costa Rica,
and Venezuela were already concerned ahout the civil confiicts and
political violence in El Salvador and Guatemala and about the
effects such violence was producing in the region, such as a
growing refugee problem for neighboring states and a further damper
on regional trade during the deepening global recession. However,
as the Reagan administration's reassertive Central American policy
unfolded during 1981 and 1982, these states became increasingly
alarmed at the growing militarization of the region and what they
perceived to be the growing risk of a region-wide war.
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Calling For Peace
-^ gro„ ing militari2ation of ^
"approve and in camng Qn ^ AmericMs ^
^olve their conflicts peacefuny
_ InearlyMay>1981Upes
PortiHo called on Honduras Md Nica 8 3 co dold discussions to
ease their emerging border tensions. Upez Portillnpe r° o personally
-i.t- the dis c ussi o„ s hald on „ay 13 betueen Honduran president
Ce„e ral P oli c arpo Pa2 Garcfa and ^
^ie! 0rtaga in „ GuasuaU> Nicaragua
_ ^^ ^
improving relations between the fwnt o governments for a time (Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987: 19; Karl, 1986: 275).
Shortly thereafter, Lopez Portillo and Venezuelan President
Luis Herrera Campus issued a joint statement urging international
mediation to resolve the Salvadoran civil war. Ia August
, MexiCQ
succeeded in winning French support for its position on El Salvador
when French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Mexican Foreign
Master Jorge Castaneda issued a joint declaration on El Salvador
and submitted it to the United Nations Security Council on August
28. The Franco-Mexican Declaration on El Salvador recognized the
FDR-FMLN as "a representative political force" that "should
participate in instituting the mechanisms of rapprochement and
negotiation required for a political settlement of the crisis" in El
Salvador. This call for a negotiated settlement between government
and armed opposition also appealed to the international community to
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- «*- Natlons t0 protect the
C1VUian P0PUlatl0D
^ "— = settlement and
;
ti0nal
- -
Evador CK8rl
, 1986: fn . 30-
Franco-Mexican Declaration, 1,31
: 1 52 -153
;
Goodf el low> ^ ^During 1982, more Cfl iic f3118 f° r PeaCe ~ed from act0rs both
withxn and outside of Central America with M, Mexico continuing to
lead the way. in a speech d Slt to ^nagua on February 21
Mexican President Lopez Portillo called for a h „e t b road process of
negotiations to bring peace to El Salvador r(*i , educe tensions between
Nicaragua and its neighbors an H, and iffipr0ve U.S. relations with
Nicaragua and Cuba. Mexico could "serve as a brid „ge between the
Polaris forces" in such a negotiation^ & ^
Propose:, Lopez PortiUo stressed ^ .^^^^
affecting Central America were the result of the region's ownWry
, tyranny and oppressiM; „ they coQid ^ shouW ^ ^
Placed "into the terrible dichotomy of East against West or
capitalism against socialism" (R iding> 1982c: g . Riding
_^ ^
Throughout March and April, the Mexican government continued to
pursue its peace initiative. However, a cool reaction fro,
Washington towards Mexico's involvement, a still-born attempt by the
five Central American heads of state to hold a summit meeting, 24 the
outbreak of the FalHands/Malvinas Islands War in late AprU, and a
chilled diplomatic exchange between the United States and Nicaragua
throughout the spring 25 all contributed to the failure of the
Mexican peace initiative. On May 9, Lo"pe 2 Portillo gave up his
mediation attempt, arguing that he had done all he could ("Central
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Americans...,"
i 982 . ]n . r1 10
> Crossette, 1982- 6- "a m
T
.
* Meeting of Five
Latin Leaders...," 1 982 • T • "m
» J, Mexico Givine U S
198? < o-
ln Pl3n Details,"
^02: 5; Riding, 1982a- 1?. r *c6. i*ez a
. 12, Goodfellow, 1987: 147).
At the same time that Eope 2 PortiUo ^^
-tiative, Nicaraguan junta leader> DMiel ga
> aiso proposed a
--agression pacts bet„ee„ ^.^ ^ ^
^
COnmitne,,t £
°
fOUO
" ^ "™^ - lgn policy
, and a pUdge ^
PoU.ica, plurals and a
_d econooy ^ ueiias
SUtStanCe fr
°™ thi
'~ —P« ^ r th. terse dlplomatic
e*c hang e s between Klcaragua and ^^^ ^ ^^ ^
1 982.
The cans for peaC e in Central America continued. At the
inaugurat IOn of Costa Rlcan President ^^^ ^ ^
1982, six leaders of the reg . on expressed the . r cm ^ ^
rCE10Ml
f" ^ -ersal" <Mex ican-Ve„e 2„elan
Declaration, 1,S2 : I 55) . In June> the
the formatl o„ of
.
„orklng group of the Centre! America„ „ations t0
study the regionel crises (Cepeda and Pardo, 1987: 23). Meanwhile
the Venezuelan g overnment of Luis Herrera Cabins baca.e even mcre
interested in seeing a negotiated settlement in El Salvador after
elections there in March for a constituent assembly reeved the
allied Christian Democrats and brought important gains for the ultra-
right-wing ARENA party. The Falklands/Mslvinas Islands War also
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C0" trUbUted
<" "» V™u„ government's distancin .a 8 from the U.S.Posxtion on Nicaragua (Chace, 1982- 31. v , 1G
» 31; Karl, 1986: 281-284).
As the Venezuelan governmenf i«„
n8 y looked for
"
"e trOUMed
-— d« the same
closely
;
0n s
— — Portillo andHerrera Campins sent fl u President R^ eagan expressing their
concern "over the events which seriously threaten the
v. .
y cn peace between
rS8M
^
H °"d"-
- >" Peace „ Central A„erica „
«~- ^ the "MexicM
-VeneMelan DeclaratiM ,, ^^^
out Che "geography considerations „ as a£ ^ ^^^^3 ^
Politicl rnterests the two states sbared in CMtrai ^^^^ ^
urged an end to the "actual onj • ..and vorry^g" military escalation in the
region as well as the ll.,,,,,„support, organxzation, and emplacement of
former Somoc.sta guards" i„ „onduras
. FinaUy> they^ ^ ^
conclusion of a gl ohal agreement that may provide true peace between
Nicaragua and Honduras, and which win bear , ^ ^
framework of world tensrons and confrontation," (Me.ican-Veneauelan
Declaration, 1 982
: 153-155; Goodfellow, 1987: 148).
One month later, on October A, 1982, a special meeting was held
in San Jose, Costa Rica, that created a new coalition of states
seeking to promote peace and democracy in the c ircum-Caribbean
region. A founding declaration creating the Forum Pro Peace and
Democracy was signed by Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Jamaica, and the United States; Dominican Republic and
Panama attended the meeting as observers only. The Forum Pro Peace
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and Democracy fonnally embraced electoral d P
, .
s emocracy, respect formM ri8htS> Dati0nal development, economic integration -
OT_
LUl
-e , regional
arms control anH n,„ • .
.
d * Prlnciple of^.^^ udedic
successor to the csHii k~still-born Central American Democratic Con,
, .
£ ic mmunity
Ura8,Md theu" ited
— -— regional
OP-S. to the revolutionary SMdinista governmMt ^
(declaration of San Jose', 1982: 155-160).
*he Forum's decidedly anti .SaDdinista ^ fro_u s
_ orientatiM
ended up alienating the n*™ • •g ew admi„ lstration „ f Colombia , s President
Belisario Betancur Cartas. since his inauguration ^^ ?
1*82. Be t ancu r had begn„ t0 dlstance Maself ^ ^
Pr0"- S
-
POSUi0" S
" POUC, After the foraation of
the Forum Pro Peace and Democracy> Betancur . s fQreign minist^
Kodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, told his Mexican and Venezuelan
counterparts that Colombia would bave endorsed the September 7
Mexican-Venesnelan Declaration if on ly Colombia had been consulted.
At the sa.e time, Panama also backed away even further from the
Forum (Bagley and ToKatlian, 1987: 19-20; Hoge. 1982: 6). The stage
was set for a new regional coalition to form.
On December 3, 1982, Present Betancur underscored the
different vision his government had of the crises in Central America
compare, to the Reagan administration. In his toast to President
Reagan, who briefly visited the Colombian capital that day,
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Resident Betancur sharply criticized U S doi •
« .
b
* P l ^ies in Central
r
ent the
— *-
.— ^ tke East .west
conflict. Betancur was cle^r-l, v. •ear y echoing the MPv,V an „
posit . n
8 exic and Venezuelan
^ew« Bight explode (We . sman; i982; ^
J
•
- the foreign ministers of the Laan ,.d_ raciesi ,
the region to discuss the deteriorating •c situation in Central
In a conscious atte.pt to create a L. t • ,a in alternative to
-—
• — p. Peace and Democracy
. and taung up ^
o f U tin mi l ti lateral ism chained by PaMna , s Qnar rorri .os untn
bis dea th in 1981, Lopez PortillnP l o spec lflca ll y ca lled on Colombia
Ven.uela to Beet „ ith Mexico at ^^^
^te. Tbe four states chose January
, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^
3"ch a meeting. They also chose aj ^ ^^ ^
Contadora, vbere six years earHer they ^ gathered ^^
Panama in its canal negotiations ^^^
Costs R ica bad Deen a part of that or
.
g
.
nai Contadora_based
now be considered as one of the parties t0 the regional
especially considering its serious border tensions ^
its sctive participation in the Porum Pro Peace and Democracy, 29 and
the pro-U.S. positions of its President. Lois Alberto Monge and its
Foreign Minister, Pernando VolioWM, Tbus, by the end of 1982,
the me„bers of a reoonstrtuted
"Contadora Group" prepared to discuss
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their growing concerns over the worseninv x g regional crisis (Bagley
and Tokatlian, 1987- 9n. r» i
°' D-k°nja-Kcr„at, 1985: 26; Bell, 1984- 1 0 .
Karl, 1986: 284).
Political and Diplomat!,. Preludesto the Contadora Call for Peace
In the late 1970s and earlv 19Rn„ ry 1980s, Central America entered into
a period of economic, social =„j , • .C t , and political crisis that attracted
the attention of many political actors^ ^^ ^
-rounding states most affected by the regional crises
active diplomatic responses to secure their regional interests.
United States policymakers came to view the region's crises as
having significant reverberations in the renewed East-West conflict
Of the 1980s. They acted to reassert traditional U.S. hegemony over
the region, thus renewing the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition of what
»as perceived to be extra-hemispheric interference in the troubled
countries of the isthmus. The United States developed a set of
policies designed to contain the spread of armed revolution in the
region. Yet the region's mil iteration and political violence
deepened
.
Increasingly alarmed by the deteriorating regional situation,
other neighboring states urged negotiations as the best path to ease
tensions and resolve conflicts in the region. Led by Mexico and
Venezuela, emerging regional subhegemons vying for regional
leadership, and later joined by Colombia and Panama, which also
sought leadership roles in the c ircum-Carr ibean region, these states
1 7
acted to def^nri #-v. •end the lr status and interests in Central Aa,e
isthmus entered i„ t „ • " *'
"e
cuL n o crisis. Yot f „~
th ,
6 > faC1Dg Sever
* economic crises
tnemselves bv 1 Qft? «-vy 1982, these states individually had limited
capabilities in influencing the iatwsthmian states to resolve their
domestic and inter-state conflicts peacefullyP C6fully; nor c^ld they singly
challenge the containment policies of .P a resurgent United States
**
-setner, Mexico
, Ven_ la
, ..^ ^^^ ^
«• -e tne „a y tor tne diplomatic aiternatrve
„f ne8 etiatrons as
the road to peace in Central America.
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recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the prolonged Iranianhostage ordeal, and personnel changes in the Carter
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during 1980
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18.
19.
Human Rights:
"One should always r~aiw* F ° f^ forin American attitudes toward HilM 5"* fund^«al changePlace in the last period of the rf" E1 Sal«dor tookunder the Carter AdminUtwt on thl ""-^""tion. It wasstopped and that military a.ai!f ^ t0 Ni"ragna was
started." m actual fait V I ™T "> E1 S*^**or was
until the Reagan administration'^ ° Nicara^ did not endhowever it is true that the Carter !d"
l°n
" April 1981
•
-Htary aid to El W^."'^^'^—
^^Zl^^^ Hi -Hefs of poucy^ersinstability i„ Central America « e d v^d'b V "v<,1" i««»ideologues and the more praematin La . between theformer saw external causes^ ifTcfn I V ^ lib"^- 'be
subversion and interventi™,! ? y S°Vlet and °uban
revolutionary in bn "J 1" <* the region's
of the revolutionary movement in L tba caus«
roots based largely inT • regl0n had indigenous
Some of this latter gro be ^tLTtneinstability Drpcprrj ea ttlat tne resulting
interest tha
P e
bI t ed
e
tr s "T^ th«" "believed such instab tv d^H T CubanS ' "hil * "hers
the United States *
PreSent a security threat to
riaotsturund
0
:: CeneraH"^^ ^ ^
under General Hejia Stores U gu ' 90 uary"l986,""""promised a democratic opening and held elections for !Constituent Assembly in 1 QfiA ^ . • Ci c t a
of 1985. The n
and national elections in the fall^o-> in u.b. Congress permitted limited n Q ~-
military aid to resume to Guatemala in lTst (T / T 1C andSchoultz, 1986: 45). ^mai 1984 rudeau and
Though championed by some hardliner* -in f^ fl j
the beginning, "rollback" in K-
administration from
horn
6 7g > ii m Nicaragua would not officiallvbecome a policy goal in President Reagan's first term
*
Nevertheless, the October 1983 invasion of GrenadJdemonstrated the administration's propensity for "rollback" ifstrategically feasible. Moreover, the administration's ontra
posi "ions'tH ^
ieDted tOW3rd rOUbaCk
'
deS P ite theJ , f C °DtraS WGre firSt ne^ssary to stem thealleged flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and then
rneLt":
1^^ Reagan
'
S S6C0Dd term
>
t0 force ^ Sandinistasto n gotiate a peace agreement.
It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1984 the U Sblocked some $200 million in noncommercial multilateral'
'
development credits to Nicaragua. See Gilbert (1986: 105).
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administration after coding to off
'
" ^ the Rea* an
continued U.S. aid to Nicaragua A
COnditio° for
99-100) and Pastor (198 * Jg)%, cc?rd »>g to Gilbert (1986:
stop its supply of arms to the FMLN
*1CaraSuan government did
Reagan administration cu off all V s"
1981
; h°Wever
.
theAPnl 1, 1981 anyway. ,S * aid to Nicaragua on
21. The administration's moves to t«ir-training of the contras began L a luS f T'l*Reagan sent his first "finding" to Preside*tcovert operations in Cental a Cong r ess authorizing CIA
trafficking to leftist^
Guatemala City on August 10 1981 lr i V" f°Unded indominated primarily by f0rmer official ^l*"^Guard and was heavily dependent on the Cll "T" 8 N* tional
1982 by two^er
1
^ e:r o Theland-' 08" ^ *»Pastora and Alfonso Robe^o A n 'I" " government, Edenbetween 1982 and 1984 Eden p \th °Ugh the CIA *i* aid ARDE
agenda to join AhJ Ttitl tie EDN^fTe ^ '°^ ^ CIA '*
assassination attempt on Pastoral t *
SUS P lcious
conference in La P e ca C
&t 3 ^ 1984 P"ss
the EDN and po-slb^ri^^tSrSif iff "broke with Eden Pastor* an * • j f ' Alfonso Robelo
troops. By he res" oFtltL
With
° f ARDE '°
away by the CIA to ?0U e FDK
n
"J^"0" b «*n lu"dguerrilla life (Kornbluh 1987 « » ™ retlr6d from
1986; Chamorro, 1987).
1 P" t0r
'
1987: 367
;
Dic^.
22. Shepherd (1986: 133-134) identifies three stages in th.
i? and .3^S",^,' SPECS'The second stage began in Angust 1983 and lasted for xmonths. Known as "Bier. Pine IT » •
longest set of U.S. m!l itary^xer
""It
LTove\
he
Lx
i
tIe°nrho
OVer
d
flVe ^ ^ -
planes iE th f°" San more on nearby naval ships and
»C™-H
Th
?»
lrd StaS e be§ an in APril 1984 with theGranadero I" exercises, which were held close to both theSalvadoran and Nxcaraguan borders. These exercises ncludedthe part.cxpatxon of Salvadoran troops. Similar joint militaryexercises would continue during President Reagan's secoZ[ term
23. In response to objections by Nicaragua to the first set of
"olll*^ AT rC1SeS regi ° D in °Ct0ber 1981 < kaovn asOceanic Adventure '81"), U.S. Assistant Secretary of StateThomas 0. Enders denied that the exercises were in any way
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24.
25.
Document Hl^-TS^T,^
On February 25 1 Qfi?
to the OAS uaveiling his Caribbean £ '"r^' Rea8M
'
s
Program the leader? of Costa Rica Ell
n\tlati*e < CB»
Nicaragua, and Panama agree to ttlr
sfvador Honduras,
to discuss solutions to^the Central\ll ?™ C °sta Rica -other natters of common interest Th? COn£Uctshowever, refused to attend tilt' government of Guatemala,
Nicaragua would he present I T') ff*T learainS thatRican Foreign Ministry ». he f°U °><"M! day, a Costa
»as indefinitely suspended ( Ce^r
0
,^"
0"0"0 th" tbe
»«. 10; "A Meeting of Five SS^*^™.
N^rt'^ex^h^p^poLls fo^ = ^ St"" a°<
relations. The Lhange be an .K.}"^"Proposal from U.S. Ambassador rw \ 3 eight-point
Coders' proposals^^^"^t. the
government responded with a v-ri+l it- Sandmista
counterproposal vhich^s fol \ ^ochTrol of •correspondance between thp fUn " taer r und written
terse and inflexible ton cnlraclll^TlV 3 r3ther
the diplomatic exchan c
6 corres Pondance
,
and
148), Chace 9 f ollapsed. Goodfellow (1987: 147-/, ^iidc Ji) ancj Gutman (1984- 1 1-1 o~\ ,nthat the verbal eight-Doint II q I \' ' aU suSg est
beein with *nH Proposal was not serious to
purposes For rT T °? y '° Um pubUc
see'B guy I a (1 85^32 42°^
° f di> 1™^ -change,B et i uy": 32-42, documents 1.14 to 1.16).
26. See endnote 25.
27. The Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration of September 7 1982 fH-rt
r982
10
ad
S
V':-;
DeClarati0D
°
f San W
'
Costa rJI ^May 8
^
President L At^k^ ^
ina^urati
-
of the Costa Rican"
'
, uis Alberto Monge,..." in which six leaders of the
ItlTeeTYorrT ^ the -™ -V L
Ilnfn ^ ! f
e
g^on^ arms reductions, peace, and democracy.
«ifnL ?k ,
ly
'
thG DameS
° r C0^tries of the six leaders whos gned the document are not identified by the Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration, and I have not been able to find otherreferences to it. This Declaration of San Jose" should not beconfused with the October 4, 1982 declaration that created theForum Pro Peace and Democracy.
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29.
Democracy. create the Forum Pro Peace and
CHAPTER VI
THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE FOR PEACEI* CENTRAL AMERICA
"Among the illusions of law tWedistinguish themselves bv Zli I S °me that
occurs with medico" t !l """^ and this
without boastfulness or A °P8 S1IDply '
It walks in the shlLl
6Xhu
?
erant Performance.
on anyone.?.and i Ihe shL
h
°f.
Casti^ ^adows
influences as advice an not ^
8 °briety
'
£t
T rto y y /
i<- a as a mandatP "Jose Lurs Bustamante Rivera
, ta* 1)^
On January 8 and 9, 1983, the foreign ministers of^
Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama met t0 discuss var£ous
Policy issues of „ tual conce„. The four £oreigii ministers ^
th«, meetings on the Panamanian isUnd of Contadora, less than
fifty miles from the Pacific Bouth of panama
agenda included discussions of the deepening trade and debt crises
that their countries were facing as well as the perceived growing
hostility of the United States toward compliance with the Carter-
Torrijos Panama Cana! Treaties. But the most central issue of
concern to the ministers meeting on the island of Contadora was, as
they put it, the "complex panorama existing in Central America."
The deepening civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, the expanding
counter-revolutionary violence against Nicaragua along with border
conflicts between Nicaragua and its neighbors, the rising numbers of
Central American refugees produced by the regional violence, and the
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:ion into
r
shared and growing fear of a direct US.S. mrHtary intervene
one or more of these escal„r;„„
.
.
ating regronal conflict, all conpeHed thefour mmrsters at Contadora to issue a call to th r
«ates to embark on ,reglo„al peace talks (Contadora Croup, 1983a .164-166). '
«Uhin three
.onths. these four foreign ministers helJ their
f0n°al
C
— ^rican counterparts in
what would become an ongoing process of u.,g dialogue, mediation, and
negotiations between the five Central American states. The fou
listing states (Me^co. Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama) soon
-opted the name "Contadora Croup,* Over time, they developed a
Political and diplomatic framework for mediating and resolving
Central Africa's violent conflicts that hecame known as the
Contadora peace process. By building
.
negotiations with the Central American states, the Contadora Croup
sought to rescue the Central American conflicts from the reeling
East-West conflict and to create a political space in which the
isthmian states could find an indigenous diplomatic alternative for
resolving their disputes. Rather than watching the Central
Americans march down the path of deepening militarization, which
seemed to lead only to the increased military involvement of extra-
regional powers and a greater chance of a region-wide war, over a
five-year period the Contadora Group tried to build a shelter of
diplomacy that encouraged and eventually permitted the Central
American states to find their own formula for peace in the region.
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" various points
, the Contadora process ^ ^^
an along, but especially a£ter^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^
Contadora peace process „as annomced oyer ^
_ ^^^
observers, such as Bagley (19g6)> Baguy ^ iokatiiM
Arnson (1987), Castro (19R11 r(1985), Cepeda and Pardo (1987), D la2 Lacayo
(1988), Purcell (1985)> Drekonja .Kornat (1985))^ (i985)
G°°dfell0U U987)
-
Karl (198«> (1985), Pas t or „,„>', ti.
Nation Bipartisan Commission on Central America U 984) and in ma„ y
edrtoHals (saa, « Seis ^
985, ate.). Vat Contadora always seemed to P rova the naysayars
wrong. Phoenix
-like, it always seemed to revive at tha most fatefu!
-ants. Tha Contadora Procass Parsistad in the face of enormous
ohstaclas hacausa tha Contadora Croup statas saw thair own national
security intarasts at stake in tha violant crisas shaking Central
Africa. An analysis of the specific foreign policy intarasts of
the Contadora statas (and others) in undertaking and maintaining the
Contadora peace process will follow in Chapter VIII. I„ this
chapter and the next, we shall reconstruct the events and analyze
the politics of the Central American process in its two major
phases, Contadora and Esquipulas.
The Contadora peace process can he broken down into five
stages. In this chapter, we shall focus on the first two: (1)
Initial Optimism and the Constitution of the Contadora Framework for
Peace (January 1983-January 1984), and (2) The First Draft of the
Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America
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<F6brUary 19"-°"°ber^ * «- — c hapter
, we shall focus
- us subsequent stages and the ^^^^ ^ E8^ ipuias ^
(November 1 984-December 1985)- (4) gt,lp ,^, l«U S a emate and the Third Draft of
^e Contadora Act (January 1986-January 1 987); and (5) ^
Contadora to Esquipulas II ( January 1987 _January^
Initial Optimis* and the Constitution of th*Contadora Framework for Peace, January iSTtfJ^ary 1984
At the end of their January 1983 meeting on Contadora Island,
vh.ch WaS not reported by the fa Yor, Zimag_, the foreign ministers 2
from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama issued an Information
Bulletin summarizing the content of their talks and the extent of
their concerns. Beyond the deepening trade and debt crises caused
by the "recessive tendency of the world economy" and the "use of
discriminatory legal devices
... found" in the execution of the Panama
Canal Treaties, the principal part of the Information Bulletin
focused on Central America. It stressed the ministers' growing
concerns over the risk of foreign military intervention in the
region's worsening conflicts. The ministers reminded "all states"
(presumably throughout the world) of their "international
obligations" to abstain from the use or threat of force and warned
against any kind of foreign interference or action that "could
worsen the situation and create the danger of a general conflict
CMld
' -ion,. Moreover, the „ inisters
explicit!, rejected as "highly undesirable" the deification „f
conflicts in Central toerica as East .Hest
The information Bulletin aUo ca]led ^ centrai
states to embark on regional peace talks Whi, • , •c iK . le invoking the
Principles of non-intervention and self-H» f • .self-determination, the Contadora
-isters pressed their states' interests in seeing the Centra!
American states find a framework for di alogue and negotiations.
The, stressed "the advantage of involving the valuable contributions
and necessary snpport of other Latin American conntries in those
efforts." The ministers further evoked traditional BoHvaran ideals
of Latin solidarity by calling for greater Latin American
consultation and cooperation in addressing common problems. But
they added a more contemporary note to these ideals
-and further
underlined their rejection of the reemergent Cold War- by urging
increased Latin Americau participation in the Non-Aligoed Movement
and other international Third World fora (Contadora Group, 1983a:
164-166).
Several factors contributed to converting this initial call for
peace into a peace initiative by the states that would soon be
called the Contadora Group. The supportive responses of the
international community in the following months provided inportant
encouragement to the call for peace. Messages of recognition and
support were increasingly sent to the Contadora Group from the
governments of Spain (which also offered to play a role in any peace
process), Portugal, Sweden, France, Argentina, Egypt, Ecuador, Peru,
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»««. others as Mll a8 tbe Non.Aligned Movement ^
Socialist InternaHonal (Voli0> 1985; 46 .4?; ^^^^ i983; ^
Mediate response
_ ^ un ^
"
Ce" ral
— *• m san Joae
<>°". Rica, she discussed the ^^^^ ^^
President Ui. Alberto Mo„8 e. After visiting „
^a,.a,„r Kirkpatrick recoanended iMreased ^ Biut^ ^ ^
that government against what she described as a large Soviet effort
'here. Later that mth
. Washington announced ^ ^ ^
U.S.-Honduran miHtary exercises k„oM as Big P ine !. TheD> on
March 10
.
1 983, President Reagan asked Coa8 ress for an emergency
military and economic aid package of ?298 million for Central
America, including 5110 „i1Uon in military ^ ^ £J
Meanvhiie, stepped-up contra attacks and armed clashes in northern
Nicara8 ua were being reported and the U.S. role in the expanding
"covert" war was becoming increasing!, public. At the end of March
1983, Mexico's ambassador to the United Nations once again called
for peace talks in the region (Volio, 1985: 49; Meislin, 1983: Al
;
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22; Weinraub, 1983a: A7; Weinraub,
1983b: Al; Weinraub, 1983c: Al
; Riding, 1983a: A5).
As for the Central Americans, a week after Ambassador
Kirkpatrick's February visit, the foreign ministers from the three
closest allies of the United States in the region, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Honduras, met in San Jose' to discuss the status of the
U.S.
-sponsored Forum pro Peace and Democracy. On March 5, these
states seemed to respond to the Contadora call for dialogue by
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-1—
-tin, „ould include Nicaragua Md Guatenau b^«~— such
. meeting
_ Mteriaii2ed
»85: 49; Meislin, 1 983: A1
,
A12;
„Central ^ ^
—d, the dynamic personal diploMcy of ColonbUn pre£ident
Belisario Betancur in early Aoril r. .
*
PrU "-««*i«d the Contadora call
for peace. Taking up the rnl» „f »S P o e of peace a^assador," Betancur
-sued Mex ico, Veneauela, and Panama as well as Cos£a ^ ^ ^
regional peace talks he undertaken as soon as possihle. On
April 11 the Contadora Croup states decided to send their foreign
listers mediately to Central American capitals where, as a
Sroup, they met with each ...^ ^^
They ended their mission in Guatemala City on April ,3 where they
announced that the first, ground-hreaking joint feting hetween the
four Contadora foreign m i„ isters and their ^ Qm
colleagues was scheduled for April 20-21 i„ Panama city (Brekonja .
Kornet, 1985: 27-28
; Cepeda Ulloa end Perdo Garcia-Pena, 1985: 166-
"7; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22; "Four Latin Officials...,"
1983: A10).
This First Joint Meeting of the region's nine foreign ministers
laid an important foundation for the building of a diplomatic
framework for peace in Central America. According to the Contadora
Group's Information Bulletin after it ended, the meeting's purpose
was focused on "bringing about a constructive dialogue and
establishing effective communication aimed at reducing tensions and
laying the foundations of a stable and lasting peace in the region."
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The Contadora minister* »ic«" J- tl t-ers also spoke nf i»K ot the 'common purpose of
bringin£ ab °Ut
-— Peacefu! Stance"
<Cont.doraGroup
. 1983b:157 _168)i
-ided
- oPp„rtu„ity for each of ^ CM[rai ^^^^^
«—— - «««— over the nature of the probUM
'he region. Fron tbe£e di8cus6ionS) ContadMa^
-U.« identified the probUms that thought^ ^
most attention; namely,
other forms of outsit I-,-
n,lllt «5' advisor, and
aimed at de.t.bHi.ln. ^ * aesista»«. actions
countries, Jrea s anf "Vf"1"* 1 "der of other
incidents and frontier
a«res.ion, warlike
rights and individual ana JZ?i ^ »t human
grave economic and social n™M
8U" a"ca., and the
of the region's pre.en r
VhlCh are at tha "cart
167).
P s t c isis (Contadora Group, 1983b:
The meeting also produced agreement in principle on the
Procedures of consultation and negotiation to be followed by the
Central American states in the future. A second joint meting of
the nine foreign ministers uas scheduled fM ^ ^ ^
"ay, again i„ PanaM city
. rf ^ ^
achieved at this first meeting, it was an important preparatory
-eting that laid the groundwork for more. U took place on the
fifteenth floor of the Banco Central de Panama, which became the
headquarters of the subsequent Contadora mediation efforts
(Contadora Croup, 1983b: 166-168; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 22-23;
Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo Garcia-Pena, 1985: 167).
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o
ora
Second Joint Meeting of the nine foreignr ministers tookPlace on May 28-30, 1983 Tfci.
outco .tco^ „ translating the initial Conta
r
" cal1 f°r peace intthe Contadora peace initiative. Fi rst in t ,„
r .
S > l alks ^at the ContadGroup ministers described as frank lM „t , lengthy, and fruitful, the
agenda items for f„f- 11ro a •uture drscusston were organized and subdivided
into four categories: Concent,,, l ,ceptual framework i 8SUes, political and
7" ity Pr0bUES " - and machinery for
- -boring of any possible agreements
reached
.
Second, and even
.ore significant than this increased
formalization of agenda items for future discussion, was the
nation of tne Technical Croup. The purpose of ^ ^
"as to coordinate tne work of the incipient peace process by
studying various problems and proposals relating to regiona! peace
Severing information, providing technical support for the ministers
end country negotiating teams, proposing procedures for dealing with
identified problems, and preparing the agendas of future Contadora
-etings. The Technical Croup was made up of the vice ministers for
foreign relations from
.1. nine states and it began its work on dune
21. 1983. Bagley and Tokatlian (1987: 24) note that Mexico came to
Play a leadership role within the Technical Group from the
beginning, given its relatively large and sophisticated diplomatic
staff as veil as the dynamism and activism of Mexican Foreign
Minister Bernardo Sepu'lveda Amor. Nevertheless, this multilateral
technical support mechanism developed its own dynamic. It worked
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- - Prevent National Guard ^^^^
government to break ro l D *.;relatl0»= v"h Nicaragua and Cuba.
Significantly the £oraation of ^ Iechnicai Group ^^ o f the inetitutional.ation Q£ CMtadora ^
VContadora Group. 1983c- 1f,ft-i7n i> ,
'
68 170; BaS ley ^ Tokatlian, 1987: 23-24;
Drekonja-Kornat, 1985- 28-2Q- ron a28 29, Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo Garci'a-Peffa
1985: 168-169).
The third signified outcome of the Secona joint
^
decision b y the Contadora Group to Mintain us ^^^^ Comi8aion
of Observers, which vas formed earHer ^ ^ nontt ^
border incidents between Costa Rica and Kicaraua
. ^ ^
Cost. Rican revest before the Organisation of States ^
to for, a multinational peacekeeping force along border
Nicaragua, Bagley and To.atlian ( 1987! 23 ) report that there a
tacit agreement to bypa ss tbe OAS. I„ fact> the Te^ t
of tbe OAS was never convoked and tbe matter was passed directly t0
tbe Contadora GroU p (Rojas Araven a
, 1990: 152-153). Tbe Contadora
Group created a civilien bod y of representatives fro, tbe four
Contadora states to investigate end diffuse tbe bilateral border
tensions. The observer commission presented its report to the
Contadora ministers at the Second Joint Meeting with several
recordations for improving Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations. The
Contadora Group's decision to maintain its support and extend the
mandate of its observer commission, as veil as the Group's related
endorsement of a proposal that the two countries form a joint
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bilateral commission 3 to resolve their conflictl S> contributed to the
erOVM8
°
PtimiSm ab°" "d
— of Contadora'. nediaUon
— • As Bagley and Tokaman (i987! ^ ^^ "lati0nS
- - *M ^ugh the efforts
- * observers conmis8ion> along uith decreasea cMtra
based m Costa Rica as the. n c te U.S. abandoned its support for the
independent contra reader Hden Pastors,* coined to "raise hopes
tUt Contadora couid perfo™ a KeW peacekeeping ^ _^
deployi „g troops." Thus, „ith its agenda „ore £„»a„^ a„d
us creation of necha„isns for technical support and conflict
resolution, the Contsdora Group h ad hegun to huild a f_s for
ongoing peace talks a„ong the Centra! Africans (Contadora Croup,
1983c: 168-170; Bagley and To.atlian, 1987= 23; Castro, 1,85: U .
Drehonja-Kornat, 1985: 29; Cepeda Ulloa and Pardo Garcr'a-PeSa, 1985:
167-168; Rojas Aravena, 1990: 152-153).
Despite the work that had been accomplished by the Contadora
Group foreign ministers through the end of May 1983, there was still
something tentative about the peace initiative. The Contadora Croup
states had from the beginning stressed the responsibility of the
Central American states themselves to embark upon peace talks.
Meanwhile, the Honduran-based contra attacks against Nicaragua had
grown in frequency and seriousness while the civil wars in El
Salvador and Guatemala continued to grow even more bloody. The
United States moved to increase its military and economic aid to its
allied governments in the region while the regional economic and
debt crises had become more severe, both for the Central Americans
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and for Mexico and Venezuela 7„
° thlS "-^Phere, the obstacles for
establishing an ongoing peace process were Mny
.
However, i„ an important meeting in July
, ^
PUdged thCir C °"" it
-" *' b-ilil, a framed for
onsoing negotiations. ln an unprecedented^ aua.it meeting of four
Latin American heads of state ,h* „, t e presidents of each of the four
Contadora Croup countries met in Cancu'n, Mexico, on July 17
, 1983
*' -d of their summit, the four presidents issued the "Canco.
situation in Central America:
IS! :"u
e
at!onr:L
ly
d
C
eterior1
at
^ "V ™
tensions, frontier incidents, and the threat ofVfl
Through the Cancu'n Declaration, the Contadora presidents
expressly addressed the "international cOBnnunity" which, they
stressed, faced the dilemma "of either resolutely supporting and
strengthening the path of political understanding by offering
constructive solutions or passively accepting the accentuation of
factors which could lead to extremely dangerous armed
confrontations." The presidents rejected the use of force as "an
approach that aggravates the underlying tensions," and cited "the
basic principles of coexistence among nations" as the only viable
path towards peace. They reiterated that the Central Americans
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the"MlK!
'
W Sh°Uld
" «» *<™
-POnSiMUty .. in resolving
the region's conflicts.
Naverthel e SS) „ the nost significant^ ^ ^^
-l—i-. the four head8 of 8£ate pUdged their poUticai
Kl11 t0 C0" inUe th6ir £« P-c «- 1-PU.itl, Oanensea
the Central Americans to do the sam* tka e. They acknowledged that the
broad international support that had followed the Contadora Croup's
-itial call for peace had "inspired" and » impe l led « the Group to
Persist in its endeavors. By sunning and pledging their political
will to continue their governments' mediation efforts, Presidents
Miguel de la Madrid (Mexico), Belisario Betancur (Colombia), Lux's
Herrera Campus (Venezuela), and Ricardo de la Espriella (Panama)
infused the mortar necessary to build a solid framework for ongoing
Peace talks. The Cancan Declaration closed by issuing an appeal to
the international community, to all American states, and to those
"states with interests in and ties to the region" for support in the
Contadora Croup's search for peace (Contadora Croup, 1983d: 170-
174).
The five Central American states formally endorsed the Cancan
Declaration at the Third Joint Meeting of the Contadora and Central
American foreign ministers, held shortly afterwards, from July 28 to
30, 1983. The Central Americans also manifested their political
will to pursue a peace process by presenting specific proposals, one
of which was made by Nicaragua and another of which was made by the
other four states. The nine ministers meeting in Panama City agreed
to study the proposals and resume their talks within a month. On
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-s- 25 and26
,
che TechDical Groypmet ^^ tkeFo^
— Kee ting scheduled £or Septeober ? ^ 9
_ (Contsdora^
1«3.. 17A-H6; Cepeda Ulloa and P ard „ Care
.a-PeHa,
, 985: „„.171)
MeanwMU, Coleman Preset Ba tancur personaUy ^ ^
arrange talks bet„een the United^ ^ ^ ^
opposition, several mee ting6 uere held betueen J<jly ^ ^
September 29 between sDeri'fll n qpecia U.S. envoy to Central America
Richard Etone> anJ pDR-FMLN repreaeatat ive Za.ora.
Nothlng of £ubst8nce .„ ach . eved by QMknj^aMtt
1985: 29). nouever
, the v„y ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
that the momentum for the usp nf ^rsi«6 USe 0 diplomacy rather than force had
gained important ground by the summer of 1983.
There were other signs that the Contadora peace initiative had
had an impact on the regional crisis in general and on United States
policy toward Central America in particular. Not only were the
Central American foreign ministers talking to each other and the
United States with the FDR-FMLN. Ambassador Stone's very
appointment as a special diplomatic envoy to the region was evidence
that the Reagan administration was under some pressure to manifest
its support for regional peace talks. Richard Stone's appointment
was announced on April 28, 1983, following President Reagan's
address to a joint session of Congress asking for support for his
military and economic aid package for Central America (Smith, 1983a:
Al; Weisman, 1983a: Al
,
A12). Stone's credentials as a former
Senator from Florida and a conservative Democrat could
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enha.ce President Reagan, biJ ^ ^ ^ ^
co
;
sres
;
beeinni"s *— - Cantral teerican
pol icy.
indeed, with the growing
of^
support for- the Contadora initiative
, 11, as well as growing domestic
congressional opposition t , ^ ^
-i«*.lti.. i. „ inning 6upport for its centrai ^ ^
the late spring and early summer of 1983* . There were also important
anions over policy „itM. the ad„inistratiM lt8elf) ^^
1aecl 0gicany-orlented political appointees and more
Cai"rlStS
"* "» °epartment on the one band and th.
White House, the Depart of Defense, and the CIA 0D ^^
(0-.ru-., 1983: A3; Snith> 1983b: M)
_ ^ ^^
<=nders as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Aff airs at
the end of May and his replacement hy the more tractable hanghorn
Motley at the end of June gave furtber ^ ^
administration's Central American policy was having internal
trouble. 7 Moreover, bipartisan support had been eroding since
Ambassador KirkpatriCc's trip to the region and needed shoring up.
Senators Henry Jackson and Charles MacMatbias soon sponsored a
senate reaolution creating a bipartisan commission to study D.S.
policy toward the region, and at the beginning of July, the Reagan
administration named Henry Kissinger as its chair. After its
members were sworn in on August 10, the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America set out to study and rationalize U.S.
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Policy toward the troubled region M* u-,8 D
'
eanw^le, after a bitter debate
at the end of July —anH ir,T d m an important blow to the
^inistratW. policy
__, the House voted 228 _i9s ^ ^
to the contras through ^ first „BoiMd
(Tolchin 1983: A3; Halloran, 1983- A2 • v
,
iy« . , Weisman, 1983b: Al
; Clines,
*983: Al;
"Kissinger Panel Meets...," 1983 . ^. R . ^ , o» aj, oberts, 1983: Al •
Leogrande, 1987: 206).
-itbU this context of growing congresE£onal ^ o£her done6tic
"Position t0 the Reag an administration's Central pcucy
the momentum generated by the CoDtadora^ during ^ ^
-
.u-„ led to
. successful and 6ignificant ffieeting of
Contadora Group foreign nini8ter6 a„d the£r ^.^
colle.g„ee in early September. Mee ting together i„ Panama for the
fourth t«e, fro. September 7 to 9, 1983, 9 the nine foreign
ministers adopted an important document known as the "Document of
Objectives." This teXt oonsolidated the various proposals and
viewpoints previously drawn up by the Peru, pro Peaoe and Democracy,
by Nicaragua, and by the Contadora Croup. While not a formal
treaty, the Document of Objectives was a kind of blueprint for the
future of the negotiations process. Indeed, it identified and
formalized the objectives of the Contadora diplomatic initiative as
veil as the means through which those objectives could be met
(Contadora Group, 1983f: 176-180).
Composed in two parts, the Document of Objectives opened by
invoking the principles of international law that should guide the
peaceful resolution of conflicts in Central America. The first part
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of the document also identifies tut he sources of tension in the
-sic. including »the preseoce of foreign mnitary ^^^^ ^
other forms of foreign ffiiutary interference/
, ^ ^ ^
re8i0DaI
'~ " — ««•• * « of the territory of
some states to destabilize others flnH ^, a d the region's
"unjust
economic, social and political structures." The firstifte section endsby underscoring the "nepH f, r « i • •S ed for a poUtic.1 agreement [that favorsl
^alogue and understanding" and that can "put into effect the
mechanisms that „U1 be able to ensure the peaceful coexistence and
security of the Central American peoples" (Contadora Group, 1983f
177-178).
The second section of the Document of Objectives lists the
specific goals and enumerates the essential
"action mechanisms-
needed to achieve peace in the region. Indeed, at this point in the
document, it becomes clear that the Contadora Croup was concerned
that the emerging peace process be not just the articulation of fine
and noble words but the realization of meaningful and viable
actions. Each of the twenty-one points in the listing of objectives
begins with a verb in its infinitive for-. The list of objectives
includes the following actions, among others: "to promote"
(detente, confidence, national reconciliations);
"to respect"
((human rights); "to take measures" (guaranteeing representative,
pluralistic, and diverse democratic systems); "to halt" (the arms
race); "to prohibit" (foreign military bases and interference); "to
eliminate" (the presence of foreign military advisors, the arms
traffic); "to work" (for economic development and cooperation);
20 1
«c in order t0 lnplement these actiM ob .ectives
_
8eIf"COn£Ci °USly
-
d «» *» *. creation „ f several
"
aCti0n "BeChaDiEmS
"
° f «ri0« Eluding: nechanism8 of
—y( , e ., elections);iDternaimechMi8B£to
traff lckiDg bet4(een , ^
airect communication to
Prevent and resolve border incidents- m^», •, mechanisms of economic
i«e8ratiOT! mechanisms for technical cooperatiM ^ ^
t-ae projects; and aechmi,m ^ ^
a«e quate s ystems of veri fic a tion and control (Contadora
1983f: 178-179).
Despite the Contadora Group's concern for action, finding the
minimum consensus that permitted toe acceptance of the Document o£
Objectives by the Centra! Africans was relative!, eaSy compel to
the next step of getting the. to implement the document's action-
objectives. The tes, seeded even .ore difficuU when, less than a
»onth Uter (on October 3), the United States sponsored a feting
between General Pau l Gorman, then head of the U.S. Southern Command
(S0UTHC0K) in Panama, and the defense ministers of E. Salvador,
Guatemala, Hondures, end Panama aimed at reviving the defunct
Cental American Defense Council (CONDECA) 10 ("Three Nations
Agree...," 1 983
:
A7
; Maira, 1985: 383). Three weeks later, on
October 25, 1983, the United Stetes carried out its invasion of
Grenada with the countries fo the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS). Both the move to revive CONDECA without inviting
Nicaragua 11 and the invasion of Grenada seemed to piece the nascent
Contadora peace process in jeopard y . Both events edded to fe a rs
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- united states might plan an invasion of N;caragua ;f^
^ the other Central African states^^^
>•»• «; Bagley and Tokatlian> 28; ^^.^^ ^
31; Maira, 1985: 383; Asenjo, 1985: 262).
Instead, however, both^^ ^ ^
—dora Croup, re80lve t0 execute Document ^ objectiTCs ^
— building a franesork for negotiations
_ ^^^^^
««e. 1- the censuring of the ^^ ^ ^ ^
-
the United Nations. The, also stepped up their dlplomatic
efforts both within and outside of the OAS r„ I,n to keep the Central
Orleans committed to the Contadora process. Por example, Brekonja
Kornat (1985: 31) reports that Panamanian Vice President dorE e
Hlueca personally worked hard to prevent the revival of CONDECA.
Meanwhile, the Contadora Group prepared a plan outli„i„g . schedule
and procedures to begin talks on Hmiting the regional ^
and arms trafficking. In mid-November, the Contadora Group
Presented the plan in the for. of a resolution to the Thirteenth OAS
General Assembly, where it was approved unanimously 1
2
(Cepeda Ulloa
and Pardo Carcia-Pena, 1985: 172-173; Kinzer. 1983: A7; Smith.
1983d: A3; "Peace Pact Urged...." 1983: A3; Smith. 1983e: A12;
Karl, 1987: 285-286. Bagley and Tokatlian. 1987: 28).
By this time, however, changes of direction in Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, and Cuatemala had also contributed to Contadora's positive
momentum. Despite the decision to revive CONDECA without including
Nicaragua and despite costly contra activities in the fall of 1983,
including the CIA-directed minings of Puerto Sandino in September
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lance
- °«ober, the Sandinista gov^ t ^^
"ith tt. Doc„ment 0£ 0bject£ves ^ severai poiit^^ ^
. peace proposal to CMtadora ^ ^
—1 Foundations t0 GuarMtee iDternationai^ ^Security of the States of Central Africa" f»meric (Nicaragua, 1983: 60-83-
Cepeda Olloa and Pardo Garci'a-Pena, 1985: 171) Th.i/i;. e proposal
inched four draft treaties
. The firs£ addreased
biUtera! relations with the Dnited^ ^^ ^ ^
-later,! treaty of peace
, friendshipj ^ ^
Honduras; the third proposed a soiution ^ w^
civil var; tU fourth „a6 . „ ltilateral draft treaty addresaing ^
-.!».«».. Of peace, security, friendship, and ^
all the Central African states (Nicaragua, 1983: 60-61; "Nicaragua
Presents...," 1983: A10; Gilbert, 1986: 119).
Beyond this, the Nicaragua, government also hegan to implement
policies designed to meet the objections of its domestic and
international critics. It eased press censorship and restrictions
on the politic., opposition; it announced the moving up of national
elections to November 4, 1984, as well as an amnesty for Miskito
Indian prisoners and contra guerrillas (but not the contra
leadership). Finally, before the year .as over, the government
asked some Salvadoran rebel leaders and over one thousand Cuban
teachers and military advisers to leave the country (Gilbert, 1986:
119-120; Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 31; Yopo, 1985: 237).
In Costa Rica, an important change of direction in the nation's
foreign policy was announced in November, forcing the resignation of
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—ty in Central
confUct8) ^ ^
- after 1980 had £orced ^ natiQn , E uader8
business leaders opposed the policy of neutrality and Kc il y embraced U.S.
Policies against Nicaragua A h*.* a. heated eternal debate emerged over
the government's clospr t- 0 i=*-- • ,e relations with Washington, its strained
relations with Managua, and its inability to • .m omt maintain a consistently
neutral foreign policy stance. Foreign Minister Volio was
especiany pro-„ashing too. He was resentful of the Contadora
»MC Had both deluded Costa Rica and s„ppl anted the Forum pr0
Peace and Democracy, where VoHo had played an important role. He
"0* a confrontational stance with Contadora and a hard Hne against
Managua. Other top officials in President Luis Alberto Monge
Mvare,' government aided the contra conizations that were based
in northern Costa Rica „hile the government officially did little to
dose the contra camps (Eguisabal, 1990: 204-205; Rojas Aravena,
1990: Volio Jimenez, 1985
; Asenjo, .985a: 301, 310; Bell, 1984/10;
Edelman and Kenen, 1989).
Nevertheless, by the late summer and fall of 1983
, there was a
growing sense of insecurity in San Jose" which the Monge
administration began to addrPSQ t>^ ™S ess. The country's continued economic
crisis, its growing refugee problem, its divisive internal debate
over foreign policy, and its sense that Costa Rica had lost its
image as an autonomous international actor all laid the groundwork
for a change of direction in foreign policy. As the Monge
len
a
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Centra! Wican p blen
, but Ce„tral ^ ^
Rica's problems " ^ tj,
— government's concern over Washington's
"tempt to revive CONDECA 14 and its tUn
„ ,
ter the Grenada invasion
serve, to reinforce President Honge's decision to strength
his government's neutrality in Central a .y America's conflicts. In ,
solemn ceremony on Movember l7
.
1983, President Monge annonnced
vision to introdnce a constitution, amendment proclaiming Costa
K'ca's
"perpetual, active, and unarmed neutrality." Shortly
hereafter, the confrontational VoHo dimeoe: resigned and Car lo8
^se Cutierre: assumed the post of Poreign Minister.'^ According ^
several puhlic opinion polls at the time, the proclamation o f
neutrality won the support of the vast majority of Ticos. 16
Nevertheless, the Monge administration continued to stress that
Costa Rica helonged to the "Western democracies" and had a
"Political and ideological partiality- to the same. This suhtle
difference between strict neutrality in the Central African
oonflicts and politico-ideological alignment with the United States
would often make it difficult for the Monge administration to
maintain an ia,age of independence in foreign policy vis-a-vis
Central America. Yet, at the end of 1983 and into 1984, Costa Rica
seemed to be reversing its slide into compliance with U.S. policy in
the region (Rojas Aravena, 1990: 83, 129-133, 141, 156; Asenjo,
1985a: 304, 312; Eguizabal, 1990: 204-207; Carcfa y Gom^riz, 1989:
31).
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A si*U„ change o£ direction ^ foreign
-
'uate.au as well. „espite the Reagan administration's^
to intensify negotiations for CONDECA after the Gren.„ • .l" cn ada invasion,
the ^Guatemalan government under Briga.ier Ceneral Oscar Humberto
«e:ra Stores began to lose interest in the idea and Stance
".elf fro. the Reagan administration's regional^ ^
continued concessions: prohibition on renewing U.S.
.Uitary aid t0
Guatemala one to a poor human rights sitnetion there may have haa
seething to oo with Mejia vires' waning support for CONDECA
(Chavez, 1983: AH
;
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 28). However,
Guatemala's
.ore independent military wa8 acting
,
agen da
. Maira („„, 383) and A6eDjo ^ ^ ^
Cuetemala backed a„ay from the u-s
_ ef£or[ £o rev .ve comEcA
it feared that the Hond ur an
.ilitary, vhich had received
military aid from the United States, woul d come to dominate the
organization and undermine Guatemala's claim to regional
leadership. Moreover, General M.jf. Vi'ctores was looking to
undertake an important change in the country's foreign policy
direction in order to reverse the country's international isolation.
With Guatemala's guerrilla groups virtually crushed after a
brutal three-year counter-insurgency campaign and with a persistent
economic crisis, the time was ripe for Mejia vfctores to begin to
discuss moves towards democratization and to rebuild the country's
ties with the rest of the world. By improving relations with
Mexico, by strengthening its ties with the Contadora Group and the
other Central American states, and by cultivating new relations
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Ue „„ it ed Na£ions and the 0A£> Guatemaian foreigo pQUcy
- a aec.ea turn auay £rom ^
adffiinistration .
s agMda d
•t— «- ««c tion invhich his government
0-.-U-. ne»trality „ the Kicarag
_ Md SaWadoran contUct6
Not only had the goveroffient backed avay us^^for the cootras; Foreign Mini££er p> Andrade^^ ^^ ^
trxp to Ma„ag„a „here be assured the Sandinista gQvernment ^
Cuate.au „euId „ot allou the in6tallation q£^ ^
that the Guatemala,, niU tary „culd not participate „ „>g> .
sponsored military exercise6
. The country ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
towards inp le.e„t ing
. >triet policy of ^ ^^
maintain fo r the next several years (Meza et al, 1987: 49;
Davison, 1989: 19-21.
These moves by the governments of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala in the fall of 1983 contributed to Contadora's positive
omentum and permitted the elaboration of Contadora's plan for
building a diplomatic framework for peace talks. 17 That plan
reached its fruition at the Fifth Joint Meeting of the Contadora
Group and Central American foreign ministers held on January 7 to 9,
1984, the first anniversary of the Contadora Group's original call
for peace. At this meeting, 18 the Central American foreign
ministers adopted a document entitled "Norms for the Implementation
of the Commitments of the Document of Objectives," hereinafter
referred to as the Norms for Implementation (Contadora Group, 1984a:
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"0-183,. Together with the Document of Objectives, the Norms forMentation ca„ be read a6 the co„ 6ti£ution of Contadora
peace process.
The Norms £or Implementation derives its name from the fact
that the document explicit!, enumerates norms that would guide the
The llst of norma is even more formalized, precise, and
authoritative than the twenty-cue points found in the Document of
Objectives. Xhe norms for Cementation reorganires the twenty-one
Points into three interre,ated but distinct sets of topic: Securi ty
^ues, Politics! lEsue8> and Economic ^ iseues
_ ^^
under the heading of "Security Issues" include some new
specifications, such as the deeioim, r „c s on to compile an inventory of all
military forces in the region, including bases, troops, and
armaments, in order to reduce and balance their numbers within
"reasonable" limits, a census of all foreign military advisors and
personnel is also requisitioned in order to fix a schedule for their
reduction and eventual elimination from the region. The no™ under
the security heading also resolve to identify and eradicate the
"irregular forces" 19 seeking to destabilize states in the region as
well as all forms of support, promotion, or financing of such
groups
.
Like these security norms
, the norms under the headings of
"Political Issues" and "Economic and Social Issues" go farther than
previous Contadora documents in specifying the details of the work
to be accomplished by the Central American governments on their own
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and in subsequent phases of the neeoti-^u g tiations process n„
.
Fiu . The norms for
re8Pect f°r hu"a
"
s of tte reg£on . s
6 e"0ral Pr0C6EEeE
"
d
~ r
• - - creati0D of .
climate of political trust between th,e governments of the region to
contribute to a reduction of tensions Tn p. he Economic and Social
norms focus on cooperation in aiding the reeion' ,"6 n g s refugees and
facilitating their voluntary repatriationy , promoting economic
integration and intrarpp inn=i - jegl onal trade, encouraging economic and social
development ms witb the support of in£ernationai c_ is6iMs
(such as ECLA)
,
£oreign aid and joint ventures, and estabUshing
"fair economic and socia! structures" that promote democracy and
ensure rights to empioyment, education, health care, and cultural
expression (Contadora Group, 1984a: 181-182).
The No™ for Implementation also addresses the Contadora
Group's continued concern for action^echaoisms hy for.ali.ing and
expanding the power of the Technical Group. Its new powers included
coordinating the activities of the peace process, overseeing the
progress made in the implementation of the no™, and reporting to
the ministerial meetings on the work being accomplished. Moreover,
the No™ for Implementation created three working commissions, each
of which was commissioned to address one of the three main issue
areas delineated by the document (i.e., a Political Commission, a
Security Commission, and an Economic and Social Commission). These
working commissions were empowered to study proposals, make
recommendations, draft legal projects for negotiations, and prepare
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verification and control procedures within the"lD ir ls ^e areas. Each
r
e coraissioD ms comp°Eed
°
f
-
<°
-
. frMe-
- nine states participating ^ ^^^^
d
:r
s for
—
—
m) Md f" completing their Etudies .Sl le8 al Projects, and
- f-
-pon t0 the nine foreign oiDisterE (Con£adora g^
1984a: 181-183).
T1>e
"
0rnS ^—f""
^ a significant document for
several masons. It representE tb. ^ ^^
diplomatic work by the Contadora states ^ Mssers their
call for a framework for negotiations for the Centra! American
states. It represents the ful] transforation of the Contadora e.U
^r peace into an ongoing ana active negotiating process hy actually
creating mechanisms geared toward producing . regional peace
agreement. It also represents a conscious effort hy the Contadora
states to redefine the regional politico! arena rather narrowly. In
setting forth the guidelines to he followed b y the working
commissions, the document explicitly rejects any "foreign advice,
whether from private individuals or from representatives of
international organizations" unless it is "previously accepted hy
consensus" (Contadora Group, 1984a: 183). This guideline thus
implicitly defines the five Central American states and the four
Contadora Group states as the exclusive set of regional actors
involved in the Contadora peace process. It is an immanently
political statement in that it implicitly rejects the occassional
21 1
-can {or the U8e of 0AS Bechaniems todeai
7 ral A"eriCan "UeS - — • »jeetlon of un60lici£edv
;
ce from —
— seeBS t0 be directed at
National Bipartisan r~~~ •part Commission on Central America (or ,-n „ • •
.
^ the Kissinger
Commission), whose report on U S nnn. . policy toward Central America was
scheduled to be spnr t>e t to Present Reagan and puMished^ ^
days of this joint meeting of Contadora.
AUhough space notations pr eCl „ d e an extensive ana lysis of
"naings of the Kissinger emission's Report, it is useful to
consider some of its points as they relate to the Contadora
Central ^ri r„ seeks to define U.S. national security and
geopolitical interests in Central America and make policy
recommendations for the United States. The report clearly frames
Central America as a crisis area of vital concern to U.S. security.
It Places the region's crises squarely in an East-West context by
naming
"Sandinista-Cuhan-Soviet subversion" as a fundamental and
direct threat to U.S. security in the region. The report identifies
the means considered most appropriate to protect U.S. security
interests, including an economic aid program of ?8 billion to
friendly Central American governments over a five-year period and an
emergency two-year military stabilization program of $400 million in
counter-insurgency and civic action assistance to El Salvador, along
vitb other tools of military force intended to promote stability in
the region (National Bipartisan Commission, 198A: 53; 101-103).
*.«W1,. t„e range of diplonatic tools ^^^^ ^
;:
port devotee oniy
— t. the TOrk accomplished up to
P01Dt
^ ^ C— -
.tates
. After
outlining the Commission's noi ,™s p licy recommendations concerning
economic and security issues in the rest of th.e report, Chapter 7
addresses "The Search for Peace » Tn t-v. • •^ . In thls nineteeQ pagg
t^re in only a one page section on "The Contadora Croup." 2 ° This
^ief section hegins with two paragraphs that do not even mention
Croup or its peace process, but announce in8tead ^^i-eresf of the United States in encouraging the Central American
states themselves "tn aco,,™^ *.vo assume the responsibility for regional
arrangements" and develoD %n ai p an independent system of relations,
backed up by commitments of u c „U.S. economic resources, diplomatic
support, and military assistance." Thus in structural terms, the
report implicitly defines the Contadora Croup as outside of or
foreign to the interests of the Central American countries and
peripheral to any eventual regional agreement that, "to be
lasting[,]... must be able t0 count oq u>s> gupport>M ^ t^
initial paragraphs close with the paradigmatic statement that any
arrangement among the Central Americans themselves must "provide
both for verification of compliance and penalties for violation"
(National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 119). 21
Once the report finally does mention the "four neighboring
Contadora countries," it politely acknowledges the "constructive-
role these "key Latin American nations" have played in "helping to
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^fine but then ca6t£^^ ^^ ^ ^
COntad0rS
C
° "*
-en their Uck 0f ..extenBive
expert" „ thi8 regard
. Moreover;
notes ^
"terests and attitudes of these f„ur c0llntrie8 ^ .uLnes are not identical,"
-Piyins the e^tence of^ division6^ ^
Croup vi8 .Mi8 its meBbers . ^^^^^
^ ^^
process. Whil e it nay have been t00^ ^
th. report thus see.s to discount tb. poss ibili ty that the Contadora
states shared a significant MtioMl security interest ^^ ^
» Pectin, peace talks and preventing further militarization .„
the region that overrode any other differences that eight exist
between the* (National Bipartisan emission, 1984 : 120).
The report then disassociates U.S. interests fr« those of the
Contadora states, whose interests "Hn ido not always comport with our
own," and concludes that "the United States cannot use the Contadora
Process as a substitute for its own policies." Instead, the
Kissinger Commission Report refers to its own "Framework for
Regional Security," which is presented in the chapter section
immediately before that on Contadora. This "framework" xs a very
general ten-point outline that summarizes the larger set of policy
recommendations presented in the report as a whole and indicates the
Place of negotiations in that larger framework: As only one
diplomatic tool among several to achieve "security" in Central
America (National Bipartisan Commission, 1984: 117-118).
Significantly, the report describes its ten-point framework as
"fully consistent with the Contadora Program." However, the
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are
isan
sion
and
Kissinger Commission Report fails to f«t foreswear the use of military
force. In fact, the Commission endorses IT 9U.S. support to the contra
organizations as "one of «->^ •the incentives working in favor of a
negotiated settlement" with the "cSandinistas now in authority in
Managua." Sphere the report argues that SUto, measures
needed to shield economic and social programs" (National Bipart
Commission, 1984: 120, 84). In short, the Kissinger Commis
^port consistently speaks of military force as a legitimate
"essential adjunct to diplomacy"" vMle> a6 „e have ^ ^
Contadora Group insists that miUtary force is a significant source
of Central America's worsening climate of tension that must he
eliminated from the region.
»ith the virtual simultaneous appearance of Contadora's Norms
for Implementation and the Kissinger Commission's Report to the
President, the international community had two clearly articulated
alternatives for understanding and dealing with Central America's
crises. 23 Significantly, in Latin America only former Costa Rican
Foreign Minister Fernando Volio Jimenez, Nicaraguan contra leader
Adolfo Calero, and Salvadoran Foreign Minister Fidel Chive, Mena
publicly embraced the Kissinger Commission Report (Cepeda Ulloa and
Pardo Garcia-Pena, 1985: 174-175; Kinzer, 1984a: A10). On the
contrary, the Archbishopric of San Salvador stated that the
Kissinger Commission "erred completely" in calling for more O.S.
military aid to the region, a position soon echoed by Mexican
President Miguel de la Madrid ("Salvadoran Leader..., 1984: A19;
Meislin, 1984a: A3). In ea rly February, other Latin American
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presidents from Argentina, 24 Bolivia Colo K- ri , mbia, Costa Rica
DOminiCa
" RePUbUc
-
"-"agua, ana Panana a6 .wen as the prime
-later o f Spain ~all attending the inauguraUon ^ f
7
PreSident
'
JaiM L
—— - —ration o£ Caracas"
P~« (Cepaaa Blloa and Pardo Garc^^ ^
1985: 47). At the end of Februarv rho ry, the Contadora Group foreign
ministers met again and reaffirmed th^rmrme ei commitment to the peace
Process (Contadora Group, 1984c: 186-187). The Contado/• J-ne t ra process
seemed well on its vay toward challenging U S doh8 ,b
' P l icy toward Central
America and the further mi, iteration of the region.
The First Draft of the Contadora Act for Peace an, r„» Central America. February 1984—October 19^ *
lw
Within weeks of signing the Noms f„ Inplemen£ation> ^^
created working emission, began their work of studying, preparing,
and drafting sections of a peace agreement. 25 By the end of
February 1984, when the working emissions submitted their planned
work schedules to the Contadora Group ministers, there were over one
hundred technical advisors and diplomats in Panama participating in
the Contadora peace process (Goodfellow, 1987: 149; Cepeda Dlloa and
Pardo Garci'a-Pena, 1985: 175-176). For its efforts up to this
point, the Contadora Croup was reportedly nominated for the Nobel
Peace Prize in March 1984 (Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1985: 36).
As the working commissions began their work, the broader
political context of the peace process underwent small but
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UN
any
I
1
;""617
-
-
By early April, disclosures of the
'
lnVOlVMe
" " -~— - -aragu,, harbors
renewed the domestic and 1Dternatl0nal d*"« over the Reagan
administration's Central A„„antr American policies. While the
administration sought to implement thei Kissinger Commission
recommendations and redoubled its efforts f „ •tt to win more D.S. aid to
allies in Central America the b;"ca, N 1C araguan government asked the
Security Council to discus. .->.„85 the ">»«. With the D.S. veto of
diSCUSSi0n
-
-
"it against the United
States before the International Court of JuE tice »„,. The
-ministration responded hy announcing that it would not accept the
court's jurisdiclion on disputes relating to Central America for the
next two years. WMle the D
. s . ^ ^ ^ ^.^ 26
both the House an, the Senate balked at approving any new D,S. aid
especiaUy military aid, to Central America. Both houses also
opened new donates concerning the use of covert activities in
Central America, the CIA's role in Nicaragua, and the
administration's new position concerning the ICJ (Ayres dr., 1984:
A4; Gwertsmau, 1984= Al
; Taubman, 1984a: Al . Smith, 1984: A12;
Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33-34).
Sensing that its policy was in trouble at a time when
presidential primaries were getting under way, the Reagan
administration sought to cultivate a show of support and solidarity
among Central American countries friendly to the United States
Keislin, 1984b: A3). New joint military exercises with Honduras
were moved up three weeks to April 1 (coinciding with an unexpected
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.-*~P i- the teadership of tl. „onduran a„ed ^
administration EucceEsfully courted Costa Rica ,8^^
b0rde
2V
U8heS b""e
"
- - - Rican civll
— „ to increased tension between those two
«*» rec«lling its ambassaaor to Managua
_ ^ ^^ ^ ^
"nitea States to reque6t affiergency securuy asEistance
_
^
that was warmly recaived by the Reagan adn . n . Etrat . on
»*»~. „£ state, 1984i Asenjo, I985a; ^ ^^^
-«£. away from its poHc, of neutrality i„ the spring of
also manifested in Us participation in . mid-April neeting ^ „
Salvador and Honduras i. „b icb the th.ee states issued a co.Mi
,MEnding that Kicaragua expla . n . t6 niiuary reiation B _ ti^
countries and end its arms buil^p through Cuba „ d ^^
Union (Drekonja-Kornat, 1985: 33). Although both Costs Rica and
Honduras would vacilate occassional^, this triangular alliance
hetweeo Costa Rica, El Salvador, end Rondures (rooted in the nov
defunct Eorum pro Peece end Democracy) against Kicaragua became the
Reagan administration's trump in silencing some of its domestic
critics and in blocking Contadora's success in later months. 29
The potential effectiveness of this new triangular alliance in
blocking Contadora's success became apparent at the Sixth Joint
Meeting of Foreign Ministers on April 30 to May 1, 1984. At this
meeting, the reports and recommendations of the three working
commissions were due; however, this aapect of the meeting was
overshadowed by the position taken by Coata Rica, El Salvador, and
Honduras against Kicaragua. Echoing their earlier communique, the
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agree to
«~ ««es tooK the offenEive by chalUnEing Nicaragua ^
ai!Cl0M inf°™ati0
" °" itS
— • The, propo6ed chat the
Inter-^erica. Defense Board <„ oppo8ed to other
created b y Contedore) be ^
«.«!..«.. Fur tber, they calUd on Kicaragua ^^
-iHtar, strength and t0 stop the exportation ^ subver£iM ^ ^
neighbors (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987- 29) T„
peace agreement could be concretize (lretized at the meeting. The Mexican
government later charo^ * Lrged that the meetxng was sabotaged by the three
Central African allies who had at one point tried to boycott it30
("Obstruction of Contadora.
.. 1984: A12)
. Nevertheles g
> ^
Contadora Group was able to get Costa Rica and Nicaragua to agree to
set up a new multilateral border commission to try to reduce
tensions along their common border. Costa Rica's ambassador soon
returned to Managua (Drekon ja-Kornat
.
1985: 33; Asenjo, 1985a: 305-
306) .
After the disappointing Sixth Joint Meeting, Mexico stepped up
its efforts to promote a concerted foreign policy position of Latin
American states both toward U.S. policies in Central America and
toward the crisis of debt faced by Latin America that had now
reached staggering proportions. 31 President de la Madrid personally
took the lead, overshadowing his capable foreign minister
Sepu'lveda. In a mid-May trip to Washington, President de la Madrid
bluntly criticized U.S. policy in Central America. He asked
President Reagan to enter into bilateral talks with Nicaragua and to
support the Contadora process. In addressing a joint session of
-S ress, the Mexican president^ ^ ^ ^
p
;
aced into the Ea6t -west
— -~— "the illusion
of the effectiveness of force" (Clines 1984*. A1 A ,l S> 1984a:
»
A4; Clines,
1984b: A14; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 30).
Significantly, after attending ^
^^
Napoleo'n Duarte in El Salvador in earlv Iy June, Secretary of State
George Shultz flew on to Managua for brief H
'
g t discussions with Daniel
Ortega (Kinzer, 1984b- A? ? 1 c. 22). Soon thereafter, the United States and
"-ragua bega n a series of bilateral meetings in ManzanHlo,
"exzco. The Maozanillo TaUs lasted until January 1,35 after nine
Harry ScMaudeman" and Kicaraguan Deputy Poreign Minister Victor
Hugo Tinoco (Goodfellow, 1987- 150-1 iu, *y°'. 151). Although the Manzanillo
Talks
.ere ultimately fruitless," their commencement in J„.„ e did
contribute to renewed optimism about the Contadora process in the
summer and early fall of 1984.
Another new source of optimism for the Contadora Group was a
certain weakening of U. S.
-Honduran relations by June and July.
After an unexpected coup within the leadership of the Honduran
military at the end of March, the new armed forces chief. General
Walter Lopez Reyes, accused his ousted predecessor, General Gustavo
Alvarez Martinez, of having compromised Honduras' "pacifist and
democratic" principles. He called for limits on new military
spending and for renewed dedication to a peaceful resolution of the
region's conflicts. He also proved to be less cooperative with the
U.S. contra policy and less supportive of the U.S. attempt to
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joiDt Salvadoran and Honduran Biutary programs
_
seeking to renegotiate
"the terms of ,>« kxts bargain with the Reagan
team, ^ the bargain itself" f^ u8 (Shepherd, 1986: 150, emphasis in
original). Nevertheless Bn^b , Honduras new stance did force the Reagan
administration to reasees, ;.-«s s its poUcy toward the Hondursn military34
(MeisUn, 1984c: A19; T^^ ^ ^^
^e triangular alliance between Rica> ^ ^
deteriorated within six »eeU, providing Contadors with . clear road
to new progress.
The Contadors Group seized the opportunity for new progress hy
computing
.
draft agreeme„t that it formally presented to the five
Central American states on dune 9 and 10, 1984. The Contadors Group
ministers personally set out on a tour of Gentra! American capitals
to discuss the draft agreement and invite feedback from the Central
Americans ("Contadora Group's Envoy...," 198A: A6 . Cepeda and
Pardo Garcla-Peffa, 1985: 177). In the next fev months, the Central
Americans conveyed their observations, objections, and suggestions
to Contadora's Technicsl Group; 35 in turn, the Contadora Group
ministers evaluated the Central American vievs and revised the draft
agreement (Cepeda Olios and Pardo Garc ia-Pena
, 1985: 178). At the
Seventh Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers on September 7 to 9,
1984, the Contadora Group ministers presented a revised peace
agreement to their Central American counterparts as ready for
signing.
ReVlSed CO" ad0
"
A« f" - Cooperation in Central
A-ica was a lo»g and detailed peace as.ee.ee, tha t sought
.
C °mPrehen6iVe reS ° 1Uti
- '° "» co^fUct. (Contadora Act
»«)• After invoking „ariont principU£ ^ instru
_ t6 ^
-etnational lav. the Contadora Act articulates a comprehensive
Project that defines peace ana cooperation in Central Africa as
-pendent on three interrelated seta „ f commitments for each Central
American atate. F ir8t COme the Political Cor-itments (Chapter I)
which include provisions for national reconciliations ana political
-eatiaa, the respect for hu.an rights and judicial
and the promotion of plnraUstic and ft.ll, participatory electoral
system as veil as cooperation between the region's five national
parliaments. The Political Cedents also include a pledge to
promote regional detente and to ahide by this regional solution to
conflicts "in the face of foreign pressures and interests."
The Contadora Act then presents the Security Commitments
(Chapter II), which provide for the demilitarisation of the region.
Specifically, the security provisions include: The prohibition of
all international military maneuvers and the ending of those in
progress within thirty days of signing the Act; an end to the
regional arms race by prohibiting any new weapoas systems and
beginning negotiations on the control and reduction of current
inventories and troop levels; the elimination of all foreign
military bases and training schools within six months of signing the
Act and setting a schedule for the gradual withdrawal of all
foreign military advisors; an end to intra- and extra-regional arms
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trafficking; and the prohibition of all forms of Eupport
»i«e8„ lar such as the^ ^ other ^
« «n as their disarming and the dismantling
„f their base6
.
The Contadora Act presents these demilitarisation c™,itMnt .
« necessary hoth to end the Uca! armed conflicts and to fr ee up
the economic resources for equi tabl e development projects without
wnrch a viable peace is impossible. Hence, the commitments in the
economic and social areas (Chapter „» provide for ^ rf
regional economic integration and development projects, the
strengthening of regional trade and financial arrangements, the
improvement of employment and health standards, and the protection
of the region's refugees (Contadora Act, 1984). Reconciliations,
uemil.tarization, and integrated development then are the requisites
for real peace and security in the region as posited by the Revised
Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.
The Contadora Act also reflects the Contadora Group's continued
concern for actions rather than just fine words. This concern is
manifested first in the very title of the document. The Contadora
peace process produced an "Act," not simply a treaty, agreement,
covenant or charter. More substantively, the Contadora Act provides
for the creation of new mechanisms to implement the commitments
made. It seeks to establish three independent committees or
commissions corresponding to the three issue areas addressed by the
Act to evaluate, verify, and follow up compliance with the Act's
provisions. The most important of these is the Commission for the
Verification and Control of Security Issues, 36 which would be made
»P of W _berE propoaed by Contadora f^^^
receded impartiality and . genuine interest in cMtribut;ng ^
the solution" of the rpoion'oe81oo e erases. The Verification sod Control
Co-issioo was g iven .tensive investigating
responsibilities and
-Id report to the Centre! American listers of foreig„ affairs"
(Contadora Act, 1984).
»• Centra! African foreign D inister
.as quit e prepared to sign
the Revised Contadora Act at the Seventh doint Meeting for their
Sovernments, hnt it was clear that the Contadora Croup was pressing
for statures in the sear future. Soon afterwards, the government
ot Guatemala announced its willingness to sign the Act while Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras all expressed their conditional
approval. The Reagan administration initially voiced favorahle
words of approval for the Revised Contadora Act, with Secretary of
State Shultz calling it "an important step forward." I„ . letter t0
the foreign ministers of the European Community, Shultz conveyed his
approval of the Act's conditional acceptance by Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Honduras, and argued that Nicaragua had rejected "key
elements of the draft, including those dealing with binding
obligations to internal democratization and to reductions in arms
and troop levels" (Quoted in Goodfellow, !987: 149; and Bagley and
Tokatlian, 1987: 30-31; Asenjo, 1985a: 310-311).
The Reagan administration and others were thus caught off guard
when, just two weeks later, the Nicaraguan government announced that
it would sign the Revised Contadora Act provided that no further
changes be introduced and that the United States sign the Protocol
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- "PPO„ for the contras 33
„„,,„. wtl
^
«cou„ce,e„t, the Reagan adffiini6tration
on th e defensive and
;
u
;
h to
—— - - ~«-
.PProval of the Revi6ed
Ac, Xee a.ini6tration fim argued ^^
- o„ ly
. draft agre_ t intfiDded
^
CMte"tiM
*— Creep (0mang
, 1984a;
A7
; Taubman, 1984c- AT- u
»
y°* . aj, Greenberger, 1984: 36- "II <? v
'
JD
>
u « s
« Version...,"
1984: A24).
US SUb8tanti
- th. adnini s t r atl0„ er8cedtb« the Act's time ta„es for some
_ ^
"1Cm80, ' ! faVOr
"
K° St
".B. orricids roucd p„bleM
with toe Act's ver ificatioo procedures, and raised que8tion6 as ^
bow the proposed Verification acd Control Co^ission would be
funded, how its repo r ts vould be submitted, bow coBplaints of
violations would be handled an A v, • -. .c , and how violations would be punished
(Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987- 32) Thle ;
,
*0/
.
51 . is issue of verification would
remain an important one for the Reagan administration, given its
deep skepticism about Nicaraguan compliance with any agreement.
Despite Nicaragua's diplomatic coup, which favorably iffipressed
the participants of the joint Contadora-European Economic Community
meeting in San W, Costa Rica, at the end of September, 39 the
Reagan administration was able to persuade its Central American
allies to reconsider the terms of the Revised Contadora Act
225
im.». As „agley and Tokatlian (198?!
it,
Honduras m'Sbl2ifS^2,S.!,e;- " S^r,previous year-and-a-half o?™ "* d«P lte the
tentative acceptance cLn
f
rS ?
tl°ne and their ««.
^ the United S^ate 'were *e d e "V* "jesteda meeting in Tegucigalpa SonH 5 J ""^"led
four days after^onfado«-»^™,
,
<1
f
°I 1
?"*" 19
'
»>*.
submission of fln.i
formal deadline for the
new amendments
Pr°P°Sed Cha"8"' '° «P their
amance against Nicaragua and block the successfu, culmination of
Contadora's efforts in this second phase of the peace process. The
meeting in Tegucigalpa produced a counter-proposal knovn as the
Tegucigalpa Draft -a proposal ^^
Perez later duhbed the "Contadora Anti-Act" ("el
„
to***.") (Castro, 1985: 10). A»ong other points, the counter-
proposal sought to regulate rather than eliminate international
military exercises and foreign military bases; it replaced
Contsdora's formula on reducing arms and troop levels based on each
country's defensive requirements with a formula of military parity
among all Central American states; it excluded the Contadora Group
from the process of choosing the neutral countries invited to form
the Verification and Control Commission; finally, the Tegucigalpa
Draft proposed the elimination of consensual decision-making based
on unanimity and substituted instead a majority vote among the
Central American countries. Although the Guatemalan foreign
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minister attended the meetino he AiAtmg, did not sign the Tegucigalpa
»«'«• I- fact, Caatea.au. Iike Nicaragua
_ ^
vnun.ne., to sign the Revi8ed ^^^
»>.
— ^ Point on, the t ri angular aUiance o f Costa Rica ,
-vadot, and Rondura s Bould he lMM as t „. Tegucigalpa
"
(Bagley and Tokatlian 1 9ft? . -x/ n> iyB7: 34
5 Castro, 1985- in-ll r
, 10-11; Cepeda Ulloa
and Pardo Garc aa-Pena 19RS- ne t,
'
iyB5: J 78; Farer, 1985- 71-7?. a/A 12
>
Asenjo, 1985a:
311; Goodfellow, 1987- 1 50-1 s l - rr <
.
^o/. ou ni; Valero, 1985: 140).
The second phase of the Cn«f«,*„Contadora peace process was thus
brought to an abrupt close vith the Tegucigalpa Draft 0n October 2Q
1984. S inC e its beginnings in thfi weeRs follow . ng ^
Norms for Mentation, this second phase of the peace process
*ad heen mar.ed by pceitlve 8teps^ ^ ^ ^ &^
agreement with only one important but temporary obstacle iD the late
spring of 1984. During this phase th» H Dtg P , e determinati on and technical
competence of the Contadora Group to finally an agreement were
dearly evident. However, in this phase, it also became clear that
the Contadora Croup faced three political problems in its
conceptualization of the peace process. First, it overestimated the
Tegucigalpa Group states' foreign policy autonomy and/or their
interest in finding a peaceful resolution to the region's
conflicts. Second, as the Kissinger Commission noted, no viable
peace agreement could be reached without the participation and
support of the United States. This became particularly clear in the
Contadora Act's provisions to end international military maneuvers,
eliminate foreign military bases and foreign military advisors from
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in having „effectiyely
MocKed Contadora Group e£forts to inpo6e „ Revi6ea
Act
.
to
.
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e
cZTsii?t\%
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Co" ad^r ag m ^
natU
co
e
I***
-"""factor,
become notafl ^ J-' c
"
»
1984: A?"
">a"gaD,ent (Washing p„.
f
_
The Contadora Group spokepersons may have becone Bore ^
the appearance of the Tegucigalpa Draft
, „„, the Group ^ ^
deterred in ite co.i t.,„ t t0 tbe peace process
_
J(^
to challenge U.S. policy toward the region and pronote a Latin
American diplomatic alternative for the Central Americans for the
next three years and beyond.
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had a difficult time maint^' g * admini8 tration stillideological field, ^r^r^!,^ 8 »?»trality in the
to a tougher attitude agXt tSe
<
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l°n '8 P°U^ did *—
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Salvador's revolutionary guerrilla »™
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'.
the status of El
unclear. On the one EdfE J," at fe'ea't^r,' "the FMLN as a letiHi»»t-» J„ l ast had long recognized
between the contras and the FMLN. That equiva ency wouldbecome even more important after El Salvador's March 1984presidential elections, when Christian Democrat Jose NapoleonDuarte was elected. After his inauguration, Venezuela wouldPlay an important role in supporting Duarte's Christ anDemocratic government within the Contadora process. Butthroughout 1983 and in eaarly 1984, the ARENA
-dominatedgovernment of Alvaro Magana had few international supporters
contributing to the FMLN's international image of legitimacy'which the Nicaraguan contra organizations never enjoyed
"
This section begins half way down page 119 and ends half waydown page 120 of the Report. y
20.
21. On page 117, the Report offers U.S. technical assistance and
advice m verification procedures.
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28.
containment" or "rollback" 0f th?Jl '° be USed forcne Nicaraguan revolution.fe^^W^^"^!--^ receive,
controversy and partisan deh!?
compared to the
the Kissinger Commission Rep *TolT ofmonth of January 1984, the LTiork « P *' throughout theabout the Contadora
^eeting^rf^fSf jUSt tV° articl-one of the two specifically review^ * Te 8igned « °*lyand this was a short article in wWh n' 00^ ° f the N™>of the document were mentioned Tht J£lj ^ Provisions"Nicaragua's expectations for the Jnr "Z"" 16 f °CUSed 0nlight of U.S. policy toward Nicir/ ?^' 8 iffiP leme°tation in
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. .
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se°e C^tldorf Group"'?,m :"lS"w)f e—
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t
n^
WeeD DDited St/ t6S and Honduras^ early June
mL:^K ^ GarciVPe-> 177; Meislin
The clashes occurred between late February and early May 1984over the activities of the Costa Rican-based contra
lSSiiU'iir'p^"' 87 thiS timei tbe SP1U betWeen ARDE 's\ /fl6t0ra Alf0n8 ° R0b6l ° was wel l ^er way,with Robelo favoring the CIA's agenda of combining and
in°Hond
atin8 fp'8 eff°rtS th°Se ° f the ™ contr.. basedm uras and Pastors resisting the CIA's control (see
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Foreign Miniver to nL !° rge ShUltZ SSked the Mexic *°
that,^here waJ a "war ^Y^ 1* in April; after
Postponed be
1. President de la Madrid's efforts and those of other LatinAmerican leaders with regard to the growing deb i ed toseveral important multilateral meetings on'the Lti debtculminating in the June 20, 1984, meeting in Cartagena
At
f0rmati °n
°
f 8 °-CalUd ^tag^n 'croup.tended by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuad0r
'
taico. Peru, Uruguay, and'Venezuela, the Cartagena meeting sought to coordinate LatinAmerican negotiating strategies toward industrialized countriesm setting a framework to refinance Third World debt. The
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after Stone resigned p ,
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then Assistant slcr^ary oTsu \lX^**" between "one
^
Langhorn Motley was the reason for Z Affairs
resignation according to
St °De 8 ""-February
Molotsky, 1984- A8 «r I
reports a * the time (c.f.j. , J * * yoH - a«, Career Envov » i oe/ . / n vt,£ '>
the talks were serious; however cri LsT"""" ln£i8ted th"talks were used as a ploy to «i gued tb" the
administration's aid nroer,! f
Congress to support the
critios of admini^t a t"n " t o
eDtr
f i™"" a"d t0 •»«««1984 presidential campalg^ It i T • "* i0n dnri,« the
«ere unilaterally broken off 1 , 6USt>lc ,lous the talks
after Daniel OrteL was in!, f 18, 1985 - sh°«ly
before Presiden teaman' rein! ? P"«««t and shortly
Al). 8 S a"S"ration (Taylor, Jr., 1985:
•wi^Jl'.fS't^S" nilitary did " ot afta«
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government. President Suazo
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n the morning after
The Technical Group, it will h P r-*™^ j
vice ministers of lore g fairs^f e«"Vth °f theparticipating in the Contadore peace process ItTclT^function was to oversee the details of the work o b! w 8co» 18 sions and to report back to the minis Serial meetings as^well as prepare the agenda of the ministerial meetings
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CT ltt6e f° r ^^""ion •» Follow-Up Procedure " f
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S0CU1 MatterE (C°°^°" Act,
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on this commission.
38. As Bagley and Tokatlian (1987- 31) „to sign the Revised Contadora Act 4t ' b*vas agreeing to make important concJl governmentall Soviet-bloc military advises "I-
0" 8
'
'"^ 38 expelling
reducmg the ei Ze of its army L
'
0J
^
"g aU ™
-Ports,
all support for El Salvador'! mN b * ^ lnven tory, endingthe Nrcaraguan political opposition withinspections by Contadora
's Veri J ^
Permitting on-site
Commission. I n return n1 10n and Con trol
^e other Central ize LT" ^ UnUed and
contras; they would also Save 0 e*Tal
f°^ 8UPP °rt f° r the
maneuvers within thirt-v ,1 „ ? 1 Jolnt military
a Honduras, El Salvador, and Co.". ^ Pr°gram8
^misters endorsed the Contadora Act as ItVT' ^ Eur° Peanfor stability in Central America and tL opportunity"the regions to an early si " flf1 d cooPeration betweenPardo Carcia-Pena, 1985- lis r 1 ^tll (Cepeda Ulloa ™*
1987) (larcera Confereacia'da" i" oa!? "f o7 ^tV"1 ""
CHAPTER VII
FROM COHTADORA TO ESQDIPDLAS II
The time for Peace has come.
—Oscar Arias Sanchez
February 15, 1987
Over the next two and a half years th« rn , e Contadora Group states
Persist in their efforts to provide a Eheuer ^
^
»hic h to mediate Central America's violent political^ ^
acre versions „f the Contadora Act discussed ^ ^
the Central Americans for signing during „„ and^ ^
_
diplomatic supp„ rt fron other Latin toer .can statesj however>
obstacles to finding an acceptaMe Contador£^^^
Bach positive step forward in the peace process met with frustration
or disappoint. From the end of 1984 through the ear ly months of
1987, the Contadora states struggled to keep the peace process
alive. But in August 1987. the Central Americans unexpectedly
agreed to a new formula and answered the Contadora call for peace in
their own voice. A new procedure for establishing peace in Central
America was found. The time for peace had come.
In this chapter we shall continue to follow the course of the
Contadora peace process through its difficult years of 1985 and
1986. We shall then trace its transformation into the Esquipulas
Phase of the Central American peace process with the signing of the
Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in
Central America in August 1987.
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Tie Second Draft of the Contadora Act f„. p
» Centra! Africa, Hov^er ^^X^er^""0"
*
- - Tegucigalpa Group uas a 8erious
"
C°"tad0ra
~"— - * TegU c igalpa Draft
;;
p
;
icated the search f° r
*
f
— -—
•
-
— — - a report t0 the Uni£ed
general secretary 2 admitting the idea of i° lncorPorating some of the
Tegucigalpa Group's observations into the Conta, adora Act insofar as
they contributed to giving the Act greater n •precision. However, they
rejected any modification of the subst.n,
i
a tive points and political
balance reached by the Act (Talavera, 1990; Castro.1985.il)
Nevertheless, during this diff lcult third , f ^
peace process from November 1 QftA ^ ~1984 through December 1985, the
C0Dtad ° ra Gr °UP «™«
-
I"* 'c a =..PMite agreemen(
between the security provision£ rf ^^ ^ ^ ^
-ad to the Second Revised Contadora Act was strewn with important
obstacles that threatened the life of H. e ™r th peace process all along
the way.
On the second anniversary of its original call for peace, the
Contadora Group mt in Panama t0 reiterate lt§ uilUngness ^
continue its mediation efforts end called on the Central Americans
to fulfill the commitments of the Document of Objectives. Hovever,
the difficult stalemate that bed developed between the Central
Americans in the fell of 1984 was complicated further by the
controversial Urbina Lara asylum case. In December 1984, the
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SSndiniSta 8 °Ve"
- *>.ta Rica, grant of
POHtiCaI asylum w Manuel „rbina lara> uho haj
»P I- *. Costa Rican embassy „ MaMgua
_ ReUtions betMM* - governments deteriorated rapidly
. Costa Rica announc^
withdrawal froa, the Contadora prQcess
e case was Pending and
"He, on the Peraanent Councn of (pcoA£) ^^ ^
CO" rOVerEy
- 0"^ 18. 1985. the PCOAS referred
t»e case to the Contadora Croup
, instructing^ ^ ^
Nicaragua t0 resoIve the ca£e through Contadora , s ^^
(Capeda D11 oa and Pardo Carcia-PeHa, 1985: As ^^
("85= 11) notes> thi8 deci6ion reneued Cont8dora , s n . ss . oni ^
also distracted Contadora from . t8 purpose m^ ^
Contadora Croup in tMs obtrus . ve b . uterai confUct
_
prevented the holding of the Eight Joint Meeting of foreign
ministers scheduled for February 14 due to . boycott by the
Teguciga , pa Group
. Xhe confHct f ,naUy reao]ved , n^
M-ch, but it bed cost the Contadora process three months and b ad
sharpened the differences between the Tegucig a l pa Group, Nicaragua,
and the Contadora Group. 3
Another setback for the Contadora Group as it began its third
year was the break-off of the Man Zanillo talks between the United
States and Nicaragua as well as the suspension of talks between the
Salvadoran government and the FDR-FMLN. At their second anniversary
meeting, the Contadora Croup ministers noted the importance of the
Manzanillo talks and urged their continuation as well as those
recently begun in El Salvador by President Jose" Napole6n Duarte.
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u. of tie Contadora Group , s meet;ng
_
announced it wp c k,-^„i •as breaking off the Manzanillo talks, asserting that
aPPrOPri" e Md
— " *• " the CoD£aJora proceS£
I. « Safvador, Pre6ident Duarte ^ cMfaigDed h^
the previous sprine nn a ~i _rP 8 ° 3 P la tform that included seeking i-8 l 8 a Political
—on to the country - s c£vil _ in eariy Oc£ober ^ iw
Pre!idMt Duarte
;°
und the
.»-. to to „fUI t ; is
CanPaiS
"
Pr0mi
- " " ™- -e, he used bis October addre£s
t- the united Nations t0 invite £he FDR-FMLN te the toun „f La^
for talks on the search for peace Tho * i,. e talks were held one week
later, on October 15, 1984, as thousands , f ^
^
Pilgrittaga to La Pal„a in support of the talks. The two sides
agree, to set up a joint commissioD that^ ^ ^ .^^^
Process under way and discuss ways to hu.sni.e the deadly air w,
The, also ag reed to „eet again, but the second
.eating at Ayaguals
on November 30 was less fruitful. By tbe end of tbe yea r, tbe
Political space that President Duarte bad tried to sieze bad closed
up. The resurgent opposition of tbe country's political end
military ultra-right vings against any accomodation with the
revolutions left, the FDR-FMLN 's unrealistic demands for tbe time,
and the re-election of President Reagan all cabined to pre-empt tbe
incipient political dialogue. Throughout 1985 and beyond,
.
political solution to EI Salvador's civil war would not be a viable
altern a tive for the beleaguered Duarte goverment (Diskin a nd Sharpe,
1986: 70-74, 81-85; Karl, 1988: 184-185; Crahan, 1988: 233).
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up
In addition to these setbacks i„ am the early mon ths of 1985
there were still others that seemed to cut the ground from under thet-ontadora peace process u;^. With renewed self-confidence aft
stunning re-election victorv th a n"tory. e Reagan administration stepped
,ltS eff°rts to implement its Cental Atral American policy. Tn addition
to a renewed rhetnnVoi „ • 5alCamPal8D f°"° on Nicaragua during the
" m0nth ° ° f 1985
- ^inistratic aoved t„ block
COnSiderati
°" °f a Ki—
" — t at the x*.^..
DeVelOPMnt
—
-
• - Push for contra aid
. a.
aaministration also promised an increase ^ iu Biu£ary ^
™ic aid t0 Honduras in February and Karch Md began mu .oin£
D.S.-Honduran m ilitary exercises fron mid .February through earJy
On April 30, President Reagao a_d ^ ^^^^ that ^
wcu, d irap0se . fnl] trade embargo agains£ ^^^^^^ ^
»«k
. I, Kay
, the adDinistration aUo £tepped ^ ^^^^
ass ista»ce to Ccst a Rica after yet another ^.^^
between that cou„t ry and Kicaragua
. „„, ^^ ^ ^^^^
and the Reagan administration pl aying hard .ball> t„. obstacJes t<>
reaching
. p eace agreement among the Central Americans seemed higher
then ever (Boyd
,
1985 a: Al
; Bri„kley , 1985a: Al
; Engelberg, ,989:
Ali "North Trial...,- 1989: 3; Gold, 1987: 41, 48; Meislin, 1985:
A9; Brinkley, 1 985h
:
A3
; "Vatican Questions...," 1 985 : A8; Cepeda
Ulloe a„d Pardo Garci'a-PeSa, 1985: 183; Christian, 1985: Al
; Valero,
1985: 144).
Nevertheless, both in spite of and because of ell these
setbacks, the Contedora Group moved to get the peace process back
24 1
in
to
o» track. A meeting of the Contadora Technicai Group ^
-oncUe tne confucting security
^ ^
- Tegucigalpa Draft> the nine vlc_inis£ers dw rNch a
consensus on the creation and basic ^^^^ of ^
Mnfkatim
^ f011— on p.litlc.1, security, and
economic and social mat(erE proposed ^ ^ ^
Th.s confidence-bunding effort opened the door te another meet£ng
of the Technical Group on May M
-17. when discussions were fi„ a„ y
opened on tk. security provi s ion£ that had deadlocked ^^
process for seven months. These discussions continued at the end of
May in a special feting in Bogota (Cepeda oil., end Pardo Garcr'a-
Pene, 1985: 182-183; Valero, 1985: 143-144).
Although the peace process seeded to be getting beck on track
in the late spring of 1985, tensions between the united States end
Nicaregue, which bed by this time become the most public focus of
conflict in Centrel America, had reached their nadir in May end
June. The new U.S. tr ade emb arg o, President Ortega's controversial
trip to Moscow, and President Reagan's hard-hitting push for renewed
contra aid all moved the D.S. House of Representatives to reverse
itself from a vote in April and approve 527 million in non-lethal
aid to the contras on June 12. At the same time, the House also
rejected a further extension of the Boland Amendment (Bagley and
Tokatlian, 1987: 36; Leogrande, 1987: 208-212; Arnson, 1987: 133-
134).
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Yet another meeting of the Technical Group had hP been scheduled
for June 18 and 19. But with the U S Cnn. . o gress moving toward a
-ava! of co„„
,u
. Nicaragua sought ^ ^ issue ^ ^
a8eDda 01 ^^ " " "~
• 60U£ht an officiai
repudiation of the U <;.S. contra , ld policy by ^ ^ ^^.^
bussing the other agenda Uems
_ Ro_ r
_ ^^
Croup dipl oma ts opposed outright whne ^
d 'Pl0Mtt t0°k P0SitiM «>» " "as too late t . chang e the
e.taMi,hed ag enda. Kicaraguan Vice Minister victor Hugo Tinoco
valKed oat of the meeting, rtiel „as thus aborted
_ ^
Nicaragua Wee president traveled to the capital, of th. Contadora
states soon thereafter to express Nicaragua's wim„gness to
continue working within the Contadora process rh.d P , t e peace process
again seemed on the veroe nf . ftna= ^ uonapse (Castro, 1985: 12; Meza et al
.
1987: 54; Valero, 1985: 145-146).
Significantly, throughout the first half of 1985, the Contadora
Group had hegun to receive new diplomatic encouragement and support
for its efforts from some of the new civilian governments coming to
power in South America. This new support had been foreshadowed
throughout 1984 by Argentine President Ra*l Alfonsxn, whose first
major foreign policy initiative was to declare his support for the
Contadora process in February 1984, just two months after his
inauguration (Cepeda Dlloa and Pardo Care la-PeSa
, 1985: 175).
Thirteen months later, President Alfonsfn spoke out forcefully in
favor of the non-intervention principle and in support of dialogue
between the United States and Nicaragua as he met President Reagan
243
at the White House (Boyd 1985h- AO
,
b. 5). Meanwhile, the March 1985
inaugurations of Uruguayan President Julio Marx'a San° " ri guinetti andh-ill- President Jo6a Sarney provided 8ignincant
*- Contadora Croup and Central African presidMt8 md
ministers to meet informally to try to r^ny eopen their dialogue and get
-ace process back 0D track
. ^ ^^
opportunity for other La£in ^rican governBMt6 ^^
support for the peace process (Cepeda „lloa and Pardo Garcia-
Pena, 1985: 181).
But after the aborted Technical Croup meeting in mid .June and
the U.S. Congress's decision to resume nonlethal contra aid ia
-U-J.1T. the new civilian governments in South Africa decided to
lend their active diplomatic support to the Contadora peace
process. At the presidential inauguration of Peru's Alan Garcia on
Ju.y 27, 1985, the new civilian presidents of Argentina, Bra.il,
Peru, and Uruguay agreed to form the Contadora Support Croup (also
known as the Lima Group) i„ order to help the Contadora Croup inject
new life into the peace process. The formation of the Support Croup
was formally declared through the Cartagena Communique, issued at
the end of a meeting on August 23-25 between the eight foreign
ministers of the new Support Group and the Contadora Group in
Cartagena, Colombia (Valero, 1985: 149-150; Comunicado „. EflItaeaM;
1985).
The Cartagena Communique is marked by a dour tone and expresses
the deep concern of the eight foreign ministers over the still
worsening situation in Central America. The eight foreign ministers
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«-« *• Support Croup had beeB f_ed to provide a ,WhMi^ of
diplomatic information, consultation, and support to the prompt
conclusion and signine nf rh*
"S ot the second draft nf + na r o the Contadora Act thenbe lng Prepared
.
two groups underlined their vie* that the
-elating regional con£Uct ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^
national security forests, both fcy ^
and sources away from the^ „ f ^^
economic situation and the debt cri,;. nsl s throughout Latin America and
^ what they perceived as the growing threat of a generated war
that would have "grave conaeque„ces for the whole hemisphere."
mdeed, the eight foreign ministers meeting in Cartagena vanned that
vnhout a peaceful settlement in Central America, the regional
conflict "will affect the poHt . cal M<J 6tabiuty ^ ^
Latin America" (Comunicad. H e P
nTrnrrni 1985)-
The significance of this very serious statement and of the
Support Croup's endorsement of the Contadora peace process as "the
only viable path to achieve peace and reestablish harmony and
cooperation between the Central American states" should not be
underestimated. 6 The members of the Support Group brought an
important political and moral force to the peace process. Despite
their economic crises in the 1980s, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay are among the most developed and powerful states of Latin
America. Together vith the Contadora Croup states, they represent
nearly 85? of the population of Latin America (Pardo Garcia-Pena,
1987: 214). Moreover, the four Support Group states had only
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™i y returned to civillan rule^^ ^
di""°"hip
"
hich
— *
-
- P0Utici2e ladlviduals or
struggle in Latin America t0 re-institute .l U d«">«atic processes and
national reconciliations in the face of ,„long-held military power and
supremacy. The decision of these nev civilian governments to support
*» Contadora process signify
. ^ ^^ ^PWism, cooperation. and development ^ ^ ^
"iection of the militated national security doctrines proved
through the dictates of cold war anti-communism.
As the Support Croup began its diplomatic lohhying efforts, the
Reagan administration's new Assign,- cv istant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Elliott Abrams,? called a special meeting of U.S
ambassadors to Central America and Belize to discuss the potential
-Pact of the Support Croup. Abrams lumped the Support Croup
together with U.S. adversaries in the region hy asserting that it
»as "necessary that „e develop an active diplomacy in order to
hinder the attests at Latin African solidarity that could he
directed against the U.S. and its allies, whether these efforts are
initiated by the Support Group, Cuba, or Nicaragua" (Babcock, 19 85:
Al, A18; also quoted in Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37). Indeed,
administration hard-liners like Abrams had come to see both the
Support Group and the Contadora Group as simply anti-U.S. and
therefore pro-Sandinista, thus precluding any serious accomodation
of the peace process.
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l
"
C°"ad0rS A
"— - ~« to the Central
Americans at the Fi Q v,n, t •n tighth Joint Meeting of th«
»Sap«erl2 1985 th f .
8 thenlne
-i»i"«r.
r
(vaur°- )985: iw
-
-
—
contadora , t focu e
Tegucigalpa Group t0 the securi v. rific , t . . „ . .emication provisions of theSeptember 1984 draft ti,
-ft. Thus, tb. deferences between the two drafts
are found mainly i n Parr t ru. I, Chapter III ("Commitments on Security
Affairs"), Part TT ("r~
( Comments on Execution and Follow-up"), and
'«* II, ("Final Bispo 6 itio„ 6 "),with only occassional minor
additions or recordings in the other chapters addressing the
Political and economic and socia, matters. Nevertheless, the
September 1985 Act does include a new article (IF) in Part I
Chapter I ("General Committments") which obliges the Gentral
American governments to respect "the riohtcn S t0 Practice free trade,"
a clear but diplomatic reference to the D S ^" U,
-
trad e embargo against
Nicaragua
.
With regard to the security provisions, the September 1985
Contadora Act continued to call for an end to the regional arms race
and arms trafficking, the prohibition of support for irregular
forces and for acts of terrorise, subversion, or sabotage in the
region, the establishment of a regional system of direct
communication to diffuse tensions, and the removal of foreign
military bases and advisors from the region. But unlike the
September 1984 Act, the new draft established a deadline of six
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also provided for a tw°-phased process of nepoti.f
„ ,
.
g tiating regional arms
control and reductions to begin after thP
, , v
e S1SDlng of the Act. TheSeptember 1985 Act did not oblige the i™, „86 mediate cessation of
international military maneuvers but it a;
'
U 11 dld attemPt to regulate
their si2e
,
duration, and location with a view to thaie r eventual
cessation.
-th regard to provisions on verif ication acd ^
^ COntad °ra ACt
— out changes in the structures of
the verification mechanisms that reflected th.nec e consensus reached on
this issue the previous Mav tv,H y. The new Act also added a new article
addressing the financing of the verifir-Hg n ication mechanisms through the
creation of a Fund for PPar P n~ ^ i 9e ce m Central America. Several other
Provisions were added to the document to specify the functions of
the Verification and Control Commission on Security Matters. The
new Act also specified with more precision th» +le timing and final
modalities of implementing the Act in Part III (.-Final
Dispositions") (Contadora Act, 1985; Contadora Act, 1984).
The Contadora Act presented to the Central Americans in
September 1985 was thus a more precise and in that sense a stronger
document than the previous one. Nevertheless, three substantive
issues continued to divide the Central Americans. The open-ended
process and unresolved formulas for negotiating regional arms
control and arms reductions divided Nicaragua and the Tegucigalpa
Group, as did the continuation of international military maneuvers
permitted by the Act. The third issue centered on the verification,
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execution, and follow-up provisions of the Act AIM. .nc . lthough there was
a consensus on the structure of the verification „ •mcatio mechanisms, there
remained some ambiguities as to just what n,those mechanisms were
-int. differences also listed on the timing of „
„f
the Act, with Nicaragua arguing that all of the Act's ocn s provisions
should enter into force simultaneously with the .1 cn signing of the Act* E
\r
iVad ° r
-
Honduras
.anted a delay of six months after
-gni„g. Tbe nine foreign minister£ neeting ^^^ ^
try to resolve these issues in a special 45-day permanent
negotiating session by the Technical Croup to hegin on Octoher 7 in
order to finalise the 1985 Contadora Act. All other suhstantive
Points of the Act were considered finaliaed (Cardenal Cha^orro,
1985a: 846-849; Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Valero, 1985: 150;
Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37).
Uttle was accomplished by the talks, which were marked by the
intransigence of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras (Cardenal
Chamorro, 1985a: 847). On November 11, the Nicaraguan government
announced that it could not sign tbe Contadora Act as it then
stood. While one hundred of the Act's nrn^e-;,^Liie s p ovisions were acceptable to
Nicaragua, seventeen relating to security matters were not,
including the continuation of international military maneuvers,
premature cuts in Nicaragua's armed forces, the lack of a specific
requirement for a halt to U.S. aid to the contras, and the absense
of a means to oblige U.S. compliance with the Act 12 (Bagley and
Tokatlian, 1987: 37; Kinzer, 1985: A8)
. In a letter to the
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is ion on
Presidents of the Contadora Croup a „a Support Group £tates
°rtega CU"^ «- onus for »icaragua - 8 dec
«*- stetes, arguing that> given ^ escaUtiDg^ J
the minimum ba£ic conditio" s «»—* Kicaragua, aecuri;«- not exiat
.
..Such conditions uin ^ ^^ ^ ^
extent that the united Stetes gove™„t undertakes effective
concrete, and real cedents t„.t^ ^^ ^
level of ttili tary development that does not entail a risk t„ its
national security" (Ortega
, 1985: 878).
The nine foreig n ministers met for
. ninth tiffie on ^
to 21 as the 45-day neEotiatin8 session dre» to a close. They
agreed to create yet another mechanism tectaical and
administrative secretariatP fnr m cc na e o the execution and follow-up of the
Act. However, the differences on the security provisions Gained.
In essence, in trying to meet most of the security concerns lodged
by the Tegucigalpa Group and the United States the previous fall and
thus keep the peace process alive, the Contadora Group had presented
a new Contadora Act that tilted against Nicaragua's security
concerns. Despite the efforts of the vice-ministers and ministers
of foreign affairs in October and November, the new diplomatic
stalemate could not be resolved (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985a: 847
;
Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b: 926; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 37).
That stalemate was not the last setback that the Contadora
peace process experienced in 1985. In what appeared to be an
attempt to address Nicaragua's concerns at their November 19-21
meeting, the nine foreign ministers agreed to a proposal by the
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Group t0 introduce a resoiution ^ m^
United States as a show of support for (W aPP t Contadora. But before the
resolution came to the floor, the U S amha•
*
b s^dor to the UN, Vernon
WaUers, 8uccessfully^ ^ ^ ^
-e UN as well as those fro. Col OInh ia
, Venezuela, and P anaffia to
object to parts of the resolution. The three Contadora^
a.bassadors removed the proposed resolution fro. the General
Assembly without inform Mexico and introduced another resolution
elating the points to which the United States objected (such as
a Paragraph expressing concern over continued joint military
maneuvers and explicit references to U.S. policy in Central
America). Nicaragua then objected to the passing of any resolution
that did not contain an explicit reference to the United States, and
the whole project failed. Yet a third resolution was introduced at
a special economic commission of the UN General Assembly by Mexico,
Peru, Algeria, and Nicaragua. This resolution focused on the U.S.
trade embargo against Nicaragua and urged that it be revoked.
Despite U.S. efforts to amend and defeat it, this resolution
eventually passed 13 (Cardenal Chamorro, 1985b).
With even the Contadora Group in disarray, 14 and frustrated by
its lack of success in finalizing the Contadora Act, it seemed that
the peace process was virtually dead. This perception was
reinforced in December when Costa Rica proposed that any further
talks be suspended for five months to await the upcoming changes of
government in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Nicaragua
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seconded the proposal (Bagley and mi, .1» ^tUan, 1 987 : 37; c.G.R., 1986
^7; Latin Peace Effort... 1985- Al^ "t •
» 1*85. 13; "Latin Peace Meetings
»«' A3). Thus closed a very diff icult
,
e
y l lC and fruitless thirdPhase of the Contadora peace process with
'
Sy Wl Pros Pects for the futurelooking excedingly grim
.
Stalemate and the Third Draft of +u n
On the thira anniversary of the or . g
.
nai ^ on
Con.aao.a Is l and
, the eig ht foreig
„ ^ ^ ^^ the Support Group ffie£
^^
th.« co.itm„ t t0 seeking peace in Centrai ihey^
that serious negotiations resume as soon as possible ana statea in
dear terms the principal bases they saw necessary to establishing
ongoing peace in Central Africa. The "Caraballeaa Message" of
January 12, 1986, stressed the necessity of a Latin American
solotion to Central Africa's conflicts. "This means that the
solution of Latin American problem should arise fro. ana be ensured
by the region itself so that the area is not placed into the East-
West world strategic conflict." With the added voices of the
Support Group, this was the strongest rejection yet of the
imposition of cold war logic in Central America as well as the
clearest assertion of Latin America's diplomatic primacy in
resolving the region's conflicts (Hens.i* H» r^^.^ 1987; 6]0 _
613; 611).
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Carahalleda Message reiterated tbe principUs £hat ^
8
;;
ded the pea
- p™
-
<°
-
-en articulated in
all previous Contadora documents (i e R „i f-,^l. ., self-determination, non-intervention, territorial inteerit-v ,grity, pluralistic democracy
demilitarization,
non-support of irregular for,
.
6 U 0 ces
» respect for human
rights, etc.). The eio)^ f~ •8 f°rei8n
"
lniEte« 'I- offered their good
offices " to foster re6Uffiption of ^ l,ee° the governments
of the United States and Nicaraou. pg a.... Respectful negotiation between
with mutual and editable concessions, is a condition tor
regional detente,. The Carahalleda Messag e stressed that such
negotiations were necessary to prevent "grave risks to Latin
American peace and stabilii-v" fu- • ,
Tvo days later, on January 14. 1986, Xarco Vinicio Cerezo
Arevalo was insulted as the first elected civUian president of
Guatemala in „ear,y twenty yea.s. 15 President Cere20 , s ^
successful diplomatic initiative was to hold an impromptu sum.it on
January 15 and persuade the other four Central American presidents
assembled for his inauguration to endorse the Carahalleda Message.
On January 16, the five states' foreign ministers signed the
Guatemala Declaration for their governments, embracing both the
"principles and propositions formulated at Carahalleda as well as
the actions proposed to restart the peace process" (C.G.R., 1986:
467, translation mine; Yopo, 1987: 326; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987:
40-41; Goodfellow, 1987: 152). Once again, at its seemingly
bleakest point, the Contadora peace process found renewed political
will to sustain its continuation.
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d6EPite
~
h°P
- - « c£ diplometic activity by
«-
—ore diplonats
,
I986 sou]d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
"» Previous yeer. Armed wlt„ ^
iBl""im
"
ei8ht
—— from the Contadora ^
S»PPOrt Groups travelUd to Ha£hington
_ Mter^^ ^
-etin8 with President ReagM> the eight mini£terfi ^
Secretery of State George shuUz ^ pebruary iQ a^ ^ ^ ^ ^
The. also ask ed for . reopening of b . laterai ta[ks
("Latxn Mi.Uter,..., I986; A7; C . G
. R<> ^ ^^ ^
<Wri„ 1 989: 34; Ceng, l 986a: A9; Ea£ley and IokatUanj i98? _ ^
GoodfeUov, 1 987: 152 ). Nevs report6 uter reveaud tha( ^
February, the State DepartBent had proposed tha( a poaiti^
be mede to Nicaragua as . ehov of 6upport fM Contadora
however the „hite „ousi, „„ Befense ^ ^
idea ((taang, 1986b: m) . In£tead> on February i986> ^
administretion submitted it e request to congress for 5100 milUon U
new centre a id for the second half of FY 1 986 and a„ of FY 1987
(LeoGrande, 1 987 : 213; Arnson, 1 989 ).
The eight foreign ministers of the Cont adcr a and Support Groups
met again in Punta del Este, Urugu ay
, on Februery 26-2 8 . Once agai„
they urged en end to contra a id and reiter a ted both the need end
cepecity for Latin America to resolve its problems without outside
interference (C.G.R., 1 986: 467). LeoGrende (1 987: 214-215) notes
that this new willingness of the eight Contadora foreign ministers
to criticize U.S. a id to the centres openly
-as opposed to a
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the
icy
~ dipWic circumspection ,^ unued states
6
"
""""" ReaSan ' 8
"— » * House of
ePreSe"atiTCS
- ~ —"on, previous arguMnt
r
tad°" cr°up— ——ly „re SUPPOr£ive of , s .
they could pubUcly acknovledge
credibiuty ^ ^^
» -1, 1 986 with the nev aS6ertivene6E of eight Contadors
foreign ministers. Nevertheless th* cb , e Senate narrowly passed the
administration's request a week later TV, •. he 18 sue of $100 million in
new contra aid was not dead.
0" April 5-7> 1986
, the first .o . Dt meet . ng ^ au thir£eM
foreign ministers from the ^^^^ Group
_
t^ Support^ ^
th. Central ,„ltl„ 8tates ua6 heJd ^ paMM ^ reopen aiscu6sions
on finalizing the Cortadora ^ fc , ^
meeting failed to break the previous diplomatic stalemate. The
only change of positions since the previous fall was that the
Contadora Group was wilUng to discuss
. Mexican proposal that the
thirteen ministers ask the united States to halt new aid to the
contras in order to give the peace process time to finalize and
implement the Contadora Act. However, the Tegucigalpa Group refused
to discuss the proposal; Nicaragua refused to discuss finalizing the
Contadora Act without first approving the proposal. The meeting
broke up with only one questionable agreement having been
reached. 17 In the final communique, all the ministers except
Nicaragua's agreed to Venezuela's proposal to set June 6, 1986, as
the final deadline for the Central Americans to sign the Contadora
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(Talavera, 1990; Eag ley and IokatUan
'• 152; Garc la and Gomariz, 1989: 34- c G B ,.K ,
1986. , u '
986:
*
68
!1986, LeMoyne, 1986c: M; LeMoyne, 1986a: A4).
Portly thereafter, the Tegucigalpa Croup^
witness to sign the September ^^ ^ ^
Act by th. nes deadUne> thus pucicg thfi _ on ^
^— ° f
- — »icaragua BaiDtained it£
position that it waq vin;,,wxllxng to si gn the Act by June 6 prov . ded fchat
North American aggression has ceased » th, c i •, us placing the onus for
stalemate on the U.S. contra aid policy.
^ this time tak en the public p0£itioD that lt .^ rf^ ^
contras was necessary to force the Sandinistas to comply with the
conditions o f any peace agreement, inclnding national reconciliation
talks between the Sandinista government and the contras. The
Nicarag uan government refused the legitimacy of the contras (calling
them "mercenaries" for the United States) and rejected any
suggestion of negotiating with them (Bagley and ToRatlian, 1987: 42;
C.G.R., 1986: 468; Omang
, 1986c: A23; Weinraub, 1986: A4).
However, the contras were no, in much of a hargaining position
in April and May of 1986. The contras suffered from a divided
leadership, a lack of military succps* nr>A yy 6 e s, and charges of corruption in
the use of the previous $27 million in non-lethal U.S. aid.
Moreover, the International Court of Justice was soon expected to
decide Nicaragua's case against the United States in Nicaragua's
favor and declare the contras illegal (Omang, 1986c: A23). These
factors, along with the hopeful diplomatic activity of the Contadora
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some in the state Bepart
_ ^ on capUo] ^ ^
reC0,,8ider
*"
C°" ad0
"
A
" " *—e—ive to the CODtra
strategy.
While tb. Whit e House redoubUd its efforts to posh for its
5100 miU ion co„ra aid package
, £he admini8tration , s speciai
envoy to Central Africa, Ambassador P hi l ip Habib," spent
. week „
*-i trying to 8et the three contra factions to for. a .ore
cooperative, civilian-run organization. Success here coal, hoth
enhance the centres' credibility on Capitol Hill and improve tbeir
canoes for a place in national reconciliation taUs i„ Nicaragua „
the Contadora Act ware signed. However, Ambassador Hahih soon foundh—lf the center of controversy. On Hay 22, Representative daC
Kemp ( R-NY) called on President Reag an to fire Hahih, charg ing that
the career diplomat was selling out hoth the centres and U.S.
interests (Omang, 1986e; Omang, 1986f).
The controversy stemmed fro. a letter hy Hahih to a member of
confess dated April 11 that explained U.S. aid to the centres would
cease "on signature" of a verifiable agreement honored hy
Hicaragua. Although the letter had cieared the proper channels in
the State Department, Kemp and other contra policy supporters
interpreted it to mean a threat to U.S. policy, which had stressed
the continuation of contra aid until after Hicaraguan compliance
with any peace treaty could he verified. Asserting that Nicaragua
would not honor any agreement, Kemp went so far aa to charge that
Habib's letter had "potentially set the stage for a new Central
American Yalta." On the other hand, liberals in congress
-and
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r-
- effort „ danage CODtrol>
^^ ^InterScan Af £airE
, Ellioct Abraffi8
_
ooted ^^^^
«i—, ta Bablb but explained that HaMb . s utter BM
and .. lmprecise ,, Ihe vord ,. impUnentation „ ^^
used inste ad of -, ignature „ (Ctaang
_ i9g6fi ^^^^ i986: ^
and Tokatlian, 1987: 42-43).
The controversy gaVe further evidence of deep ^
tb. Ministration over U.S. polioy
. crucial ti« f„ ^ peace
P-cess. i„ fact> the cortrover£y ^ ^^ ^^
fencing between th. State Department and the Defense
_
the posaibility ana iapHcatios of the s igning of the Conta.ora
Act. On Kay 20, the lUZLMxkJUMUL Published the d et ails of .
Defense Department study that, a s the fl* headline put it,
"...Predicts Big war If Latins Sign PeaC e Accord" (Gelb. 1986 : A4)
.
The Pentagon study questioned whether Nicarsgua „oul d ever comply
with the Contador a Act ana speculated that if the Act were sig„ed
ana Nicaragua then violated it for three years, "an effective
containment program „oul d require "a protracted con-icent" of at
least 100,000 O.S. troops and up to $8.5 billion a year. The State
Department, which had prepare,! its own stu dy
19
on the costs of
verifying the Act's provisions throughout Central America,
immediately challenged the stud y and stated that it was "an internal
study written under contract" and had "no standing a s a U.S.
Government document." Fred C. Ikle, the conservative Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the sponsor of the Pentagon's
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e
?
~J-« thi , charge as .,plaiD „rong „ (0mang> 1986c:A23
0~»g. 1986d: A35; Gwertzmen, 1986: Al
,
A5).
The elarrusm of the p„
* ana the conservative
backlash over Habib's role both revealed and contributed to a
certain momentum for the. r,oo,-~
. ,
""""
— the
Contadora Act seem both possible end l ike l y bv mid Miy y - ay. Why els
would the conservatives go to such l Pn ^le gths to discredit the Act'
CO"ad0ra
^
S
" * * H,^^ oo May M . She
aUc spo,e of T.lt . and raised ^^ ^ ^
compliance. The Contadora Act shoulH Ka a c d be opposed because
••[cJommunists don't comply:"
be neg ot iated7
a
rJ P::4T iioerA^Jr 118"" e-M
The strong conservative opposition to the Contadora Act closed off
the more terete dip, oma ti c track of the State Department. The
Reagan administrate could not give the Contadora Act a chance to
work.
However, vhile the debate in the United States focused on
prospects for Nicaraguan compliance, the other Central American
states faced other realities that affected the outcome of the peace
process. Each of the five states had indicated its willingness to
sign the Act, yet as the June 6 deadline approached outside
pressures and domestic politics led to important obstacles. In
Honduras, the government may have begun to feel U.S. pressure not to
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Honduran domestic opinion uas divided concerning B contra
POUC,
.anar.Uy, most Hondurans £hared ^^^^ ^ ^
-
. 0£ araed contras Uft on Honduran ^ ^ ^^
-Snea. Xhe Contad0M Act ^ e ^ provision
of
centres. In „ Salvador> pre£ident faced ^
-u tary intent 0„ continuing t0 proaecute the cou„ £er .in8urgency
Mr D
- S
-
In C°"' ««.. • signifies change of
government brought Oscar Ari.c qjC i
" " a6 Sancl,ez to P°"« on May 8. President
Arias h ad c^iued hiMelf to fnlfilUng his canpaign pr0ffiiae6 of
"Storing real Costa Rican neutrality in the Nicareguan end
Salvador conflict, and working for peace in the region. President
Arias' new foreign policy direction, including his public opposition
to support for the contras and his decision to close the contra
camps remaining in Costa Rica, 20 began the weakening of the
Tegucigalpa Group triangle, leaving El Salvador end Honduras alone
in clear alignment with U.S. policy toward the region. Xnstead,
Arias joined Guatemala-. President Cerezo in the neutral middle
ground between El Salvador and Honduras on the one hand end
Nicaragua on the other. Relations between Washington and San Jose
cooled (LaMoyne, 1986b: A3; Hopfensperger, 1986; Arias, 1991; Garc it
and ComaViz, 1989: 34; Werner, 1986: 73; C.G.R., 1986: 469).
This realignment of Costa Rica may have contributed to the
alarm of U.S. conservatives over the Contadora Act's prospects,
especially as a special summit meeting approached between all five
Central American presidents at the end of May. But, despite the
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fears of U.S. conservatives Cost* R-i -, a lca s renewed neutrality did not
necessarily ffiean it would automatically side with
.
l Sl Wl Nicaragua against
Unrted States, as th
. presidential 8unmit would shou
.
The Centra! American presidential «uMit vas called and
organized by C.tffl,,, President^ ^ , ^ ^
»» inhere! initiatives the previous danuary. On May 25 and 26
». "ve Centra! presidente ^ ^
t- both the Contadora act and a propoEal by PresideDt Cere2o
to create a Centra! African parHament that he hoped could spur a
- intention e ffort among t be five Btate8
. withou£ ^
five presidents were free to speak franhly and 8 et to snow each
other's positions in a more intimate setting. Ihis vas the „„,
time Presidents Cerezo, Arias, Ascona, Puarte, and Ortega met viti
each other; significantly, it would not he the last.
By the end of their summit, the presidents had agreed in
Principle to Cerezo's proposal for a regional parliament and agreed
to meet again at E 6(!uipulas within a year. However, they were not
ahle to resolve their remaining differences on the Contadora Act.
ft fact, the summit meeting included an apparently rather lively
discussioo of the legitimacy of Nicaragua's 1984 elections and the
government's democratic credentials since the imposition of a state
of emergency in October 1985. 21 The issue of democratization was a
new one for the peace process raised by Arias; national
reconciliation was another raised by both Arias and Azcona. Both
issues opened up discussion of the "Political Commitments" in the
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Conors Ac t that had been cons;dered finauzed
_ ^ ^
C0"i,K
' — - o f the June ,
deadline from the Contadora Group in orderP l t0 carry out further
negotiations on the stiU outstanding issue8 of arffis^
verification, and no. nation, reconciliation
1986: 10; Weiner, 1986: 73; C.G.R., 1986 . 469 . B _. «o. ^oy } agley and Tokatlian,
1987: 44; Garcia and Goma'riz, 1989 : 34).
0= the day after the sumit c]osed> ,
^
Contadora's Technic Croup opened in Panama in . last ffiinute effort
to negotiate closure for the Conta<jora ^ ^ ^^^
(on «ay 27), Nicaragua 0ffer6d „ _ controi proposai ^^
the deadlock on this issue." Vet the diplomats „ere unable to
resolve the disparate positions of the Central Americana.
Significant^, there vas further evidence of the break-up of the
Tegucigalpa Group as Costa Pica joined Guatemala and Nicaragua in
seeking to end international military maneuvers. Moreover, El
Salvador joined Guatemala and Nicaragua in opposing limits on
national militia forces (Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 44). The
impasse prevailed, and the self-imposed June 6 deadline arrived
without a signature.
Yet the Contadora Group persisted. On June 6 it unexpectedly
offered a third
-and what it called its final- draft of the
Contadora Act to the Central Americans and vowed to continue its
mediation efforts. Rather than try to resolve the divisive arms
control issues before signature, the new draft called instead for a
second process of arms control negotiations to begin after the Act
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entered into fore* ti,~ ace. The new Act specified the stages that second
P-esa should tak e „ great detail." The _^ ^^
^ the i^iate suspension
„ f .„ ^
" region but pennitted their resumption u ^^^
to reach any agreement i„ the „„ arm6 control negotl.t
P-ess. The June 6 Draft
_^ ^
verification, induding a latin American secretariate, an
International Corps of Xnspectors. and an Advisor, Bod y to help the
Vesication and Control Co.ission for Security Matters discharge
its responsibilities and to facilitate „t communication between the
mission and the Centra! American states. The fnnctions of these
bodies and of the Verification and Control Cession itself were
also spelled out in great detail. The considerable care taKen in
elaborating the verification provisions reflected the Contadora
Group's attempt to address Dasf- it <?u p st U.S. objections to this aspect of
the Contadora Act and incorporate the State Department's
recommendations 25 i„ these matters. Most of the other provisions of
the Act remained the same as the previous September 1985 draft,
including an immediate end to the support of "irregular forces" and
a dismantling of their bases (Contadora Act, 1986; Contadora Act,
1985; Ford, 1986: 9; Bagley and Tokatlian, 1987: 44-45; Goodfellow,
1987: 154).
Within a week, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras had
rejected the third version of the Contadora Act. All three states
cited problems with the verification provisions of the Act, but the
open-ended arms control issue was also an important factor.
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Guatemala, howpvor
3
n e e , remained open to the new version aand stressed
;
ts continued suppo
- f
- * ~ Guatemalan Fore . n
—«« "ario Qui„onea reaffimed cQuntry , s _ ^
7
isted that u K°uid
-* - - »«
- or group
its part, the Nicaraguan government announced its
willingness to accept the new version of the Art-0t ct on June 20. While
th. new Act „as more favoraHe to Nicaragua ^ ^
draft, Nicaragua „as Un questionah> y^ fcy ^ ^ ^
the U.S. House of Representees on centre aid. That vote yas
held on dune 26. and ln . drMatic reyersal ^ ^
fro. the previous Kerch, the House narrowly approved President
Reagan's^lCO mill ion centre aid re,uest. The Senete would soon
follow. 26 Within a E0nth , s t .mej paipabu hopes ^ ^ ^
a Contadora agreement was within reach had given wav to a renewal of
the contra war. The Contedora process suffered its nost severe
b low.
From Contadora to Esquipulas:
The Arias Plan and the Esquipulas II "Agreement
Despite the serious setback to the peace process presented by
the contra aid vote, the Contadora Group and the Support Group
characteristically vowed to continue their work. Goodfellow (1987:
154-155) notes that immediately following the House vote, Contadora
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negotiators at the UN commented stoicallv th . ry at Contadora had
"^reached the end of = ~ua chapter, „ot the of itswork- „,
the Contadora Group and the Support Group, which had be rr> mcn n gun to act as
one and were increasingly referred to as the »Grn * „•cn oup of Eight "
P—ted in their mediation efforts. At his juration on A„guat
' ~
C0l00bian
Baroo Vargas, ur6 ed that
the Gontadora atates revive the ataUed taUa. The other seven
Contadora presidents.
.„ in attei,da
_,^ ^ ^
At the end of Ootoher. the senior deputy foreign ministers of the
Croup of^Eight met in Hexico CUy to discuss £taned^
P-cess. 7 In it. NoveKber ^ ^ ^ ^
Passed a declaration recog ni 2 ing the Gontadora Group's efforts and
offered the support of the OAS in the search for peace. In
December, border incidents between Nicaragua and Honduras as a
result of the stepped-up contra war led to the formation of a
mission of diplomats fro. the Group of Eight, the UN, and the OAS to
tour the five Central American capitals and try to reanimate the
peace process. This effort, combined with the political fall-out
fro. the first revelations of the Iran-Contra scandal in November,
led to a series of meetings between December 1986 and April 1987 in
which the Contadora Act was again discussed. However, the same
difficulties in reaching a final agreement remained: Arms control,
verification, and now internal democratization and national
reconciliations all stood in the way of finalizing the Contadora
Act, especially in light of the escalating contra war ("Meeting of
the Contadora Group," 1986: A6 ; Garc/a and ComaViz, 1989: 34-35).
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i es to
of 1986 and int0 I987 uere leading to a transformatio]i ^ ^
process. The Contadora phase of the Cental a •me tra As,ericai
, peace proce£s
-
<.ra„ ing to a close. The escaU ting contra Mr addcd
. „„
urg enc y to resolving the regional conflicts, and
scandal
.as heg inni„g to undermine „ >g-^^ ^^
However, whi le these reaHties presented certain oppertnniti,
Gr°UP
°
f Ei8ht
"
the C— 1 found the Contadora
Process hopelessly stalemated. Guat e„ala-s President Cereso and
Costa Rica's President Arias had beP un to look f„o g or alternative paths
to peace since their respective inaugurations. Indeed
, this
urging new phase of the regional peace process can be traced to
Cerezo's impromptu su^it with has colleagues at his January 1986
inauguration. Working separately at first, Cerezo and Arias looked
for a truly C^l A*^, initiative to resolve their
violent conflicte (Solis, 1991). m ear]y 1987
, Cerezo ^
holding a second Central African presidential summit
. as had been
agreed at Esquipulas in May 1 986, to accelerate the rotation of a
Central American parliament that could revive regional
integrationism and cooperation. At the same time, Arias was
preparing a text that he hoped could be the basis of a new regional
agreement. The so-called "Arias Plan" was made pub 1 ic on Feburary
15, 1987.
The formal document was entitled "A Time for Peace: Procedure
for Establishing a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America." It
was presented to the presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, and El
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a 1991
""""
~" <° - '«< «« «. occassio, ln .
—View, President Arias expuined that he
a
^>
alone m Managua n,-f«„ud . Ortega was not orieinallv a •g y aS ainst the plan
though he later aired some opposition « , , ,S1Cl
-
E1 Salvador and Honduras
originally had many reservations tk. . The presidents agreed to study
^ " «il the second presidential
~ at EsquiPulas tentatively scheduled for late May 19S 7 (Arias
,
1991; Kinaer, 1987: A16).
President Arias'
"Procedure" w kvss based on the philosophy that
democratization and national reconciHations hy the Central
Americans themselves. Arias viewed the Contadora Act as being
flawed because it was too "ambitious" and "complex" in its g oal of
reducing and balancing the region's armed forces. Moreover, the
Contadora project
.as "exotic," comiag not fro, the Central
Americans but from other Lafin •n t American countries, some of vhose
democratic credentials vera weak. "How could countries like Mexico
and Panama teach us about democracy, liberty, and peace in Centra.
America?" After waiting to see what might become of the Contadora
process i„ the wake of the 5100 million contra aid vote. Arias
decided at the end of 1986 that the time was ripe for preparing a
Cestrfll twxium peace plan from a country that m have democratic
credientials. Rather than the question of regional arms control,
the Arias Plan emphasized democracy as a condition for peace and
peace as a condition for development (Arias, 1991).
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~ -— recoKil,tira!bl(ea onpoUticai amestiee ^
betUee
" ""™ -— o PPositions eroups
"~—
*
- — *»PPcsed to create
.
these objectives and oversee their „compliance within each country
^e second point called for Mediate cease fires between
beUiserant groops io ts. COUDtries ^ ^
_ ^
^estic political dialog hega „. The third ^^^
dealt with degradation thron g h the liftiag of censorship and
other controls on free political dehate as well as the grantee of
free elections acoordi„g t0 the constitutiona] ^ ^
country. The plan a , 6 o incited a provision for eventual reg ion-
"ide Sections to a regi onal parliament as proposed by Pre£ident
Cerezo.
Point five called on the Central Africa* states to ask outside
states to suspend their respective
.Hitary aid program to the
region. Thxs petition, along with another askxng the region's
irregular forces to abstain fro, receiving such aid, was to occur
simultaneously with the signing of the Procedure. The sixth point
obliged each Central American country to prohibit the use of its
territory by groups seeking to destabilize neighboring states.
Point seven called for negotiations on regional arms control in the
spirit of Contadora to begin sixty days after the signing of the
Procedure. Points eight and nine focused on the issues of
verification and evaluation of compliance with the agreement. Point
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nine
s ix
e m
•** —a
. Foll
_ p COTmittee conpMed ^
' - * » - «. as Bell as the foreign minister£ ^
- «~P of Eight countries to ov_ coffipliMce^National Commissions for Reconcile-onciliation Md Dialogue). Point
cane, for a feting of thfi
^^^^^
of signing the agreeMnt £o ^^^^ ^^ ^
imPlene" iD8
• "» "«1 Point „.,.„ tor future
economic ana cuUura! agents aimed at prMoting regiOTa]
oevelopment a„a stressea tbat t„. point> ^ ^
"for, a harmonious ana invisible whole" ( "PIa££diai£at£ . . . .
„
1987a: 423-426).
The unexpectea appearance of thi . _^ ^^^
reactions. Presiaent Arias 6aid that his ^.^ a
great aeal of support fro, throughout Latin Africa. Including th.
Contadora countries (Aries, 1991). Indeed> at tbeir AprH 19e7
meeting, the Group of Eig ht .roisters aeciaea to tabU further
consideration of the thira Contadora Act until the, knew the results
of the second su^it of Central American presidents at Escuipulas
which was now scheduled for June 25-26, 1987 (Garcia ana Gor.ariz,
1989: 36). Arias founa the reaction fron, inos t of Western Europe to
be n,ore skeptical, given the EC's previous support of Contaaora,
"ana of course Mrs. Thatcher was totally again8t if (Ari a s, 1991).
Reaction in the United States was also mised. On the one hana
,
Congress responded favorably with the Senate's vote of 97-1 to
enaorse the peace plan in
-id-March. Or the other hana, officials
in the Reagan Administration either ninimiaed the significance of
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Is on
«• or critici^ it for not maMng sufficient^
«.«K« (Sciolino, 1987: AU)
. Choosing ^^
President Arias 8tated t „. t he^ ^^ ^^^^
reaction to be "support through exhortation that was not .L sincere.
...-ic.il, the, kept trying to unaermine my effort8 „ (ArU ,
1991).
Ib. Keasao saministration's pressures on Arias
.ft„ March I98?
-luaed a slowdown in the disbursement of economic aia
.he,,
approved by Congress,"
. aelay in appointing
. _ ^
San Jose, ana the position of restrictions on some of Costa Rica's
-ports. Moreover, in a June visit to Washington, Presiaent Arias
ana a close advisor were given "a severe 65-minute lecture on his
-stakes" by top White House ana aaministration officials (Vol™,
1987: 5). The aaministration also pressurea the other Central
American presidents to oppose any plan that aia not meet U.S. views
ana security interests in the region. Ambassador Habib personally
delivered this message in a tour of Central American capitals in mid-
dune, soon before the second Esquipulas summit. In the wake of this
tour, President Duarte asked the other Central American presidents
for a last minute postponement of the summit. Despite initial
objections from Nicaragua and Costa Rica, it was finally agreed to
postpone the summit until August 6-7 and to hold a meeting of
foreign ministers at the end of July or early August to prepare for
it. There were also reports that contra leaaers wantea to attena
the summit ana that the Reagan aaministration supportea the iaea.
However, top officials from both Costa Rica ana Guatemala rejected
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^5iAriM>1991;Honey andAvirgan> 1987: 220 .22i;Rin2ei ^
Pear,
.988: Al.AU;
"Costa Rica I. Different," 1 988)
.
despite Duarte's folding under pressure> BMci co£t ^^
P-tige in the region> Washington's pressures 00 the other^
Wrican presidents prove, to he counterproductive. Vol™ („„.„
notes that hoth Ar ias and Cere2c^
_ ^^
-dependent positions fro. Hashington. Even ^ ^ ^
moving aBay fr„ it8 pro .Kashington stance
_ ^ ^ ^^
the Reagan administration's position had veasened considerah ly in
the vake of the Iran-Contra congressional hearings and the fai.ure
of the contras to achieve a„y serious miHtary successes with their
5100 „1U„ doners. In
. la£t ninute to ^
outcome of the Centra! American su™it, President Reagan and House
Speaker Jim Wright offerprf t-h*i~ „g ttered heir own peace plan for the region on
August 4 (Lemoyne, 1987a: A7)
. After such a hard line position for
so long, the Reagan-Wright plan was a mixed signal that surprised
and confounded the Central American leaders; but it did not deter
them. (Arias, 1991; Solis, 1991; Bendana, 1990; Torres, 1990).
The Esquipulas II summit meeting was tense (Arias, 1991).
Diplomatic aides at the meeting and other observers said it opened
with the presidents arguing and trading insults, but then they got
down to work (Bendana, 1990; Solis, 1991; Sarti, 1990). The foreign
ministers presented the presidents with a report of their work at
their meetings on August 3-4. The report identified the approved
points, the disapproved points, and the points for further
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d— very tm points _ already ^^^^ aimogt ^ f^
- «- other two categ0ries
. Arias said thia trouMed becauge
he saw that an agreement vould be difficult to1CU 0 reach
- Nevertheless,
the presidents were flKl 0ab e to resolve many of their differences ^
began to build a consensus. Aries
"forced" the., tCM " m to continue the
-tin, until the, f0u„d agreement on the remaini„g issues, the
-st troubling issues had to do with the timing of certain
Provisions and the question of
"simultaneity" as veil as
verification. Arias said he revered a tactic FrankHn Koosevelt
reportedly used and tried to use it at Fsquipulas: He tried to
to consult with their home governments, thus undermining the
consensus reached thus far. Nevertheless, there was a break in the
-eting after 2:00 a.m., but it soon resumed and a final agreement
was reached by 4:00 a.m. on August 7, 1987 (Arias, 1991).
The Esquipulas II Procedure for Establishing a Firm and Lasting
Peace in Central America differed somewhat from Arias' original
Plan, reflecting the bargaining that had taken place between the
presidents; however, its basic outline remained the same. After
invoking various documents produced by the Contadora process
(including the June 1986 Act) as its guides, the Esquipulas II
Procedure contains eleven points plus a brief section entitled
"Final Dispositions." As in the original plan, the first point
addresses "National Reconcilation," however it deals with the
sections on "Dialogue" and "Amnesty" in reverse order and adds a
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third and expanded section spelling out thpe composition and internal
verifxcation
responsibilities of the "Na t ! n *n ional Reconciliation
Commissions." The spm^ • _ .econd point is re titled
"Exhortation for
Cessation of Hostilities" and urges thos.e governments facing armed
insurgencies to takp *naU necessary actions" to reach a cease fire
within a constitutional framework."
thira ana fourth points of the Es quipulas „ Precede
continue to aaaress
^ocratiaation" ana "Fre e Elections"
-actively, but see of the woraing U changed
. The
now "commit themselves to n.,cK ci push for an authentic democratic,
Pl"ali"iC
-
Md '""^"^ P-ess" that inches
for television, raaio ana the press as well as full freea on of
speech, assess. a nd campaigning for political parties. A new
Paragraph aaas that
.„ states of exception shou,a he end ea an d full
contitutional guarantees shoula be reestahl ishea
. There are only a
few minor changes with reparH f-^ t-uS g d to the paragraphs on free elections,
however there is a new paragraph snecifv^,, ^ , ,g r p ying the need for the Central
American governments to ratify a treatv on ,u t<-±±y d y the formation of the
regional parliament before elections for it can be held.
Points five and seven differ markedly in their wording from the
Arias Plan while point six ("Non-Use of Territory to Attack Other
States) remains virtually the same. Point five ("Cessation of Aid
to Irregular Forces or Insurrectional Movements") calls on the five
Central American governments to seek an end to all outside military,
logistical, financial and propagandist ic aid to the region's
irregular forces and insurgent groups. An important exception is to
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• i- *» oUtside aid for £he peaceful resem
_ t ^ ^
- ^ fo rces or groups
. pcint sevec ^ cQmpUteiy^ ^
—„. ..e8OEiatl0ns on Security> Verification>^ ^dArms Control" specifically calls for th.y i-an t e continuation of
negotiations on the 1986 Contadora Act's securitvy provisions as well
as the means for disarming the reeion'c8 g s irregular forces willing to
lay down their arms.
The last four points of the Esquipulas II Procedure are
significantly different from the Arias Plan Tnri
'
I° an entirely new
provision, point eight addresses the protection Aun and eventual
repatriati oo of .. Re fug ees a„d Displaced Persons." The provision
focusin8 oo regional economic developnent ^ cooperatiM^ ^
ninth point of the Procedure ("Cooperation n fl nc , Democracy, and Liberty
for Peace and Development") while the tenth now contains the
provisions on "International Verification and Follow-up." The
Presidents agreed to create an International Verification and Follow-
u P Commission made up of the secretaries general of the UN and OAS,
the foreign ministers of the Group of Eight plus the foreign
ministers from the five Central American states. There was
apparently some discussion about allowing the Central Americans
alone to be responsible for verifying compliance with the Procedure,
but Nicaragua insisted on including the participation of the eight
Contadora states (Bendana, 1990).
The eleventh point was entirely new and spelled out the
"Calendar of Implementation of Commitments." It named the Central
American foreign ministers as constituting an Executive Commission
274
on
ires
,
«-t « ld begin to develop the procedures ^ ^
lmPUmenting
-Ubi. fifteen days of the
*isnin8 of the ag reenen, Ninety d ays a f tersignature (i.e..
November 7, 1987 1) t-^ i987), the key previous on amnesties, cease f .
democratization, cut-nff ne -jo of aid t0 lrreguUr (orces
_
^ bw^m ^
territory would a ll enter i„i-„ tinto force. The Interna tion a l
Verification and Follo„-up Cession „as scheduled t„ begin ^
-lysis of coEplian=e a t 1M days after 6ignature^
7) and present its report to a n,4«iP third summit meeting of the Central
American presidents at the 150 day mark (i m ty u -e., January 7, 1988). I n
its "Final Dispositions," the Procedure again stressed the
indivisibility of its provisions (
«
£ra££!iiBifia£a, .
.
.
1987b) .
The success of the Es quip„l as I! su^it seeded to surprise
everybody. After four end a half years of diplomatic hopes,
frustrations, and stalemates t-ho r^r,*- i ai , he Central Americans finally found
their own diplomatic voice and political will to answer the
Contadora Croup's original call for peace. The Esquipulas II
agreement was both literally and figuratively a procedure the war-
veary Central Americans could follow to rebuild mutual trust and to
establish internal peace processes based on the goals of national
reconciliations and democratization. Nevertheless, there still
remained a great deal to be worked out at the national levels, and
carrying out the various steps of the Esquipulas Procedure in each
country would prove to be difficult and sometimes impossible.
Although the agreement was supposed to apply to all five
Central American countries, its application to Nicaragua and to a
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PUtUC att6ntiM
- * *—a governs initiany
°™ —
.... support>
-w M80tiati0DS uitb Hanagua but refQsed ^ uy
"eir ar.s unti] democratic conditions existed in Nlcaragua
<«ann 10n, 1987a; 2A; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
f«.t ninety days Khen t„. key provision£ ^ ^
agreement vera supposed to take effect (November ?)
_
-versed Us position and agreed to begin^ ^^ ^ ^
contras through th. intermediary of ^^^^^ ^^^^^
Obnndo y Brevo. Two rounds of talks too, pl ace in December 198?
before breaking down, but Ma „agua - S recoaaitttent to tbe talks
followed in Jenuary (Robter, 1987: A19; Bennett, 1988: 1, ,4). Tbus
began tbe c 0npl ex process of interna, peeking in Nicaragua.
In El Salvador, tbe FDR-FMLN agreed to President Duarte's
invitation to begin talks soon after the signing 0 f Escuipulas II,
however it refused to accept the Esquipulas II agreement ^ „
(Mannion, 1987c: 6A • Manm'rm 1 Q«7K . n»\w mon, 1987b: 2A)
. Two meetings were held in
October but at the beginning of November the FDR-FMLN broke off the
talks to protest the killing of a human rights official (LASA, 1988:
11; LeMoyne, 1987b: A6)
. Ending the Salvadoran civil war would
prove to be a long and arduous process stretching over the next four
years. In Honduras, the most difficult parts of the Procedure to
implement would be those provisions relating to the continued use of
Honduran territory by the contras as a base of operations and the
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continued supply of aid to the contras T n r ,aS
*
I Guat^ala, the National
CUlationC°—
"nse of political vieus and £or faiHng ^ ^ ^
reCOnCiUati0n
P™ *» *— «*» by political
-We. In Msta Rica>
. Nati0Ml ReconciUation Conmission ms*~ ana unexpectedly discovered
_^ ^
-ests, lengthy detentions without triai
_ ^ other vioiati^ ^
indxvidual right,. The commission soon began to acto as an ombudsman
to address these problems ("The c t«tr.l «
«.
m Cen a American Accord...," i 987 .
A6; LASA, 1988: 8, 14, 19-20).
On danuary 15, I9M> the ^ ^
their third formal sum.it as agreed in the Es quipulas II Procedure
to receive the report of the international Commission on
Verification and Follow-up on compliance. The report was mixed.
The presidents agreed to contrnue their efforts to implement the
Esquipulas H Procedure, but they disbanded the verification
co-ission and charged the foreign ministers' Executive Commission
"ith its tasks. Nevertheless, Nicaragua asked the Group of Eight
and the secretaries general to constitute a special verifrcation
team to re-evaluate the new measures Managua agreed to make to
comply with the Esquipulas treaty (LASA, 1988: 22). That team would
continue to play an important role in Nicaragua's subsequent
domestic peace process.
An examination of next phase of the Central American peace
process as it came to focus on the internal dynamics of conflict
resolution within the individual countries (especially Nicaragua and
" is, onfortunately
, beyond the scope of th£s^
Such an axamination Bin ^ to untn ^ ^ ^
-~-t.it is i»Portant t0 aote that £uMit _ ings ^ ^
— teerican presidents „ould become occur_ es ^
l«t... of the Esquipulas „ prccedure ^ fact
_^Wic prasidantial 8umi£ry a£ter^ i98g^
-ternati onal commitments that helped ^ ^^^^^
Process o„„ard in Nlcaragua and (<) #^^ ^ ^
S P ec ifi c ally> five TOre suamit8 Det«een Pebruary I989 and
deserve brief mention as part of t-h* p • ,the Esquipulas phase of the Central
American peace process.
Central American Summitry after January 1988:
Fulfilling the Spirit of Esquipulas
After the January 1988 summit (the third f orma l summit since
the first Esquipulas meeting in May 1986), informal meetings at the
inaugurations of other civilian presidents in Ecuador, Mexico, and
Venezuela during 1988 and into 1989 allowed the Central American
presidents and their foreign ministers to maintain their regional
dialogue in the face of uncertainty and remaining obstacles (i.e.,
lack of consensus on future verification procedures and continued
U.S. pressures to undermine the viability of Esquipulas II) (Arias,
1991; Solis, 1991; Bendafia, 1990). With the continued help of the
Contadora Group states, especially the new presidents of Mexico and
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Venezuela (Carlos Salinas de Gortari an. r id Carlos Andres Pe'rez
respectively), the groundwork ^
of Central Erica's p „" S Presid ^nts on February 13-14 1989 , r
Sol, El Salvador Thi •
>
at Costa del
0 t .
m
-~* -r President
83 8 PUMlC^ "— -aragua, procesfi of
democratization and move ud th~
1990 f .
' """^
* c«"it-tWl, undated
national elections from November to February tb t,y- hus scheduling
the elections to take place within the year Mo. reover, the five
Presidents reiterated their call f„for an end to all outside aid to
the region's irregular forces and urged that all „a such groups in the
region participate in their country's national reconciliation
Presses. Signif icantly, they also agreed to haye their foreign
Hesters undertake meetings with the UN secretary
,general to find
acceptable yerification mechanisms f or the region's demil itari.t ion
CArias, 1991
, SoliSi 1Mlj Benda5a
_
i990; Ofa2o BerMies ^
Fernandez V., 1990: 282-283).
This last cogent soon bore fruit at the fifth regional
sum.it in August 1989 in Tela, Honduras. It was the first
Presidential sum.it attended by El Salyador's new President, Alfredo
Cristiani (ARENA)
,
who had succeeded Duarte earlier that su».
But Presidents Ortega and Azcona took center stage in Tela as the
two worked out agreements to bring about contra demobilUation and
an end to the contra war. 29 mdeed, the Tela meeting was one of the
-est significant of all the post-Esquipulas H summits and perhaps
of the entire Central American peace process. After years of
negotiations within the Contadora and Esquipulas phases, the fiye
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ion and
Central American leaders finally agreed to ne . ,y utral verificati
Peace keeping mechanisms focusing nn a Asm o the demobili2ation and
repatriation of the contras.
Specifically, t„o mechanisms under the «,„„" auspices of the UN and
the OAS were created at Tela. The offices of th.l t e secretaries
8en" al
°
f the
™ and 0AS «~« * ^„ati0Ml Verification
^ Support Co»i8sion (CIAV) and charged ^ administering au
tl>e detaiU reUti "S t0
"» i"Pl-«t.ti« and oversight of the
contra demobilization and repatriation tv ,. The top diplomats of the
«AV were Spaniards Francese Tofcfl , ^ Hugo ^^ ^ ^
was a ided by a UN peace ke.„:„„ teping force named ONUCA (United Nations
Organization in Centra, America), which was in8talUd in
and Nicaragua in Deceffiber ^ ^ ^
technical advisors and troops fro, Canada, West Cermany, Spain,
Brazil, Ireland, Venezuela „j r i v ,, and Colombia (Solis, 1991; Bendana,
1990; Opazo Bernales and Fernandez V., ,990: 337-341). 30 The Iela
su-it had set into motion a sig„if icant process „£ international
verification and peace keeping that facilitated the end of the
contra war.
"ore presidential snmmits folloved. A sixth regional summit in
Coronado, Costa Rica, was hastily called in December 1989 to discuss
the deteriorating situation in El Salvador. In November, the FMLN
had launched a new offensive in the capital city and government
forces responded with aerial bombardments of civilian
neighborhoods. News of the shocking murders of six Jesuit priests,
their housekeeper, and her daughter added to the urgency for
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action. The presidents urged the Salvadoran ao
to arrant
g vernment and the FMLN
3
-
-pen <.isc„ssions
; the, also sthat thn c y 0 u8gested
"
Wtl °nS
^ C- -— t0 oversee
;
the peace process inside ei—°- be slow t0 emerge;
-ve, it i8 Slgniflcant fchat ^ ^^^^^ ^what was becoming a connnon occurance
-face-to ftaCe t0" ace meetings- to
address another diffie,,!*rtlcult aspect of the regional no*peace process.
In early April 1 99n *-uI, 1990, the seventh formal summit „as held .„
Montelimar, Nicaragua. It „=, n,. ,»as the last suma.it for Presidents Ortega
-
Arias and the first for Honduras'
„e„ Preset, Hafael
Callej
- *^ «-~^e, the presidents recogn.ed and
applauded the clean February elections in Nicara.ua H •g and positive
arrangements for the peacpfnl • •e u transition of power f r0m the
Sandinista government to the win«,*„ • .ning opposition. They also asked
the United Nations to take the necessarvy steps to complete the final
demobilization of the contras in t^he coming weeks. While several
inportant issues remained unresolved, especiallv t-h1 y e continued war
in El Salvador and renewed political viol* • „ence m Guatemala, the
Montelimar summit represents a culmination of the Fs,uipulas phase
of the Central American peace process. Future regional summits,
soch as the eighth meeting in mid June 1990 in Antigua, Guatemala,
would focus on regional economic issues and hegin yet a new phase of
diplomacy for the Central Africans (Medina, 1990: 2A).
These five summits after January 1988, along with their
preparatory meetings by the region's foreign ministers, kept alive
28 1
the c.MitMnt t0 peace undertak
. presidents and top ^^^^ ^
on a more ner^n^i u • otnerP sonal basis, to speak franklvv dK r y, and to come to
—«~ each other, positions
constraiots
^las, 1991; BendaSa, N_^ ^ ^ ^ ;
-1— -l- «e Ks,uipulas phase> £he pre£idents ^^^^ a
- Public dipl omacy and ffiutual support uibeit ^ oj
POSltiV6) ™ *W ^er-st.te r el a£ions
and laid the groundwork for fntnr.t u u e regional cooperation in the
PoHtlcal and economic spheres. The regional sumit$ ^^
- portent role in keeping Nicarauga , s ^ ^ ssi^^
Peace processes on track, even if th,, a
» ose processes followed their own
dynamic s
.
Of cou.se, beyond these sumnit s, there were other important
factors at both the domestic ano international levels that
facilitated the region's internal pence processes, hut many of these
factors had a lso heeo present at the Es,uipul a s II sue.it. The
weakened Centr a l American policies of the Reagan administration in
the wak e of the Ira„-Co„tra scandal, the waning of the cold war and
proved U.S.-Soviet reletions after 1987, and the persistent
efforts of the Contadora countries in promoting the continustion of
the regionel peece process ell allowed the war-weary Central
Americans to find their own formulas for peace. Moreover, the more
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^tive role of the UN and OAS after 1989 , •
thp
9 ln facil itating the end ofe contra war ^ n,and the new role of UN Secretarv r
de Cuell, •
y General Javier PeVezellar ln mediating El Salvador's internal D
1990 we • •
etern peaC e process after^ S ^-ficant in building the confid.8 ° ence needed for peace toe-rge ln Nicaragua and „ Salvador. In a symbol
"
K .
D v ic ceremony inNicaragua on June 9, 1990 ro „iyyu, representatives of th a
, .
V6S 0 the contras formally
- " °* ~"
- —a, new President,V-etta de Chamorro, and ONUCA forces31 ( „Entrega
.
1 990:1)
* ^ Salvador, peace process
eventually shifted to the UN secretary general's of f
"
,.
y i s fice, culminating
Anally in a cease fire agreement between the P og vernment and the
FMLN guerrillas in January 19 92 WMl -uy . while the emergence of peace in
Central America would not h 3vo ka e been possible without these and other
Actors, it was the political determination and commitment of the
Central American presidents themselves that reclaimed the time for
'
peac e
Conclusion
The diplomatic stalemate that developed with the Tegucigalpa
Croup's counterproposal to the 1984 Contadora Act continued through
1985 and into 1986. The Contadora Group, joined later by the
Support Group, persisted in its attempts to mediate discussions
between the Central American states and resolve differences arising
from the region's violent conflicts. Two new versions of the
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Contadora Act were prepared and discussed how, ever the complex
security and verified™, • .location Provisions never fn,,^
million contra aid Da k
aS" e"ent
-
^
'
886 aPPr°Ved in th
*« o, 1986 was
Nevertheless, the Coot d
Pr°"SS -
eC
~" "entries vowed to continue their
d lplomacy
.
hanging political reamies ^ regiMai ^^
'
C"ated
- - -tes involved i„ the
Peace process. »e„ presidents in Cuatemala, Honduras, and
e S Pecia lly Costa Kica durmg 1,88 contributed to a new regl o„ al
dynamic. President Aria*' m~s moves not only led m t-h* uix i a to the break up of the
of the remaining contra camps on Costa Kican soil. Then at the
beg inning of 1987, Presided A,,-sident Arias presented a simpler ten-point
alternative to the stalemated Contadora Act. With the help of
Plan became a viable step toward reachi„g . regional peace
agreement. The added troubles of the Reagan administration's
Central American policies by the summer of 1987 created the
additional politics, space needed to allow the Central Americans to
find agreement at the Esquipulas II presidential summit. The
Central American presidents recommitted themselves to the Esquipulas
II Procedure over and over after 1988, thus facilitating the
continuation of the internal peace processes in Nicaragua and El
Salvador and building the foundation for greater regional
cooperation in the future.
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The Contadora phase of the Central American peace process
c-ated and supported a diploic shelter that nc permitted peace
"Us
„ Central America for over four years B t
Phase Pr :
111 the Es1"iPulas, esent arias found the way to set the Central A* •
"eir own paths to peace Lik i>
°"
PreSide " C
- - secnr ity interests in
Pursuing an active diplomacy aimed at find,l ln§ a Peaceful way out ofthe region's violent conflict. These in*
_
.
S lnterests are the focus of thefollowing chapter.
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CHAPTER VIII
COMPARING SS^S"^!™61 P°LICIES '
one
W
o f
1C
ts
1S S6t in
-otion^i parts receives a shockWe must be ready to come to ourneighbors' aid especially, as any
^sorders in those nations will
7
doubtless spread to ours."
Simon Bolivar to Francisco de. Paulat>antander, January 6-7, 1825. 1
Fro. the Cental Croup's initial ^ ^^ ^ ^
Sisnin8 of the Esqulpulas „ pr0cedure EstaMisMng a
.
^ ^
Usting Peace in Central America, the Central American peace Process
o»ers imPorta„t les$ons for of utin
and forergn polioy
. In tMs chapter> ^ co ^
»hy s« of the states involved in the peace process came to
Participate in it i„ the way that they did. Space limitations and
reliable information preclude us from examining all of the states
involved in the peace process. Thus we „iU analyze and conpare ^
particular foreign policy perspectives, interests, capacities, and
contributions (both positive and negative) of the most significant
actors in the peace process: Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia from
the Contadora Group states and Costa Rica from Central America.
Through this comparative analysis, we also hope to acqmre a general
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- -etgn pollcy naking
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Bitfcin
Restates. AUhous. 80me of our conclusioii3 be_
impressionistic than others, this studv !
.
cm y 1S intended to serve
P°in t o £ departure tor identi ty ing gaps in informa£ion ^
***** tU dtrection o f f„ture research and analysts o f
-Parative hatin Vatican diplomacy and fo rei8 n policy making.
* few 8e„era. remarks ahont the stnd y „ f Latin toerican^
nature of the literature regains lifted and, as it were,
underdeveloped. In fart-ct, lt was not until the 1970s that studies
focustng on foreign poHcies of Latin Aa.er.can states heg an to
appear. Prtor to that appearance
-and even afterwards-, the
literature on Lattn Area's internat tonal relates usually came
in the for, of diplomatic histories. Some diplomatic hrstories were
(and are) so sweeping that little could he learned ahout the fore ig „
policy making process in any one particular state (e.g., Moreno,
1°28; Rippy,
, 938; Zea
,
I960; Davis, Finan and Peek, 1977
; Boersner,
1986; Karnes, 1976). Other diplomatic htstories took the case study
approach, focusing on one particular country. This rendered some
insights into the foreign policy making behavior of some states,
such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (which have tended to be
overstudied), but it ignored other states, focused on outcomes
rather than processes, and precluded much comparative analysis or
theoretical development. Diplomatic histories of the inter-American
system have been more numerous, bnt they have tended to focus on
U.S. interests and predominance in th.
. .
l e S ystem «d/or on U.S.
-Latin
»*«- attention
r
r
r
°r Laun-Latin
— <.....-. 1967;Mecham
, 196,Connell-Smith lQfifi. r 1n '5 1966
'
C°nnell-Smith, 1974; Gil 1971. t
»
v-li, Inman, 1965-
Moreno Pino
, 1977; Kryzanek 198s- m, 5; Martz and Schoultz, 1980)
» «- and 197„s>latinAjnericabecane ^ f_ ^
nev studies rtth nore theoretica[ ^ ^^ ^
international relations To-- *•t—.. Uta Amerrca became one of several regions
lntere
"
" ith re8"d
<» "">^ th. integration experience
<*-. !*>, Haas, 1975; scatter, 1972)
. H„, ^ -
-tegrationism i„ Latin Anerica_^_ ^ ^
-PHcations for international relations theory-building and less in
the rmplications for buildlng theories abou£^ ^
Policy orientations and decision-making.
More importantly, the appearance of both the field of
cooperative foreign policy and dependency theory in the United
S-tes has had an important yet somewhat contradictory impact on the
study of Latin American foreign policy per se. Following their
increased participation in the international system, some Latin
American states were finally studied as international actors with
their own interests, capabilities, and behaviors (e.g., Bailey,
1967; Atkins, 1977; Davis and Wilson, et al, 1975; Astiz, 1969;
Fontaine and Theberge
,
eds., 1976; Cochrane, 1978; Bellman and
Rosenbaum, 1975; Ferris and Lincoln, 1984). Yet the dependent
status of Latin American states in the international system meant
that, in the end, their foreign policy choices were circumscribed.
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are so
ir
Indeed, some proponents of t-h« ahe dependency school would g0 so far as
- "Sue that most
, if not all>of ^ utin American^
dependency on the United States that there is no
.
18
° Point to studying
the foreign policy making process in t-hg m ose states because that
Process is located in Washington 2 9 knmgton. Such an understanding of
dependency theory is useless in explaining how and why the dependent
Contadora states actiyely ^ persistentiy chaiunged ^^ ^Central America £or such . prolo„gued^ ^ ^^ ^
- »»y the highly dependent minis£ates ^ ^^ _
and ca„ ied through~their _ ^^
The most dynamic and insightful students of Lat . n Amer . can
foreign policy have been the Lati„
^ ^
"70. and 1980s, 8ignificant theoreticai ^ conparative 8tudias ^
foreig n policies of Latin states ^ ^ ^ ^^
America and have contributed a great deal ^ understanding
role" that Latin America has been playing in ^.^^
in the past few dec ades (Drekon ja-Kornat end Tokatlian, 1983
; Maira,
1.. 1985; Munoz, 1980; Munos, ed.
, 1988; Puig , ed. , 1984; Parma,
'
»85; Tomassini, 1975; and many others). Jndeed, as we have seen in
Chapter IV, there has been a significant growth in the number of
Latin African research institutes and "think tanks" devoted to the
study of Latin America's international relations parallelling the
increased foreign policy activism of a number of Latin American
states. The studies produced by Latin American researchers have
focused on the nature of dependency3 and its implications for both
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domestic and foreign policy. However thp K, ey have also developed thestudy of such concepts a* "w ,?' s heterodoxica, autonomy" (Puig> „„,
Perxpheral autonomy" (Jaguaribe, 1979) and "b •
,
' argaining power"
'Btojistw ia%) (Aftalion 1975) „•„,..
. „
'
UlthlD a
»* dependency.
Such studies suggest that there are degrees of den Ha pendency and hence
reciprocal degrees of autonomy that a state uy n c might exercise. The
—
ions „„ depend on the nature and degree or its dependency in
the international system The more active states in the
international system give evidence of enjoying relatively more
Gonzalez G. (1984- AAA 1 „ ».U3OT
- notes that to as<?PQ Csess the room for maneuver
and bargaining power
-or relative autonomy- of a medium power, It
^ best to study the patterns of action in its foreign policy rather
than to try to evaluate the bases of power that sustain it.
Latin American students of international relations have also
shown a marked interest in the concept of "complex interdependence"
developed by Kechane and Nye (1977), Keohane (1984), and
-any others
<aee e.g., Tokatlian, 1,83). Although it is often acre illicit
than explicit, this interest seems related to two issues relevant to
Latin America's foreign relations. On the one hand, understanding
interdependence a.ong first world states means understanding better
the nature of the contemporary international system, which is
necessary for any state in formulating its foreign policy
realistically. On the other hand, if even first world states
experience sensitivities and vulnerabilities towards each other and
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exercise varying degrees of ™5 a power in differenf icet lss "e areas at
Srent^ »"— interdependence and
interdependent fir« world
.
tat6S beCOmes attenuated and relative,depending on the issue area t . .
and the k-* "PablUtieS (
— •«« variahUa)
„f those states
*«. has important iffipUcations ^ dependent £[ates ^ L^ in
8SPire
^
U
-^— - W «. ran. o£
—~nt. The distance to appears ^^^^ ^
states can already Mercian reUtive autonomy approaching ^ o£
-e £itsC Borld 6tates
.
Moreover, if dependent Utin ^erinan
states cooperate with each other and poo! their resonrces in a
Particular issue area, they aight he able to exercise a still
greater degree of power or relate autonomy vis-a-vis first world
^ates. These hypotheses see, to underlie the research of Latin
American writers who have Stained both . theoretica[ ^
Practical interest in Latin American regional cooperation
("asmauto and econo.ic integration schemes (e.g., BUar, 1985-
Maldonado, 1987; Puig, 1987). They are also shared hy those
interested in the diversif icatxon of Latin Africa's ties to Europe
and other regrons (e.g., Tanner, 1986; Van Klaveren, 1988) as
strategies for lessening the effects of dependency on the United
States and widening the range of foreign policy choices available to
Latin American states.
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Gerhard Drekon ja-Kornat (1983: 16-17) ha* •„ •U s identified a group ofstates that, in the earl 8
"
S> Sh °Wed 3 hl* h international profileand hence a marked degree of a„*8 aUt0n ° ffiy
» the" relations:3Zl1, Ar8«t«a. Mexico, and Venezuela a!
of Cuh „
8 Wlth Special
ba and the new cases of wNicaragua and Grenada. For Drekonja .
Kornat, these states, and especially the fi rst fy " l ou r, represent the
outcome 0£ an lmportant Uarning proc£ss ^ „ apprenticeship|i ^toteriC
'''
— - - P»vi0U8 three andahalf
decades and siem'fv m„gni y the emergence of a "new Latin AAmerican foreign
P0Ucy , this new £oreign poUcy behavior of utin American^ ^
marked by the following characteristics:
I'f 'w
eaUr degree of a«°non,y marked by a redefinifo relations with the United Stir** ; v- t £lnlt i°n
American state aceeots m» "
"hlch the Lati"
with Washington! Political disagreement
states"^ ac'cive'part llll't ^ Lati" A—
3. a high degree of geographical diversification of
tn,i
a
,
high
u
1^61
°
f ParticiPation in Third World forai cluding the Non-Aligned Movement; '
5. a stronger negotiating position based on bettertraining of diplomatic and technical cadres;
develop'mentT ^ °' technol°^ ^vance.ent and economic
7. a high degree of predominance of the Foreign Ministrym the formulation of foreign policy;
mist
8. increased openness to international trade, but with ita high degree of foreign debt (Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1983: 17-19).
:in
and
The high foreign debt of these L*t-4U in states is a
"vulnerability- of
Utln^—— -— hes some of the,
Pr
;
V10USly aCqUired ba
—- P^r Orekon.a-Kornat, 1983 . 19 _
YetDrek0nj*-----^
American foreign poliev"8 P°^cy „ a fact Qf international
represents the slow but clear l-ra„ «t ns format ion of the international
economic and political •31
°
rder 1Dt
° °ne in which Latin America will
Play a more dynamic, creative, and powerful role (Drekon ja-Kornat
,
1983: 22-23).
Juan G. Tokatlian (19fmU983) is more pessimistic and highly
critical of the assertion that there is anything "new" about Latin
America's foreign relations. He notes that th. ac e designations
"middle
income country" and ..mediuffi pouer „ ^ uMch _^^
- supposed to apply are po„ ly conceptual . 2ed not . ons gioss
over a country's dependent statu$ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Peculiarities of its depended role in the rnternational political
economy (..,.. tne nature and deg ree of extroversion of its economy,
the extent of control of foreign capital over the dynamic sectors of
the economy, the role of the state in capital accumulation, the
domestic distention of wealth and resources, etc.). Moreover,
Tokatlian sees no clear pattern emerging in the foreign policies of
such states or even within any particular such state. Finally, he
questions whether dependent states, no .natter how advanced, can ever
really exercise true autonomy and independence and he warns of
confusing "relative autonomy" with the real thing (Tokatlian, 1983:
175,182-183). By contrast, Juan Carlos Puig (1975/76: 10) reminds
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recent
on
This
el <
s on
a
moi
and
us that " f#- •18 possible that there exist in ,•
absolute sit„„ f -
reality
«uat lons of dependency Qr auton;)ny _„
— *«—cal discussions, the rest o£ the
"""^
- — tive
_a
"
; — -— -serine, with _^ „fdependency taken as a given Th„=. ese case stadias tend to fooa
ChrOn0l °8iCal
<* -Holes carried oat by
.
P-icular president or presrdential admiration. Thus st o£
""' ^ * - " «- hrstory genre
;
Ually
"
n
"— - "<•"
- - P-ey .king ME_.
Occassional ly
, . case study^ ^ ^^™ that have influenced some aspect of a state's foreign poHcyhOWV
"
StUdieE
°
f L" in
^reisn poHc y making at the
bureaucratic politics level are sorely lackine T
'
l "ig- In a very general
study, Ca r] os J. Moneta (1987) found that, i„ o0st cases, the
foreign P o, lcy making subsystem in La ti„ African states saffers
fro. contradictions and inadecuacies that seriously harm those
states' interests in the rnternational system He urges that the
foreign policy makrng process be nodernized) professional
i
2ed
, and
opened up
; however, he fails to provide concrete examples fro,
specific countries. By contrast, Ester Lozano de Key and Pilar
Manrlanda de Galofre published an exceptional 1982 study of the
Colombian foreign policy maki„g process that gives an interesting
look into the structure and functioning of the Colombian foreign
ministry as well as other institutions and actors that influence the
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ADOther
"P
°rta
" ™ ln *• — uterature has to d0 Bith
the recruitment process of «,
"
°
"
COU" ry 8 "Plonatic corps. Few case
—3 mention the role of academic institut;ons ^ ^ iding
-im, and training ^ ^^^
Process, so it is virtually impossible to assess the „• •sophistication
professionalise of a country's diplomats beyond Mre
and Maurlanda de Calcfre's are needed.
With this hrief loop at the literature, „ can nov turn to our
comparative analysis of the foreign policy per8pec t ives
_
capahilities, and contributions of the four most active states in
the Central American peace process from 1983 to 1986. While
recog„i 2 i„g the gap8 ;n the case £tudy uterature
_
M ^ ^
to Piece together an understanding of foreign policy ^ ^^
of these states in their diplomatic search for peace.
The Contadora Group States
General RffflflrfT
By undertaking and persisting in their efforts to build a
diplomatic framework for peace talks among the Central Americans,
the most active states making up the Contadora Group
-Mexico,
Venezuela, and Colombia ~ manifested many of the characteristics of
Gerhard Drekon ja-Kornat 's definition of the "new Latin American
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foreign policy" ( Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1983) Th
'
ese states also gave
ev.dence of exercising heterodoxical or relative ,i autonomy in
international and regional polities
.lb... •(„•,„, ' a eit 111 ™ryi»s Agrees(Purg, 1975/76; Tokatlian, 1983: 177).
-ese states share a diplomatic history
„ £^ ^ ^
-Pendent states vulnerable to the regional hegemon
B~aln in the nineteenth and toe United States in the twentieth
centuries. Moreover, their own preoccupations with internal
—MUty in toe nineteenth and mch of £he
"eant that their fore ign relates were usually pass.ve or, at most,
reactive. However, i„ the past^^ ^ ^
_ ^
country, these states hsve become
.creasingly active in regional
-d international politics. This new international active is the
-suit o f both the increased internationalization o f their economl es
as their development processes have progressed and the related need
to do a hotter joh of representing their state's interests in the
international system. Hence their continued but altered dependency
has required a more active and effective foreign policy
orientation.
Today these states are classified as Newly Industrializing
Countries (NIC). Quite different from the image of poverty-
stricken "banana republics," these states are middle income states
whose economies are being transformed by the industrialization
process. Although the peasantry, the rural economy, and traditional
exports are still important, the development strategies pursued by
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significant growth nf „^k
'long «Uh
.an„£acturi
also
S
' ^ """-traditional experts have
Er0™ ^
-tors of the economy.
of „;
eSPUe
-
y^ -— —on from the status
lesser developed country" (UC , to that of NIC, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Colombia are .rillst structurally dependent and thua
'"^ VUln"able t0 "~" «—
-
conditions. lndeed. the
"80s were particularly rough economically and facially for these
states. Th. global recessions of 1979 and 1982 led to severely
depressed reg ional trade, high unemployment, high inflation> and o£
course the crisis of debt that plag ued Latin America after 1982
Sol Line (1,88/89) and others have noted that as a result of the
oebt crisis and rts associated austerity policies, Latin America as
a whole has loat a full decade of development. More recent
observers augg est that living standards in many countries have
fallen to those of thirty years ago. It is therefore very
significant that these Contadora Group states undertook their
diplomatic mediation efforts in Central America^ the debt
crisis was well under way and maintained their efforts througout the
difficult decade of the 1980s.
These Contadora Group states share several s imilar it ies and
differences with regard to their general foreign policy orientations
and their interests in the Central American conflicts. All three
countries share a foreign policy tradition that emphasized legalism,
the principles of international law, and the Bolivaran ideal as the
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— • *°r protecting national sovereignty
_ stiu 8aiiMt^
«« tradition has cone t0 focus on natiMai economic
-tl— sovereignty
. AUhough ^^^ ^
Participation" in Drekonja .Kornat . s notion of Latin
aMlitie. to take an activ ist role in regional and international
politics in recent vpsrc tv,~ uyea s. They have shown greater political will
self-conf.dence, and the ability t0 experiffient ^ _
in dealing with each other, the United States, and other
international actors. Moreover, each has manifested aspirations for
a leadership ro le in the reg.on as well as in third world for..
The president renins present in foreign policy decision maklng
in each state, but, with the exception of Col0mbia, there seems to
have been a growing prof ess ionalization and sophistication of the
foreign ministries in the formation and implementat ion of foreign
policy as a result of this new international activism (or
"apprenticeship," to borrow Drekon ja-Kornat 's term).
With regard to their foreign policy interests in Central
America, it is significant to note that each of these Contadora
states had initiated recent apertures to Central America (and the
Caribbean), creating growing economic as well as political and
cultural interests in the region. Hence all had economic and
political tools available to coax the Central Americans along in the
peace process, at least in the beginning. With regard to the
Central American conflicts, these three Contadora states shared the
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— «« underdevelopment and soclaI^
_ ^ ^ _ ^
p„l ltical instabilUy and vioUnce> au ^
*«. that the old^ pass ^^ ^
«- ideas about exactly
_ ^ ^ on
should look l ike
. Nevertheless, a ll ejected the •reject imposition of the
East-West conflict ™ tuon the region's troubles end the related growing
-Uit-i-tU. of the isthmus from whatever quarter. Ml manifested
*
strong concern that the region's conflicts could escalate to the
Point of regionally war and further endanger their own national
security interests
—namely, the fear of h»i a1, cn r be ng drawn into such a
conflict and having to choose sides
; the stress of receiving even
-re refugees from the region, the continued stagnation of regional
trade hindering economic recovery; and so on.
Thus, at a general level, there were many similar foreign
policy reasons for these Contadora states to undertake the building
of a framework for peace talks in Central America. We can now study
each country's specific foreign policy motivations, interests, and
contributions to the Central American peace process.
Mexico
Mexico is one of the states identified by Drekon ja-Kornat as
participating in the "new Latin American foreign policy" during the
early 1980s and can even be said to be a model. However, the
country did not become such a model easily, and it is doubtful
whether it remains such today. Despite an early bid for a
leadership role in the Latin congress movement (see Chapter II),
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—
-
.««- int0
. rather defensive Md isoutioni8tic
world for most of the nineteenth ^^^^ ^
- country preoccupied wth chronic poUticai^« «n—
.,
u auo suffered the hunillatlon of a cosUy Mr^ * United States and an inperial inte_ tion witiin
— - - ty year, Indeed> MexicQ . s struggie ^ estabush ^
^end Us sovereign^ during the ^^^
""UrieS defin6S * « I*- -reign reUtions during that
period and beyond.
After the Mexican Revolution, the country's foreign poUcy
continue, to taxe second plaC e to the government's internal
Political projects, and the geopolitical real lty of neighboring an
emergent power like the United States meant that this bilateral
relationship wou.d dominate Mexico's lim.ted diplomatic agenda.
interest in regional and world politics and broaden its foreign
policy agenda. At the beginning of I960, President Adolfo Lopez
Mateos embarked upon a tour of South America. Soon thereafter,
Mexico was invited to join the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) as a founding member and joined in signing the Montevideo
Treaty in February (Rico, 1987: 122).
Mexico's new interest in regional economic integration was the
first step in the development of a more active and assertive foreign
policy. As noted in Chapter IV, during the 1960s Mexico challenged
and resisted United States' efforts to isolate Cuba from the OAS
system and, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mexico took the
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lead in negotiating a regional treaty declaring Lat- ' ay o i tin America to be
a nuclear free zone, culminating in the 1968 T , c6 n reaty of Tlatelolco
!
kU"' IM
"
337-"8=^ Mexico also
— its activisn in th. United Na£ions ^^ ^^
-ions efforts t0„ard estabUshing 6coMnic ^
Central teerica at thi8 time
_
<*stav Dla2 o rdax administrations, several yentures sere
U,,dertaken
»" ^rica, such as efforts to
urease trade rel ations> promote Mexican fa ^^
African Bank of Economic Integration (Rico, 1987= 123).
Nevertheless, Mexico's international role in the 1960s regained
cautious, lifted, and generaUy accep£ing o£ regiMai ^
international status quo (Gonzalez G.
, 1984: 447).
This role began to change significantly in the 1970s. The
stagnation of Mexico's import-substitution development Model, the
crisis of legitimacy of the political system after 1968, and the
apparent lach of interest on the part of the United States to give
Mexican exports preferential access to the protected U.S. market all
Played a role in spurring a change in Mexico's foreign policy
orientation. President Lux's EcheverriVs administration developed a
new foreign policy both in style and substance. Punctuated by a
strident nationalistic rhetoric, its main features included
strengthened political and ideological support for national
liberation movements and leftist governments in Latin America, an
explicit identification of Mexico's interests with those of the
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a New
an
and
to play a leadership ^ tuciu ^
Int"nati0nal^ "«
- «- » Assembly, and
_
T7
f
" -
- -»
- - sources o£ capital
D0lO8y
-
D"'u
"
this
- assertivene8s
, hovever>
.growing trade deficit ,,j f„ •and foreig n indebtedness in the early 1970s 5
underscored the fact nf mof Mexico s cootinned dependency and the limits
of it. objective bases of power «Wl„ G.
, 1984: 450^ 52)
After 1976, tbe Lope, Portillo administration pursued a .ore
Pragmatic and measured forergn policy without abandonning tbe desire
to Play a leadership role in regions! and tbird world fora. Tbis
administration was able to st«h,li.„abi ze the economy in the short term
^ signing an agreement with the IMF. but it also benefitted in tbe
longer term from the new discoveries and paction of petroleum at
a time when oil prices were high. Thus by 1978-1979, Mexico's
economic power bad increased, its status as a medium power was
strengthened, and its room for autonomous action in regional and
international politics was opening up as well, with Mexico's top
diplomat, Jorge Castaneda, taxing over as Foreign Minister, Mexico
sought to develop petroleum as a tool of a new foreign policy "based
on traditional principles, but adjusted to present realities"
(Gonzalez G.
,
1984- M » • , ™
,
w 456;. Mexico joined Venezuela in creating
the Program of Energy Cooperation for Central America and the
Caribbean through the Pact of San Jose" in August 1980.
Thus, as the decade of the 1980s opened, Mexico had become a
significant regional and international actor. Its general foreign
policy goals and interests were clear: Promoting national economic
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g
f
;;;
i8
;
poli
-
- *
—
~» ^ t0 this
— • —^ * country, bargaining
_ Md ^ ^
a medium power
, Mexico could dependen^ ^ ensure its
system,
:ions
t0 act with relative autonony ^
^
«el«ed goals included Baintaiaiag a uadership ^ ^ tin
^erica ana the third world „ithout jeopardizing cordiai^
»Uh the United States, diversi£ying the country , g ecoMmic
relation, with other regions of the uorld
, promQting
_ ^Ut„ AMritan cooperation, and continuing t0 defend tbfi
of international law
~especial ly those concerned with national
sovereignty, such as non-intervention and self-determination.
The new centralit y of foreign policy and Mexico's new
international activist has meant that the nature of the fore
policy making process has become ioportaat
_ president . al
leadership and initiative have reined significant in Mexico
forexgn policy process; however, since Castaneda, the Mexican
foreign minister has come to exercise a significant degree of
leadership on his own account. Indeed, many observers have credited
Bernardo Sepulveda Anor, Foreign Minister under President de la
Madrid, with a significant role in keeping the Contadora peace
process going. As an institution, the Mexican foreign ministry has
also been generally credited with developing a high level of
diplomatic sophistication and experience over the years which was
crucial to the institutionalization and functioning of the Contadora
sign
s
309
Process (Gonza'lez G.
,
1984- 466- R a i^66, B gley and Tokatlian, 1987- 24-
Valero, 1985: 131; VanKlaveren, 1985b: 42).
A
*
of 1983, Mexico had at least ei.hfg t research institutes
devoted to the study of some aspect of inrP C ° l temational relations 6
(Drekonja-Kornat and Tokatlian, 1983- 557) aim. u. Although there has been
°° 3 £udy « this question
, it u reasonaMe to hypothesize
the creation of these in£titutes ^ ^ a posUive infiuen^
on Mexico's recent foreign poUcy ac[ivism ^
^
capable diplomats to the foreign
Gonzalez G. (1987- 2'5S-9Sft >> u>B . 255 258) has noted that the increased
sophistication and expertise of the Mexico f6 ican foreign ministry have
come about primarily uith regard to ^
while accuiring the technical skiUs necessary ^^ ^
aggressive foreign economic policy continues to be a problem
Moreover, curing the 1980s, tbere bas been a tendency toward tbe
"feudali.ation" of foreign policy decision making, with politico-
diplomatic matters regaining within the foreign ministry but foreign
economic policy matters being increasingly controlled by
governmental agencies charged with internal economic and development
policies. 7 Bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles have emerged.
Nevertheless, in the context of the Central American peace process,
it is clear that by the early 1980s and after, the Mexican foreign
ministry had developed significant diplomatic skills to both
undertake and maintain its diplomatic effort.
As for its role in the Central American peace process,
participants and observers alike have agreed that Mexico's
Uade"hiP
^ dedi—— "
-ation and
Persistance of Contadnro Ct i^uuc ao a (.Talavera l qqn . r j «m1 iy90
'
Bendana, 1990; Solis,
1991; Arias Sanchez lqqi . u i
L
.
k „
'
99I> Valer0
"
1985
' "85; Karl, ,986).i e the other Contadora Group states, Mexico had
-rests at stake „ Central te„ica. since ^^
10 "*""™*> » "0' ^fore, Mexico had deHherate ly
sought to increase its economic and poHtical role in Centra!
-«ica and had consequently developed subhegemonic interests in the
"Sioo. With its e,„8io8 ., phere of influence „ ^ £uraon> Mexico
-Id not ignore the regiMal crises
_ Moreover> ^ ^ ^ e ^
between 25,000 and 35,000 re fugees from Guatemala and another 6,000
to 12,000 from E, Salvador had fled to Mexico (Meislin, 1983a:
A10). He ig htened horder tensions with Guatemala 8 were an unweicome
effect of the reg ional violence and threatened the stability of
Mexico's troubled southern state. m..s. The economic burden of caring
for these and
.ore refugees at a txme when Mexico was feeling the
first effects of the debt crisis was also a problem Disrupted
trade with Central America further contributed to a difficult
economic situation and jeopardized the prospects for economic
recovery (Van Klaveren, 1985b: 40-43, 48; Karl, 1986: 274, 277).
But a peaceful border and economic ties with Central America
were not the only interests at stake for Mexico. The government
also found itself confronted by a resurgent United States seeking to
reassert its hegemony over its traditional sphere of influence.
Wishing to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States wluch
it knew it could not win, the Mexican government was nevertheless
alarmed by the possibility that US „„i • •7 cn .S. policies toward the region
-« 1- t.
. regionali,ed Bar forcing Hexico
, at the ieast>
to choose siaes. Moreover, and unlike the United^ ^
««icM government did not perceive revoiuUon se ^ ^
as a threat. 0n the contrary, Mexico turned to its own
reVOlUtiODary hl"0ry «" defense o f the principle
of self-deter.ination as guides to its Centra! African policy.
By late 1982, the Mexican government's objectives in Centra!
America became clear: Io work t0 impede th. ^^.^ ^ _
that could lead to the
"Lebanonization" of Centra, America; to
oefend the principles of self-deter.inat.cn and non-i„terventionism;
to support the emergence of nationalist governments committed to
reforms ar^ed at eliminating the causes of the region's political
and economic crises; and to develop an alternative to D. S. policies
in Central America through a collective effort involving ether Latin
American states (Van Klaveren, 1985b: 41-42). The formation of the
Contadora Group and the development of the Contadora peace process
served these ends well.
Along with the energy of Foreign Minister Sepulveda and other
Mexican diplomats to keeping Contadora going, Mexico played an
important role in the peace process with regard to Nicaragua. Its
largely sympathetic attitude towards the Sandinista government
encouraged Managua that its interests would not be ignored, thus
keeping Managua involved in the peace process. Indeed, the
Sandinista government considered Mexico to be its most helpful and
trusted advocate in the peace process (Bendana, 1990; Talavera,
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1990). Mexico's cautious and proper relaMP ations with Guatemala
Played a role in encouraging the l.tf . -8 la ter
. continued participation
and neutrality in the peace process M P -
— t* other Central ta •
S P°Utlfi " 1
^ riCan St3teS
~ 1- clear. The meffibers
of the Tegucigalpa Group at different ti™.6 lmes exPressed some concern
-/or resentment towards what they perceived to he Mexico's
'-hegemonic interference in their affairs (Purcell, 1 985: 88 .
VOUO, 19S5: 46 ). -t maintaining g00d relatl0ns wUh Mexic; had
its benefits.
"exico had some potential economic in£luence vM centrai
A"mCanS
'
US PKSMce, joint economic
ventures, and petroleum subsidies „ ith ^ ^ ^ f
San W (Maira, 1985: 381)
. Hovever> Adol£o^^^
109) argues ttat neither Mexico nor Venecuela used their economic
tools to force
. successful conclusion to the Contsdora process,
"exreo appar ent ly bad guaranteed Nicaragua's foreign debt and became
a major aid donor in an £o ^^
greater rad ical izat ion (Karl, 1986: 275). But by late 1984 and
1985, it became clear that Mexico's own economic ana debt crises
Preclude, greater use of its economic tools to influence tbe Central
Americans. In fact. Mexico temporarily suspended petroleum supplies
to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 1984 and 1985 because they were
behind in their payments. But rather than being a "punitive"
measure again st them, the suspension va s the result of Mexico's own
economic difficulties and the short term considerations of officials
in PEMEX and the Ministry of Finance, not the Foreign Ministry.
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Nevertheless, the suspensions did cost Mpa exico some influence with
these countries and contributed to „„out an erosion of Mexico's prestige
m the region (Gonzalez G. 1987- 2SR ?sq v ,•» 58-259; Karl, 1986: 275)
ton on Mexico. ,eclining on prices ^ shrioking^
"" b gr°" inS debt wakened Mexico's internatiooa, •n l position and
^cea a more cautious foreign policy
. ^ ^
Dnltea States deteriorated markedly duri„g 1986 10 ^
further to a lower international p ro fil e (Meyer, 1987: 70-71 74-
Meyer, 1988; Minor Maerr, 1,86; Eoazilez G
.
the Be La Madrid administration remaineJ ^
for the Contadora process. Indeed, given Mexico's weakened
Position, concerts i on
,
or „ltiUt.,.l policy coordination with
other Latin African states, became more important than ever, hoth
»ith regard to Central America and the debt crisis. The Mexican
governor's interests and objectives in Central Amer lC a had not
changed; peace in Central America regained crucial to Mexico's long
tern, economic recovery and its short term national security
interests. Mexico regained committed to supporting a peaceful
resolution to the regional conflicts even if it could not find a way
to reinvigorate Contadora during the second half of 1986. Though
cautious at first, Mexico came to embrace the Arias Plan as the best
way out of Contadora's stalemate and it participated in the
International Verification and Follow-up Commission set up by the
Esquipulas Procedure. Mexico's role in the Central American peace
process was thus vindicated and its diplomatic prestige salvaged.
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VenP7. U g] a
Venezuela
„ also one o£ the states nreKoo ja-Kornat identified
as participating in the „nev Latin ^ ^
1980s. But like Mexico> ^
_ ^^ ^
Passivity in its £oreign reUtions
_ Donestic ins^ iiity
P-occupiea its ea rly governments ^ ^
economic opportunities brough t Httle interest from outsiae powers
Th. country was able to avoia the concentration of its traae with
any one ootsiae power ana also escapea incurri„g much foreig„ debt
until late in the nineteenth centnry. Occassional horaer conflicts
with its neighb ors ana the promotion of migration represent the
extent of Venezuela's forergn relations in the nineteenth century.
In the early twentieth century, the centralising dictator General
auan Vincente Gomez finally hroug ht a measure of political stability
to the country a„a promoted the aevelpment of the petroleum industry
through concessions to foreign investors. By 1926, petroleum
accounted for half of the country's export earning while North
American capital had acquired a preponderant position in the oil
industry. Nevertheless, Venezuela's foreign relations remained
limited, ana it is really not until the post Worla War II perioa
—and especially since the post 1958 democratic perioa- that
Venezuela can be saia to have a clear foreign policy orientation
(Biez Cabrera, 1984: 542-545; Boersner, 1983: 400-401).
The foreign policy principles ana orientations that aevelopea
after 1958 were foreshaaowea in the brief revolutionary junta that
first brought R<Smulo Betancourt to power from 1945 to 1947. In
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OS
to
1958, ten years after the Marcos PeVez jy, -r r Jimenez military
;r
tatorship had
~™ - ~.«.^ Gallego
"
BetanC0U
"
"d the^^xi^ UD) party returned
Pove, and
.. t Venezuela on . foreign policy course ^^ ^
PrODOte de"°CratiC~ " * -isp^e and spur national
economic development. Both themes led VenezueU out of its
traditional foreign polic y passivity and into
. more activist^
regionally and globally
. Support denQcracy .n
was both a „ttar of principle Md securUy m
and reformist Betancourt administration. The "Betancourt Doctrine"
refused recognition of governments coming to power hy force after
1959 and sought to create a hemispheric front that would oppose the
surviving military dictatorships in the region, such as the
Trujillo, Somoza, and DuvaHer dictatorships among others. The
doctrine was not initially applied to revolutionary Cuha, but as the
Castro regime moved further to the left and as it came to support
armed struggle in Venezuela, relations between the two governments
deteriorated. The Betancourt administration broke off diplomatic
relations with Cuba in 1961 and supported the 1962 vote to suspend
Cuban participation in the OAS. Despite this coincidence with 0. S.
policy, the Betancourt Doctrine rejected unilateralism and U.S.
interventionism. Betancourt protested the U.S. role in the Bay of
Pigs invasion and his successor, Rail Leoni, led the rest of Latin
America in condemning the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic. Although it was the centerpiece of Venezuela's foreign
policy throughout the 1960s, the Betancourt Doctrine lost some of
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-— - I970E and gave uay to the principu of support
233; Boersner, 1983: 404-408- r u^ Utt
»
B4ez Cabrera, 1984: 549-552).
The joint goal of promoting the nation',8 l0D S ^onomic independence
and lndustri al developBMt
other importMt ^ ^
the means to achievp if at. A measure of economic nationals and a
concerted effort by Venezuela's progressive W k-leadership to "sow the
Petroleum" i„ order t0 fiDMce the country . s industriaii2ation
Process led the state t0 seek t0 regain ^ ^^
controlled petroleum industry. The international ^ ^
new effort included Venezuela initiative t0 c„ate ^
0r8a„ i2ation of Petroleum Export . ng Countr . es (QpEc) ^^^
drew the country far outside the western hemisphere and into contact
with the oil rich states of the Middle East. This new
multilateral^ expanded into other arenas as well. During the
1960s, Venezuela played an active role in the formation and
strengthening of the Group of Seventy-Seven a„d, in 1964, became one
of the first Latin American states to become an observer
-member of
the Non-Aligned Movement. Venezuela also took an active interest in
the creation of the Andean Pact, however it delayed joining the
organization until February 1973U (Baez Cabrera, 1984: 550;
Boersner, 1983: 406-407; Atkins, 1989: 194).
Under both the Christian Democratic (COPED administration of
Rafael Caldera and the A££££ administration of Carlos Andre's Perez
in the 1970s, Venezuela's foreign policy continued along the path of
more
greater international activism. The Calder* „ •n L a administration based
its foreign policy on the notion of "international social justice"
International Economic Order. Nort„-Sout h politicE beca„e^
important than East-West nolin*..w p tics, given the period of detente
between the superpowers and a certain disillusionment with
Washington's apparent indifference towards Venezuela's development
goals. Although it did not participate in the OPEC embarg0 against
states supporting I srae l in the 1973 Yoffi Kippur ^ ^
welcome the 400% increase in petroleum prices at a time when
Venezuela's import-substitution industrialization policies had
reached their limits and new capital wag needed ^ ^
accelerate its economic development (Boersner, 1983: 407-409; Baez
Cabrera, 1984:551-553; Karl, 1986: 278-279).
Venezuela's new oil wealth in the mid 1970s gave the country's
leadership both the means and the self-confidence to exercise
greater bargaining power vis-a-vis industrialized countries and more
autonomy in its foreign policy. The Pe'rez administration continued
to play an active role in the third world demand for a New
International Economic Order and moved to increase Venezuela's
presence in the c ircum-Car ibbean region. Indeed, by the mid 1970s,
Venezuela was beginning to play a subhegemonic role in the region.
Not only were public and private Venezuelan investments in the
Caribbean and Central America increasing (Maira, 1985: 381), but
Caracas moved to extend its economic aid to the region. As early as
1974, Venezuela began a program of supplying subsidized petroleum to
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~ states ot the circu^aribbean> foreshadouing i9eo
^" of sa„W with Mexico (Kan, 1 986: 279). Also in 1974,
Venezuela implemented an a in «"d Pr°gra
"
t0 Ce""l Africa and Panamadesigned to withhold coffee •exports in order to stabilise coffee
prices (Aftalion, 1975: 549).
Venezuela's new presence in ,h.the circum-Caribbean region was
fe.t in other ways as well. The Perez administration
relations with Cuba and developed a positive relationship witb
Havana. It maintained
. cordU1 ^ ^
Torrijos and ,ed hemispheric support for Panama's position in the
canal negotiations with the United States. I t played
. role „
Preventing
.
,978 military coup in the Dominican Repuhlio end it
supported Belize in its claims against Guatemala. It collaborated
dose ly with Mexico
-the other aspiring regiona! subhegemon- i„
encouraging multilateral cooperation in Latin America and the
Caribbean aimed at increasing the region's economic and political
autonomy (Boersner, 1983: 409; Karl, 1986: 279). In short, Caracas
developed an active economic and political presence in the circum-
Caribbean region in the mid to late 1970s that tied the region's
fortunes (and misfortunes) to those of Venezuela.
Caracas also played a significant role in aiding the Nicaraguan
opposition to overthrow Anastacio Somoza. Ties between the AD and
Nicaraguan opposition leaders (such as Arturo Cruz, Ede'n Pastora and
others) as well as the old animosity for Somoza since the days of
Betancourt were important reasons for Venezuela's involvement, but
the extent of its support for the Nicaraguan opposition was
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unprecedented. ThP Pp' A .Perez adm^stration coordinated a mass . ve
SUPPly °P««ion with Panama and Costa Rica to SoKl moza s opposition.
S0Ur
" " *~ * («. !»., 280). H0V6ver
tial elections in Venecia brought t „e oPP osing Crista
0CratiC (C°m)W
" -—
. —a Campios, to power
- -«»
- -i* hin . significant (and ^
Partisan change of foreign poHc y too, shape. Concerned about his
ChrisMan Bemocratic counterparts in a post-Somoza Nlcaragua
,
Herrera Campins cooled Venezuela's support £or the Sandinistas and
conditioned Venetian economic aid to the Sand.nista government's
commitment to democrecy. Betueen 19„ and Caracas cMtinued
- Provide some ? 150 minion in credUs ^
the federation of the Ssndinista government, hut in 1981, Caracas
ended its economic aid and cut Nicaragua off from its subsidized
petroleum ostensibly „ ti , Managua paid u§ ^ ^
281). Caraces also increased its involvement with Christisn
Democratic end other opposttion forces ins.de Nic aragua. Liaise.
Herrera Cempins ceme to the a id of fellow Christian Democrat (and
personal friend) W Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador, who wa s the
sole remaining civilian in the governing junta after January 1980.
The coincidence of Herrera Cains' position towards Nicaragua
and El Salvador with that of the United States should not be taken
as evidence of a lack of autonomy on Venezuela's part, as Tokatlian
(1983: 180) suggests. Indeed, Herrera Cempins reversed his position
toward El Salvador after Duarte lost the March 1982 elections to the
right wing ARENA's ea i nq v& g i s. Moreover, Hprr Pr= r '1 e e a Campms was one of the
most outspoken critics of the U S ™ •*
-
P °SltlOD « Falkland/Malvinas
islands war. Thp m.,T-e.„ rcourse of events i„ 1 982 and the grouing
-Ui.-I-.i- of Central^ ud ^^^^^^
-
«sume a closer coordination o£ it< regional^^^fading t0 the «ex ican-Venezuelan oeclaration of September 1,82
"Sins President Keagan t0 undertake negotiations with Kicaragua and
end U.S. support t0 ..former SoaocUta ^ ^
1986: 283-284).
Herrera Campins' policy reversals do suggest, however, a lack
of institutional strength on the part of t-fc fcn he foreign ministry in the
formation of Venecia's foreign policv. Stated differently, it
appears that presidential leadership and the id iosyucrac ies of the
Person in office continue to he more important in formulating
Venezuela's foreign policy than is the foreign m i„ is try. Baez
Cahrera (1984: 553) has noted, without elahoration, that despite
havi„g developed skilled negotiators and diplomats, especially in
the field of oil politics, Venezuela has not been able to "multiply
its administrative capacities in a form corresponding to the
accelerated multiplication of its financial resources," especially
in the case of foreign policy. Moreover, Karl (1986: 280) notes
that the Venezuelan foreign ministry, "a traditionally weak
bureaucracy," had "suffered from the concentration of power in the
presidency that had occurred during the Perez years" (see also
Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 111). Herrera Campins continued to
C1
~" ^ -
- 1, PUC C0PE1 party
in carrying out his foreign poUcies
_
wilhelmy and vio (19g6! llMij> ^^juridical basis for presidential6 l ^^-^ * fo-ign policy in theVenezuelan system, but they add that th.y e constitution has also
created a significant role for f«former presidents in continuing to
shape the country's foreign policy. After iP nc leaving office, former
PreSide" S beC °" e "» £
~ Prolong^ theirleader statU8
. The president ^ ^
- -* tt or not
. in the per„ dispute fM natiMai
bought on by the ex .Presidents ,. ^ this dispute ^ ^^^^^
"Snificant in the field 0£ foreign affairs
_ Thus> unuke^
« appears that Venezuela has not yet developed
._
forergn ministry „ith . measure of institutiona] influence Qver
formulation end implementation of foreign policy. However, like
Mexico, the Venezuelan for e lgn ministry does suffer ^ ^^
problem of competition Bith other ministries the Qf
Energy and Mines> the Ministry q{^ ^
the Institute of Foreign Trade, and others) for authority over the
various spheres of Venezuela's foreign relations
.
It is also important to note that, at the societal level of
analysis (Rosenau, 1976), puhlic opinion in the Venezuelan democracy
appears to have played a role in the foreign policy orientation of
the president. At the very least, beyond party politics, public
opinion appears to set limits to the range of variation in the
country's foreign policy. Herrera Campi'ns' early Central American
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Policies dra„ heavy publlc criticisn ^ debate tM^
to Was hi„8ton and too interventiQnistic ^ ^^^^ ^ Sai^orM
Pontics. Repre S en tin8 . more conservatiye £action of christiM
»-«.*.. He„e ra Campi'ns faced a rare o£ consensus M
-tUtive., eventual even fr0E^ ^ _^ ..^^
s»xp has been the ruIe in ,„„„.,.„ foreign policy si.ce 1958
.
Thus aortic poutic. aiso Playea . rol e in £orc ing Herrera Caopina
to derate his Central American po.icies in 1982 and int0 19g3>
when campaigns for national elections ont ago under way (Karl, 1986: 282-
283; Medina, 1985: 72
, 75) . By returning t0 regional
with Mexico and the non-intervention principle, the Herrera Caupx'ns
administration found the Contadora initiative t0 be the begt
to follow in protecting Venezuelan interests in Central America.
After February 1984, the new president, Jaime Lusinchi (AD),
continued to follow a more bipartisan and pragmatic Central American
policy and played an important moderating role within Contadora
(Medina, 1985: 76; Wilhelxny and Vio, 1986: 113).
Given this confluence of factors influencing Venezuela's
foreign policy in the early to mid 1980s, the country's interests in
Contadora were as extensive as Mexico's, but they were also somewhat
more moderately stated. Like Mexico, Venezuelan economic ties to
Central America had become significant; thus the region's peace and
stability were considered important for Venezuela's economic
security, particularly in the context of deteriorating regional
trade and falling oil prices in the wake of the global recession and
13the Iran-Iraq War. Venezuela also was concerned about the
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elation could lead t0 . regi_ ide _ vene2ueu^
"-«..-. rejection of the East .Hest confUct ^ Mderiying
-ever, unlixe Mexlc0> ^ ^ _ ^
« wen as those o f the United States as exacerbating th. East .Hest
dimension of the regional conflicts Car*,u nic . acas was critical of the
Sandinistas' de.oc.atic credential, and more cool than Mexico to
Hague's concerns in the peace process. lndeed
, Nicaraguan
d.plomats involved in the peace process viewed Venecia as far less
helpful or sympathetic than Mexico (BendaSa, 1990; Torres, 1990;
Talavera, 1990). Nevertheless, Venecia did oppose the O.S. trade
embargo against Nicaragua. After Jose' Napoleon Duarte's return as
president of El Salvador after May 1984, Caracas tended to balance
Mexico's support of Nicaragua's positions with its own support of
Duarte's positions (but not necessarily those of the Onited States)
within the Contadora process. Caracas also encouraged Guatemala's
active neutrality in Contadora (Wilhelmy and Vio, 1986: 134, 1 39 -
140).
Thus, Venezuela had clear economic and political interests that
it sought to secure through its involvement in Contadora. Moreover,
Venezuela's Contadora policy was guided by the consensus principles
of regional solidarity, the peaceful
-and regional- solution of
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"sputee. non-interventronis.. self .deteraination
_ representative
—cr«„ human rights and ideologicai piurausm ^
»*-">. Us capacities and contributions t0 t „. ^
»ere lmportant and complemeDted those ^ ^Master of Poreign Affairs
_
career ^^^^^ ^
»a» recogni Z ed by international observers as playi„6 . very actiye
role in Contadora's Technical Croup „hile other
»Uh experience at multilateral consensus building have been
described as "invaluable" in Central Africa (Medina. 1,85- 82-
Karl, 1986: 278). Moreover. Venezuela broug bt its Internationa!
Prestige as a stable de.ocratic repubHc and credible regions! and
international actor to the peace process. The country's election to
the UN Security Council in 1985 for a terB fro. 19 86 to 1988 was an
indication of its continued international prestige and an lmportant
boost to its role in the peace process (Wilhelmy and Vio. 1986: 116;
Bras, 1988: 72).
Unfortunately, the economic difficulties Caracas began to face
after 1983 meant that its economic tools, especially petroleum,
became less useful than they might have been otherwise. Venezuela
could no longer use its petroleum as a bargaining tool with the
United States, and, like Mexico, it lost important leverage over the
Central Americans when it was forced to cut back its subsidized oil
sales in 1986. Yet by that time, Venezuela's economic and domestic
political situation was still better than Mexico's or Colombia's,
and it was Caracas that rose to inject new life into the stalled
peace process by sponsoring the successful Caraballeda meeting of
thfi C°"ad0ra Gr °up «< ^ p in January of 1986
<Wllhelmy
^ Vl °- 1986 = 131; .U^, 1987:95-97,
;
iMlly
'
VeneZUeU ' 6
- Colombra witMn
ad0
"
P"lUeled"™
-— such as £he debt
crisis as veil as petroleum policy with M.P exico and border conflicts
»« Cl-u. Iud eed
. Presets Lusinchi Md ^^^^ <Coionbia)
<eveloped a personal friendship that
relations and downplaye. more traditiona,
between the two countries (wiiui J „.n W lhelmy and Vxo, 1986: 137; Hazleton
1984)).
On bnUnce. Venezuela was a central p layer and moderating £orce
» the fetation a„ d contrnuation of the Centura process. However
by 1986 it was clear that Caracas was frustrate. witi the lack ot
P-gress as well as the averse economic and political situation
it faced
.
Caracas thus welcomed the signing of the Esquipulas II
Procedure and participated in the International Verification and
Follow-up CoM ission, which was based in Caracas. With this new
phase of the peace process under way, Caracas marntai„ed its
cogent to regional multilateralism and policy coordination by
agreeing with the other Contadora Group and Support Group states in
late 1986 to continue to meet periodically to discuss other issues
of common concern, such as the debt crisis (Bras, 1988:73). Yet the
economic crisis and related domestic political fall-out forced
Caracas to make the .domestic political scene the focus of its
attention. Like Mexico, Venezuela had found both the scope and the
limits of its relative autonomy in the 1980s.
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ColoT^
j n
i. u not one 0£ the states identi£ied by Drekonja _Rornat
«) as Participating in the iatin^ foreign
- «-*. in lw he concluded that Coionbia reoains^
«•«-. of the Latin Anerican mainstream ^ £oreign^^
(Drekonja-Kornat, 1984- 340) u„340). However, during the administration o£Present BeXisario Betancur ( 1 982-1986 ) > Colombian £oreign poUcy
-if«t many important changes frM Us traditionai iou_profiie
0rle"'ati0
" ^ S6emed " ^ a new regional activism
similar to Mexico's and Venezuela's.
Like Venezuela, Colombia', early aspirations of diplomatic
leadership at the time of the 0ong res s of Panama and its role iu
subsequent Latin congresses easily gave way to a preoccupation with
domestic political problems in the course of the nineteenth
century. Yet an awareness of the geopolitical importance of its
Panamanian province to any future transisthmian canal and a jealous
concern for protecting its sovereignty led Colombia to develop
skillful ways of playing off the European powers against one
another. As the United States' growing power in the circum-
Caribbean region displaced the European presence there at the end of
the nineteenth century, Colombian governments found themselves
increasingly unable to withstand Washington's bid to undertake
unilateral construction of a canal. 15 The Colombian senate's angry
rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty (1903) as being too one-sided led
Theodore Roosevelt to support a plan for a revolt that led to
Panamanian independence (Roosevelt, 1922). The traumatic
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d^er^t of Panama from Colonbu ^ NovMber ^^ ^
Sive up Us Caribbean idantity and withdrau
caribb^n^<*»U1. 1959: 249; Drekonja .Kornat> 1984; 3i7 _3i9; Vm
1985a: 158).
Washington's role in Panama , s indepeDdence brougbt about ^
strong Colomhian resentment towflrd
regionai^
<»e »° it ea States t0 repair relations ^ confensate ^^^^
for lt< loss during the wilson adminiEtration
_ culBinat . ng , n
t-rrutia-Thompson Treaty (1921/22). By this time
, Colombia's
President (and former Foreign Hinister)^ Fidei^ ^
^eloping a new attitude towards Washington that set bilateral
relations on a much more friendly course. President Snare*
summarized his new foreign policy orientation towards the United
States in the brief phrase respite P0 ,„m , or , look t0 the North
St.r." indicting Colombia willingness to be pulled into the U.S.
orbit 16 and follow U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. President
Soared dictum became the guiding principle of Colombia's forergn
policy for the next fifty years. After World War H, Colombia was a
dependable supporter of the United States in the OAS (whose first
secretary general was Colombian Alberto LLeras Camargo) and in the
UN (Colombia was the only Latin American country to send troops to
fight in Korea). However, a decade of civil war beginning in 1948,
the conservative bipartisanship of the National Front after 1958,
and a guerrilla insurgency beginning in the 1960s contributed to the
low international profile of Colombian governments (Drekon ja-Kornat
,
1984: 320-323; Atkins, 1989: 61).
» >-* *. look Co its Andean neighbQrs ^ ^^^^^ ^
And"n ^ -t*«i- Plan as
. foundlDg
member. The government also opened trade d" 00rs
'« E"ope and Asia
^hrs new trade PoHo y proved successful in diversity the
C0UDtry '8 trade P~ - ^ -ports 1 ' and created an
advantageous accumulation of international reserves to finance
development (Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1984- 326-330- v ri1
*
J/b JJ
;
an Klaveren, 1985a-
>«>• I- 19", President Alfonso Lope, Miehelsen „as reporteJly
able to turn down bilateral financial aid £ro„ ^^^
With this enhanced bargaining position during the .id 1970a
President Lope 2 Michelsen began to implement a new foreign policy
orientation that, while not as daring as that of Mexico or
Venezuela, nevertheless shared some of the same characteristics.
His administration (1974-1978) sought to distance itself fro.
Washington and expand diplomatic relations with more states around
the world, including reopening relations with Cuba in 1975. It als
Participated in the discussions for a New International Economic
Order and joined Venezuela, Costa Pica, and Panama in the "first"
Contadora Group's support for a new U.S.-Panamanian canal treaty.
LoW Michelsen's successor, President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala
(1978-1982), continued this new direction in foreign policy through
the first half of his administration. President Turbay personally
visited Yugoslavia in July 1979 to strengthen new bilateral
relations and two months later sent an observer delegation to the
Non-Aligned Movement's meeting in Havana. Moreover, the Turbay
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supported the „pollticization „ of the p^
— U,t„ recog ni2ad the SaDdlnista oppo£ition ^
anti-Somoza opposition, the Turbav ^ •y administration was taken aback
vhen the Sandinista government registered its 1claim to the San
«uti0M gre„ tense (Drekonja.Kornat> 1984; 326 _33Q;
1985: 127).
By 1981, severe! factors led the Turfcay ^^
s»e sig„ificant changes in . ts foreign poUcy oriMtation
_
Tensions vitt Kicaragua)
. deteriorating
^ ^
g ro„i„g challenge of Colombia . s guerriiu^ ^ ^
adverse effects of t„e global recession on th. county exports .„
contributed to Turbav's shift- k„„i,& y s ft back towards closer cooperation with
Washington. Relations with Cuba were suspended in March 1981,
Colombia backed off a bit from the Non-Aligned Movement, and Turbay
publicly criticized the Franco-Mexican Declaration on Central
America. Moreover, with trade falling by 12% in 1981 from the
previous year, Colombia seemed to have reached the limits of its
export-led growth strategy. The Turbay government was hardpressed
to find new markets for Colombia's exports. It was as this point
that Colombia "rediscovered" its Caribbean identity and turned to
the circum-Caribbean region as the locus of its new economic and
political aspirations (Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1984: 330-333; Van Klaveren,
1985a: 158).
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Respite Turbay's realigns with U S Bn, •l *
- P°llc y ™ the region,
la ' s exclusira f™ *
- inistrati0D -s Caribbean
Bas ln Initiative developnent prograa coropiicat^ ^
another regional oowpr i« #-»,P e xn the c ircum-Caribbean. Bogot^ moved to
develop new instruments to increase it. ,1s influence with the
governments of the rpci^n veg o , such as technical and scientific
cooperation, economic and financial .ina d, joint ventures, and
provisions of Colombian coal. In early 1982 ri w, Colombia negotiated
^ ~» into the Nassau Group, a of regional po_
of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States, aimed at better
coordination of the doers' foreign aid program in the circus-
Caribbean (Pardo Garcfa-Pena, 1988: 100). Thus accepted as the
"fifth" regional power, Colon's new Caribbean policy was paying
off. Yet its interests in regional stability and its reading of the
deteriorating situation in Central America (as well as its position
in the FalUands/Malvinas Islands conflict) continued to coincide
with those of the United States (Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 336-337;
Hoge, 1982: 6; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 130).
Such was not the case with Turbay's successor, Belisario
Betancur Cuartas, who set Colombia's foreign policy orientation in
yet a new direction. Betancur was elected on a strong platform of
peace amid the public's fears of growing political violence related
to Colombia's guerrilla groups, the government's counter-insurgency
campaign, and emergent narco-terrorism. Betancur's domestic peace
plan consisted of an amnesty for all guerrillas willing to lay down
their arms and reinin ajo a more open noHn^.iP P°Ut ^al process as well as an
effort to negotiate cease fires with m, *the four major guerrilla
r
uP£
:
This do
— — - . „ucial lnternational
—, tn order to gain the confidence of the^
to pre-empt any internationai supfort ^
-b a „ r Nicaragua __ BetMcur ^^^^ m^
—ve that sought t0 project Coiombia , s ioternationai
-
P™ peace in Central America.
with Washington
, and moved t(> improvfi reUtions ^ a
<b
" """^ '~ ~«»-*« f„„ diplomatic reIatiM£ ^
the public opposition of the Colombian miutary)
_ ^ ai£o^
ror the nation's fuU membership in the Non .AUgned Movenent> making
Colombia the one hundredth membpr «f m,taun e o the organization (Hoge, 1982:
6; Van Klaveren. 1985a» 1 Sft l 71 , -, c
>
^wa. 158, 1 73-1 75; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985: 131-132)
Moreover, Betancur sought t0 play an active ^ ^^
Africa, both by hosting the first Latin conference on debt in
Cartagena (June 1984) and by participating actiwly .„
Indeed, Betancur became Perha P s the most significant force in
transform the Contadora Group's initial call for peace into an
ongoing peace process. Bis domestic peace process depended on it.
Not only did Betancur notify Mexico and Venezuela that be
supported the 1982 Mexican-Venezuelan Declaration but he politely
admonished the two for not having included Colombia in their
consultations. After January 1983, Betancur's personal diplomacy
within Contadora won hxm strong support both at home and abroad. I„
April 1983 and again in July, Betancur played a central role in
mediating among the Central Americans to . uget them to consider
ent" inE iDt0
~" *' ^ efforts did not end
«» «•«<». the U.S. special envoy
AmbaSSad ° r RiCh"d S
— -— -tb a representative of B
S"1Vad0r '8 FDR"FMLN
"— — - Played a signrficant
»»• I" encouraging the La palma talks between presidmt^ ^
the FDR-FMLN in the fall of 198A1984, and he tried, l ess successfully,
to mediate differences between theWc Sandmista government and
opposition candidate Arf-i,^ r"a turc Cruz ln preparing for the November 1984
ejections. Unlike Mexico's readers, He did not shy may from
Publicly criticize the united states as wen ^ ^
Soviet Union for their roles in international^ and esoalating
the reg ion's conflict,, and he insisted that the Contadora Act
contain an additional protocol to he sig„ed hy all three powers
spelling out their leg al obligations to support the implementation
of the Act. Betancur's firm commitment to the peace process and his
even-handed mediation efforts contributed to the widely held
perception that he was an "honest broker" in the search for peace.
Domestically, Betancur's peace strateg y paid off with the signing of
cease fire agreements with Colombia's four guerrrlla groups in March
and August 1984 (Van Klaveren, 1985a: 160-161; Cepeda Ulloa, 1985 :
139-141, 144; Chernick, 1988: 80).
In addition to his personal prestige, Betancur had other tools
to use to encourage the Central Americans to continue along in the
peace process, thanks to the new regional aid programs developed by
the previous administration. But Betancur went further. He
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committed Colombian economic aid to Cenr , a •
.
0 tral Ame^ca through CADESCA
.Econ6ini r n y Sflgjfl] ,,],
which was created within SELA th , ucn bb rough the Contadora
Process U Member lMJ
. ^ ^ ^^ ^
ax«ce economic aid to the region in March lm that grMted
Preferences ,„ Central expo„ s ^ ^ ^
1985a: 159).
Unfortunately, by the end cf ^ ^
economy wa8 in serious trouMe
. ^
was losing lt
. economic tools t0 encomge progress .„ ^
Process. Moreover, Betancur was losing domestic support as his
domestic politics. and economic policies began t0 mmU ^ ^
serious poUtical setback was the take-over of the Palace of Justice
in November 1985 h y the M-19 guerrillas and the^^ ^
dislodge the. by the military. With the domestic peace process
discredited and the Contadora process stalemated, Betancur was
forced to moderate Colombia's aspirations for regional leadership.
The Central American peace process remained important, both to
salvaging some prestige for Colombia's foreign policy and to
deterring more guerrilla violence, but Betancur had clearly lost the
political initiative to a deteriorating domestic situation
(Chernick, 1988: 92; Cepeda Ulloa, 1986).
His successor, President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), faced
continued domestic troubles, including an increasingly bloody drug
war. However, foreign policy was not abandonned even if it took a
more pragmatic line. Barco remained committed to Contadora and
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l"er to the Esquipulas „ agreenent
_ Coioobia
'«««, in helping t0 sponsor a diaiQgue ^ PDR-FMLN and
the Salvador governiDent in ^^ ^
Contrary t0 expectations
,
Barco maintaiMd
_^«~ the unit ed states
, especially uith regard ^ ^
antl-drug strategies, and the 0iS> ve£o ^ ^^^^^^^
Development Ban,. Vet there „e re areas o£ ^
Washington, 6uch as the reestabUshment of internationai
agree.ent a„a the extradition issue. Barco also continued
Colon's participation in the Group of Eight and other Latin
German efforts at foreig n policy coordination in specific issue
areas (e.g., debt ) a£ . „ea„ s to ^
bargarnrng power. As a further
.eats to that goal. Barco set out to
refer, the country's foreign ministry (Pardo Garc ia-Pena
, 1987 and
1988; Tokatlian and Pardo, 1988).
The wobbling of Colombia's foreign policy since the mid 1970s
between its traditional lov-profile alignment with Washington and
its more recent ambition for autonomy and regional leadership is the
result of several factors, both foreign and domestic. However, the
nature of Colombia's foreign policy making subsystem, particularly
the weak institutionalization of its foreign ministry, seems to be
one of the more important factors of this variation. Colombia's
foreign policy suffers from »f rac t ional izat ion" even more than is
true in Mexico or Venezuela. For decades, Colombia's foreign
ministry has been removed from negotiating the country's
international coffee agreements, ceding to the powerful Fondo
335
an responsibly ln representing Md 8elUng
COUntry ' S eXP°" * «" ^.ti^ Mrket
. In the ute
1960s, Colombia's new trade policy vis-a-vis th« . „Vl e Andean Pact and
other regions vas supported by the creation of several state-owned
enterprises and agencies that regained outside of the foreign
ministry. Colons does not suffer fro, a lac k of or
Professionals with eXperience in „ ltilateral c0_ rcia]
out these people are generally „ ot found in the foreign ministry
(Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 337-34n- T no j t,7 340, Lozano de Rey and Marulanda de
Galofre, 1982: 91-99).
Within the foreign ministry, a paltry budget, insufficient
archival material, a lack of systematic policy analysis, and
ineffectual advisory bod.es are serious structural problems.
Efforts to fix these problems, including a program to improve the
training of diplomatic cadres with the help of France since the
1970s, have so far had limited success due to the persistence of
clientelism. These problems have further limited the participation
of the ministry in the decision-making process (Lozano de Rey and
Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 60-71, 76-77; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984:
339).
These institutional weaknesses have contributed to the
predominance of presidential initiative in Colombia's foreign
policy. Yet in addition to idiosyncratic variables, various factors
at the societal level of analysis appear to shape the president's
foreign policy agenda. Aside from the participation of the powerful
coffee and COImercial interests> Coionbia , s ^^ ^
"llitary
'~ "— *" ' — P«« » tU orientation of the
C7 r,
'
S f0r6i8n POli
- — *~ «-«.. C^U-. foreign
'
CHMS
—
C
° Refined ,deology „ of
P-nciples, giving the presideDt a^ ^
Conserves, tend not to divide^ ^^ ^ ^
*eology in foreign policy (nor in donestic pQUcy ^
but instead share
. generaUy pro.West pro_traae Mtiook
_ ^
tend to adapt their different^ ^
or rnternational circumstances, thfi . r relaUve roies ^ gove^ent
or opposition, and the „ inds of
^ ^
be seen whether the Patrioti c Union,
. new part y created by former
gnerrilla
-embers of Colombia's FARC ltaaau
ttYolucinnnnn- dn c-1
,-,,,1 h) and tbe older comnunist party> w .n
have an impact on defining the non-commercial p ri„c i ples and goals
of Colombia's foreign polio y more cle a rl y .
19
Yet this party's
interests would likely be checked b y the still subst a„cia l in£lue„ce
of pro-U.S. sectors in the country's political spectrum. Finally,
public opinion ha s tr ad ition a ll y played a very limited role in
influencing the country's foreign policy due to a general lack of
popular interest (Lozano de Rey and Marulanda de Galofre, 1982: 74-
83; Drekonja-Kornat, 1984: 339-340).
Of the three Contadora Group states studied, Colombia clearly
has the least advanced foreign policy making process. However,
Colombia has shown at various times since the late 1960s that it has
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- *««ee t ^ tak ing a mC re active ^ ^^ ^
Pursue its foreign policy interests U f .V . Unfortunately, its domestic
economic and political r r ;*F ul crises m the late 1 QftOo1980s, especially the more
-eDt energ ence of narco-terrori8n ^ ^^ ^ ^^Cart6lS
' ^ C" ated °bS— - «- "evelop.eot of the country . 6
foreign policy potential.
Dependency and KeUtive Autoncay in Central Carina:The Costa Rican Case
^e five states of Central Africa are highly dependent, with
extroverted economies that are vulnerable to international economic
conditions. Their h.story is mark ed by g reat power dominance and
intervention in their internal affairs, with Great Britain playing
the role of heg enon in .uch of the nineteenth century and the United
States playing that role in the twentieth. Central America's
history is also marked by repeated f=n^u tailed attempts to reconstitute
the ill-fated political union (the United Provinces of Central
America) that existed from 1924 to 1838 (Moreno, 1928; Lopez Mora,
1984; Karnes, 1976). The most recent attempt at regional
integration occurred through the Central American Common Market, but
this experiment resulted in increased economic dependence on the
United States and fell apart in the wake of the 1969 "Soccer War"
between El Salvador and Honduras (Nye, 1967; L<fpez Mora, 1984;
Martz, 1975). 20
With the (qualified) except.cn of Nicaragua r * ,, Central America's
;
endence on the^ st—— £ot ltseconomic
,
;°
itical
-
and
•
iiit
-—
-^^». lin„,
;
as we have seen in ch— »
-
m.
of the
ai American
°- has not alvays meant an
automatic subord in at
;
n„ *0 C
° " a"ePtan« ° f »•• Policies. Evea the
dePende
" ° f^ Wfc. have heen abIe to
idMtify th6ir
~
£
— - «- * PoHtic, space in Bhich^ can pursue those interests
. u uouU ^ gQing tM ^
«». the Central teilM states h_ abnity ^ exercise
anythin, 1*. th. relate autonomy exerclsed fcy ^^
Ut in Anetlca„ states. Indeed> ^^ ^ ^ ^
Part lac, the critical (viZ
., anti-status
,„„, perspective of
emergent regional powers l ike Mexico or Venecia, much less the
relative economic power and technical skills of snch states, to
exercise a large degree of freedom of Denver in their domestic and
foreign poHcies. As Lopez Mora (1984: 300-301) notes, the Central
American states have traditionally followed a conservative foreign
policy oriented toward supporting the international status-q uo and
O.S. leadership. Moreover, their foreign ministries suffer from a
low degree of professionalism, a high degree of clientelism, and a
high degree of subordination to the president (or other chief
executive)
.
This conservative foreign policy orientation and supremacy of
the chief executive in foreign policy decision making often make it
difficult to identity the room for maneuver a particular Central
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A"eriCa
"
" Ste
— *- ^ £oreig„ regions. A
" lnCldCnC!
^
f°reign
"
01^ a dependent
. tate and its»~ does nol mean that the dependent sute ^ ^^^
°' that Us foreig n policy positions „e dictated ^ ^
- - - uctil
. dependMt state gives ^^^^ of a ^
'he he8 eraon that one can begin to Wentify ^ assaes
^sree of political space and/or autonMy avaiUMe to ^
Guatemala gave evidence of . fair degree of fofeign^
independence fro„ Was hi„gt0„ throug h General Mej ra victores'
-eutralit, polic y after toe fall of 1983.
Cuacemala did not have the political spece available to exercise
such independence before the overthrow of Gener al Rio s Montt, or
only that Rios Montt chose cot to exerc.se euch
.dependence from
«ashi„gto„ ? El Sslvador end Honduras conld easil y he classified as
the two most dependpnt rpntr,i ae Central American states on Washington during
the 1980s, but as ve saw in Chapters VI and VII, they occass ional ly
showed some divergence from Washington's preferences in the peace
process, especially when they signed the Esquipulas II Procedure.
This suggests that they possess some (albeit a limited) degree of
xndependence in their foreign policies, even if they usually agreed
with Washington's policies. Revolutionary Nicaragua found and
sought to create more political space in which to exercise its
international (and domestic) autonomy, but it "went too far" for the
Reagan administration's interests and was forced to pay a price.
In the case of Costa Rica, 21 we find a country that seemingly
re(dis)covered a degree of autonomy that was eroding in the early
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cas e
1980s. Although Costa Rica is rathpr a , . ,e atypical of its Centralwi« neighbors in terns of its econoDic> sociai> ^ poUticai
characteristics, it provides in£eresting ussono ^ ^
policy potential of Central A™. •American states. The Costa Eican
-SSests that even a dependent country facing a serious economic
crisis can define and implement its own definitions o f national
interest and national secnr^,, au ity, despite some of Washington's
pressures to the contrary.
Unlike its troohled neighbors, Costa Rica possesses a stable
aemocracv and relatively accent living standards for its people.
The lack of a powerful landed oligarchy and two liberal reforms
Periods in the 1880s and 1920s helped to promote the early emergence
of democratic institutions. A brief civil war in 1948 brought yet
another reformer to power, socia! democrat Josi Figueres. Before
turning power back over to the winner of the 1948 elections (over
which the civil war was fought), Figueres nationalised the banks and
abolished the country's military. Without a military to feed, Costa
Xican governments after 1949 were able to invest in the country's
economic development and social welfare. By the 1970s, Costa Rica
boasted of one of the highest literacy rates in the western
hemisphere, along with excellent health care and adequate housing.
Costa Rica also had a large array of autonomous state enterprises
and institutions that comprised the country's welfare state and that
employed managers and professionals in the growing middle class
(Edelman and Kenen, 1989).
Costa Rlca - S foreign pQlicy orientation ^^ ^
—bet aloof fromits less
neighbcrsi ho_er ^
C0U,Ury Pa" iCiPate
* "» """I Common Market <CAC„>
» * T„e of the CACH after 1969
_ conbined Bith
«-
-rgence of detente betueen the u s
_ Soviet
contributed to Costa r,v,%M 8 KOVeS C°"ar° universalizing its £oreign
reUtW. In 1972> u ms fir£t ^ ^
establish diplomatic ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^
mrtiated consular relations with Cuba. Costa Rica also began to
"Pana Us relations with Europe and Japan^ ^
«. relations with the rest of Lafin
Venezuela, and ColomMa. The main reason for this new
international^ was to promote trade aad g aia access to new markets
for Costa Rica's exports, coffee and bananas. Costa Rica did not
identify Bi£h nor participate in the th . rd uorid a ^
International Economic Order and it remained outside the Non-AligD ed
Movement, although it did attend the 1979 and 1981 Non-Aligaed
meetings as an observer. It is important t0 note ^ ^
new internationalism was guided by Foreign Minister Aldo Facio, who
served two president!.! administrations for an unprecedented eight
years (Lopez Mora, 1984: 299-300; Rojas Aravena, ed., 1990: 15;
Rojas Aravena, 1990: 54; Solis, 1991).
Despite Costa Rica's diplomatic and commercial opening to the
socialist bloc and des P ite its Particular version of state
ca P italism and social welfare programs, Costa Rica identified itself
as a member of the western capitalist world. The an ti
-communist and
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Str°nSly den°CratiC
-
if leaders (including Jose
Fisue.es, who remained
. pouerful poaticai ^^^
politics until his death in 1990) 1 j rl6d C0Sta Rica to maintain a clear
alignment with the wp^ 0m i -uestern Hberal democracies. Nevertheless, Ccsta
»«. played an important roU ^ supporting ^^ ^ ^
overthrow of Anastarin c~c o Somoza. As noted elsewhere, the Carazo
administration (1978-1 Qfm „ - • •1982) participated in supplying arms to the
FSLN, allowed the FSLN to find refuge on Costa Rican soil, and
joined the rest of Latin America in opposing the United States'
-ove. in the OAS to remove Somoza without a Sandinista victory.
By 1982, the honeymoon between the Ticos and the new Sandinista
government in Nicaragua ended. Growing public disenchantment with
the course of Nicaragua's revolution was reinforced when Eden
Pastors, a previously popular figure in Costa Rica, announced his
break with the FSLN and his decision to fight Managua in April,
1982. In May, the newly inaugurated President Lui's Alberto Monge
faced the presence of growing unmoors of anti-Sandinista combatants
on Costa Rican territory. Pastora's fighters, combined with those
of another former Nicaraguan junta member, Alfonso Robelo, began
offensive military operations against Nicaragua from their bases in
Costa Rica in April, 1983, leading to serious border conflicts and
an increased sense of Costa Rican vulnerability (Edelman and Kenen,
1989: 270-271).
President Monge faced a difficult domestic and international
situation. Domestic opinion was largely against support for the
Sandinistas but it was also turning against support for the contras
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based on Costa Rican soil (Solis, 1991) Ye rt an increasingly vocal
right wing did favor support for m, 0PP the contras and the United States'
contra aid policy. Moreover lit. -v, Uke the rest of Latin America after
1982, Costa Rica found itself in th* -au, e Bld8t of a difficuU econoffi . c
— ion. The global recession gevereiy country^
led growth strategy and the nation soon faced the largest per capita
debt burden in all of Latin America. Costa Rica's welfare state was
-
crisis. Credit from private international b anks was tight, out
Walton was will lng to belp. Total bllateral flid f_ ^^
States to Costa Rica increased from $15.26 million in 1981 to $53.83
million dollars in 1982. It more than quadrupled ^
year, increasing to $218.72 million in 1983 (Solis, 1990: 39, table
1; Rojas Aravena, 1987a: 56). More aid came from the IMF. But the
flood of US and IMF aid to Costa R 1C a did not come without strings.
It was conditioned on government austerity measures, including the
privatization of the numerous autonomous state enterprises. The aid
"including security assistance- was also used to pressure the
Monge administration to support Washington's policies in Central
America. However, the costs of completely deteriorated relations
with Nicaragua were too high. It was in this context that President
Monge proclaimed Costa Rica's "active, perpetual, and unarmed
neutrality" in Central America's military conflicts and "ideological
alignment" with Washington in the region's political conflicts (see
Chapter VI).
The neutrality policy was difficult to maintain, especially
given Monge's otherwise close political and economic relations with
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BMhi"8tM thr°- h
—' "s term (Solie
, m0! 4^5)
r
ver
- Monse vas not
—^ -—gton . ;e could
«- ™ support of the Contadora Group ^ o£ ^
Europeans, thanks to the Hoe rtl6S C °Sta Rl"'° ^lous administrations
l
CUUiVated
" *^ — ac tlvely joined an o£ ^ utin
^UUvea on debt
, thus ^^ ^* ~. of Lat i„ Anerica
. Moreover> ^ tseiw^
CaPlt3lS
^
JUD€ 1984
' P"-i«. of economic and polltical
support from them as well a,s the Economic Community. I„ September,
^ hosteo the unpreceaentea conference of fore ig
„ ministers from the
«C. the Contaaora Group, and the five Central American states In San
Jos^ (Asenjo, 1985a: 310-3111 ti311). This conference has been callea "the
-st important manifestation of extrarenal support receivea h y
the Contaaora Group" (Asenjo, 1985a: 311). It „as also very
important support for Monge's neutrality policy. But as the
Contaaora process developed its stalemate in 1985, Monge founa it
harder to maintain Costa Rican neutrality. Conversely, Monge's
participation in the Tegucigalpa Group helped to prolong Contadora's
diplomatic stalemate.
Despite the difficult balancing act between Washington and
Contadora, the neutrality policy had the support of the vast
majority of Ticos (Solxs, 1991). I n Fe5ruary 1986j the Costg Ricans
ratified their support of neutrality by voting for another member of
Monge's National Liberation Party, Oscar Arias, to succeed him.
Arias had campaigned on a platform of "peace and neutrality", and
his significant electoral victory22 gave him the support to carry it
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out (Rojas Aravena, 1986: 311-312- Kn ; aRojas Aravena, 1987b: 283-285)w months of hi8 _gurationj tociose _ ^
J
1 C °Dtra CamPS ^— on C OSta Rlca 's northern
border with Nicaragua. Soon after that as k
> ^ have seen in Chapter
VII, President Arias began to develop his plan fi n or peace in Central
America.
- b e
achallengetotheUnUedstates(Arias
_
i99i ^
»t-f o f the Koreign „inistry
, Ws GuiUerao SoUs
_
vent on co
-PUi. tUt the peace plan's conceptual design
_ ^ ^^
U.S. options
-nor for that matter Nicaragua , s ._^ ^ ^
xt did ended up doing so. The plan was also not .
.ejection of
Contadora per se. The Arias P lan »vas a specific^ fcy^
to propose a negotiated way out and guaran[ee democratic
stability in an international context of great diplomatic stalemate"
(Solis, !,„,. Arias and his advisors c<;sta Rica . s ^ MtioMi
security at staRe. Vulnerable to the region's vroleot conflicts,
but unwilling to give up Dearly four decades of denocratic
without a military, diplomacy was Costa Rrca's only means to secure
the country's interests. Moreover, peace in Central America was
necessary not only to protect the country's territorial integrity
and political stability; it was also necessary for the country's
long term economic recovery.
The economic and political pressures that the Reagan
administration placed on Costa Rica, both after Arias presented his
peace plan and after the signing of the Esquipulas II agreement,
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end
S.
reasons
are
were diffiml*rr cult, especially in light of n,A the country's continued
-•"-»
- -*« «-s. But those
- - After the signing of ^^^^ a ^
;
is tera
- Arias
—
> - cPP „£ed further „.
-Hitary aid to the contras in order for ,„the Pea« process in
Nicaragua to proceed t„« d. In response> the Reagan adm . n .nstrat . on couid
-t appear to be too hostile toward Arias considering the
international presti^P n,o r u • „.•«„. that hrs drplomatic success had hrought him
"e 1987
»ri..). Beyond thrs. the
explaining why Arias was able t-„» to move beyond Monge's neutrality
Policy and accomplish what the Contadora process could not
Pursue what he saw as being in Costa R.ca's nations, interests
Whether that conflicted with Washington's interests or not. On
the other hand, the wearing of the U.S. position as a result of
the Iran-contra scandal and President Reagan's iame-duck perrod may
have reopened the political space Arias needed to assert his
country's interests. It is likely that both idiosyncratic
differences and this changed international context 23 played
important roles in Arias' ability to move beyond Honge's cautious
and sometimes contradictory neutrality policy.
Costa Rica's foreign policy experience in the early to mid
1980s suggests that other factors are also important in defining the
country's foreign policy orientation and implementing its policies.
The president and his top advisors continue to be predominant in
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^ - eow foreign policy _ AccordingtoW£Gunierao
P0UCy Und
"
—"on. Structurally> the £oreign
"1,,1Stry C°" inUeS
» ^ *—
—ancracy vith liBlted
professional exDPrf,^. jP " lSe and cUenteli.*. Yet the
emergence of international
'
relatlo»* Programs at Costa Rioa's
-varsities in tbe I9,s, including the SchooJ ^
Relations at the ^O,^,^, in Beredia> ^ ^
5 8reat
"
PreParati
°"
-
- -fessiona! diplomatic cadres
-
«» fut-r.. Lai's CuiHermo Solis is an sample of the country's
growing ability to connect the ac.d»™,v ,a emic analysis of international
relations to government service. 24
The country's two major political parties seemed to have
developed clear and distinct fcrign policy orientations daring the
l«0s. The positive side of this difference is that voters had a
dear choice in the 1986 national elections, the negative side is
that bipartisanship in foreign policy was not possible, at least
"ith regard to Centra, America. The center-right
SgCja1 Cn>fi n n i (PUSC)
— ^ to block Monge's constitutional
amendment on neutrality in the congress from early 1984 to the end
of his term. It has also blocked ratification of the agreement to
create a Central African parliament as envisioned by Guatemala's
President Cerezo.
Beyond the party structures, public opinion plays an important
role in Costa Rica's foreign policy. It provided one of the brakes
on President Mongers slide towards Washington when an increasingly
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~ ^—
-
-Uc opinion then
supported Monge's 8„he 0 „8 S subsequent neutrality policv t n
u , ,
POi y. In Costa Rica'sbSalthy d
—
•
-— -a the ,,eace and
— candidate a. reelected
. M adBinistration m6
-P- «— t ec0D0Bic 8ituation> aithQugh uter ^
administration An- »c"on, rias came under some public critic *F 1C iticism for paying
DUCh atteDtiM
"
£
— •«.'«" - not enough t0 the
economic crisis. UnIik e Me
xicoandColonbia>inCos£aRica)the
— of the pubHc's interest flnd participatiM ^^ poUcyU
-ativeXy high, yet there persisu a aioofness
isolationist* 8entIment to„ard ^ ^ ^^
-ir problems, the Ticos
reason ^ ^^ ^
the,, stable and peaceful democracy when cropared e „ ^ tragic
violence cf their neighbors.
Sunmary
By analyzing the £oreign poUcies of four q£ ^
involved in the Centra! American peace process, we have found that
each of them acted not out of some altruistic or idealistic
commitment to peace. All had real national security interests at
stake in the region. All were concerned about the effects of the
region's wars on their own political and economic stability. All
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had
——— t,y could use to keep thepeaceProcess goi„g . A11 £ace<j 4„ .
their DO
C Cri88S that
" P °Wer C ° ««• their interests
_
'
yec
"*a-th the possible
exceptlon Gf President Monge
.
. t
3 those crises did notdeter them from persist- . •P sisting xn their diplomatic effort, n •
.
r LXC rt s. Despite thefrustations and the obstacles the f
'
f0rei
^ D P ol
-y -king system8 ofthese states found the politicP litical space and kept it open for the
diplomacy of peace.
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1. From Lecuna and Bierck (1951: 463).
2. Such>u a position was held by several Mn uAmericanists, including rIi!! ? well-known Latin
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(198A: 453 "454) n°teS that betw-n 1970a 197 exico s trade deficit increased from one billion tothree billion dollars while its foreign debt grew from four totwenty billion dollars. Foreshadowing what was to come in the
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Gua temalan government whose army was apparentlyolved m some way in the attack. The Guatemalan governmentdenied any connection between its army and the raid. The twogovernments tried to resolve the conflict and Mexico decidel toroove the estimated 46,000 refugees to new camps in the Yucatan(Van Klaveren, 1985: 48; Karl, 1986: 274).
In 1986, Mexico's foreign debt had reached $100 billion whileincome from its petroleum exports had fallen to $8 billion,
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between 1982 and 1987, Mexico payed
?73 billion dollars m interest on its foreign debt withoutbeing able to lower the amount of the principle (Meyer, 1988:
The deteriorating bilateral relationship between Mexico and theUnited States included increasingly vocal criticism by the
Reagan administration of Mexico's political system and U.S.
Ambassador John Gavin's close relations with Mexico's
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' teiS'S^r'S" Df laratio. (1982) „as . Utter from"exican President Lopez Portillo and Venezuelan PresidentHerrera Camp ins to President Reagan expressing concern a the
lit ^ Sr°Ving "iii^rization and tension between
^ '/J NlCara8" a - 11 — ^ted September 7, 1982 SeeChapter V for more on the context of the letter.
13. Venezuela's economic crisis began to emerge in 1983, vithf,Uing petroluem exports and prices as well as declining non-
120 121
UYT, tS "LiMMM^ debt (Wilh*lmy and Vio?i986:- ; Wilhelmy, 1987: 87-94).
It was Venezuela that persuaded the other Contadora states toimpose the deadline of June 6, 1986, for the signing of thethird Contadora Act. S
I**/?? be6n Started iD the 18808 h y s Fr *nch companyheaded by Ferdinand de Lesseps, but bankruptcy and other
Problems brought construction to an end in 1889 with only onethird of the canal completed.
16. Between 1913 and 1929, U.S. investment in Colombia increased by
almost thirteen thousand percent while U. S.
-Colomb ian tradequintupled (Drekon ja-Kornat , ] 984: 320-321).
17. By 1976-1978, the European Common Market bought 32.8% of
Colombia's exports, thus surpassing the United States (32.7%)
as the principle destination of the country's exports. Exports
to Latin America more than doubled between 1961-63 (6.5%) and
1976-78 (13.2%). In 1974, coffee accounted for only 44% of
Colombians exports, although by 1980 it was back up to 59.5%.
Colombia's other exports included hydrocarbons, agricultural
products, flowers, textiles, fungicides, cement, paper, and
other products. Drekon ja-Kornat (1984: 326, 333) cites the
Banco de la fieptifr) k-fl and the Inter-American Development Bank,
as the source of the trade statistics.
18. Colombia had been able to avoid incurring much debt since the
late 1960s due to its successful trade strategy and its healthy
14.
15.
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international reserves; despite Colombia's good credit ratin*the Latin American debt crisis made new credit hard to r ind
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The government successfullyhe I F and instead sought to combine regionalintegration (i.e. the Andean Pact) with export promotion to
IMF was
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This successful challenge to the
wMch Bet"
1"POrt8
:! P-Cede°t symbolizing Colombian autonomyhic ancur could not ignore (Drekon ja-Kornat
, 1984: 325-Van Klaveren, 1985a: 163). '
Betancur began to implement his own "austerity measures "by slashing the government budget, restricting imports fromits Andean and Central American neighbors, devaluing its
currency gradually, and opening the country up to foreigndirect investment. These policies vere costly at both thedomestic and international levels (Van Klaveren, 1985a: 163-
165). Then, in October 1984, it was discovered that aColombian delegation in Washington had been secretly meeting
with the IMF to discuss the terms of a possible loan
agreement. The ensuing domestic criticism signaled the end ofBetancur's political honeymoon. As one observer put it, "it
was the end of autonomy in the economic field Foreign policy
was left without any economic support" (Cepeda Ulloa, 1986:
210). For more on Colombia's 1966 disagreement with the IMF,
see the essay by Richard L. Maulin in Ferguson (1972).
19. In 1 986 and again in 1990, the Union Patriot
?
V f (UP)
participated in national elections and won several seats either
alone or in alliance with the Liberal party. According to
Chernick (1988: 86) the FARC used the existing political
machinery of the Colombian communist party to form the UP.
Unlike the M-19 guerrillas, the FARC continued to honor its
cease fire agreement achieved during Betancur's peace process.
20. Despite a history of parochial elite jealousies and the more
recent emergence of popular nationalisms that have prevented
effective political and/or economic integration, a Central
American identity persists in the region. An example of the
persistence of this somewhat supranational identity is that the
automobile license plates and many other official stamps in the
region state the country name as well as "Centroam^rica " (e.g.,
"Costa Rica, Centroame'r ica") .
oolicv maw-
Central American countries' foreign
nov Tn] LvTtoT
i0DS 6trUCt—
'
Unfortunate^, for
present^ laterel°t?° T ^ C ° 8ta * ica > which
potential nf\! C? ! 8 lessons about the foreign policy
however ^ Zolllll of Co JaY*
6
*
•
^ ° f
.
this
«
Uestion
>
spent a total „f f •
103 18 m0re direct after having
January 1991 do" ^
Weeks there ( in June 1990 «d
are richer lilt I
™ a 8 forei8n Policy in the 1980sthan my sources for Guatemala.
Arias won the election bv 52 V/ tr, a'/ - • i_ •
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nd^PUS^ (PUSC) . (R°^ S A™> IWbVSlf ° ^ frona d the USC were perceived as being anti-Contadora and anti-
! ^
e PDSC ^d blocked Mongers effort to pass aconstitutional amendment making permanent neutrality the law ofthe land since the end of 1983. In its formal 1986 campaignPlatform, the PUSC Prpgrmfl de Go^. TT] n critiqued Monge's
neutrality policy by arguing that
-permanent neutrality is notsynonymous with peace but in reality is a synonym fordefenselessness, which provokes abuse and leads to violenceIt critiqued Contadora as weakening the inter-American system,
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°Ur nation '" (Rojas Aravena,iyot). JUy-310). Elsewhere Rojas Aravena (1987b: 284) notesthat this victory for the National Liberation Party (PLN) brokethe tradition of alternation in power of these two principalpolitical parties.
It should also be noted that by 1987, other important changesin the international context included the emergence of
political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union after
Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. The new orientation
of the USSR may have encouraged Arias and the other Central
American leaders to believe that Moscow was not or was no
longer the regional threat that was once believed.
Luis Guillermo Solis is both an academic and served as one of
Arias' top advisors in the position of Chief of Staff ( Jefe dp
Cabinet? ) of the Foreign Ministry, which has both
administrative and political functions (Solis, 1991). After
leaving the foreign ministry in 1990, Solis returned to
academia and teaches at both the National University in Heredia
and the University of Costa Rica outside of San Jose7 . The
School of International Relations at Costa Rica's National
University publishes a fine trimestral journal, Relaciones
InternacionalPE.
Arias was also said to have gotten a "big head" once he won the
Nobel Peace Prize.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1988
The Central American peace process from 1983 to 1988 was the
result of a variety of historical and contextual political factors:
The Bolivaran tradition of Latin solidarity in the face of perceived
threats to security; the historical weakness of the inter-American
system's formal mechanisms of conflict resolution and the breakdown
of the OAS; the deepening of civil and interstate violence in
Central America; the increased diplomatic activism and relative
autonomy of emerging Latin American regional powers; the reemergence
of the cold war and the resurgence of U.S. claims to hegemony in the
circum-Caribbean region. All these factors came together in the
early 1980s in such a way that the four Contadora Group states,
moved by concerns for their own interests and stability as well as
their desire to play a larger international role, undertook an
active experiment in multilateral diplomacy that unfolded and
persisted for well over four years.
This Latin American diplomatic response to civil and interstate
conflicts in Central America evolved into an ongoing peace process
that sought to promote peace and cooperation in Central America.
The Contadora phase of this peace process provided an informal but
persistent mechanism of mediation for the Central American states
that allowed them to undertake and maintain joint discussions on
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their most difficult political, soc io-economic
. and security
conflicts. The Contadora peace process ultimately came to focus on
the negotiation of an ambitious demilitarization of the region
through a complex arms reduction and arms control regime. Unable to
find an acceptable formula for achieving and verifying such
demilitarization while still guaranteeing the security of the
Central American states, particularly in light of continued military
assistance programs and pressures from states outside of the
isthmian region, the Contadora process gave way to a new peace
initiative originating from within Central America itself that
ultimately answered the Contadora Group's original call for peace
between the Central American states. The Esquipulas II agreement
was a less ambitious but still highly significant step towards
achieving peace and cooperation in Central America.
The Central American peace process we have analyzed should be
understood as one ongoing process with two phases, the Contadora
phase and the Esquipulas phase. The Contadora phase created the
diplomatic space from which the Esquipulas phase emerged. Indeed,
it is unlikely that the Esquipulas summits of May 1986 and August
1987 could have occurred at all had it not been for the previous
diplomatic work of the Contadora states. The Contadora Group and
later the Support Group were able to place and keep the possibility
of regional peace and detente on the agenda of the Central American
states. Moreover, the ongoing meetings and informal contacts
established between the Central American diplomats during the
Contadora phase proved to be important opportunities for coming to
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understand each others' political realities and positions (Talavera,
1990). Unfortunately, the Central American diplomats were limited
in what they could accomplish during the Contadora phase given the
difficult positions of their presidents and the complex economic,
Political, and military contexts these dependent states faced at the
ti*e. At the very least, Contadora's persistent mediation efforts
helped to diffuse the more serious border incidents that threatened
to trigger a wider regional war; at most, Contadora facilitated the
emergence of proposals from Guatemala's President CereZ0 and Costa
Rica's President Arias to gather all five Central American
presidents together at Esquipulas, Guatemala, to find their own way
out of the political conflicts that divided them.
In this study, we have sought to examine the emergence and
development of the Contadora and Esquipulas phases of the Central
American peace process as case studies that shed light on the
interests, capabilities, and limits of contemporary Latin American
diplomacy and foreign policy. It is only by understanding those
interests, capabilities, and limits that one can explain the
persistence of the Contadora Group's efforts to mediate peace talks
and demilitarization among the Central American states. We have
sought to investigate the emergence, persistence, and meaning of the
Contadora process as both a Latin American political response to
disfavored U.S. policies in Central America as well as a
manifestation of the new diplomatic activism, multilateralism, and
relative autonomy increasingly found in the foreign policy
strategies of leading Latin American states. Finally, we have also
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tried to understand the effects of thi* a- iS 0t ls diplomacy on the Central
American states themselves as they Dasspd ,-v,n p e through one of the most
violent decades of their troubled history.
The Contadora Group states (Mexico, Venecia, Colombia, and
Panama) persisted in their diplomatic efforts because it was in
their interests to do so. These states needed peace and cooperation
in Central America in order to protect their economic interests in
the face of the global recession and the debt crisis that plagued
Latin American economies during the 1980s. These economic interests
-eluded the need to re-inv lg orate inter-regional trade and protect
the recent investments of the Contadora Group states in Central
America as well as the requirement for debt relief while billions
were spent for war. More importantly, the Contadora Group states
had significant political interests at stake. Their new leadership
roles and sub-hegemonic interests in the c ircum-Car ibbean region
were challenged by the active reassertion of U.S. hegemony in the
region. The unilateral and militaristic policies developed by
Washington in its traditional sphere of influence along with its
reintroduction of cold war logic conflicted with the Contadora
Group's prescriptions for promoting regional stability and claims to
regional leadership. Indeed, the United States' hegemonic
resurgence and its policies toward Central America during the 1980s
upset the distribution of power and authority that had evolved there
in the previous decades as the Contadora Group states developed
their own sub-hegemonic presence, interests, and diplomatic activism
in the region.
While these economic and political irn-o »P interests gave the Contadora
Group states the political will to persist «„«..• , •m their mediation
efforts, their diploic skiUs and foreign poUcy activ^ ^
rKMt 8aVe the "Hbiliti^ to sustain tbeir regional
diplomacy, despite the serious stalemates among the Centra!
Americans that developed along the way. The diplomatic
"apprenticeship" the Contadora states undertook since the 1950s and
1960s as their economies hecame increasingly internationalized
provided them with a cadre of diplomats experienced in complex
multilateral neget ia t ions
.
The complexity of the Contadora Act for
Peace and Cooperation in Central America, particularly the security
and verification provisions, attests to the sophistication and
seriousness the Contadora diplomats brought to their work.
Moreover, their growing economic and political contacts with Central
America in the 1960s and 1970s as their foreign policy strategies
became increasingly active gave the Contadora Group states
significant influence and useful tools to help keep the Central
American states involved in the peace process.
By 1985 the difficult economic and debt crises had placed clear
limits on the economic tools available to the Contadora states while
U.S. military and economic aid packages to the region continued to
increase. Nevertheless, by that time the Contadora diplomats had
built a solid framework for regional negotiations and the mediation
of bilateral conflicts that even the OAS deferred to. But
throughout the Contadora phase of the peace process, it was clear
that by pooling their diplomatic resources and complementary
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Politic*! lnfluence among the Central WlfiM^ ^
Roup's mul ti lateralism in and of ifcself a significant
Political tool t0 offset the unilateral power of the United States
- the xsthmus. In this sensej the stalemate deveioped
the Central Americans during the Contadora phase of the peace
Process was in many ways a stalemate hetween the United States and
the Contadora Group states over the relative capabilities of each to
shape the outcome of the regional crises. The Contadora Croup
became a counterpoise to the United States and the Contadora
framework created the diplomatic space for the Central Africans to
consider finding their own way out of their conflicts.
The condor, Phnpp iQ8W 987- s„„.~ or Fai- 1llTO?
The Contadora phase of the Central American peace process has
been judged a "failure of diplomacy" by Bagley (1986) and most other
observers. This assessment is based on the fact that no version of
the Contadora Act was ever signed by the five Central American
states. But seeing through the finalization of a Contadora peace
treaty among the Central Americans became a goal of the Contadora
Group only after the Central Americans agreed to the Norms for
Implementation of the Document of Objectives in January 1984. One
year earlier, in its original call for peace in Central America, the
Contadora Group simply called on the Central Americans to find some
way of resolving their domestic and international conflicts
peacefully. There is no clear evidence that the Contadora Group
states set out from the very beginning to set up an ongoing peace
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process and oversee the negotiation ^^ ^ ^ ^.^ ^
agreement
.
The Contadora peace process developed slowly. It was not mM
the Cancan Summit in July 1983, six months after the original call
for peace, that the Contadora Group presidents committed themselves
to offering their good offices and to playing the role of mediator
to facilitate talks among the Central Americans. This commitment
came about only after the Central Americans had indicated their
interest in holding such talks. The Document of Objectives of
September 1983, which the Central Americans helped to draft,
formally identified the fundamental problems that would have to be
addressed while the Norms for Implementation created the blueprint
for future negotiations aimed at developing a regional treaty.
Given its modest beginnings, the fact that the Contadora process
developed and persisted as it did for over four years is an
important diplomatic success for the Contadora Group states,
especially considering the obstacles and frustrations they faced at
nearly every turn as the peace process developed. Indeed, these
obstacles and frustrations propelled the Contadora process onward.
Not only did the diplomacy of the Contadora Group succeed in
getting the Central Americans to talk to each other; it also played
a significant and successful role in mediating border tensions in
the region. These mediation efforts helped to prevent border
incidents related to the U. S.
-supported contra war from escalating
into full-scale war between Nicaragua and its neighbors. This fact
should not be underestimated. The border incidents were widely
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fUSh POi" 6 ««" a larger re.iona! „ar
trigger a fuU U.S. military intervention. The ^
Support Group's statements from the Cartagena Communique to the
CsrahaUena Message clear ly expressed this concern. „ igh-ranKing
diplomats fro. Nicarag „a, such as dose ledn Talavera and Alejandro
Bendaffa, and froD Costa Rica, snch as Ws Guin«r» Soils, have
stated in interviews that thev belipv* fhoi-ney D e e the mam contribution and
success of the Contadora process was tn ^o deter and prevent the United
States fro, launching a full-scale military intervention in Central
America (Talavera, 1990; Bendana, 1990; Solis, 1991). Whether
Contadora actually did help deter any possible intervention or not
is less important than the fact that this was an apparently widely
held belief among those involved in the peace process.
Another supposed failure of the Contadora process is that it
did not directly involve the United States, wh.ch was after all one
of the major players in the region's conflicts. Echoing the
Kissinger Commission's view, by failing to involve the United
States, it is argued that the Contadora process was doomed to
failure. One variation of this argument is that the Contadora Group
(and later the Support Group) neglected to lobby the U.S. congress
sufficiently and thus could not temper U.S. policy toward Central
America (Aguilar Zinser, 1988: 108). These points seem to have
validity until one looks closely at the principles and underlying
logic of the Contadora process and the foreign policy orientation of
the Contadora Group states. At least four inter-related principles
guiding the Contadora process both explain and necessitated (from
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Centra's perspective, tb. exclusion of the United States ^ ^
peace talks:
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UCh 3 peace Process would haveee s unwieldy as it was improbable. The Contadora Group
if o h?" r t0 the * l °hal East-West conflict
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xt^s ug t only to get the Cental Am. ri>^ talking to each
2. Regional Solution to Regional Problems: This idea wasthe most important underlying principle of the Contadoraprocess, and it appears over and over in the Contadoradocuments. It flows logically from Contadora's rejection oft e East-West Conflict and defines the Central American"
with the help of the Contadora Group states, as the exclusive
set of regional" actors able to resolve the isthmian crisesleaving the United States on the outside. It asserts that byworking together, Latin American states
-including the weak
states of Central America- can resolve their own problems
without the interference of non-regional states. This ideais also the contemporary reiteration of the old Bolivaran
themes of Latin solidarity and mutual support in the face offoreign interference.
3. Relative Foreign Policy Autonomy: Although this
notion was not explicitly stated in any of the Contadora
documents, it clearly guided the work of the Contadora
Group and is related to the previous idea. It asserts
that even dependent states lying within the traditional
sphere of influence of a world power have some degree of
autonomy in their foreign policy decisions. Such states
have only to look for it and use it. In other words,
sovereign states, even dependent ones, are capable of
resolving their problems and do not have to ask the
permission of the hegemon to follow a particular foreign
policy or undertake a particular diplomatic initiative.
Dependent states still have a range of foreign policy
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lnte
^T
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i ir
26 ^ 3CtUal ° r P° tenti^ interventiony th ited States m Central America (or by the CentralAmericans in each other's internal affairs), It alsorequired the Contadora Group states not to interfere in
Thl\ ? l
ltlCS
^ ^ bUt the m0St diplomatic of ways.e U.S. congress knew of the Contadora process, whichdid have some influence on congressional debates on contraaid. The Contadora process was also known at leastto the attentive public in the U.S. and its existence hadsome effect on public opinion. Moreover, the Contadorapresidents and diplomats did seek to persuade the Reagan
administration to give the peace process a chance to workbut were rebuffed by administration hard-liners more than'
once. Of course, the Contadora Group was sometimes
perceived as interfering in the domestic affairs of theCentral American states, particularly through its attempt to
seek an end to civil wars and promote respect for politicalpluralism and human rights in El Salvador and Nicarauga, butthe Contadora Group states apparently did not see those
efforts as interference, only mediation.
The first three of these principles guiding the Contadora peace
process explain why the Contadora Group did not seek to involve the
U.S. directly in the peace process; the fourth principle explains
why the Contadora Group (and Support Group) did not become heavily
involved in lobbying Capitol Hill. The logic of the Cont-pdora
Process wag to fogUS On the Central Amerira n s themselves and tn
epcpurage
.
them
. tP find their own wav of r esolvin
r their cnnflirr. .
The Contadora process sought to open a political space in which the
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Centra! Anericans couU choose d . piomacy ^ ^
erecting a fra.ewort £or negotiations, the Contadora Group ensured
that the Centra! Americans had other foreign po l icy „ptions £rom
which to choose.
As for the Central Africans, the fact that they could not
agree on any of the three versions of the Contadora Act is due to a
number of reasons. Susan Purcell (1985) has argued that some of the
Central Americans resented pressure from the Contadora Group to hold
negotiations and sign a peace agreement. While it is clear that
former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Volio resented Contadora, the
evidence among the other Central Americans is inconclusive.
Occasionally all of the Central American states expressed some
dissatisfaction with the Contadora process; but all remained
involved in it and no one forced them to participate. Moreover, the
Central American states were able to use the peace process to
further their foreign policy interests and objectives.
For example, Nicaragua was able to neutralize some of the
Reagan administration's ant i-Sand inis t a rhetoric and gain some
international support through its participation in Contadora. It
was also able to ensure some of its interests within the peace
process by threatening to withdraw from it. Honduras was able to
extract more aid from the United States by manipulating its
commitment to the peace process, as it did after General Alvarez
Martinez was ousted in the spring of 1984. It also faced the
difficult question of what would become of the thousands of contras
based in the country if a regional peace agreement were reached.
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Costa ElC a could not afford to withdraw fro, the Contadora process
given its own internationa! reputation as a peace-loving nation and
President Kongo's difficulty in maintaining the neutrality policy.
Guatemala's participation in the peace process facilitated first the
military government's and then President Cerezo's attempts to
reverse Guatemala's international isolation and improve its
international reputation. Finally, the peace process offered
President Duarte some room to maneuver against the Salvadoran
military's goal of total victory in the civil war and against U.S.
pressures for the same.
Put simply, there were important reasons for each of the
Central American states to participate in the Contadora peace
process. All had interests to protect and none wanted to be blamed
for its failure. Yet (with the possible exception of Guatemala) all
of the Central American states were being pressured in opposing
directions by the Contadora Group and Support Group on the one hand
and by U.S. policies on the other. Instead, led by Presidents
Cerezo and Arias, the five states found the diplomatic space opened
by the Contadora process and a changing international context to
fashion their own procedure for peace and cooperation in Central
Amer ic a
.
The EsQuipulfls Phase. 1986 -1988 and Bpyon rl
Emerging from within the Contadora process, the beginning of
the Esquipulas phase of the Central American peace process can be
traced to the inauguration of Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo
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in January 1 986
. Indeed
, President^ ^^ ^
he has received publicly for his role in sponsoring first the
impromptu summit of Central African presidents at his inauguration
then the two formal summits at EiquipuU§ ^ ^ ^ ^^
1987. At his inauguration he persuaded the other presidents to
reaffirm their comment to the Contadora peace process by
endorsing the Caraballeda Message and agreeing to hold a more formal
sum.it at which they could discuss Cerezo's proposal for a regional
parliament. Despite their continued lack of agreement on the
Contadora Act, it is significant that the new m ix of presidents at
the first Esquipulas summit could commit themselves to study further
this proposal for an isthmian parliament aimed at reviving regional
integrationism. Such a project could not become a reality without
peace in the region and without a commitment to regional
cooperation. After February 1987, President Arias' peace plan
upstaged Cerezo's initiative, but the two leaders ended up working
together to achieve success at the second Esquipulas summit.
The signing of the Esquipulas II Procedure to Establish a Firm
and Lasting Peace in Central America was a major accomplishment for
the five Central American presidents. By focusing on mutual support
for democratization, national reconciliations, and an end to outside
aid to irregular forces, the Esquipulas Procedure was a less complex
document than the Contadora Act and therefore easier to accept.
Implementation would prove more difficult. The Esquipulas II
Procedure incorporated both Cerezo's proposal for a regional
parliament and Contadora's project of continued negotiations for
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reg io„ al d emiUtari2ation and
^ ^^
^Uowins the EsquipuUs „ SUBmUi neUher of these provisions
vouH b e i.pie.enteo as envisionea by the agreeaent
. By Ute^
Costa Rica remained the sole Central Am^-c American country that had not
ratified the treaty creating the isthmian parliament. The goal of
continuing arms control talks under the auspices of Contadora had
Petered out in 1 988 as other aspects ,f ^
awaited implementation and a new president was elected in the United
States. After January 1988, the implementation of the Esquipulas
Procedure limped along with uneven compliance records and serious
political obstacles. Prolonged civil war in El Salvador, continued
U.S. aid to the contras still based in Honduras, and the shrinking
of the already restricted political space in Guatemala all raised
serious questions about the real effectiveness and success of the
Esquipulas II agreement in and of itself.
Despite these and other serious problems in implementing the
Esquipulas II Procedure, the Esquipulas phase of the Central
American peace process should not be judged a failure. Its most
significant and innovative achievement was calling the five Central
American presidents together in face-to-face meetings to discuss
their conflicts and to work out a formula for achieving regional
peace and cooperation they thought they could live with. This
achievement led to at least five more formal summits over the next
three years in which a real personal dynamic of mutual respect and
commitment to cooperation developed between the five Esquipulas
presidents and eventually their successors (Solis, 1991). From the
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San W summit of January 198gj when pregidents ^^^^
their commitment to the Esquipulas Procedure; through the Tela
(Honduras) sum.it of August 1989, when Honduras and Nicaragua found
acceptable international verification and support mechani SffiS to
oversee the demobilization of the contras; to the Antigua
(Guatemala) sum.it in June 1990, when the region's five presidents
turned their attention away from war and towards regional economic
cooperation: The pos t-Esou ipulas summits
-and the preparatory and
support meetings of the foreign ministers- marked a new develops
in Central American diplomacy that increases the prospects for
deeper regional cooperation in the future.
Of course, there were significant external reasons for the
successes of the Esquipulas phase of the peace process. Not only
had the Contadora process created the space in which Esquipulas
could emerge. Important changes in the United States and in U.S.-
Soviet relations further opened the political space for the Central
Americans to find their own way. The revelations of the Iran-Contra
scandal in the fall of 1986 marked a turning point for the Central
American peace process. The scandal weakened the Reagan
administration's position and facilitated the Central Americans-
serious consideration of President Arias' peace plan in the spring
and summer of 1987. The failure of the contras to achieve any
significant military gains with their $100 million in U.S. aid
further opened the political space for success at the Esquipulas II
summit. These setbacks in U.S. policy created a certain ambiguity
in the Reagan administration's position towards the Arias Plan that
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encouraged the five Central American presidents to forge their owa
formula for peace (Solis, 1991).
The Central Americans interviewed for this study noted that
this ambiguity in the U.S. position continued to grow through the
end of the Reagan administration and into the Bush administration.
On the surface at least, many of the old policies continued through
1988 and into 1990: Prolongued U.S. aid and rhetorical support for
the contras, a continued hard-line rhetoric against the Sandinista
government along with the maintenance of the U.S. trade embargo, and
continued military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government.
However, with the election of George Bush, a new pragmatism emerged
in U.S. policy along with a willingness to repair U.S.
-Latin
American relations and inter-American institutions. At the same
time, the winding down of the cold war and a new understanding
between the superpowers on regional conflicts after 1987 vastly
reduced the East-West dimensions of Central America's crises. These
international changes presented clear opportunities for the Central
American presidents to maintain their commitment to the spirit if
not the letter of Esquipulas; they also permitted the post-
Esquipulas summits to forge ahead and new peace initiatives to
emerge. With continued international support
—from the Group of
Eight, the United States, the OAS and the UN— the Central Americans
eventually succeeded in resolving their most violent civil and inter-
state conflicts. The signing of the UN-sponsored cease fire
agreement in El Salvador in January 1992 represents the culmination
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of the Central African peace process begun nine years earlier. The
Contadora Group's original call for peace has been answered.
Contadora, Esquipulas, and the Future of the Inter-American System
The Central American peace process represents both continuity
and change for the inter-American system. It was rooted in the
Bolivaran traditions and historical development of Latin American
diplomacy. The Contadora phase of the peace process was especially
reminiscent of Latin America's nineteenth century practice of
regional consultation and defensive solidarity in the face of
perceived foreign military threats. The Contadora process also
echoed the experience of the ABC powers' mediation efforts between
the United States and factions in Mexico's civil war earlier in this
century
.
More importantly, the Central American peace process of the
1980s recalled the history of divergent interests between the United
States and the leading Latin American states in the inter-American
system for most of the past century. In much of the post World War
II period, this divergence
—indeed, the identity crisis of the OAS
over whether it was an organization to promote hemispheric security
in the cold war or regional economic cooperation and development-
led to the structural dysfunction of the OAS. After the 1982 South
Atlantic War, the breakdown of the OAS seemed complete. The
unilateralism of the Reagan administration and the renewal of the
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cold war during the 1980s meant that the OAS system could not
guarantee hemispheric security nor promote economic development to
relieve the hemisphere's economic and debt crises. For the
deepening crises in Central America, the OAS surely could not
Provide real conflict resolution, for which OAS mechanisms had
always been weak. With divergent perspectives and interests in the
Central American crises from those of Washington, the Contadora
Group undertook its mediation efforts.
Beyond its roots in the past, the Central American peace
process represented the outgrowth of a new Latin American diplomacy
for both the Contadora and the Central American states. More
active, more capable, more autonomous, the Contadora Group states
sought to secure their new regional interests by coordinating their
positions, pooling their resources, and developing an ongoing
process of multilateral mediation. The focus of this multilateral
diplomacy soon spread beyond Central America and led to new
multilateral initiatives addressing regional debt and economic
recovery that involved still more Latin American states. This new
diplomacy brought a proliferation of diplomatic contacts, both
formal and informal, between the Group of Eight, the Central
Americans, and other Latin American states. Most significantly, it
brought the civilian presidents of Latin America together on
numerous occassions during the 1980s. At both formal working
summits and through informal meetings at their colleagues'
inaugurations, presidential summitry played an important role in
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both the Contadora and Es quipulas phases of thg peace ^
-rked a significant innovation in Latin American diplomacy.
The Central African peace process provides i.portant lessons
for the nature of contemporary inter-American relations but also
raises new questions for future research. The peace process
illustrates the increased Latin American ability to identify and act
on national interests, even if they conflict with those of the
United States. It also suggests that the Central Americans
underwent their own diplomatic apprenticeship during the 1980s. It
remains to be seen what long term effect the peace process will have
on the diplomatic capabilities of the Central African states. It
is clear that much more systematic research needs to be undertaken
on the foreign policy subsystems of the Central American states to
understand the extent of change the peace process may have brought
to the region's diplomatic capabilities, but this promises to be a
fascinating topic for future research.
The Central American peace process also shows us that Latin
American solidarity and multilateral action can lead to finding room
for maneuver to protect certain foreign policy interests, despite
the continued dependency of these states. This dependency still
subjects Latin America's foreign policies to real constraints in the
international system. No study of Latin American foreign policy or
diplomacy can ignore the international context in which the Latin
Americans act. But even within those constraints, it is clear that
Latin American states can coordinate their foreign policies, pool
their diplomatic resources, and share the political risks to ensure
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and
)ra
area of
their relative foreign policy autonomy within the international
inter-American system. Research into the Latin on the
debt crisis during the 1980s which grew out of the Contado:
diplomacy would provide more useful insights into this
contemporary Latin American diplomacy.
Finally, the Central American peace process demonstrates the
need for the United States to take Latin American states and their
foreign policy interests more seriously. Divergent interests
between the United States and Latin America can no longer be ignored
for very long because the Latin Americans will act to ensure their
interests. The Bush administration has been able to repair much of
the damage to the inter-American system during the 1980s by working
with Latin America, not against it. The OAS has even undergone
something of a revival since 1989 with Bush's more pragmatic and
multilateral style. In Central America, particularly in the contra
demobilization and later in the Salvadoran peace process, the OAS
and UN played significant roles
—with both U.S. and Latin support-
that deserve more detailed study. In Panama and Haiti, OAS
delegations have sought to use diplomacy first to mediate political
solutions to anti-democratic coups.
These positive developments in the inter-American system should
not obscure the fact that divergence between U.S. and Latin American
interests can reemerge. After all, Latin American states and the
United States still have very different levels of economic
development and very different roles in the international system.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cold war now finally
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over, the possibility of new North-South issues coming to dominate
the agenda of inter-American relations is greater. Moreover, Latin
policies that conflict with the United States can no longer be
interpreted as "anti-U. S.
" and therefore
"pro-Moscow." This
development may allow the Latin American states more room for
maneuver in their foreign and domestic policies. And despite
improved U.S.-Latin relations, it is unlikely that Latin American
states will confine their foreign policies to the western
hemisphere. Even the Central Americans will continue to cultivate
relations with the European Community while the leading Latin states
will continue to play an active role in the United Nations.
As in the pre-cold war era of U.S.-Latin relations, we can
expect that Latin American states will most likely be willing to
work with the United States and cooperate on regional issues,
particularly those relating to economic development, if at all
possible. But Latin American states will continue to resist
unilateralism by the United States and will expect to be treated as
good neighbors. The leading Latin American states have the
diplomatic capacity to assert their own interests and defend them.
This is what the Central American peace process was all about.
FIN
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